A recursive call to Reader.Next did not check the error before
trying to use the result, leading to a nil pointer panic.
This specific CL addresses the immediate issue, which is the panic,
but does not solve the root issue, which is due to an integer
overflow in the base-256 parser.
Updates #12435
Change-Id: Ia908671f0f411a409a35e24f2ebf740d46734072
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/15437
Run-TryBot: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Motivation:
* There are an increasing number of "one-off" corrupt files added
to make sure that package does not succeed or crash on them.
Instead, allow for the test to specify the error that is expected
to occur (if any).
* Also, fold in the logic to check the MD5 checksum into this
function.
The following tests are being removed:
* TestIncrementalRead: Done by TestReader by using io.CopyBuffer
with a buffer of 8. This achieves the same behavior as this test.
* TestSparseEndToEnd: Since TestReader checks the MD5 checksums
if the input corpus provides them, then this is redundant.
* TestSparseIncrementalRead: Redundant for the same reasons that
TestIncrementalRead is now redundant
* TestNegativeHdrSize: Added to TestReader corpus
* TestIssue10968: Added to TestReader corpus
* TestIssue11169: Added to TestReader corpus
With this change, code coverage did not change: 85.3%
Change-Id: I8550d48657d4dbb8f47dfc3dc280758ef73b47ec
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/15176
Reviewed-by: Andrew Gerrand <adg@golang.org>
If the stream is in an inconsistent state, it does not make sense
that Reader.Read can be called and possibly succeed.
Change-Id: I9d1c5a1300b2c2b45232188aa7999e350809dcf2
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/15177
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
The sparseFileReader is prone to two different forms of
denial-of-service attacks:
* A malicious tar file can cause an infinite loop
* A malicious tar file can cause arbitrary panics
This results because of poor error checking/handling, which this
CL fixes. While we are at it, add a plethora of unit tests to
test for possible malicious inputs.
Change-Id: I2f9446539d189f3c1738a1608b0ad4859c1be929
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/15115
Reviewed-by: Andrew Gerrand <adg@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Andrew Gerrand <adg@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Convert splitUSTARPath to return a bool rather than an error since
the caller never ever uses the error other than to check if it is
nil. Thus, we can remove errNameTooLong as well.
Also, fold the checking of the length <= fileNameSize and whether
the string is ASCII into the split function itself.
Lastly, remove logic to set the MAGIC since that's already done on
L200. Thus, setting the magic is redundant.
There is no overall logic change.
Updates #12638
Change-Id: I26b6992578199abad723c2a2af7f4fc078af9c17
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/14723
Reviewed-by: David Symonds <dsymonds@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: David Symonds <dsymonds@golang.org>
Do not assume that if stat shows multiple links that we should mark the
file as a hardlink in the tar format. If the hardlink link was not
referenced, this caused a link to "/". On an overlay file system, all
files have multiple links.
The caller must keep the inode references and set TypeLink, Size = 0,
and LinkName themselves.
Change-Id: I873b8a235bc8f8fbb271db74ee54232da36ca013
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/13045
Reviewed-by: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@golang.org>
Signed-off-by: Vincent Batts <vbatts@hashbangbash.com>
The issue was identified while
working with round trip FileInfo of the headers of hardlinks. Also,
additional test cases for hard link handling.
(review carried over from http://golang.org/cl/165860043)
Fixes#9027
Change-Id: I9e3a724c8de72eb1b0fbe0751a7b488894911b76
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/6790
Reviewed-by: Russ Cox <rsc@golang.org>
Signed-off-by: Vincent Batts <vbatts@hashbangbash.com>
Check for errors when reading the headers following the pax headers.
Fixes#11169.
Change-Id: Ifec4a949ec8df8b49fa7cb7a67eb826fe2282ad8
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/11031
Reviewed-by: Russ Cox <rsc@golang.org>
Signed-off-by: Vincent Batts <vbatts@hashbangbash.com>
Sanity check the pax-header size field before using it.
Fixes#11167.
Change-Id: I9d5d0210c3990e6fb9434c3fe333be0d507d5962
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/10954
Reviewed-by: David Symonds <dsymonds@golang.org>
Signed-off-by: Vincent Batts <vbatts@hashbangbash.com>
Write should return ErrWriteAfterClose instead
of ErrWriteTooLong when called after Close.
Change-Id: If5ec4ef924e4c56489e0d426976f7e5fad79be9b
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/9259
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
Signed-off-by: Vincent Batts <vbatts@hashbangbash.com>
Archives produced with GNU tar can have types of TypeGNULongName and
TypeGNULongLink.
These fields effectively appear like two file entries in the tar
archive. While golang's `archive/tar` transparently provide the file
name and headers and file payload, the access to the raw bytes is still
needed.
This fixes the access to the longlink header, it's payload (of the long
file path name), and the following file header and actual file payload.
