Rework TPM measurements to use fewer PCRs. After discussion with upstream,
it's preferable to avoid using so many PCRs. Instead, measure into PCRs 8
and 9 but use a prefix in the event log to indicate which subsystem carried
out the measurements.
We want a single buffer that contains the entire kernel image in order to
perform a TPM measurement. Allocate one and copy the entire kernel int it
before pulling out the individual blocks later on.
We want a single buffer that contains the entire kernel image in order to
perform a TPM measurement. Allocate one and copy the entire kernel into it
before pulling out the individual blocks later on.
The Secure Boot code currently reads the kernel from disk, validates the
signature and then reads it from disk again. A sufficiently exciting storage
device could modify the kernel between these two events and trigger the
execution of an untrusted kernel. Avoid re-reading it in order to ensure
this isn't a problem, and in the process speed up boot by not reading the
kernel twice.
If grub is signed with a key that's in the trusted EFI keyring, an attacker
can point a boot entry at grub rather than at shim and grub will fail to
locate the shim verification protocol. This would then allow booting an
arbitrary kernel image. Fail validation if Secure Boot is enabled and we
can't find the shim protocol in order to prevent this.
struct ... foo = { 0, } is valid initializer, but older GCC emits
warning which is fatal error due to -Werror=missing-field-initializer.
So simply use full initializer to avoid these errors. This was fixed
probably in GCC 4.7.
See https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=36750
Currently, if "linux" fails, the "goto fail;" in grub_cmd_initrd sends us
into grub_initrd_close() without grub_initrd_init() being called, and thus
it never clears initrd_ctx->components. grub_initrd_close() then frees that
address, which is stale data from the stack. If the stack happens to have a
stale *address* there that matches a recent allocation, then you'll get a
double free later.
So initialize the memory up front.
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
In file included from ./include/grub/dl.h:23:0,
from grub-core/lib/libgcrypt-grub/cipher/rfc2268.c:3:
./include/grub/list.h:34:18: warning: conflicting types for 'grub_list_push' [en
abled by default]
void EXPORT_FUNC(grub_list_push) (grub_list_t *head, grub_list_t item);
^
./include/grub/symbol.h:68:25: note: in definition of macro 'EXPORT_FUNC'
# define EXPORT_FUNC(x) x
^
In file included from ./include/grub/fs.h:30:0,
from ./include/grub/file.h:25,
from ./grub-core/lib/posix_wrap/stdio.h:23,
from c:\mingw\include\libintl.h:314,
from ./include/grub/i18n.h:33,
from ./include/grub/misc.h:27,
from ./include/grub/list.h:25,
from ./include/grub/dl.h:28,
from grub-core/lib/libgcrypt-grub/cipher/rfc2268.c:3:
./include/grub/partition.h:106:3: note: previous implicit declaration of 'grub_l
ist_push' was here
grub_list_push (GRUB_AS_LIST_P (&grub_partition_map_list),
^
list.h needs just ATTRIBUTE_ERROR from misc.h; split compiler features
into separate file grub/compiler.h and include it instead.
