Add support for performing basic TPM measurements. Right now this only
supports extending PCRs statically and only on UEFI. In future we might
want to have some sort of mechanism for choosing which events get logged
to which PCRs, but this seems like a good default policy and we can wait
to see whether anyone has a use case before adding more complexity.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
An error emerged as when I was testing the verifiers branch, so instead
of putting it in pgp prefix, the verifiers is used to reflect what the
patch is based on.
While running verify_detached, grub aborts with error.
verify_detached /@/.snapshots/1/snapshot/boot/grub/grub.cfg
/@/.snapshots/1/snapshot/boot/grub/grub.cfg.sig
alloc magic is broken at 0x7beea660: 0
Aborted. Press any key to exit.
The error is caused by sig file descriptor been closed twice, first time
in grub_verify_signature() to which it is passed as parameter. Second in
grub_cmd_verify_signature() or in whichever opens the sig file
descriptor. The second close is not consider as bug to me either, as in
common rule of what opens a file has to close it to avoid file
descriptor leakage.
After all the design of grub_verify_signature() makes it difficult to keep
a good trace on opened file descriptor from it's caller. Let's refine
the application interface to accept file path rather than descriptor, in
this way the caller doesn't have to care about closing the descriptor by
delegating it to grub_verify_signature() with full tracing to opened
file descriptor by itself.
Also making it clear that sig descriptor is not referenced in error
returning path of grub_verify_signature_init(), so it can be closed
directly by it's caller. This also makes delegating it to
grub_pubkey_close() infeasible to help in relieving file descriptor
leakage as it has to depend on uncertainty of ctxt fields in error
returning path.
Signed-off-by: Michael Chang <mchang@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
This module provides shim lock verification for various kernels
if UEFI secure boot is enabled on a machine.
It is recommended to put this module into GRUB2 standalone image
(avoid putting iorw and memrw modules into it; they are disallowed
if UEFI secure boot is enabled). However, it is also possible to use
it as a normal module. Though such configurations are more fragile
and less secure due to various limitations.
If the module is loaded and UEFI secure boot is enabled then:
- module itself cannot be unloaded (persistent module),
- the iorw and memrw modules cannot be loaded,
- if the iorw and memrw modules are loaded then
machine boot is disabled,
- GRUB2 defers modules and ACPI tables verification to
other verifiers.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
This type of modules cannot be unloaded. This is useful if a given
functionality, e.g. UEFI secure boot shim signature verification, should
not be disabled if it was enabled at some point in time. Somebody may
say that we can use standalone GRUB2 here. That is true. However, the
code is not so big nor complicated hence it make sense to support
modularized configs too.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
This way if a verifier requires verification of a given file it can defer task
to another verifier (another authority) if it is not able to do it itself. E.g.
shim_lock verifier, posted as a subsequent patch, is able to verify only PE
files. This means that it is not able to verify any of GRUB2 modules which have
to be trusted on UEFI systems with secure boot enabled. So, it can defer
verification to other verifier, e.g. PGP one.
I silently assume that other verifiers are trusted and will do good job for us.
Or at least they will not do any harm.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Serbinenko <phcoder@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
Verifiers framework provides core file verification functionality which
can be used by various security mechanisms, e.g., UEFI secure boot, TPM,
PGP signature verification, etc.
The patch contains PGP code changes and probably they should be extracted
to separate patch for the sake of clarity.
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Serbinenko <phcoder@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
Let's provide file type info to the I/O layer. This way verifiers
framework and its users will be able to differentiate files and verify
only required ones.
This is preparatory patch.
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Serbinenko <phcoder@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
Clean up code for matching IS_ARM64 slightly by making use of struct
linux_arm64_kernel_header and GRUB_LINUX_ARM64_MAGIC_SIGNATURE.
Signed-off-by: Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Clean up code for matching IS_ARM slightly by making use of struct
linux_arm_kernel_header and GRUB_LINUX_ARM_MAGIC_SIGNATURE.
Signed-off-by: Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Rename GRUB_LINUX_MAGIC_SIGNATURE GRUB_LINUX_I386_MAGIC_SIGNATURE,
to be usable in code that supports more than one image type.
Signed-off-by: Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Prevent a double open. This can cause problems with some ieee1275
devices, causing the system to hang. The double open can occur
as follows:
grub_ls_list_files (char *dirname, int longlist, int all, int human)
dev = grub_device_open (device_name);
dev remains open while:
grub_normal_print_device_info (device_name);
dev = grub_device_open (name);
Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
when protocols_per_handle returns error, we can't use the pointers we
passed to it, and that includes trusting num_protocols.
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
In util/getroot and efidisk slightly modify exitsing comment to mostly
retain it but still make GCC7 compliant with respect to fall through
annotation.
In grub-core/lib/xzembed/xz_dec_lzma2.c it adds same comments as
upstream.
In grub-core/tests/setjmp_tets.c declare functions as "noreturn" to
suppress GCC7 warning.
In grub-core/gnulib/regexec.c use new __attribute__, because existing
annotation is not recognized by GCC7 parser (which requires that comment
immediately precedes case statement).
Otherwise add FALLTHROUGH comment.
Closes: 50598
Fixed loading of ACPI tables on EFI (side effect was apparent memory
corruption ranging from unpredictable behavior to system reset).
Reported by Nando Eva <nando4eva@ymail.com>
Define
* GRUB_EFI_PERSISTENT_MEMORY (UEFI memory map type 14) per UEFI 2.5
* GRUB_MEMORY_PERSISTENT (E820 type 7) per ACPI 3.0
* GRUB_MEMORY_PERSISTENT_LEGACY (E820 unofficial type 12) per ACPI 3.0
and translate GRUB_EFI_PERSISTENT_MEMORY to GRUB_MEMORY_PERSISTENT in
grub_efi_mmap_iterate().
Includes
* adding the E820 names to lsmmap
* handling the E820 types in make_efi_memtype()
Suggested-by: Vladimir 'φ-coder/phcoder' Serbinenko <phcoder@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Andrei Borzenkov <arvidjaar@gmail.com>
PIT isn't available on some of new hardware including Hyper-V. So
use pmtimer for calibration. Moreover pmtimer calibration is faster, so
use it on coreboor where booting time is important.
Based on patch by Michael Chang.
Add the descriptions of the “core”, that means no vendorcode or payload,
coreboot time stamps added up to coreboot commit a7d92441 (timestamps:
You can never have enough of them!) [1].
Running `coreboot_boottime` in the GRUB command line interface now shows
descriptions for all time stamps again on the ASRock E350M1.
[1] http://review.coreboot.org/9608
EBDA layout is not standardized so we cannot assume first two bytes
are length. Neither is it required by ACPI standard. HP 8710W is known
to contain zeroes here.
Closes: 45002
