Motivation:
* The logic to verify the numEntries can overflow and incorrectly
pass, allowing a malicious file to allocate arbitrary memory.
* The use of strconv.ParseInt does not set the integer precision
to 64bit, causing this code to work incorrectly on 32bit machines.
Change-Id: I1b1571a750a84f2dde97cc329ed04fe2342aaa60
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/15173
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
A recursive call to Reader.Next did not check the error before
trying to use the result, leading to a nil pointer panic.
This specific CL addresses the immediate issue, which is the panic,
but does not solve the root issue, which is due to an integer
overflow in the base-256 parser.
Updates #12435
Change-Id: Ia908671f0f411a409a35e24f2ebf740d46734072
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/15437
Run-TryBot: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Motivation:
* There are an increasing number of "one-off" corrupt files added
to make sure that package does not succeed or crash on them.
Instead, allow for the test to specify the error that is expected
to occur (if any).
* Also, fold in the logic to check the MD5 checksum into this
function.
The following tests are being removed:
* TestIncrementalRead: Done by TestReader by using io.CopyBuffer
with a buffer of 8. This achieves the same behavior as this test.
* TestSparseEndToEnd: Since TestReader checks the MD5 checksums
if the input corpus provides them, then this is redundant.
* TestSparseIncrementalRead: Redundant for the same reasons that
TestIncrementalRead is now redundant
* TestNegativeHdrSize: Added to TestReader corpus
* TestIssue10968: Added to TestReader corpus
* TestIssue11169: Added to TestReader corpus
With this change, code coverage did not change: 85.3%
Change-Id: I8550d48657d4dbb8f47dfc3dc280758ef73b47ec
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/15176
Reviewed-by: Andrew Gerrand <adg@golang.org>
The sparseFileReader is prone to two different forms of
denial-of-service attacks:
* A malicious tar file can cause an infinite loop
* A malicious tar file can cause arbitrary panics
This results because of poor error checking/handling, which this
CL fixes. While we are at it, add a plethora of unit tests to
test for possible malicious inputs.
Change-Id: I2f9446539d189f3c1738a1608b0ad4859c1be929
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/15115
Reviewed-by: Andrew Gerrand <adg@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Andrew Gerrand <adg@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Check for errors when reading the headers following the pax headers.
Fixes#11169.
Change-Id: Ifec4a949ec8df8b49fa7cb7a67eb826fe2282ad8
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/11031
Reviewed-by: Russ Cox <rsc@golang.org>
Signed-off-by: Vincent Batts <vbatts@hashbangbash.com>
Sanity check the pax-header size field before using it.
Fixes#11167.
Change-Id: I9d5d0210c3990e6fb9434c3fe333be0d507d5962
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/10954
Reviewed-by: David Symonds <dsymonds@golang.org>
Signed-off-by: Vincent Batts <vbatts@hashbangbash.com>
