2014-04-10 23:03:52 +00:00
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package restrict
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import (
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"fmt"
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2014-04-24 01:12:07 +00:00
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"os"
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2014-04-10 23:03:52 +00:00
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"path/filepath"
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"syscall"
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2014-04-24 01:12:07 +00:00
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"github.com/dotcloud/docker/pkg/system"
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2014-04-10 23:03:52 +00:00
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)
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2014-05-01 01:00:42 +00:00
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// "restrictions" are container paths (files, directories, whatever) that have to be masked.
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// maskPath is a "safe" path to be mounted over maskedPath. It can take two special values:
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// - if it is "", then nothing is mounted;
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// - if it is "EMPTY", then an empty directory is mounted instead.
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// If remountRO is true then the maskedPath is remounted read-only (regardless of whether a maskPath was used).
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type restriction struct {
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maskedPath string
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maskPath string
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remountRO bool
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}
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2014-04-10 23:03:52 +00:00
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2014-05-01 01:00:42 +00:00
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var restrictions = []restriction{
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{"/proc", "", true},
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{"/sys", "", true},
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{"/proc/kcore", "/dev/null", false},
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2014-04-10 23:03:52 +00:00
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}
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2014-05-01 01:00:42 +00:00
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// This has to be called while the container still has CAP_SYS_ADMIN (to be able to perform mounts).
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// However, afterwards, CAP_SYS_ADMIN should be dropped (otherwise the user will be able to revert those changes).
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// "empty" should be the path to an empty directory.
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2014-04-10 23:03:52 +00:00
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func Restrict(rootfs, empty string) error {
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2014-05-01 01:00:42 +00:00
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for _, restriction := range restrictions {
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dest := filepath.Join(rootfs, restriction.maskedPath)
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if restriction.maskPath != "" {
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var source string
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if restriction.maskPath == "EMPTY" {
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source = empty
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} else {
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source = filepath.Join(rootfs, restriction.maskPath)
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}
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if err := system.Mount(source, dest, "", syscall.MS_BIND, ""); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("unable to bind-mount %s over %s: %s", source, dest, err)
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2014-04-24 01:12:07 +00:00
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}
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2014-04-10 23:03:52 +00:00
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}
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2014-05-01 01:00:42 +00:00
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if restriction.remountRO {
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if err := system.Mount("", dest, "", syscall.MS_REMOUNT|syscall.MS_RDONLY, ""); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("unable to remount %s readonly: %s", dest, err)
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}
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2014-04-10 23:03:52 +00:00
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}
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}
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2014-05-01 01:00:42 +00:00
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// This weird trick will allow us to mount /proc read-only, while being able to use AppArmor.
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// This is because apparently, loading an AppArmor profile requires write access to /proc/1/attr.
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// So we do another mount of procfs, ensure it's write-able, and bind-mount a subset of it.
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tmpProcPath := filepath.Join(rootfs, ".proc")
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if err := os.Mkdir(tmpProcPath, 0700); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("unable to create temporary proc mountpoint %s: %s", tmpProcPath, err)
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}
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if err := system.Mount("proc", tmpProcPath, "proc", 0, ""); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("unable to mount proc on temporary proc mountpoint: %s", err)
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}
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if err := system.Mount("proc", tmpProcPath, "", syscall.MS_REMOUNT, ""); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("unable to remount proc read-write: %s", err)
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}
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rwAttrPath := filepath.Join(rootfs, ".proc", "1", "attr")
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roAttrPath := filepath.Join(rootfs, "proc", "1", "attr")
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if err := system.Mount(rwAttrPath, roAttrPath, "", syscall.MS_BIND, ""); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("unable to bind-mount %s on %s: %s", rwAttrPath, roAttrPath, err)
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}
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if err := system.Unmount(tmpProcPath, 0); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("unable to unmount temporary proc filesystem: %s", err)
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}
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2014-04-10 23:03:52 +00:00
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return nil
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}
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