Add support for multiple scope parameters on V2 auth requests

Fixes https://jira.coreos.com/browse/QUAY-892
This commit is contained in:
Joseph Schorr 2018-03-23 17:47:55 -04:00
parent 86aa93aab5
commit a59c951aa3
5 changed files with 164 additions and 119 deletions

View file

@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ from flask_principal import Identity, Principal
from mock import Mock
from auth import permissions
from endpoints.v2.v2auth import get_tuf_root
from endpoints.v2.v2auth import _get_tuf_root
from test import testconfig
from util.security.registry_jwt import QUAY_TUF_ROOT, SIGNER_TUF_ROOT, DISABLED_TUF_ROOT
@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ def test_get_tuf_root(identity, expected):
app, principal = app_with_principal()
with app.test_request_context('/'):
principal.set_identity(identity)
actual = get_tuf_root(Mock(), "namespace", "repo")
actual = _get_tuf_root(Mock(), "namespace", "repo")
assert actual == expected, "should be %s, but was %s" % (expected, actual)
@ -64,5 +64,5 @@ def test_trust_disabled(trust_enabled,tuf_root):
app, principal = app_with_principal()
with app.test_request_context('/'):
principal.set_identity(read_identity("namespace", "repo"))
actual = get_tuf_root(Mock(trust_enabled=trust_enabled), "namespace", "repo")
actual = _get_tuf_root(Mock(trust_enabled=trust_enabled), "namespace", "repo")
assert actual == tuf_root, "should be %s, but was %s" % (tuf_root, actual)

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@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ from flask import url_for
from app import instance_keys, app as original_app
from endpoints.test.shared import conduct_call
from util.security.registry_jwt import decode_bearer_token
from util.security.registry_jwt import decode_bearer_token, CLAIM_TUF_ROOTS
from test.fixtures import *
@ -34,6 +34,8 @@ from test.fixtures import *
('repository:buynlarge/orgrepo:pull,push,*', 'devtable', 'password', 200,
['buynlarge/orgrepo:push,pull,*']),
('', 'devtable', 'password', 200, []),
# No credentials, non-public repo.
('repository:devtable/simple:pull', None, None, 200, ['devtable/simple:']),
@ -51,6 +53,20 @@ from test.fixtures import *
# Unknown repository in another namespace.
('repository:somenamespace/unknownrepo:pull,push', 'devtable', 'password', 200,
['somenamespace/unknownrepo:']),
# Multiple scopes.
(['repository:devtable/simple:pull,push', 'repository:devtable/complex:pull'],
'devtable', 'password', 200,
['devtable/simple:push,pull', 'devtable/complex:pull']),
# Multiple scopes with restricted behavior.
(['repository:devtable/simple:pull,push', 'repository:public/publicrepo:pull,push'],
'devtable', 'password', 200,
['devtable/simple:push,pull', 'public/publicrepo:pull']),
(['repository:devtable/simple:pull,push,*', 'repository:public/publicrepo:pull,push,*'],
'devtable', 'password', 200,
['devtable/simple:push,pull,*', 'public/publicrepo:pull']),
])
def test_generate_registry_jwt(scope, username, password, expected_code, expected_scopes,
app, client):
@ -86,3 +102,4 @@ def test_generate_registry_jwt(scope, username, password, expected_code, expecte
})
assert decoded['access'] == expected_access
assert len(decoded['context'][CLAIM_TUF_ROOTS]) == len(expected_scopes)

View file

@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
import logging
import re
from collections import namedtuple
from cachetools import lru_cache
from flask import request, jsonify
@ -24,13 +25,8 @@ logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
TOKEN_VALIDITY_LIFETIME_S = 60 * 60 # 1 hour
SCOPE_REGEX_TEMPLATE = r'^repository:((?:{}\/)?((?:[\.a-zA-Z0-9_\-]+\/)*[\.a-zA-Z0-9_\-]+)):((?:push|pull|\*)(?:,(?:push|pull|\*))*)$'
@lru_cache(maxsize=1)
def get_scope_regex():
hostname = re.escape(app.config['SERVER_HOSTNAME'])
scope_regex_string = SCOPE_REGEX_TEMPLATE.format(hostname)
return re.compile(scope_regex_string)
scopeResult = namedtuple('scopeResult', ['actions', 'namespace', 'repository', 'registry_and_repo',
'tuf_root'])
@v2_bp.route('/auth')
@process_basic_auth
@ -44,12 +40,13 @@ def generate_registry_jwt(auth_result):
audience_param = request.args.get('service')
logger.debug('Request audience: %s', audience_param)
scope_param = request.args.get('scope') or ''
logger.debug('Scope request: %s', scope_param)
scope_params = request.args.getlist('scope') or []
logger.debug('Scope request: %s', scope_params)
auth_header = request.headers.get('authorization', '')
auth_credentials_sent = bool(auth_header)
# Load the auth context and verify thatg we've directly received credentials.
has_valid_auth_context = False
if get_authenticated_context():
has_valid_auth_context = not get_authenticated_context().is_anonymous
@ -58,117 +55,45 @@ def generate_registry_jwt(auth_result):
# The auth credentials sent for the user are invalid.
raise InvalidLogin(auth_result.error_message)
if not has_valid_auth_context and len(scope_params) == 0:
# In this case, we are doing an auth flow, and it's not an anonymous pull.
logger.debug('No user and no token sent for empty scope list')
raise Unauthorized()
# Build the access list for the authenticated context.
access = []
scope_results = []
for scope_param in scope_params:
scope_result = _authorize_or_downscope_request(scope_param, has_valid_auth_context)
if scope_result is None:
continue
scope_results.append(scope_result)
access.append({
'type': 'repository',
'name': scope_result.registry_and_repo,
'actions': scope_result.actions,
})
# Issue user events.
user_event_data = {
'action': 'login',
}
tuf_root = DISABLED_TUF_ROOT
if len(scope_param) > 0:
match = get_scope_regex().match(scope_param)
if match is None:
logger.debug('Match: %s', match)
logger.debug('len: %s', len(scope_param))
logger.warning('Unable to decode repository and actions: %s', scope_param)
raise InvalidRequest('Unable to decode repository and actions: %s' % scope_param)
logger.debug('Match: %s', match.groups())
registry_and_repo = match.group(1)
namespace_and_repo = match.group(2)
actions = match.group(3).split(',')
lib_namespace = app.config['LIBRARY_NAMESPACE']
namespace, reponame = parse_namespace_repository(namespace_and_repo, lib_namespace)
# Ensure that we are never creating an invalid repository.
if not REPOSITORY_NAME_REGEX.match(reponame):
logger.debug('Found invalid repository name in auth flow: %s', reponame)
if len(namespace_and_repo.split('/')) > 1:
msg = 'Nested repositories are not supported. Found: %s' % namespace_and_repo
raise NameInvalid(message=msg)
raise NameInvalid(message='Invalid repository name: %s' % namespace_and_repo)
final_actions = []
repo = model.get_repository(namespace, reponame)
repo_is_public = repo is not None and repo.is_public
invalid_repo_message = ''
if repo is not None and repo.kind != 'image':
invalid_repo_message = ((
'This repository is for managing %s resources ' + 'and not container images.') % repo.kind)
if 'push' in actions:
# Check if there is a valid user or token, as otherwise the repository cannot be
# accessed.
if has_valid_auth_context:
# Lookup the repository. If it exists, make sure the entity has modify
# permission. Otherwise, make sure the entity has create permission.
if repo:
if ModifyRepositoryPermission(namespace, reponame).can():
if repo.kind != 'image':
raise Unsupported(message=invalid_repo_message)
final_actions.append('push')
else:
logger.debug('No permission to modify repository %s/%s', namespace, reponame)
else:
user = get_authenticated_user()
if CreateRepositoryPermission(namespace).can() and user is not None:
logger.debug('Creating repository: %s/%s', namespace, reponame)
model.create_repository(namespace, reponame, user)
final_actions.append('push')
else:
logger.debug('No permission to create repository %s/%s', namespace, reponame)
if 'pull' in actions:
# Grant pull if the user can read the repo or it is public.
if ReadRepositoryPermission(namespace, reponame).can() or repo_is_public:
if repo is not None and repo.kind != 'image':
raise Unsupported(message=invalid_repo_message)
final_actions.append('pull')
else:
logger.debug('No permission to pull repository %s/%s', namespace, reponame)
if '*' in actions:
# Grant * user is admin
if AdministerRepositoryPermission(namespace, reponame).can():
if repo is not None and repo.kind != 'image':
raise Unsupported(message=invalid_repo_message)
final_actions.append('*')
else:
logger.debug("No permission to administer repository %s/%s", namespace, reponame)
# Add the access for the JWT.
access.append({
'type': 'repository',
'name': registry_and_repo,
'actions': final_actions,
})
# Set the user event data for the auth.
if 'push' in final_actions:
# Set the user event data for when authed.
if len(scope_results) > 0:
if 'push' in scope_results[0].actions:
user_action = 'push_start'
elif 'pull' in final_actions:
elif 'pull' in scope_results[0].actions:
user_action = 'pull_start'
else:
user_action = 'login'
user_event_data = {
'action': user_action,
'repository': reponame,
'namespace': namespace,
'namespace': scope_results[0].namespace,
'repository': scope_results[0].repository,
}
tuf_root = get_tuf_root(repo, namespace, reponame)
elif not has_valid_auth_context:
# In this case, we are doing an auth flow, and it's not an anonymous pull
logger.debug('No user and no token sent for empty scope list')
raise Unauthorized()
# Send the user event.
if get_authenticated_user() is not None:
@ -176,13 +101,22 @@ def generate_registry_jwt(auth_result):
event.publish_event_data('docker-cli', user_event_data)
# Build the signed JWT.
context, subject = build_context_and_subject(get_authenticated_context(), tuf_root=tuf_root)
tuf_roots = {'%s/%s' % (scope_result.namespace, scope_result.repository): scope_result.tuf_root
for scope_result in scope_results}
context, subject = build_context_and_subject(get_authenticated_context(), tuf_roots=tuf_roots)
token = generate_bearer_token(audience_param, subject, context, access,
TOKEN_VALIDITY_LIFETIME_S, instance_keys)
return jsonify({'token': token})
def get_tuf_root(repo, namespace, reponame):
@lru_cache(maxsize=1)
def _get_scope_regex():
hostname = re.escape(app.config['SERVER_HOSTNAME'])
scope_regex_string = SCOPE_REGEX_TEMPLATE.format(hostname)
return re.compile(scope_regex_string)
def _get_tuf_root(repo, namespace, reponame):
if not features.SIGNING or repo is None or not repo.trust_enabled:
return DISABLED_TUF_ROOT
@ -190,3 +124,94 @@ def get_tuf_root(repo, namespace, reponame):
if ModifyRepositoryPermission(namespace, reponame).can():
return SIGNER_TUF_ROOT
return QUAY_TUF_ROOT
def _authorize_or_downscope_request(scope_param, has_valid_auth_context):
if len(scope_param) == 0:
if not has_valid_auth_context:
# In this case, we are doing an auth flow, and it's not an anonymous pull.
logger.debug('No user and no token sent for empty scope list')
raise Unauthorized()
return None
match = _get_scope_regex().match(scope_param)
if match is None:
logger.debug('Match: %s', match)
logger.debug('len: %s', len(scope_param))
logger.warning('Unable to decode repository and actions: %s', scope_param)
raise InvalidRequest('Unable to decode repository and actions: %s' % scope_param)
logger.debug('Match: %s', match.groups())
registry_and_repo = match.group(1)
namespace_and_repo = match.group(2)
actions = match.group(3).split(',')
lib_namespace = app.config['LIBRARY_NAMESPACE']
namespace, reponame = parse_namespace_repository(namespace_and_repo, lib_namespace)
# Ensure that we are never creating an invalid repository.
if not REPOSITORY_NAME_REGEX.match(reponame):
logger.debug('Found invalid repository name in auth flow: %s', reponame)
if len(namespace_and_repo.split('/')) > 1:
msg = 'Nested repositories are not supported. Found: %s' % namespace_and_repo
raise NameInvalid(message=msg)
raise NameInvalid(message='Invalid repository name: %s' % namespace_and_repo)
final_actions = []
repo = model.get_repository(namespace, reponame)
repo_is_public = repo is not None and repo.is_public
invalid_repo_message = ''
if repo is not None and repo.kind != 'image':
invalid_repo_message = ((
'This repository is for managing %s resources ' + 'and not container images.') % repo.kind)
if 'push' in actions:
# Check if there is a valid user or token, as otherwise the repository cannot be
# accessed.
if has_valid_auth_context:
# Lookup the repository. If it exists, make sure the entity has modify
# permission. Otherwise, make sure the entity has create permission.
if repo:
if ModifyRepositoryPermission(namespace, reponame).can():
if repo.kind != 'image':
raise Unsupported(message=invalid_repo_message)
final_actions.append('push')
else:
logger.debug('No permission to modify repository %s/%s', namespace, reponame)
else:
user = get_authenticated_user()
if CreateRepositoryPermission(namespace).can() and user is not None:
logger.debug('Creating repository: %s/%s', namespace, reponame)
model.create_repository(namespace, reponame, user)
final_actions.append('push')
else:
logger.debug('No permission to create repository %s/%s', namespace, reponame)
if 'pull' in actions:
# Grant pull if the user can read the repo or it is public.
if ReadRepositoryPermission(namespace, reponame).can() or repo_is_public:
if repo is not None and repo.kind != 'image':
raise Unsupported(message=invalid_repo_message)
final_actions.append('pull')
else:
logger.debug('No permission to pull repository %s/%s', namespace, reponame)
if '*' in actions:
# Grant * user is admin
if AdministerRepositoryPermission(namespace, reponame).can():
if repo is not None and repo.kind != 'image':
raise Unsupported(message=invalid_repo_message)
final_actions.append('*')
else:
logger.debug("No permission to administer repository %s/%s", namespace, reponame)
return scopeResult(actions=final_actions, namespace=namespace, repository=reponame,
registry_and_repo=registry_and_repo,
tuf_root=_get_tuf_root(repo, namespace, reponame))

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@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
ANONYMOUS_SUB = '(anonymous)'
ALGORITHM = 'RS256'
CLAIM_TUF_ROOTS = 'com.apostille.roots'
CLAIM_TUF_ROOT = 'com.apostille.root'
QUAY_TUF_ROOT = 'quay'
SIGNER_TUF_ROOT = 'signer'
@ -106,18 +107,20 @@ def _generate_jwt_object(audience, subject, context, access, lifetime_s, issuer,
return jwt.encode(token_data, private_key, ALGORITHM, headers=token_headers)
def build_context_and_subject(auth_context=None, tuf_root=None):
def build_context_and_subject(auth_context=None, tuf_roots=None):
""" Builds the custom context field for the JWT signed token and returns it,
along with the subject for the JWT signed token. """
# Serialize to a dictionary.
context = auth_context.to_signed_dict() if auth_context else {}
# Default to quay root if not explicitly granted permission to see signer root
if not tuf_root:
tuf_root = QUAY_TUF_ROOT
# TODO: remove once Apostille has been upgraded to not use the single root.
single_root = (tuf_roots.values()[0]
if tuf_roots is not None and len(tuf_roots) == 1
else DISABLED_TUF_ROOT)
context.update({
CLAIM_TUF_ROOT: tuf_root
CLAIM_TUF_ROOTS: tuf_roots,
CLAIM_TUF_ROOT: single_root,
})
if not auth_context or auth_context.is_anonymous:

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@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ class ImplementedTUFMetadataAPI(TUFMetadataAPIInterface):
'name': gun,
'actions': actions,
}]
context, subject = build_context_and_subject(auth_context=None, tuf_root=SIGNER_TUF_ROOT)
context, subject = build_context_and_subject(auth_context=None, tuf_roots={gun: SIGNER_TUF_ROOT})
token = generate_bearer_token(self._config["SERVER_HOSTNAME"], subject, context, access,
TOKEN_VALIDITY_LIFETIME_S, self._instance_keys)
return {'Authorization': 'Bearer %s' % token}