grub_xfs_iterate_dir did not restore first character after inline
name when match was found. Dependning on XFS format this character
could be inode number and we could return to the same node later in
find_file if processing cycled symlinks.
CID: 86724
If line contains single word, line and argv[0] are aliases, so
no NULL dereference is possible, but Coverity does not know it.
Change code to avoid ambiguity and also remove redundant call to
grub_strchr.
CID: 86725
It's helpful to determine that a request was sent by grub in order to permit
the server to provide different information at different stages of the boot
process. Send GRUB2 as a type 77 DHCP option when sending bootp packets in
order to make this possible.
Add support for adding gpg keys to the trusted database with a new command
called "trust_var". This takes the contents of a variable (in ascii-encoded
hex) and interprets it as a gpg public key.
The getenv code was mishandling the conversion of binary to hex. Grub's
sprintf() doesn't seem to support the full set of format conversions, so
fix this in the nasty way.
Timer event to keep grub msec counter was running at 1000HZ. This was too
fast for UEFI timer driver and resulted in a 10x slowdown in grub time
versus wallclock. Reduce the timer event frequency and increase tick
increment accordingly to keep better time.
coreboot has ACPI while 2 others don't. *BSD need ACPI and have trouble
without it. Don't even attempt to boot *BSD on multiboot or qemu targets.
On coreboot boot all *BSD except 32-bit NetBSD which apparently does some
early BIOS calls.
We want a single buffer that contains the entire kernel image in order to
perform a TPM measurement. Allocate one and copy the entire kernel int it
before pulling out the individual blocks later on.
We want a single buffer that contains the entire kernel image in order to
perform a TPM measurement. Allocate one and copy the entire kernel into it
before pulling out the individual blocks later on.
Add support for performing basic TPM measurements. Right now this only
supports extending PCRs statically and only on UEFI and BIOS systems, but
will measure all modules as they're loaded.
The Secure Boot code currently reads the kernel from disk, validates the
signature and then reads it from disk again. A sufficiently exciting storage
device could modify the kernel between these two events and trigger the
execution of an untrusted kernel. Avoid re-reading it in order to ensure
this isn't a problem, and in the process speed up boot by not reading the
kernel twice.
