The necessary check for NULL before use of function ver->close is not
taking place in the failure path. This patch simply adds the missing
check and fixes the problem that GRUB hangs indefinitely after booting
rogue image without valid signature if secure boot is turned on.
Now it displays like this for booting rogue UEFI image:
error: bad shim signature
error: you need to load the kernel first
Press any key to continue...
and then you can go back to boot menu by pressing any key or after a few
seconds expired.
Signed-off-by: Michael Chang <mchang@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
This way if a verifier requires verification of a given file it can defer task
to another verifier (another authority) if it is not able to do it itself. E.g.
shim_lock verifier, posted as a subsequent patch, is able to verify only PE
files. This means that it is not able to verify any of GRUB2 modules which have
to be trusted on UEFI systems with secure boot enabled. So, it can defer
verification to other verifier, e.g. PGP one.
I silently assume that other verifiers are trusted and will do good job for us.
Or at least they will not do any harm.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Serbinenko <phcoder@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
Verifiers framework provides core file verification functionality which
can be used by various security mechanisms, e.g., UEFI secure boot, TPM,
PGP signature verification, etc.
The patch contains PGP code changes and probably they should be extracted
to separate patch for the sake of clarity.
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Serbinenko <phcoder@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
