mod_hello/cap_check.stp

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Executable File

#! /usr/bin/env stap
# Copyright (C) 2016 Red Hat, Inc.
# Written by William Cohen <wcohen@redhat.com>
#
# container_check.stp watches for use of
# prohibited capabilities, use of prohibited syscalls, and
# syscall failures) that would indicate that this application
# would not operate properly in a restricted contiainer.
#
# By default this script monitors all systemcalls system-wide.
# To limit to limit container_check.stp to monitoring a particular
# process and it children use the systemtap -x <pid> option
# or -c <command> option.
#
# By default this script lists all capabilities requested.
# To limit it to a subset of capabilities use the following
# option on the command line with a '-' separated list of
# forbidden capabilites:
#
# -G forbidden_capabilities="badcap1-badcap2"
#
# By default this script allows all syscalls.
# To mark syscalls as forbidden use a '-' separate list:
#
# -G forbidden_syscalls="syscall1-syscall2"
#
# control-c to exit data collection
global forbidden_capabilities="" # '-' separated list of forbidden capabilities
global forbidden_syscalls="" # '-' separated list of forbidden syscalls
global capability, cap_use
global badcaps = -1, cap_name
global cap_syscall
global badsyscall
global problem_syscall
global syscall_errno
# Determine whether t is a ancestor of target()
# returns 1 if ancestor of target()
# returns 0 if not an ancestor of target()
function child_of_target:long (t:long)
{
if (!target()) return 1
while(t && t != task_parent(t)) {
if (task_pid(t) == target()) return 1
t = task_parent(t)
}
return 0
}
function init_cap_name2num()
{
/* set up the names */
cap_name[0]="cap_chown"
cap_name[1]="cap_dac_override"
cap_name[2]="cap_dac_read_search"
cap_name[3]="cap_fowner"
cap_name[4]="cap_fsetid"
cap_name[5]="cap_kill"
cap_name[6]="cap_setgid"
cap_name[7]="cap_setuid"
cap_name[8]="cap_setpcap"
cap_name[9]="cap_linux_immutable"
cap_name[10]="cap_net_bind_service"
cap_name[11]="cap_net_broadcast"
cap_name[12]="cap_net_admin"
cap_name[13]="cap_net_raw"
cap_name[14]="cap_ipc_lock"
cap_name[15]="cap_ipc_owner"
cap_name[16]="cap_sys_module"
cap_name[17]="cap_sys_rawio"
cap_name[18]="cap_sys_chroot"
cap_name[19]="cap_sys_ptrace"
cap_name[20]="cap_sys_pacct"
cap_name[21]="cap_sys_admin"
cap_name[22]="cap_sys_boot"
cap_name[23]="cap_sys_nice"
cap_name[24]="cap_sys_resource"
cap_name[25]="cap_sys_time"
cap_name[26]="cap_sys_tty_config"
cap_name[27]="cap_mknod"
cap_name[28]="cap_lease"
cap_name[29]="cap_audit_write"
cap_name[30]="cap_audit_control"
cap_name[31]="cap_setfcap"
cap_name[32]="cap_mac_override"
cap_name[33]="cap_mac_admin"
cap_name[34]="cap_syslog"
cap_name[35]="cap_wake_alarm"
cap_name[36]="cap_block_suspend"
}
function parse_capabilities() {
/* convert optional list of forbidden capabilities into a bitmask */
caps = 0
cname = tokenize(forbidden_capabilities, "-")
while (cname != "") {
i =36
while(i>0) {
if(cname == cap_name[i]) {
caps |= 1<<i
i = -1
}
i -= 1
}
cname = tokenize("", "-")
}
if (caps) badcaps = caps
}
function parse_syscalls() {
/* The following assignment is to ensure that badsyscall has typeinfo. */
badsyscall["no_a_syscall"]=1
/* Put in optional list of bad syscalls. */
sysname = tokenize(forbidden_syscalls, "-")
while (sysname != "") {
badsyscall[sysname] = 1
sysname = tokenize("", "-")
}
}
probe begin {
init_cap_name2num()
parse_capabilities()
parse_syscalls()
printf ("starting container_check.stp. monitoring %d\n", target())
}
# bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
probe ns_capable = kprobe.function("ns_capable")
{
cap = 1 << int_arg(2)
}
# bool capable(int cap)
probe capable = kprobe.function("capable")
{
cap = 1 << int_arg(1)
}
probe ns_capable !, capable
{
if ((cap & badcaps) && child_of_target(task_current()))
cap_use[tid()] |= cap
}
probe nd_syscall.*.return {
# note any problem capabilities use during syscall
cap = cap_use[tid()]
if (cap && child_of_target(task_current())) {
capability[execname()] |= cap
cap_syscall[execname(), name, cap] <<< 1
delete cap_use[tid()]
}
# note any prohibited systemcalls
if (name in badsyscall && child_of_target(task_current())) {
problem_syscall[execname(), name] <<< 1
}
# note any syscalls returning errors
if (returnval() < 0 && child_of_target(task_current())) {
syscall_errno[execname(), name, returnval()] <<< 1
}
}
probe end {
printf("\n\ncapabilities used by executables\n");
printf("%16s: %20s\n\n", "executable", "prob capability")
foreach(e+ in capability) {
cap = capability[e]
i=0
while (cap) {
if (cap & 1)
printf("%16s: %20s\n", e, cap_name[i] );
cap = cap >> 1
i += 1
}
printf("\n")
}
printf("\n\ncapabilities used by syscalls\n");
printf("%16s, %20s ( %16s ) : %16s\n", "executable", "syscall", "capability", "count")
foreach([e+,s,c] in cap_syscall){
printf("%16s, %20s ( ", e, s);
cap = c
i=0
while (cap) {
if (cap & 1)
printf("%16s ", cap_name[i] );
cap = cap >> 1
i += 1
}
printf(") : %16d\n", @count(cap_syscall[e,s,c]) );
}
printf("\n\nforbidden syscalls\n");
printf("%16s, %20s: %16s\n", "executable", "syscall", "count")
foreach([e+,s] in problem_syscall){
printf("%16s, %20s: %16d\n", e, s, @count(problem_syscall[e,s]) );
}
printf("\n\nfailed syscalls\n");
printf("%16s, %20s = %16s: %16s\n", "executable", "syscall", "errno", "count")
foreach([e+,s,v] in syscall_errno){
printf("%16s, %20s = %16s: %16d\n", e, s, errno_str(v),
@count(syscall_errno[e,s,v]) );
}
}