diff --git a/docs/spec/auth/jwt.md b/docs/spec/auth/jwt.md
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+
+
+# Docker Registry v2 Bearer token specification
+
+This specification covers the `docker/distribution` implementation of the
+v2 Registry's authentication schema. Specifically, it describes the JSON
+Web Token schema that `docker/distribution` has adopted to implement the
+client-opaque Bearer token issued by an authentication service and
+understood by the registry.
+
+This document borrows heavily from the [JSON Web Token Draft Spec](https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token-32)
+
+## Getting a Bearer Token
+
+For this example, the client makes an HTTP GET request to the following URL:
+
+```
+https://auth.docker.io/token?service=registry.docker.io&scope=repository:samalba/my-app:pull,push
+```
+
+The token server should first attempt to authenticate the client using any
+authentication credentials provided with the request. As of Docker 1.8, the
+registry client in the Docker Engine only supports Basic Authentication to
+these token servers. If an attempt to authenticate to the token server fails,
+the token server should return a `401 Unauthorized` response indicating that
+the provided credentials are invalid.
+
+Whether the token server requires authentication is up to the policy of that
+access control provider. Some requests may require authentication to determine
+access (such as pushing or pulling a private repository) while others may not
+(such as pulling from a public repository).
+
+After authenticating the client (which may simply be an anonymous client if
+no attempt was made to authenticate), the token server must next query its
+access control list to determine whether the client has the requested scope. In
+this example request, if I have authenticated as user `jlhawn`, the token
+server will determine what access I have to the repository `samalba/my-app`
+hosted by the entity `registry.docker.io`.
+
+Once the token server has determined what access the client has to the
+resources requested in the `scope` parameter, it will take the intersection of
+the set of requested actions on each resource and the set of actions that the
+client has in fact been granted. If the client only has a subset of the
+requested access **it must not be considered an error** as it is not the
+responsibility of the token server to indicate authorization errors as part of
+this workflow.
+
+Continuing with the example request, the token server will find that the
+client's set of granted access to the repository is `[pull, push]` which when
+intersected with the requested access `[pull, push]` yields an equal set. If
+the granted access set was found only to be `[pull]` then the intersected set
+would only be `[pull]`. If the client has no access to the repository then the
+intersected set would be empty, `[]`.
+
+It is this intersected set of access which is placed in the returned token.
+
+The server will now construct a JSON Web Token to sign and return. A JSON Web
+Token has 3 main parts:
+
+1. Headers
+
+ The header of a JSON Web Token is a standard JOSE header. The "typ" field
+ will be "JWT" and it will also contain the "alg" which identifies the
+ signing algorithm used to produce the signature. It will also usually have
+ a "kid" field, the ID of the key which was used to sign the token.
+
+ Here is an example JOSE Header for a JSON Web Token (formatted with
+ whitespace for readability):
+
+ ```
+ {
+ "typ": "JWT",
+ "alg": "ES256",
+ "kid": "PYYO:TEWU:V7JH:26JV:AQTZ:LJC3:SXVJ:XGHA:34F2:2LAQ:ZRMK:Z7Q6"
+ }
+ ```
+
+ It specifies that this object is going to be a JSON Web token signed using
+ the key with the given ID using the Elliptic Curve signature algorithm
+ using a SHA256 hash.
+
+2. Claim Set
+
+ The Claim Set is a JSON struct containing these standard registered claim
+ name fields:
+
+
+ -
+
iss (Issuer)
+
+ -
+ The issuer of the token, typically the fqdn of the authorization
+ server.
+
+ -
+
sub (Subject)
+
+ -
+ The subject of the token; the name or id of the client which
+ requested it. This should be empty (`""`) if the client did not
+ authenticate.
+
+ -
+
aud (Audience)
+
+ -
+ The intended audience of the token; the name or id of the service
+ which will verify the token to authorize the client/subject.
+
+ -
+
exp (Expiration)
+
+ -
+ The token should only be considered valid up to this specified date
+ and time.
+
+ -
+
nbf (Not Before)
+
+ -
+ The token should not be considered valid before this specified date
+ and time.
+
+ -
+
iat (Issued At)
+
+ -
+ Specifies the date and time which the Authorization server
+ generated this token.
+
+ -
+
jti (JWT ID)
+
+ -
+ A unique identifier for this token. Can be used by the intended
+ audience to prevent replays of the token.
+
+
+
+ The Claim Set will also contain a private claim name unique to this
+ authorization server specification:
+
+
+ -
+
access
+
+ -
+ An array of access entry objects with the following fields:
+
+
+ -
+
type
+
+ -
+ The type of resource hosted by the service.
+
+ -
+
name
+
+ -
+ The name of the resource of the given type hosted by the
+ service.
+
+ -
+
actions
+
+ -
+ An array of strings which give the actions authorized on
+ this resource.
+
+
+
+
+
+ Here is an example of such a JWT Claim Set (formatted with whitespace for
+ readability):
+
+ ```
+ {
+ "iss": "auth.docker.com",
+ "sub": "jlhawn",
+ "aud": "registry.docker.com",
+ "exp": 1415387315,
+ "nbf": 1415387015,
+ "iat": 1415387015,
+ "jti": "tYJCO1c6cnyy7kAn0c7rKPgbV1H1bFws",
+ "access": [
+ {
+ "type": "repository",
+ "name": "samalba/my-app",
+ "actions": [
+ "pull",
+ "push"
+ ]
+ }
+ ]
+ }
+ ```
+
+3. Signature
+
+ The authorization server will produce a JOSE header and Claim Set with no
+ extraneous whitespace, i.e., the JOSE Header from above would be
+
+ ```
+ {"typ":"JWT","alg":"ES256","kid":"PYYO:TEWU:V7JH:26JV:AQTZ:LJC3:SXVJ:XGHA:34F2:2LAQ:ZRMK:Z7Q6"}
+ ```
+
+ and the Claim Set from above would be
+
+ ```
+ {"iss":"auth.docker.com","sub":"jlhawn","aud":"registry.docker.com","exp":1415387315,"nbf":1415387015,"iat":1415387015,"jti":"tYJCO1c6cnyy7kAn0c7rKPgbV1H1bFws","access":[{"type":"repository","name":"samalba/my-app","actions":["push","pull"]}]}
+ ```
+
+ The utf-8 representation of this JOSE header and Claim Set are then
+ url-safe base64 encoded (sans trailing '=' buffer), producing:
+
+ ```
+ eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IlBZWU86VEVXVTpWN0pIOjI2SlY6QVFUWjpMSkMzOlNYVko6WEdIQTozNEYyOjJMQVE6WlJNSzpaN1E2In0
+ ```
+
+ for the JOSE Header and
+
+ ```
+ eyJpc3MiOiJhdXRoLmRvY2tlci5jb20iLCJzdWIiOiJqbGhhd24iLCJhdWQiOiJyZWdpc3RyeS5kb2NrZXIuY29tIiwiZXhwIjoxNDE1Mzg3MzE1LCJuYmYiOjE0MTUzODcwMTUsImlhdCI6MTQxNTM4NzAxNSwianRpIjoidFlKQ08xYzZjbnl5N2tBbjBjN3JLUGdiVjFIMWJGd3MiLCJhY2Nlc3MiOlt7InR5cGUiOiJyZXBvc2l0b3J5IiwibmFtZSI6InNhbWFsYmEvbXktYXBwIiwiYWN0aW9ucyI6WyJwdXNoIl19XX0
+ ```
+
+ for the Claim Set. These two are concatenated using a '.' character,
+ yielding the string:
+
+ ```
+ eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IlBZWU86VEVXVTpWN0pIOjI2SlY6QVFUWjpMSkMzOlNYVko6WEdIQTozNEYyOjJMQVE6WlJNSzpaN1E2In0.eyJpc3MiOiJhdXRoLmRvY2tlci5jb20iLCJzdWIiOiJqbGhhd24iLCJhdWQiOiJyZWdpc3RyeS5kb2NrZXIuY29tIiwiZXhwIjoxNDE1Mzg3MzE1LCJuYmYiOjE0MTUzODcwMTUsImlhdCI6MTQxNTM4NzAxNSwianRpIjoidFlKQ08xYzZjbnl5N2tBbjBjN3JLUGdiVjFIMWJGd3MiLCJhY2Nlc3MiOlt7InR5cGUiOiJyZXBvc2l0b3J5IiwibmFtZSI6InNhbWFsYmEvbXktYXBwIiwiYWN0aW9ucyI6WyJwdXNoIl19XX0
+ ```
+
+ This is then used as the payload to a the `ES256` signature algorithm
+ specified in the JOSE header and specified fully in [Section 3.4 of the JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)
+ draft specification](https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms-38#section-3.4)
+
+ This example signature will use the following ECDSA key for the server:
+
+ ```
+ {
+ "kty": "EC",
+ "crv": "P-256",
+ "kid": "PYYO:TEWU:V7JH:26JV:AQTZ:LJC3:SXVJ:XGHA:34F2:2LAQ:ZRMK:Z7Q6",
+ "d": "R7OnbfMaD5J2jl7GeE8ESo7CnHSBm_1N2k9IXYFrKJA",
+ "x": "m7zUpx3b-zmVE5cymSs64POG9QcyEpJaYCD82-549_Q",
+ "y": "dU3biz8sZ_8GPB-odm8Wxz3lNDr1xcAQQPQaOcr1fmc"
+ }
+ ```
+
+ A resulting signature of the above payload using this key is:
+
+ ```
+ QhflHPfbd6eVF4lM9bwYpFZIV0PfikbyXuLx959ykRTBpe3CYnzs6YBK8FToVb5R47920PVLrh8zuLzdCr9t3w
+ ```
+
+ Concatenating all of these together with a `.` character gives the
+ resulting JWT:
+
+ ```
+ eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IlBZWU86VEVXVTpWN0pIOjI2SlY6QVFUWjpMSkMzOlNYVko6WEdIQTozNEYyOjJMQVE6WlJNSzpaN1E2In0.eyJpc3MiOiJhdXRoLmRvY2tlci5jb20iLCJzdWIiOiJqbGhhd24iLCJhdWQiOiJyZWdpc3RyeS5kb2NrZXIuY29tIiwiZXhwIjoxNDE1Mzg3MzE1LCJuYmYiOjE0MTUzODcwMTUsImlhdCI6MTQxNTM4NzAxNSwianRpIjoidFlKQ08xYzZjbnl5N2tBbjBjN3JLUGdiVjFIMWJGd3MiLCJhY2Nlc3MiOlt7InR5cGUiOiJyZXBvc2l0b3J5IiwibmFtZSI6InNhbWFsYmEvbXktYXBwIiwiYWN0aW9ucyI6WyJwdXNoIl19XX0.QhflHPfbd6eVF4lM9bwYpFZIV0PfikbyXuLx959ykRTBpe3CYnzs6YBK8FToVb5R47920PVLrh8zuLzdCr9t3w
+ ```
+
+This can now be placed in an HTTP response and returned to the client to use to
+authenticate to the audience service:
+
+
+```
+HTTP/1.1 200 OK
+Content-Type: application/json
+
+{"token": "eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IlBZWU86VEVXVTpWN0pIOjI2SlY6QVFUWjpMSkMzOlNYVko6WEdIQTozNEYyOjJMQVE6WlJNSzpaN1E2In0.eyJpc3MiOiJhdXRoLmRvY2tlci5jb20iLCJzdWIiOiJqbGhhd24iLCJhdWQiOiJyZWdpc3RyeS5kb2NrZXIuY29tIiwiZXhwIjoxNDE1Mzg3MzE1LCJuYmYiOjE0MTUzODcwMTUsImlhdCI6MTQxNTM4NzAxNSwianRpIjoidFlKQ08xYzZjbnl5N2tBbjBjN3JLUGdiVjFIMWJGd3MiLCJhY2Nlc3MiOlt7InR5cGUiOiJyZXBvc2l0b3J5IiwibmFtZSI6InNhbWFsYmEvbXktYXBwIiwiYWN0aW9ucyI6WyJwdXNoIl19XX0.QhflHPfbd6eVF4lM9bwYpFZIV0PfikbyXuLx959ykRTBpe3CYnzs6YBK8FToVb5R47920PVLrh8zuLzdCr9t3w"}
+```
+
+## Using the signed token
+
+Once the client has a token, it will try the registry request again with the
+token placed in the HTTP `Authorization` header like so:
+
+```
+Authorization: Bearer eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IkJWM0Q6MkFWWjpVQjVaOktJQVA6SU5QTDo1RU42Ok40SjQ6Nk1XTzpEUktFOkJWUUs6M0ZKTDpQT1RMIn0.eyJpc3MiOiJhdXRoLmRvY2tlci5jb20iLCJzdWIiOiJCQ0NZOk9VNlo6UUVKNTpXTjJDOjJBVkM6WTdZRDpBM0xZOjQ1VVc6NE9HRDpLQUxMOkNOSjU6NUlVTCIsImF1ZCI6InJlZ2lzdHJ5LmRvY2tlci5jb20iLCJleHAiOjE0MTUzODczMTUsIm5iZiI6MTQxNTM4NzAxNSwiaWF0IjoxNDE1Mzg3MDE1LCJqdGkiOiJ0WUpDTzFjNmNueXk3a0FuMGM3cktQZ2JWMUgxYkZ3cyIsInNjb3BlIjoiamxoYXduOnJlcG9zaXRvcnk6c2FtYWxiYS9teS1hcHA6cHVzaCxwdWxsIGpsaGF3bjpuYW1lc3BhY2U6c2FtYWxiYTpwdWxsIn0.Y3zZSwaZPqy4y9oRBVRImZyv3m_S9XDHF1tWwN7mL52C_IiA73SJkWVNsvNqpJIn5h7A2F8biv_S2ppQ1lgkbw
+```
+
+This is also described in [Section 2.1 of RFC 6750: The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer Token Usage](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6750#section-2.1)
+
+## Verifying the token
+
+The registry must now verify the token presented by the user by inspecting the
+claim set within. The registry will:
+
+- Ensure that the issuer (`iss` claim) is an authority it trusts.
+- Ensure that the registry identifies as the audience (`aud` claim).
+- Check that the current time is between the `nbf` and `exp` claim times.
+- If enforcing single-use tokens, check that the JWT ID (`jti` claim) value has
+ not been seen before.
+ - To enforce this, the registry may keep a record of `jti`s it has seen for
+ up to the `exp` time of the token to prevent token replays.
+- Check the `access` claim value and use the identified resources and the list
+ of actions authorized to determine whether the token grants the required
+ level of access for the operation the client is attempting to perform.
+- Verify that the signature of the token is valid.
+
+If any of these requirements are not met, the registry will return a
+`403 Forbidden` response to indicate that the token is invalid.
+
+**Note**: it is only at this point in the workflow that an authorization error
+may occur. The token server should *not* return errors when the user does not
+have the requested authorization. Instead, the returned token should indicate
+whatever of the requested scope the client does have (the intersection of
+requested and granted access). If the token does not supply proper
+authorization then the registry will return the appropriate error.
+
+At no point in this process should the registry need to call back to the
+authorization server. The registry only needs to be supplied with the trusted
+public keys to verify the token signatures.
diff --git a/docs/spec/auth/token.md b/docs/spec/auth/token.md
index 5fa5a36d..4a96eed1 100644
--- a/docs/spec/auth/token.md
+++ b/docs/spec/auth/token.md
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@