If the stream is in an inconsistent state, it does not make sense
that Reader.Read can be called and possibly succeed.
Change-Id: I9d1c5a1300b2c2b45232188aa7999e350809dcf2
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/15177
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
The sparseFileReader is prone to two different forms of
denial-of-service attacks:
* A malicious tar file can cause an infinite loop
* A malicious tar file can cause arbitrary panics
This results because of poor error checking/handling, which this
CL fixes. While we are at it, add a plethora of unit tests to
test for possible malicious inputs.
Change-Id: I2f9446539d189f3c1738a1608b0ad4859c1be929
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/15115
Reviewed-by: Andrew Gerrand <adg@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Andrew Gerrand <adg@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Check for errors when reading the headers following the pax headers.
Fixes#11169.
Change-Id: Ifec4a949ec8df8b49fa7cb7a67eb826fe2282ad8
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/11031
Reviewed-by: Russ Cox <rsc@golang.org>
Signed-off-by: Vincent Batts <vbatts@hashbangbash.com>
Sanity check the pax-header size field before using it.
Fixes#11167.
Change-Id: I9d5d0210c3990e6fb9434c3fe333be0d507d5962
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/10954
Reviewed-by: David Symonds <dsymonds@golang.org>
Signed-off-by: Vincent Batts <vbatts@hashbangbash.com>
Archives produced with GNU tar can have types of TypeGNULongName and
TypeGNULongLink.
These fields effectively appear like two file entries in the tar
archive. While golang's `archive/tar` transparently provide the file
name and headers and file payload, the access to the raw bytes is still
needed.
This fixes the access to the longlink header, it's payload (of the long
file path name), and the following file header and actual file payload.
