2019-05-27 06:55:01 +00:00
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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/*
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epoll: fix epoll's own poll
Fix a bug inside the epoll's f_op->poll() code, that returns POLLIN even
though there are no actual ready monitored fds. The bug shows up if you
add an epoll fd inside another fd container (poll, select, epoll).
The problem is that callback-based wake ups used by epoll does not carry
(patches will follow, to fix this) any information about the events that
actually happened. So the callback code, since it can't call the file*
->poll() inside the callback, chains the file* into a ready-list.
So, suppose you added an fd with EPOLLOUT only, and some data shows up on
the fd, the file* mapped by the fd will be added into the ready-list (via
wakeup callback). During normal epoll_wait() use, this condition is
sorted out at the time we're actually able to call the file*'s
f_op->poll().
Inside the old epoll's f_op->poll() though, only a quick check
!list_empty(ready-list) was performed, and this could have led to
reporting POLLIN even though no ready fds would show up at a following
epoll_wait(). In order to correctly report the ready status for an epoll
fd, the ready-list must be checked to see if any really available fd+event
would be ready in a following epoll_wait().
Operation (calling f_op->poll() from inside f_op->poll()) that, like wake
ups, must be handled with care because of the fact that epoll fds can be
added to other epoll fds.
Test code:
/*
* epoll_test by Davide Libenzi (Simple code to test epoll internals)
* Copyright (C) 2008 Davide Libenzi
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
*
* Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
*
*/
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <poll.h>
#include <sys/epoll.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#define EPWAIT_TIMEO (1 * 1000)
#ifndef POLLRDHUP
#define POLLRDHUP 0x2000
#endif
#define EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN 100L
#define EPOLL_TF_LOOP (1 << 0)
struct epoll_test_cfg {
long size;
long flags;
};
static int xepoll_create(int n) {
int epfd;
if ((epfd = epoll_create(n)) == -1) {
perror("epoll_create");
exit(2);
}
return epfd;
}
static void xepoll_ctl(int epfd, int cmd, int fd, struct epoll_event *evt) {
if (epoll_ctl(epfd, cmd, fd, evt) < 0) {
perror("epoll_ctl");
exit(3);
}
}
static void xpipe(int *fds) {
if (pipe(fds)) {
perror("pipe");
exit(4);
}
}
static pid_t xfork(void) {
pid_t pid;
if ((pid = fork()) == (pid_t) -1) {
perror("pipe");
exit(5);
}
return pid;
}
static int run_forked_proc(int (*proc)(void *), void *data) {
int status;
pid_t pid;
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0)
exit((*proc)(data));
if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status): -2;
}
static int check_events(int fd, int timeo) {
struct pollfd pfd;
fprintf(stdout, "Checking events for fd %d\n", fd);
memset(&pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd));
pfd.fd = fd;
pfd.events = POLLIN | POLLOUT;
if (poll(&pfd, 1, timeo) < 0) {
perror("poll()");
return 0;
}
if (pfd.revents & POLLIN)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLIN\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLOUT)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLOUT\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLERR)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLERR\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLHUP)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLHUP\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLRDHUP)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLRDHUP\n");
return pfd.revents;
}
static int epoll_test_tty(void *data) {
int epfd, ifd = fileno(stdin), res;
struct epoll_event evt;
if (check_events(ifd, 0) != POLLOUT) {
fprintf(stderr, "Something is cooking on STDIN (%d)\n", ifd);
return 1;
}
epfd = xepoll_create(1);
fprintf(stdout, "Created epoll fd (%d)\n", epfd);
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
xepoll_ctl(epfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, ifd, &evt);
if (check_events(epfd, 0) & POLLIN) {
res = epoll_wait(epfd, &evt, 1, 0);
if (res == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Epoll fd (%d) is ready when it shouldn't!\n",
epfd);
return 2;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int epoll_wakeup_chain(void *data) {
struct epoll_test_cfg *tcfg = data;
int i, res, epfd, bfd, nfd, pfds[2];
pid_t pid;
struct epoll_event evt;
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
epfd = bfd = xepoll_create(1);
for (i = 0; i < tcfg->size; i++) {
nfd = xepoll_create(1);
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, nfd, &evt);
bfd = nfd;
}
xpipe(pfds);
if (tcfg->flags & EPOLL_TF_LOOP)
{
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, epfd, &evt);
/*
* If we're testing for loop, we want that the wakeup
* triggered by the write to the pipe done in the child
* process, triggers a fake event. So we add the pipe
* read size with EPOLLOUT events. This will trigger
* an addition to the ready-list, but no real events
* will be there. The the epoll kernel code will proceed
* in calling f_op->poll() of the epfd, triggering the
* loop we want to test.
*/
evt.events = EPOLLOUT;
}
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, pfds[0], &evt);
/*
* The pipe write must come after the poll(2) call inside
* check_events(). This tests the nested wakeup code in
* fs/eventpoll.c:ep_poll_safewake()
* By having the check_events() (hence poll(2)) happens first,
* we have poll wait queue filled up, and the write(2) in the
* child will trigger the wakeup chain.
*/
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0) {
sleep(1);
write(pfds[1], "w", 1);
exit(0);
}
res = check_events(epfd, 2000) & POLLIN;
if (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return res;
}
static int epoll_poll_chain(void *data) {
struct epoll_test_cfg *tcfg = data;
int i, res, epfd, bfd, nfd, pfds[2];
pid_t pid;
struct epoll_event evt;
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
epfd = bfd = xepoll_create(1);
for (i = 0; i < tcfg->size; i++) {
nfd = xepoll_create(1);
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, nfd, &evt);
bfd = nfd;
}
xpipe(pfds);
if (tcfg->flags & EPOLL_TF_LOOP)
{
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, epfd, &evt);
/*
* If we're testing for loop, we want that the wakeup
* triggered by the write to the pipe done in the child
* process, triggers a fake event. So we add the pipe
* read size with EPOLLOUT events. This will trigger
* an addition to the ready-list, but no real events
* will be there. The the epoll kernel code will proceed
* in calling f_op->poll() of the epfd, triggering the
* loop we want to test.
*/
evt.events = EPOLLOUT;
}
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, pfds[0], &evt);
/*
* The pipe write mush come before the poll(2) call inside
* check_events(). This tests the nested f_op->poll calls code in
* fs/eventpoll.c:ep_eventpoll_poll()
* By having the pipe write(2) happen first, we make the kernel
* epoll code to load the ready lists, and the following poll(2)
* done inside check_events() will test nested poll code in
* ep_eventpoll_poll().
*/
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0) {
write(pfds[1], "w", 1);
exit(0);
}
sleep(1);
res = check_events(epfd, 1000) & POLLIN;
if (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return res;
}
int main(int ac, char **av) {
int error;
struct epoll_test_cfg tcfg;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing TTY events\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_test_tty, NULL);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing short wakeup chain\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == POLLIN ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing long wakeup chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing short poll chain\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == POLLIN ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing long poll chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = EPOLL_TF_LOOP;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing loopy wakeup chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = EPOLL_TF_LOOP;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing loopy poll chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Pavel Pisa <pisa@cmp.felk.cvut.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-03-31 22:24:10 +00:00
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* fs/eventpoll.c (Efficient event retrieval implementation)
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* Copyright (C) 2001,...,2009 Davide Libenzi
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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*
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* Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
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*/
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#include <linux/init.h>
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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2017-02-02 18:15:33 +00:00
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#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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#include <linux/fs.h>
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#include <linux/file.h>
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#include <linux/signal.h>
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#include <linux/errno.h>
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#include <linux/mm.h>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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#include <linux/poll.h>
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#include <linux/string.h>
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#include <linux/list.h>
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#include <linux/hash.h>
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#include <linux/spinlock.h>
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#include <linux/syscalls.h>
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#include <linux/rbtree.h>
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#include <linux/wait.h>
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#include <linux/eventpoll.h>
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#include <linux/mount.h>
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#include <linux/bitops.h>
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2006-03-23 11:00:32 +00:00
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#include <linux/mutex.h>
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2007-05-11 05:23:21 +00:00
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#include <linux/anon_inodes.h>
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2012-05-01 19:33:34 +00:00
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#include <linux/device.h>
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2016-12-24 19:46:01 +00:00
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#include <linux/uaccess.h>
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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#include <asm/io.h>
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#include <asm/mman.h>
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2011-07-26 23:09:06 +00:00
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#include <linux/atomic.h>
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2012-12-18 00:05:02 +00:00
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#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
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#include <linux/seq_file.h>
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2013-02-24 19:52:17 +00:00
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#include <linux/compat.h>
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2013-11-12 23:10:16 +00:00
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#include <linux/rculist.h>
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2017-03-24 17:08:30 +00:00
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#include <net/busy_poll.h>
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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/*
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* LOCKING:
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* There are three level of locking required by epoll :
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*
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2023-04-11 23:41:59 +00:00
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* 1) epnested_mutex (mutex)
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2007-05-15 08:40:47 +00:00
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* 2) ep->mtx (mutex)
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2019-03-08 00:28:53 +00:00
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* 3) ep->lock (rwlock)
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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*
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* The acquire order is the one listed above, from 1 to 3.
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2019-03-08 00:28:53 +00:00
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* We need a rwlock (ep->lock) because we manipulate objects
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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* from inside the poll callback, that might be triggered from
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* a wake_up() that in turn might be called from IRQ context.
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* So we can't sleep inside the poll callback and hence we need
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* a spinlock. During the event transfer loop (from kernel to
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* user space) we could end up sleeping due a copy_to_user(), so
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* we need a lock that will allow us to sleep. This lock is a
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2007-05-15 08:40:41 +00:00
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* mutex (ep->mtx). It is acquired during the event transfer loop,
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* during epoll_ctl(EPOLL_CTL_DEL) and during eventpoll_release_file().
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2023-04-11 23:41:59 +00:00
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* The epnested_mutex is acquired when inserting an epoll fd onto another
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* epoll fd. We do this so that we walk the epoll tree and ensure that this
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epoll: prevent creating circular epoll structures
In several places, an epoll fd can call another file's ->f_op->poll()
method with ep->mtx held. This is in general unsafe, because that other
file could itself be an epoll fd that contains the original epoll fd.
The code defends against this possibility in its own ->poll() method using
ep_call_nested, but there are several other unsafe calls to ->poll
elsewhere that can be made to deadlock. For example, the following simple
program causes the call in ep_insert recursively call the original fd's
->poll, leading to deadlock:
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/epoll.h>
int main(void) {
int e1, e2, p[2];
struct epoll_event evt = {
.events = EPOLLIN
};
e1 = epoll_create(1);
e2 = epoll_create(2);
pipe(p);
epoll_ctl(e2, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, e1, &evt);
epoll_ctl(e1, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, p[0], &evt);
write(p[1], p, sizeof p);
epoll_ctl(e1, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, e2, &evt);
return 0;
}
On insertion, check whether the inserted file is itself a struct epoll,
and if so, do a recursive walk to detect whether inserting this file would
create a loop of epoll structures, which could lead to deadlock.
[nelhage@ksplice.com: Use epmutex to serialize concurrent inserts]
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Reported-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Tested-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.34+, possibly earlier]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-02-25 22:44:12 +00:00
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* insertion does not create a cycle of epoll file descriptors, which
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* could lead to deadlock. We need a global mutex to prevent two
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* simultaneous inserts (A into B and B into A) from racing and
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* constructing a cycle without either insert observing that it is
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* going to.
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2011-11-01 00:13:14 +00:00
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* It is necessary to acquire multiple "ep->mtx"es at once in the
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* case when one epoll fd is added to another. In this case, we
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* always acquire the locks in the order of nesting (i.e. after
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* epoll_ctl(e1, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, e2), e1->mtx will always be acquired
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* before e2->mtx). Since we disallow cycles of epoll file
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* descriptors, this ensures that the mutexes are well-ordered. In
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* order to communicate this nesting to lockdep, when walking a tree
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* of epoll file descriptors, we use the current recursion depth as
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* the lockdep subkey.
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2007-05-15 08:40:41 +00:00
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* It is possible to drop the "ep->mtx" and to use the global
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2023-04-11 23:41:59 +00:00
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* mutex "epnested_mutex" (together with "ep->lock") to have it working,
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2007-05-15 08:40:41 +00:00
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* but having "ep->mtx" will make the interface more scalable.
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2023-04-11 23:41:59 +00:00
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* Events that require holding "epnested_mutex" are very rare, while for
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2007-05-15 08:40:41 +00:00
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* normal operations the epoll private "ep->mtx" will guarantee
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* a better scalability.
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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*/
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/* Epoll private bits inside the event mask */
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2016-01-20 22:59:24 +00:00
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#define EP_PRIVATE_BITS (EPOLLWAKEUP | EPOLLONESHOT | EPOLLET | EPOLLEXCLUSIVE)
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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2018-02-11 22:34:03 +00:00
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#define EPOLLINOUT_BITS (EPOLLIN | EPOLLOUT)
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epoll: restrict EPOLLEXCLUSIVE to POLLIN and POLLOUT
In the current implementation of the EPOLLEXCLUSIVE flag (added for
4.5-rc1), if epoll waiters create different POLL* sets and register them
as exclusive against the same target fd, the current implementation will
stop waking any further waiters once it finds the first idle waiter.
This means that waiters could miss wakeups in certain cases.
For example, when we wake up a pipe for reading we do:
wake_up_interruptible_sync_poll(&pipe->wait, POLLIN | POLLRDNORM); So if
one epoll set or epfd is added to pipe p with POLLIN and a second set
epfd2 is added to pipe p with POLLRDNORM, only epfd may receive the
wakeup since the current implementation will stop after it finds any
intersection of events with a waiter that is blocked in epoll_wait().
We could potentially address this by requiring all epoll waiters that
are added to p be required to pass the same set of POLL* events. IE the
first EPOLL_CTL_ADD that passes EPOLLEXCLUSIVE establishes the set POLL*
flags to be used by any other epfds that are added as EPOLLEXCLUSIVE.
However, I think it might be somewhat confusing interface as we would
have to reference count the number of users for that set, and so
userspace would have to keep track of that count, or we would need a
more involved interface. It also adds some shared state that we'd have
store somewhere. I don't think anybody will want to bloat
__wait_queue_head for this.
I think what we could do instead, is to simply restrict EPOLLEXCLUSIVE
such that it can only be specified with EPOLLIN and/or EPOLLOUT. So
that way if the wakeup includes 'POLLIN' and not 'POLLOUT', we can stop
once we hit the first idle waiter that specifies the EPOLLIN bit, since
any remaining waiters that only have 'POLLOUT' set wouldn't need to be
woken. Likewise, we can do the same thing if 'POLLOUT' is in the wakeup
bit set and not 'POLLIN'. If both 'POLLOUT' and 'POLLIN' are set in the
wake bit set (there is at least one example of this I saw in fs/pipe.c),
then we just wake the entire exclusive list. Having both 'POLLOUT' and
'POLLIN' both set should not be on any performance critical path, so I
think that's ok (in fs/pipe.c its in pipe_release()). We also continue
to include EPOLLERR and EPOLLHUP by default in any exclusive set. Thus,
the user can specify EPOLLERR and/or EPOLLHUP but is not required to do
so.
Since epoll waiters may be interested in other events as well besides
EPOLLIN, EPOLLOUT, EPOLLERR and EPOLLHUP, these can still be added by
doing a 'dup' call on the target fd and adding that as one normally
would with EPOLL_CTL_ADD. Since I think that the POLLIN and POLLOUT
events are what we are interest in balancing, I think that the 'dup'
thing could perhaps be added to only one of the waiter threads.
However, I think that EPOLLIN, EPOLLOUT, EPOLLERR and EPOLLHUP should be
sufficient for the majority of use-cases.
Since EPOLLEXCLUSIVE is intended to be used with a target fd shared
among multiple epfds, where between 1 and n of the epfds may receive an
event, it does not satisfy the semantics of EPOLLONESHOT where only 1
epfd would get an event. Thus, it is not allowed to be specified in
conjunction with EPOLLEXCLUSIVE.
EPOLL_CTL_MOD is also not allowed if the fd was previously added as
EPOLLEXCLUSIVE. It seems with the limited number of flags to not be as
interesting, but this could be relaxed at some further point.
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Tested-by: Madars Vitolins <m@silodev.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ftp.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric Wong <normalperson@yhbt.net>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-02-05 23:37:04 +00:00
|
|
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2018-02-11 22:34:03 +00:00
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#define EPOLLEXCLUSIVE_OK_BITS (EPOLLINOUT_BITS | EPOLLERR | EPOLLHUP | \
|
epoll: restrict EPOLLEXCLUSIVE to POLLIN and POLLOUT
In the current implementation of the EPOLLEXCLUSIVE flag (added for
4.5-rc1), if epoll waiters create different POLL* sets and register them
as exclusive against the same target fd, the current implementation will
stop waking any further waiters once it finds the first idle waiter.
This means that waiters could miss wakeups in certain cases.
For example, when we wake up a pipe for reading we do:
wake_up_interruptible_sync_poll(&pipe->wait, POLLIN | POLLRDNORM); So if
one epoll set or epfd is added to pipe p with POLLIN and a second set
epfd2 is added to pipe p with POLLRDNORM, only epfd may receive the
wakeup since the current implementation will stop after it finds any
intersection of events with a waiter that is blocked in epoll_wait().
We could potentially address this by requiring all epoll waiters that
are added to p be required to pass the same set of POLL* events. IE the
first EPOLL_CTL_ADD that passes EPOLLEXCLUSIVE establishes the set POLL*
flags to be used by any other epfds that are added as EPOLLEXCLUSIVE.
However, I think it might be somewhat confusing interface as we would
have to reference count the number of users for that set, and so
userspace would have to keep track of that count, or we would need a
more involved interface. It also adds some shared state that we'd have
store somewhere. I don't think anybody will want to bloat
__wait_queue_head for this.
I think what we could do instead, is to simply restrict EPOLLEXCLUSIVE
such that it can only be specified with EPOLLIN and/or EPOLLOUT. So
that way if the wakeup includes 'POLLIN' and not 'POLLOUT', we can stop
once we hit the first idle waiter that specifies the EPOLLIN bit, since
any remaining waiters that only have 'POLLOUT' set wouldn't need to be
woken. Likewise, we can do the same thing if 'POLLOUT' is in the wakeup
bit set and not 'POLLIN'. If both 'POLLOUT' and 'POLLIN' are set in the
wake bit set (there is at least one example of this I saw in fs/pipe.c),
then we just wake the entire exclusive list. Having both 'POLLOUT' and
'POLLIN' both set should not be on any performance critical path, so I
think that's ok (in fs/pipe.c its in pipe_release()). We also continue
to include EPOLLERR and EPOLLHUP by default in any exclusive set. Thus,
the user can specify EPOLLERR and/or EPOLLHUP but is not required to do
so.
Since epoll waiters may be interested in other events as well besides
EPOLLIN, EPOLLOUT, EPOLLERR and EPOLLHUP, these can still be added by
doing a 'dup' call on the target fd and adding that as one normally
would with EPOLL_CTL_ADD. Since I think that the POLLIN and POLLOUT
events are what we are interest in balancing, I think that the 'dup'
thing could perhaps be added to only one of the waiter threads.
However, I think that EPOLLIN, EPOLLOUT, EPOLLERR and EPOLLHUP should be
sufficient for the majority of use-cases.
Since EPOLLEXCLUSIVE is intended to be used with a target fd shared
among multiple epfds, where between 1 and n of the epfds may receive an
event, it does not satisfy the semantics of EPOLLONESHOT where only 1
epfd would get an event. Thus, it is not allowed to be specified in
conjunction with EPOLLEXCLUSIVE.
EPOLL_CTL_MOD is also not allowed if the fd was previously added as
EPOLLEXCLUSIVE. It seems with the limited number of flags to not be as
interesting, but this could be relaxed at some further point.
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Tested-by: Madars Vitolins <m@silodev.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ftp.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric Wong <normalperson@yhbt.net>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-02-05 23:37:04 +00:00
|
|
|
EPOLLWAKEUP | EPOLLET | EPOLLEXCLUSIVE)
|
|
|
|
|
epoll: fix epoll's own poll
Fix a bug inside the epoll's f_op->poll() code, that returns POLLIN even
though there are no actual ready monitored fds. The bug shows up if you
add an epoll fd inside another fd container (poll, select, epoll).
The problem is that callback-based wake ups used by epoll does not carry
(patches will follow, to fix this) any information about the events that
actually happened. So the callback code, since it can't call the file*
->poll() inside the callback, chains the file* into a ready-list.
So, suppose you added an fd with EPOLLOUT only, and some data shows up on
the fd, the file* mapped by the fd will be added into the ready-list (via
wakeup callback). During normal epoll_wait() use, this condition is
sorted out at the time we're actually able to call the file*'s
f_op->poll().
Inside the old epoll's f_op->poll() though, only a quick check
!list_empty(ready-list) was performed, and this could have led to
reporting POLLIN even though no ready fds would show up at a following
epoll_wait(). In order to correctly report the ready status for an epoll
fd, the ready-list must be checked to see if any really available fd+event
would be ready in a following epoll_wait().
Operation (calling f_op->poll() from inside f_op->poll()) that, like wake
ups, must be handled with care because of the fact that epoll fds can be
added to other epoll fds.
Test code:
/*
* epoll_test by Davide Libenzi (Simple code to test epoll internals)
* Copyright (C) 2008 Davide Libenzi
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
*
* Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
*
*/
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <poll.h>
#include <sys/epoll.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#define EPWAIT_TIMEO (1 * 1000)
#ifndef POLLRDHUP
#define POLLRDHUP 0x2000
#endif
#define EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN 100L
#define EPOLL_TF_LOOP (1 << 0)
struct epoll_test_cfg {
long size;
long flags;
};
static int xepoll_create(int n) {
int epfd;
if ((epfd = epoll_create(n)) == -1) {
perror("epoll_create");
exit(2);
}
return epfd;
}
static void xepoll_ctl(int epfd, int cmd, int fd, struct epoll_event *evt) {
if (epoll_ctl(epfd, cmd, fd, evt) < 0) {
perror("epoll_ctl");
exit(3);
}
}
static void xpipe(int *fds) {
if (pipe(fds)) {
perror("pipe");
exit(4);
}
}
static pid_t xfork(void) {
pid_t pid;
if ((pid = fork()) == (pid_t) -1) {
perror("pipe");
exit(5);
}
return pid;
}
static int run_forked_proc(int (*proc)(void *), void *data) {
int status;
pid_t pid;
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0)
exit((*proc)(data));
if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status): -2;
}
static int check_events(int fd, int timeo) {
struct pollfd pfd;
fprintf(stdout, "Checking events for fd %d\n", fd);
memset(&pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd));
pfd.fd = fd;
pfd.events = POLLIN | POLLOUT;
if (poll(&pfd, 1, timeo) < 0) {
perror("poll()");
return 0;
}
if (pfd.revents & POLLIN)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLIN\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLOUT)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLOUT\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLERR)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLERR\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLHUP)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLHUP\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLRDHUP)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLRDHUP\n");
return pfd.revents;
}
static int epoll_test_tty(void *data) {
int epfd, ifd = fileno(stdin), res;
struct epoll_event evt;
if (check_events(ifd, 0) != POLLOUT) {
fprintf(stderr, "Something is cooking on STDIN (%d)\n", ifd);
return 1;
}
epfd = xepoll_create(1);
fprintf(stdout, "Created epoll fd (%d)\n", epfd);
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
xepoll_ctl(epfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, ifd, &evt);
if (check_events(epfd, 0) & POLLIN) {
res = epoll_wait(epfd, &evt, 1, 0);
if (res == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Epoll fd (%d) is ready when it shouldn't!\n",
epfd);
return 2;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int epoll_wakeup_chain(void *data) {
struct epoll_test_cfg *tcfg = data;
int i, res, epfd, bfd, nfd, pfds[2];
pid_t pid;
struct epoll_event evt;
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
epfd = bfd = xepoll_create(1);
for (i = 0; i < tcfg->size; i++) {
nfd = xepoll_create(1);
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, nfd, &evt);
bfd = nfd;
}
xpipe(pfds);
if (tcfg->flags & EPOLL_TF_LOOP)
{
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, epfd, &evt);
/*
* If we're testing for loop, we want that the wakeup
* triggered by the write to the pipe done in the child
* process, triggers a fake event. So we add the pipe
* read size with EPOLLOUT events. This will trigger
* an addition to the ready-list, but no real events
* will be there. The the epoll kernel code will proceed
* in calling f_op->poll() of the epfd, triggering the
* loop we want to test.
*/
evt.events = EPOLLOUT;
}
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, pfds[0], &evt);
/*
* The pipe write must come after the poll(2) call inside
* check_events(). This tests the nested wakeup code in
* fs/eventpoll.c:ep_poll_safewake()
* By having the check_events() (hence poll(2)) happens first,
* we have poll wait queue filled up, and the write(2) in the
* child will trigger the wakeup chain.
*/
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0) {
sleep(1);
write(pfds[1], "w", 1);
exit(0);
}
res = check_events(epfd, 2000) & POLLIN;
if (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return res;
}
static int epoll_poll_chain(void *data) {
struct epoll_test_cfg *tcfg = data;
int i, res, epfd, bfd, nfd, pfds[2];
pid_t pid;
struct epoll_event evt;
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
epfd = bfd = xepoll_create(1);
for (i = 0; i < tcfg->size; i++) {
nfd = xepoll_create(1);
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, nfd, &evt);
bfd = nfd;
}
xpipe(pfds);
if (tcfg->flags & EPOLL_TF_LOOP)
{
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, epfd, &evt);
/*
* If we're testing for loop, we want that the wakeup
* triggered by the write to the pipe done in the child
* process, triggers a fake event. So we add the pipe
* read size with EPOLLOUT events. This will trigger
* an addition to the ready-list, but no real events
* will be there. The the epoll kernel code will proceed
* in calling f_op->poll() of the epfd, triggering the
* loop we want to test.
*/
evt.events = EPOLLOUT;
}
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, pfds[0], &evt);
/*
* The pipe write mush come before the poll(2) call inside
* check_events(). This tests the nested f_op->poll calls code in
* fs/eventpoll.c:ep_eventpoll_poll()
* By having the pipe write(2) happen first, we make the kernel
* epoll code to load the ready lists, and the following poll(2)
* done inside check_events() will test nested poll code in
* ep_eventpoll_poll().
*/
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0) {
write(pfds[1], "w", 1);
exit(0);
}
sleep(1);
res = check_events(epfd, 1000) & POLLIN;
if (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return res;
}
int main(int ac, char **av) {
int error;
struct epoll_test_cfg tcfg;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing TTY events\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_test_tty, NULL);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing short wakeup chain\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == POLLIN ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing long wakeup chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing short poll chain\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == POLLIN ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing long poll chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = EPOLL_TF_LOOP;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing loopy wakeup chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = EPOLL_TF_LOOP;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing loopy poll chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Pavel Pisa <pisa@cmp.felk.cvut.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-03-31 22:24:10 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Maximum number of nesting allowed inside epoll sets */
|
|
|
|
#define EP_MAX_NESTS 4
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2006-10-11 08:21:44 +00:00
|
|
|
#define EP_MAX_EVENTS (INT_MAX / sizeof(struct epoll_event))
|
|
|
|
|
2007-05-15 08:40:41 +00:00
|
|
|
#define EP_UNACTIVE_PTR ((void *) -1L)
|
|
|
|
|
epoll: introduce resource usage limits
It has been thought that the per-user file descriptors limit would also
limit the resources that a normal user can request via the epoll
interface. Vegard Nossum reported a very simple program (a modified
version attached) that can make a normal user to request a pretty large
amount of kernel memory, well within the its maximum number of fds. To
solve such problem, default limits are now imposed, and /proc based
configuration has been introduced. A new directory has been created,
named /proc/sys/fs/epoll/ and inside there, there are two configuration
points:
max_user_instances = Maximum number of devices - per user
max_user_watches = Maximum number of "watched" fds - per user
The current default for "max_user_watches" limits the memory used by epoll
to store "watches", to 1/32 of the amount of the low RAM. As example, a
256MB 32bit machine, will have "max_user_watches" set to roughly 90000.
That should be enough to not break existing heavy epoll users. The
default value for "max_user_instances" is set to 128, that should be
enough too.
This also changes the userspace, because a new error code can now come out
from EPOLL_CTL_ADD (-ENOSPC). The EMFILE from epoll_create() was already
listed, so that should be ok.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: use get_current_user()]
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegardno@ifi.uio.no>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-12-01 21:13:55 +00:00
|
|
|
#define EP_ITEM_COST (sizeof(struct epitem) + sizeof(struct eppoll_entry))
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
struct epoll_filefd {
|
|
|
|
struct file *file;
|
|
|
|
int fd;
|
2013-04-30 22:27:38 +00:00
|
|
|
} __packed;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-09-02 15:45:57 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Wait structure used by the poll hooks */
|
|
|
|
struct eppoll_entry {
|
|
|
|
/* List header used to link this structure to the "struct epitem" */
|
|
|
|
struct eppoll_entry *next;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-09-02 15:45:57 +00:00
|
|
|
/* The "base" pointer is set to the container "struct epitem" */
|
|
|
|
struct epitem *base;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Wait queue item that will be linked to the target file wait
|
|
|
|
* queue head.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
wait_queue_entry_t wait;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* The wait queue head that linked the "wait" wait queue item */
|
|
|
|
wait_queue_head_t *whead;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2007-05-15 08:40:41 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Each file descriptor added to the eventpoll interface will
|
|
|
|
* have an entry of this type linked to the "rbr" RB tree.
|
2013-04-30 22:27:38 +00:00
|
|
|
* Avoid increasing the size of this struct, there can be many thousands
|
|
|
|
* of these on a server and we do not want this to take another cache line.
|
2007-05-15 08:40:41 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
struct epitem {
|
2013-11-12 23:10:16 +00:00
|
|
|
union {
|
|
|
|
/* RB tree node links this structure to the eventpoll RB tree */
|
|
|
|
struct rb_node rbn;
|
|
|
|
/* Used to free the struct epitem */
|
|
|
|
struct rcu_head rcu;
|
|
|
|
};
|
2007-05-15 08:40:41 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* List header used to link this structure to the eventpoll ready list */
|
|
|
|
struct list_head rdllink;
|
|
|
|
|
2007-05-15 08:40:47 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Works together "struct eventpoll"->ovflist in keeping the
|
|
|
|
* single linked chain of items.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
struct epitem *next;
|
|
|
|
|
2007-05-15 08:40:41 +00:00
|
|
|
/* The file descriptor information this item refers to */
|
|
|
|
struct epoll_filefd ffd;
|
|
|
|
|
epoll: use refcount to reduce ep_mutex contention
We are observing huge contention on the epmutex during an http
connection/rate test:
83.17% 0.25% nginx [kernel.kallsyms] [k] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
[...]
|--66.96%--__fput
|--60.04%--eventpoll_release_file
|--58.41%--__mutex_lock.isra.6
|--56.56%--osq_lock
The application is multi-threaded, creates a new epoll entry for
each incoming connection, and does not delete it before the
connection shutdown - that is, before the connection's fd close().
Many different threads compete frequently for the epmutex lock,
affecting the overall performance.
To reduce the contention this patch introduces explicit reference counting
for the eventpoll struct. Each registered event acquires a reference,
and references are released at ep_remove() time.
The eventpoll struct is released by whoever - among EP file close() and
and the monitored file close() drops its last reference.
Additionally, this introduces a new 'dying' flag to prevent races between
the EP file close() and the monitored file close().
ep_eventpoll_release() marks, under f_lock spinlock, each epitem as dying
before removing it, while EP file close() does not touch dying epitems.
The above is needed as both close operations could run concurrently and
drop the EP reference acquired via the epitem entry. Without the above
flag, the monitored file close() could reach the EP struct via the epitem
list while the epitem is still listed and then try to put it after its
disposal.
An alternative could be avoiding touching the references acquired via
the epitems at EP file close() time, but that could leave the EP struct
alive for potentially unlimited time after EP file close(), with nasty
side effects.
With all the above in place, we can drop the epmutex usage at disposal time.
Overall this produces a significant performance improvement in the
mentioned connection/rate scenario: the mutex operations disappear from
the topmost offenders in the perf report, and the measured connections/rate
grows by ~60%.
To make the change more readable this additionally renames ep_free() to
ep_clear_and_put(), and moves the actual memory cleanup in a separate
ep_free() helper.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/4a57788dcaf28f5eb4f8dfddcc3a8b172a7357bb.1679504153.git.pabeni@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Tested-by: Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhiat.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-03-22 16:57:02 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Protected by file->f_lock, true for to-be-released epitem already
|
|
|
|
* removed from the "struct file" items list; together with
|
|
|
|
* eventpoll->refcount orchestrates "struct eventpoll" disposal
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
bool dying;
|
|
|
|
|
2007-05-15 08:40:41 +00:00
|
|
|
/* List containing poll wait queues */
|
2020-09-02 15:45:57 +00:00
|
|
|
struct eppoll_entry *pwqlist;
|
2007-05-15 08:40:41 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* The "container" of this item */
|
|
|
|
struct eventpoll *ep;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* List header used to link this item to the "struct file" items list */
|
2020-09-27 15:18:30 +00:00
|
|
|
struct hlist_node fllink;
|
2007-05-15 08:40:41 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2012-05-01 19:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
/* wakeup_source used when EPOLLWAKEUP is set */
|
2013-04-30 22:27:39 +00:00
|
|
|
struct wakeup_source __rcu *ws;
|
2012-05-01 19:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2007-05-15 08:40:47 +00:00
|
|
|
/* The structure that describe the interested events and the source fd */
|
|
|
|
struct epoll_event event;
|
2007-05-15 08:40:41 +00:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* This structure is stored inside the "private_data" member of the file
|
2011-01-30 21:42:29 +00:00
|
|
|
* structure and represents the main data structure for the eventpoll
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
* interface.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
struct eventpoll {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2007-05-15 08:40:41 +00:00
|
|
|
* This mutex is used to ensure that files are not removed
|
|
|
|
* while epoll is using them. This is held during the event
|
|
|
|
* collection loop, the file cleanup path, the epoll file exit
|
|
|
|
* code and the ctl operations.
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2007-05-15 08:40:41 +00:00
|
|
|
struct mutex mtx;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Wait queue used by sys_epoll_wait() */
|
|
|
|
wait_queue_head_t wq;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Wait queue used by file->poll() */
|
|
|
|
wait_queue_head_t poll_wait;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* List of ready file descriptors */
|
|
|
|
struct list_head rdllist;
|
|
|
|
|
2019-03-08 00:28:53 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Lock which protects rdllist and ovflist */
|
|
|
|
rwlock_t lock;
|
|
|
|
|
2007-05-15 08:40:52 +00:00
|
|
|
/* RB tree root used to store monitored fd structs */
|
2017-09-08 23:15:18 +00:00
|
|
|
struct rb_root_cached rbr;
|
2007-05-15 08:40:41 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* This is a single linked list that chains all the "struct epitem" that
|
2011-03-31 01:57:33 +00:00
|
|
|
* happened while transferring ready events to userspace w/out
|
2019-03-08 00:28:53 +00:00
|
|
|
* holding ->lock.
|
2007-05-15 08:40:41 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
struct epitem *ovflist;
|
epoll: introduce resource usage limits
It has been thought that the per-user file descriptors limit would also
limit the resources that a normal user can request via the epoll
interface. Vegard Nossum reported a very simple program (a modified
version attached) that can make a normal user to request a pretty large
amount of kernel memory, well within the its maximum number of fds. To
solve such problem, default limits are now imposed, and /proc based
configuration has been introduced. A new directory has been created,
named /proc/sys/fs/epoll/ and inside there, there are two configuration
points:
max_user_instances = Maximum number of devices - per user
max_user_watches = Maximum number of "watched" fds - per user
The current default for "max_user_watches" limits the memory used by epoll
to store "watches", to 1/32 of the amount of the low RAM. As example, a
256MB 32bit machine, will have "max_user_watches" set to roughly 90000.
That should be enough to not break existing heavy epoll users. The
default value for "max_user_instances" is set to 128, that should be
enough too.
This also changes the userspace, because a new error code can now come out
from EPOLL_CTL_ADD (-ENOSPC). The EMFILE from epoll_create() was already
listed, so that should be ok.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: use get_current_user()]
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegardno@ifi.uio.no>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-12-01 21:13:55 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2012-05-01 19:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
/* wakeup_source used when ep_scan_ready_list is running */
|
|
|
|
struct wakeup_source *ws;
|
|
|
|
|
epoll: introduce resource usage limits
It has been thought that the per-user file descriptors limit would also
limit the resources that a normal user can request via the epoll
interface. Vegard Nossum reported a very simple program (a modified
version attached) that can make a normal user to request a pretty large
amount of kernel memory, well within the its maximum number of fds. To
solve such problem, default limits are now imposed, and /proc based
configuration has been introduced. A new directory has been created,
named /proc/sys/fs/epoll/ and inside there, there are two configuration
points:
max_user_instances = Maximum number of devices - per user
max_user_watches = Maximum number of "watched" fds - per user
The current default for "max_user_watches" limits the memory used by epoll
to store "watches", to 1/32 of the amount of the low RAM. As example, a
256MB 32bit machine, will have "max_user_watches" set to roughly 90000.
That should be enough to not break existing heavy epoll users. The
default value for "max_user_instances" is set to 128, that should be
enough too.
This also changes the userspace, because a new error code can now come out
from EPOLL_CTL_ADD (-ENOSPC). The EMFILE from epoll_create() was already
listed, so that should be ok.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: use get_current_user()]
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegardno@ifi.uio.no>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-12-01 21:13:55 +00:00
|
|
|
/* The user that created the eventpoll descriptor */
|
|
|
|
struct user_struct *user;
|
epoll: limit paths
The current epoll code can be tickled to run basically indefinitely in
both loop detection path check (on ep_insert()), and in the wakeup paths.
The programs that tickle this behavior set up deeply linked networks of
epoll file descriptors that cause the epoll algorithms to traverse them
indefinitely. A couple of these sample programs have been previously
posted in this thread: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/25/297.
To fix the loop detection path check algorithms, I simply keep track of
the epoll nodes that have been already visited. Thus, the loop detection
becomes proportional to the number of epoll file descriptor and links.
This dramatically decreases the run-time of the loop check algorithm. In
one diabolical case I tried it reduced the run-time from 15 mintues (all
in kernel time) to .3 seconds.
Fixing the wakeup paths could be done at wakeup time in a similar manner
by keeping track of nodes that have already been visited, but the
complexity is harder, since there can be multiple wakeups on different
cpus...Thus, I've opted to limit the number of possible wakeup paths when
the paths are created.
This is accomplished, by noting that the end file descriptor points that
are found during the loop detection pass (from the newly added link), are
actually the sources for wakeup events. I keep a list of these file
descriptors and limit the number and length of these paths that emanate
from these 'source file descriptors'. In the current implemetation I
allow 1000 paths of length 1, 500 of length 2, 100 of length 3, 50 of
length 4 and 10 of length 5. Note that it is sufficient to check the
'source file descriptors' reachable from the newly added link, since no
other 'source file descriptors' will have newly added links. This allows
us to check only the wakeup paths that may have gotten too long, and not
re-check all possible wakeup paths on the system.
In terms of the path limit selection, I think its first worth noting that
the most common case for epoll, is probably the model where you have 1
epoll file descriptor that is monitoring n number of 'source file
descriptors'. In this case, each 'source file descriptor' has a 1 path of
length 1. Thus, I believe that the limits I'm proposing are quite
reasonable and in fact may be too generous. Thus, I'm hoping that the
proposed limits will not prevent any workloads that currently work to
fail.
In terms of locking, I have extended the use of the 'epmutex' to all
epoll_ctl add and remove operations. Currently its only used in a subset
of the add paths. I need to hold the epmutex, so that we can correctly
traverse a coherent graph, to check the number of paths. I believe that
this additional locking is probably ok, since its in the setup/teardown
paths, and doesn't affect the running paths, but it certainly is going to
add some extra overhead. Also, worth noting is that the epmuex was
recently added to the ep_ctl add operations in the initial path loop
detection code using the argument that it was not on a critical path.
Another thing to note here, is the length of epoll chains that is allowed.
Currently, eventpoll.c defines:
/* Maximum number of nesting allowed inside epoll sets */
#define EP_MAX_NESTS 4
This basically means that I am limited to a graph depth of 5 (EP_MAX_NESTS
+ 1). However, this limit is currently only enforced during the loop
check detection code, and only when the epoll file descriptors are added
in a certain order. Thus, this limit is currently easily bypassed. The
newly added check for wakeup paths, stricly limits the wakeup paths to a
length of 5, regardless of the order in which ep's are linked together.
Thus, a side-effect of the new code is a more consistent enforcement of
the graph depth.
Thus far, I've tested this, using the sample programs previously
mentioned, which now either return quickly or return -EINVAL. I've also
testing using the piptest.c epoll tester, which showed no difference in
performance. I've also created a number of different epoll networks and
tested that they behave as expectded.
I believe this solves the original diabolical test cases, while still
preserving the sane epoll nesting.
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Cc: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-01-13 01:17:43 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct file *file;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* used to optimize loop detection check */
|
2020-09-10 12:30:05 +00:00
|
|
|
u64 gen;
|
epoll: take epitem list out of struct file
Move the head of epitem list out of struct file; for epoll ones it's
moved into struct eventpoll (->refs there), for non-epoll - into
the new object (struct epitem_head). In place of ->f_ep_links we
leave a pointer to the list head (->f_ep).
->f_ep is protected by ->f_lock and it's zeroed as soon as the list
of epitems becomes empty (that can happen only in ep_remove() by
now).
The list of files for reverse path check is *not* going through
struct file now - it's a single-linked list going through epitem_head
instances. It's terminated by ERR_PTR(-1) (== EP_UNACTIVE_POINTER),
so the elements of list can be distinguished by head->next != NULL.
epitem_head instances are allocated at ep_insert() time (by
attach_epitem()) and freed either by ep_remove() (if it empties
the set of epitems *and* epitem_head does not belong to the
reverse path check list) or by clear_tfile_check_list() when
the list is emptied (if the set of epitems is empty by that
point). Allocations are done from a separate slab - minimal kmalloc()
size is too large on some architectures.
As the result, we trim struct file _and_ get rid of the games with
temporary file references.
Locking and barriers are interesting (aren't they always); see unlist_file()
and ep_remove() for details. The non-obvious part is that ep_remove() needs
to decide if it will be the one to free the damn thing *before* actually
storing NULL to head->epitems.first - that's what smp_load_acquire is for
in there. unlist_file() lockless path is safe, since we hit it only if
we observe NULL in head->epitems.first and whoever had done that store is
guaranteed to have observed non-NULL in head->next. IOW, their last access
had been the store of NULL into ->epitems.first and we can safely free
the sucker. OTOH, we are under rcu_read_lock() and both epitem and
epitem->file have their freeing RCU-delayed. So if we see non-NULL
->epitems.first, we can grab ->f_lock (all epitems in there share the
same struct file) and safely recheck the emptiness of ->epitems; again,
->next is still non-NULL, so ep_remove() couldn't have freed head yet.
->f_lock serializes us wrt ep_remove(); the rest is trivial.
Note that once head->epitems becomes NULL, nothing can get inserted into
it - the only remaining reference to head after that point is from the
reverse path check list.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-10-02 00:45:51 +00:00
|
|
|
struct hlist_head refs;
|
2017-03-24 17:08:30 +00:00
|
|
|
|
epoll: use refcount to reduce ep_mutex contention
We are observing huge contention on the epmutex during an http
connection/rate test:
83.17% 0.25% nginx [kernel.kallsyms] [k] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
[...]
|--66.96%--__fput
|--60.04%--eventpoll_release_file
|--58.41%--__mutex_lock.isra.6
|--56.56%--osq_lock
The application is multi-threaded, creates a new epoll entry for
each incoming connection, and does not delete it before the
connection shutdown - that is, before the connection's fd close().
Many different threads compete frequently for the epmutex lock,
affecting the overall performance.
To reduce the contention this patch introduces explicit reference counting
for the eventpoll struct. Each registered event acquires a reference,
and references are released at ep_remove() time.
The eventpoll struct is released by whoever - among EP file close() and
and the monitored file close() drops its last reference.
Additionally, this introduces a new 'dying' flag to prevent races between
the EP file close() and the monitored file close().
ep_eventpoll_release() marks, under f_lock spinlock, each epitem as dying
before removing it, while EP file close() does not touch dying epitems.
The above is needed as both close operations could run concurrently and
drop the EP reference acquired via the epitem entry. Without the above
flag, the monitored file close() could reach the EP struct via the epitem
list while the epitem is still listed and then try to put it after its
disposal.
An alternative could be avoiding touching the references acquired via
the epitems at EP file close() time, but that could leave the EP struct
alive for potentially unlimited time after EP file close(), with nasty
side effects.
With all the above in place, we can drop the epmutex usage at disposal time.
Overall this produces a significant performance improvement in the
mentioned connection/rate scenario: the mutex operations disappear from
the topmost offenders in the perf report, and the measured connections/rate
grows by ~60%.
To make the change more readable this additionally renames ep_free() to
ep_clear_and_put(), and moves the actual memory cleanup in a separate
ep_free() helper.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/4a57788dcaf28f5eb4f8dfddcc3a8b172a7357bb.1679504153.git.pabeni@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Tested-by: Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhiat.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-03-22 16:57:02 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* usage count, used together with epitem->dying to
|
|
|
|
* orchestrate the disposal of this struct
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
refcount_t refcount;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-24 17:08:30 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_NET_RX_BUSY_POLL
|
|
|
|
/* used to track busy poll napi_id */
|
|
|
|
unsigned int napi_id;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2020-04-07 03:11:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCK_ALLOC
|
|
|
|
/* tracks wakeup nests for lockdep validation */
|
|
|
|
u8 nests;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Wrapper struct used by poll queueing */
|
|
|
|
struct ep_pqueue {
|
|
|
|
poll_table pt;
|
|
|
|
struct epitem *epi;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
epoll: introduce resource usage limits
It has been thought that the per-user file descriptors limit would also
limit the resources that a normal user can request via the epoll
interface. Vegard Nossum reported a very simple program (a modified
version attached) that can make a normal user to request a pretty large
amount of kernel memory, well within the its maximum number of fds. To
solve such problem, default limits are now imposed, and /proc based
configuration has been introduced. A new directory has been created,
named /proc/sys/fs/epoll/ and inside there, there are two configuration
points:
max_user_instances = Maximum number of devices - per user
max_user_watches = Maximum number of "watched" fds - per user
The current default for "max_user_watches" limits the memory used by epoll
to store "watches", to 1/32 of the amount of the low RAM. As example, a
256MB 32bit machine, will have "max_user_watches" set to roughly 90000.
That should be enough to not break existing heavy epoll users. The
default value for "max_user_instances" is set to 128, that should be
enough too.
This also changes the userspace, because a new error code can now come out
from EPOLL_CTL_ADD (-ENOSPC). The EMFILE from epoll_create() was already
listed, so that should be ok.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: use get_current_user()]
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegardno@ifi.uio.no>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-12-01 21:13:55 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Configuration options available inside /proc/sys/fs/epoll/
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* Maximum number of epoll watched descriptors, per user */
|
2011-01-13 01:00:01 +00:00
|
|
|
static long max_user_watches __read_mostly;
|
epoll: introduce resource usage limits
It has been thought that the per-user file descriptors limit would also
limit the resources that a normal user can request via the epoll
interface. Vegard Nossum reported a very simple program (a modified
version attached) that can make a normal user to request a pretty large
amount of kernel memory, well within the its maximum number of fds. To
solve such problem, default limits are now imposed, and /proc based
configuration has been introduced. A new directory has been created,
named /proc/sys/fs/epoll/ and inside there, there are two configuration
points:
max_user_instances = Maximum number of devices - per user
max_user_watches = Maximum number of "watched" fds - per user
The current default for "max_user_watches" limits the memory used by epoll
to store "watches", to 1/32 of the amount of the low RAM. As example, a
256MB 32bit machine, will have "max_user_watches" set to roughly 90000.
That should be enough to not break existing heavy epoll users. The
default value for "max_user_instances" is set to 128, that should be
enough too.
This also changes the userspace, because a new error code can now come out
from EPOLL_CTL_ADD (-ENOSPC). The EMFILE from epoll_create() was already
listed, so that should be ok.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: use get_current_user()]
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegardno@ifi.uio.no>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-12-01 21:13:55 +00:00
|
|
|
|
epoll: use refcount to reduce ep_mutex contention
We are observing huge contention on the epmutex during an http
connection/rate test:
83.17% 0.25% nginx [kernel.kallsyms] [k] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
[...]
|--66.96%--__fput
|--60.04%--eventpoll_release_file
|--58.41%--__mutex_lock.isra.6
|--56.56%--osq_lock
The application is multi-threaded, creates a new epoll entry for
each incoming connection, and does not delete it before the
connection shutdown - that is, before the connection's fd close().
Many different threads compete frequently for the epmutex lock,
affecting the overall performance.
To reduce the contention this patch introduces explicit reference counting
for the eventpoll struct. Each registered event acquires a reference,
and references are released at ep_remove() time.
The eventpoll struct is released by whoever - among EP file close() and
and the monitored file close() drops its last reference.
Additionally, this introduces a new 'dying' flag to prevent races between
the EP file close() and the monitored file close().
ep_eventpoll_release() marks, under f_lock spinlock, each epitem as dying
before removing it, while EP file close() does not touch dying epitems.
The above is needed as both close operations could run concurrently and
drop the EP reference acquired via the epitem entry. Without the above
flag, the monitored file close() could reach the EP struct via the epitem
list while the epitem is still listed and then try to put it after its
disposal.
An alternative could be avoiding touching the references acquired via
the epitems at EP file close() time, but that could leave the EP struct
alive for potentially unlimited time after EP file close(), with nasty
side effects.
With all the above in place, we can drop the epmutex usage at disposal time.
Overall this produces a significant performance improvement in the
mentioned connection/rate scenario: the mutex operations disappear from
the topmost offenders in the perf report, and the measured connections/rate
grows by ~60%.
To make the change more readable this additionally renames ep_free() to
ep_clear_and_put(), and moves the actual memory cleanup in a separate
ep_free() helper.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/4a57788dcaf28f5eb4f8dfddcc3a8b172a7357bb.1679504153.git.pabeni@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Tested-by: Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhiat.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-03-22 16:57:02 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Used for cycles detection */
|
2023-04-11 23:41:59 +00:00
|
|
|
static DEFINE_MUTEX(epnested_mutex);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-09-10 12:30:05 +00:00
|
|
|
static u64 loop_check_gen = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
epoll: prevent creating circular epoll structures
In several places, an epoll fd can call another file's ->f_op->poll()
method with ep->mtx held. This is in general unsafe, because that other
file could itself be an epoll fd that contains the original epoll fd.
The code defends against this possibility in its own ->poll() method using
ep_call_nested, but there are several other unsafe calls to ->poll
elsewhere that can be made to deadlock. For example, the following simple
program causes the call in ep_insert recursively call the original fd's
->poll, leading to deadlock:
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/epoll.h>
int main(void) {
int e1, e2, p[2];
struct epoll_event evt = {
.events = EPOLLIN
};
e1 = epoll_create(1);
e2 = epoll_create(2);
pipe(p);
epoll_ctl(e2, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, e1, &evt);
epoll_ctl(e1, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, p[0], &evt);
write(p[1], p, sizeof p);
epoll_ctl(e1, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, e2, &evt);
return 0;
}
On insertion, check whether the inserted file is itself a struct epoll,
and if so, do a recursive walk to detect whether inserting this file would
create a loop of epoll structures, which could lead to deadlock.
[nelhage@ksplice.com: Use epmutex to serialize concurrent inserts]
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Reported-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Tested-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.34+, possibly earlier]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-02-25 22:44:12 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Used to check for epoll file descriptor inclusion loops */
|
2020-09-26 20:29:02 +00:00
|
|
|
static struct eventpoll *inserting_into;
|
epoll: prevent creating circular epoll structures
In several places, an epoll fd can call another file's ->f_op->poll()
method with ep->mtx held. This is in general unsafe, because that other
file could itself be an epoll fd that contains the original epoll fd.
The code defends against this possibility in its own ->poll() method using
ep_call_nested, but there are several other unsafe calls to ->poll
elsewhere that can be made to deadlock. For example, the following simple
program causes the call in ep_insert recursively call the original fd's
->poll, leading to deadlock:
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/epoll.h>
int main(void) {
int e1, e2, p[2];
struct epoll_event evt = {
.events = EPOLLIN
};
e1 = epoll_create(1);
e2 = epoll_create(2);
pipe(p);
epoll_ctl(e2, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, e1, &evt);
epoll_ctl(e1, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, p[0], &evt);
write(p[1], p, sizeof p);
epoll_ctl(e1, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, e2, &evt);
return 0;
}
On insertion, check whether the inserted file is itself a struct epoll,
and if so, do a recursive walk to detect whether inserting this file would
create a loop of epoll structures, which could lead to deadlock.
[nelhage@ksplice.com: Use epmutex to serialize concurrent inserts]
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Reported-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Tested-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.34+, possibly earlier]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-02-25 22:44:12 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Slab cache used to allocate "struct epitem" */
|
2006-12-07 04:33:20 +00:00
|
|
|
static struct kmem_cache *epi_cache __read_mostly;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Slab cache used to allocate "struct eppoll_entry" */
|
2006-12-07 04:33:20 +00:00
|
|
|
static struct kmem_cache *pwq_cache __read_mostly;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
epoll: limit paths
The current epoll code can be tickled to run basically indefinitely in
both loop detection path check (on ep_insert()), and in the wakeup paths.
The programs that tickle this behavior set up deeply linked networks of
epoll file descriptors that cause the epoll algorithms to traverse them
indefinitely. A couple of these sample programs have been previously
posted in this thread: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/25/297.
To fix the loop detection path check algorithms, I simply keep track of
the epoll nodes that have been already visited. Thus, the loop detection
becomes proportional to the number of epoll file descriptor and links.
This dramatically decreases the run-time of the loop check algorithm. In
one diabolical case I tried it reduced the run-time from 15 mintues (all
in kernel time) to .3 seconds.
Fixing the wakeup paths could be done at wakeup time in a similar manner
by keeping track of nodes that have already been visited, but the
complexity is harder, since there can be multiple wakeups on different
cpus...Thus, I've opted to limit the number of possible wakeup paths when
the paths are created.
This is accomplished, by noting that the end file descriptor points that
are found during the loop detection pass (from the newly added link), are
actually the sources for wakeup events. I keep a list of these file
descriptors and limit the number and length of these paths that emanate
from these 'source file descriptors'. In the current implemetation I
allow 1000 paths of length 1, 500 of length 2, 100 of length 3, 50 of
length 4 and 10 of length 5. Note that it is sufficient to check the
'source file descriptors' reachable from the newly added link, since no
other 'source file descriptors' will have newly added links. This allows
us to check only the wakeup paths that may have gotten too long, and not
re-check all possible wakeup paths on the system.
In terms of the path limit selection, I think its first worth noting that
the most common case for epoll, is probably the model where you have 1
epoll file descriptor that is monitoring n number of 'source file
descriptors'. In this case, each 'source file descriptor' has a 1 path of
length 1. Thus, I believe that the limits I'm proposing are quite
reasonable and in fact may be too generous. Thus, I'm hoping that the
proposed limits will not prevent any workloads that currently work to
fail.
In terms of locking, I have extended the use of the 'epmutex' to all
epoll_ctl add and remove operations. Currently its only used in a subset
of the add paths. I need to hold the epmutex, so that we can correctly
traverse a coherent graph, to check the number of paths. I believe that
this additional locking is probably ok, since its in the setup/teardown
paths, and doesn't affect the running paths, but it certainly is going to
add some extra overhead. Also, worth noting is that the epmuex was
recently added to the ep_ctl add operations in the initial path loop
detection code using the argument that it was not on a critical path.
Another thing to note here, is the length of epoll chains that is allowed.
Currently, eventpoll.c defines:
/* Maximum number of nesting allowed inside epoll sets */
#define EP_MAX_NESTS 4
This basically means that I am limited to a graph depth of 5 (EP_MAX_NESTS
+ 1). However, this limit is currently only enforced during the loop
check detection code, and only when the epoll file descriptors are added
in a certain order. Thus, this limit is currently easily bypassed. The
newly added check for wakeup paths, stricly limits the wakeup paths to a
length of 5, regardless of the order in which ep's are linked together.
Thus, a side-effect of the new code is a more consistent enforcement of
the graph depth.
Thus far, I've tested this, using the sample programs previously
mentioned, which now either return quickly or return -EINVAL. I've also
testing using the piptest.c epoll tester, which showed no difference in
performance. I've also created a number of different epoll networks and
tested that they behave as expectded.
I believe this solves the original diabolical test cases, while still
preserving the sane epoll nesting.
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Cc: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-01-13 01:17:43 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* List of files with newly added links, where we may need to limit the number
|
2023-04-11 23:41:59 +00:00
|
|
|
* of emanating paths. Protected by the epnested_mutex.
|
epoll: limit paths
The current epoll code can be tickled to run basically indefinitely in
both loop detection path check (on ep_insert()), and in the wakeup paths.
The programs that tickle this behavior set up deeply linked networks of
epoll file descriptors that cause the epoll algorithms to traverse them
indefinitely. A couple of these sample programs have been previously
posted in this thread: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/25/297.
To fix the loop detection path check algorithms, I simply keep track of
the epoll nodes that have been already visited. Thus, the loop detection
becomes proportional to the number of epoll file descriptor and links.
This dramatically decreases the run-time of the loop check algorithm. In
one diabolical case I tried it reduced the run-time from 15 mintues (all
in kernel time) to .3 seconds.
Fixing the wakeup paths could be done at wakeup time in a similar manner
by keeping track of nodes that have already been visited, but the
complexity is harder, since there can be multiple wakeups on different
cpus...Thus, I've opted to limit the number of possible wakeup paths when
the paths are created.
This is accomplished, by noting that the end file descriptor points that
are found during the loop detection pass (from the newly added link), are
actually the sources for wakeup events. I keep a list of these file
descriptors and limit the number and length of these paths that emanate
from these 'source file descriptors'. In the current implemetation I
allow 1000 paths of length 1, 500 of length 2, 100 of length 3, 50 of
length 4 and 10 of length 5. Note that it is sufficient to check the
'source file descriptors' reachable from the newly added link, since no
other 'source file descriptors' will have newly added links. This allows
us to check only the wakeup paths that may have gotten too long, and not
re-check all possible wakeup paths on the system.
In terms of the path limit selection, I think its first worth noting that
the most common case for epoll, is probably the model where you have 1
epoll file descriptor that is monitoring n number of 'source file
descriptors'. In this case, each 'source file descriptor' has a 1 path of
length 1. Thus, I believe that the limits I'm proposing are quite
reasonable and in fact may be too generous. Thus, I'm hoping that the
proposed limits will not prevent any workloads that currently work to
fail.
In terms of locking, I have extended the use of the 'epmutex' to all
epoll_ctl add and remove operations. Currently its only used in a subset
of the add paths. I need to hold the epmutex, so that we can correctly
traverse a coherent graph, to check the number of paths. I believe that
this additional locking is probably ok, since its in the setup/teardown
paths, and doesn't affect the running paths, but it certainly is going to
add some extra overhead. Also, worth noting is that the epmuex was
recently added to the ep_ctl add operations in the initial path loop
detection code using the argument that it was not on a critical path.
Another thing to note here, is the length of epoll chains that is allowed.
Currently, eventpoll.c defines:
/* Maximum number of nesting allowed inside epoll sets */
#define EP_MAX_NESTS 4
This basically means that I am limited to a graph depth of 5 (EP_MAX_NESTS
+ 1). However, this limit is currently only enforced during the loop
check detection code, and only when the epoll file descriptors are added
in a certain order. Thus, this limit is currently easily bypassed. The
newly added check for wakeup paths, stricly limits the wakeup paths to a
length of 5, regardless of the order in which ep's are linked together.
Thus, a side-effect of the new code is a more consistent enforcement of
the graph depth.
Thus far, I've tested this, using the sample programs previously
mentioned, which now either return quickly or return -EINVAL. I've also
testing using the piptest.c epoll tester, which showed no difference in
performance. I've also created a number of different epoll networks and
tested that they behave as expectded.
I believe this solves the original diabolical test cases, while still
preserving the sane epoll nesting.
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Cc: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-01-13 01:17:43 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
epoll: take epitem list out of struct file
Move the head of epitem list out of struct file; for epoll ones it's
moved into struct eventpoll (->refs there), for non-epoll - into
the new object (struct epitem_head). In place of ->f_ep_links we
leave a pointer to the list head (->f_ep).
->f_ep is protected by ->f_lock and it's zeroed as soon as the list
of epitems becomes empty (that can happen only in ep_remove() by
now).
The list of files for reverse path check is *not* going through
struct file now - it's a single-linked list going through epitem_head
instances. It's terminated by ERR_PTR(-1) (== EP_UNACTIVE_POINTER),
so the elements of list can be distinguished by head->next != NULL.
epitem_head instances are allocated at ep_insert() time (by
attach_epitem()) and freed either by ep_remove() (if it empties
the set of epitems *and* epitem_head does not belong to the
reverse path check list) or by clear_tfile_check_list() when
the list is emptied (if the set of epitems is empty by that
point). Allocations are done from a separate slab - minimal kmalloc()
size is too large on some architectures.
As the result, we trim struct file _and_ get rid of the games with
temporary file references.
Locking and barriers are interesting (aren't they always); see unlist_file()
and ep_remove() for details. The non-obvious part is that ep_remove() needs
to decide if it will be the one to free the damn thing *before* actually
storing NULL to head->epitems.first - that's what smp_load_acquire is for
in there. unlist_file() lockless path is safe, since we hit it only if
we observe NULL in head->epitems.first and whoever had done that store is
guaranteed to have observed non-NULL in head->next. IOW, their last access
had been the store of NULL into ->epitems.first and we can safely free
the sucker. OTOH, we are under rcu_read_lock() and both epitem and
epitem->file have their freeing RCU-delayed. So if we see non-NULL
->epitems.first, we can grab ->f_lock (all epitems in there share the
same struct file) and safely recheck the emptiness of ->epitems; again,
->next is still non-NULL, so ep_remove() couldn't have freed head yet.
->f_lock serializes us wrt ep_remove(); the rest is trivial.
Note that once head->epitems becomes NULL, nothing can get inserted into
it - the only remaining reference to head after that point is from the
reverse path check list.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-10-02 00:45:51 +00:00
|
|
|
struct epitems_head {
|
|
|
|
struct hlist_head epitems;
|
|
|
|
struct epitems_head *next;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static struct epitems_head *tfile_check_list = EP_UNACTIVE_PTR;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static struct kmem_cache *ephead_cache __read_mostly;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline void free_ephead(struct epitems_head *head)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (head)
|
|
|
|
kmem_cache_free(ephead_cache, head);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void list_file(struct file *file)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct epitems_head *head;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
head = container_of(file->f_ep, struct epitems_head, epitems);
|
|
|
|
if (!head->next) {
|
|
|
|
head->next = tfile_check_list;
|
|
|
|
tfile_check_list = head;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void unlist_file(struct epitems_head *head)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct epitems_head *to_free = head;
|
|
|
|
struct hlist_node *p = rcu_dereference(hlist_first_rcu(&head->epitems));
|
|
|
|
if (p) {
|
|
|
|
struct epitem *epi= container_of(p, struct epitem, fllink);
|
|
|
|
spin_lock(&epi->ffd.file->f_lock);
|
|
|
|
if (!hlist_empty(&head->epitems))
|
|
|
|
to_free = NULL;
|
|
|
|
head->next = NULL;
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock(&epi->ffd.file->f_lock);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
free_ephead(to_free);
|
|
|
|
}
|
epoll: limit paths
The current epoll code can be tickled to run basically indefinitely in
both loop detection path check (on ep_insert()), and in the wakeup paths.
The programs that tickle this behavior set up deeply linked networks of
epoll file descriptors that cause the epoll algorithms to traverse them
indefinitely. A couple of these sample programs have been previously
posted in this thread: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/25/297.
To fix the loop detection path check algorithms, I simply keep track of
the epoll nodes that have been already visited. Thus, the loop detection
becomes proportional to the number of epoll file descriptor and links.
This dramatically decreases the run-time of the loop check algorithm. In
one diabolical case I tried it reduced the run-time from 15 mintues (all
in kernel time) to .3 seconds.
Fixing the wakeup paths could be done at wakeup time in a similar manner
by keeping track of nodes that have already been visited, but the
complexity is harder, since there can be multiple wakeups on different
cpus...Thus, I've opted to limit the number of possible wakeup paths when
the paths are created.
This is accomplished, by noting that the end file descriptor points that
are found during the loop detection pass (from the newly added link), are
actually the sources for wakeup events. I keep a list of these file
descriptors and limit the number and length of these paths that emanate
from these 'source file descriptors'. In the current implemetation I
allow 1000 paths of length 1, 500 of length 2, 100 of length 3, 50 of
length 4 and 10 of length 5. Note that it is sufficient to check the
'source file descriptors' reachable from the newly added link, since no
other 'source file descriptors' will have newly added links. This allows
us to check only the wakeup paths that may have gotten too long, and not
re-check all possible wakeup paths on the system.
In terms of the path limit selection, I think its first worth noting that
the most common case for epoll, is probably the model where you have 1
epoll file descriptor that is monitoring n number of 'source file
descriptors'. In this case, each 'source file descriptor' has a 1 path of
length 1. Thus, I believe that the limits I'm proposing are quite
reasonable and in fact may be too generous. Thus, I'm hoping that the
proposed limits will not prevent any workloads that currently work to
fail.
In terms of locking, I have extended the use of the 'epmutex' to all
epoll_ctl add and remove operations. Currently its only used in a subset
of the add paths. I need to hold the epmutex, so that we can correctly
traverse a coherent graph, to check the number of paths. I believe that
this additional locking is probably ok, since its in the setup/teardown
paths, and doesn't affect the running paths, but it certainly is going to
add some extra overhead. Also, worth noting is that the epmuex was
recently added to the ep_ctl add operations in the initial path loop
detection code using the argument that it was not on a critical path.
Another thing to note here, is the length of epoll chains that is allowed.
Currently, eventpoll.c defines:
/* Maximum number of nesting allowed inside epoll sets */
#define EP_MAX_NESTS 4
This basically means that I am limited to a graph depth of 5 (EP_MAX_NESTS
+ 1). However, this limit is currently only enforced during the loop
check detection code, and only when the epoll file descriptors are added
in a certain order. Thus, this limit is currently easily bypassed. The
newly added check for wakeup paths, stricly limits the wakeup paths to a
length of 5, regardless of the order in which ep's are linked together.
Thus, a side-effect of the new code is a more consistent enforcement of
the graph depth.
Thus far, I've tested this, using the sample programs previously
mentioned, which now either return quickly or return -EINVAL. I've also
testing using the piptest.c epoll tester, which showed no difference in
performance. I've also created a number of different epoll networks and
tested that they behave as expectded.
I believe this solves the original diabolical test cases, while still
preserving the sane epoll nesting.
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Cc: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-01-13 01:17:43 +00:00
|
|
|
|
epoll: introduce resource usage limits
It has been thought that the per-user file descriptors limit would also
limit the resources that a normal user can request via the epoll
interface. Vegard Nossum reported a very simple program (a modified
version attached) that can make a normal user to request a pretty large
amount of kernel memory, well within the its maximum number of fds. To
solve such problem, default limits are now imposed, and /proc based
configuration has been introduced. A new directory has been created,
named /proc/sys/fs/epoll/ and inside there, there are two configuration
points:
max_user_instances = Maximum number of devices - per user
max_user_watches = Maximum number of "watched" fds - per user
The current default for "max_user_watches" limits the memory used by epoll
to store "watches", to 1/32 of the amount of the low RAM. As example, a
256MB 32bit machine, will have "max_user_watches" set to roughly 90000.
That should be enough to not break existing heavy epoll users. The
default value for "max_user_instances" is set to 128, that should be
enough too.
This also changes the userspace, because a new error code can now come out
from EPOLL_CTL_ADD (-ENOSPC). The EMFILE from epoll_create() was already
listed, so that should be ok.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: use get_current_user()]
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegardno@ifi.uio.no>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-12-01 21:13:55 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/sysctl.h>
|
|
|
|
|
proc/sysctl: add shared variables for range check
In the sysctl code the proc_dointvec_minmax() function is often used to
validate the user supplied value between an allowed range. This
function uses the extra1 and extra2 members from struct ctl_table as
minimum and maximum allowed value.
On sysctl handler declaration, in every source file there are some
readonly variables containing just an integer which address is assigned
to the extra1 and extra2 members, so the sysctl range is enforced.
The special values 0, 1 and INT_MAX are very often used as range
boundary, leading duplication of variables like zero=0, one=1,
int_max=INT_MAX in different source files:
$ git grep -E '\.extra[12].*&(zero|one|int_max)' |wc -l
248
Add a const int array containing the most commonly used values, some
macros to refer more easily to the correct array member, and use them
instead of creating a local one for every object file.
This is the bloat-o-meter output comparing the old and new binary
compiled with the default Fedora config:
# scripts/bloat-o-meter -d vmlinux.o.old vmlinux.o
add/remove: 2/2 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 24/-188 (-164)
Data old new delta
sysctl_vals - 12 +12
__kstrtab_sysctl_vals - 12 +12
max 14 10 -4
int_max 16 - -16
one 68 - -68
zero 128 28 -100
Total: Before=20583249, After=20583085, chg -0.00%
[mcroce@redhat.com: tipc: remove two unused variables]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530091952.4108-1-mcroce@redhat.com
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c]
[arnd@arndb.de: proc/sysctl: make firmware loader table conditional]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617130014.1713870-1-arnd@arndb.de
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/eventpoll.c]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190430180111.10688-1-mcroce@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-18 22:58:50 +00:00
|
|
|
static long long_zero;
|
2011-01-13 01:00:01 +00:00
|
|
|
static long long_max = LONG_MAX;
|
epoll: introduce resource usage limits
It has been thought that the per-user file descriptors limit would also
limit the resources that a normal user can request via the epoll
interface. Vegard Nossum reported a very simple program (a modified
version attached) that can make a normal user to request a pretty large
amount of kernel memory, well within the its maximum number of fds. To
solve such problem, default limits are now imposed, and /proc based
configuration has been introduced. A new directory has been created,
named /proc/sys/fs/epoll/ and inside there, there are two configuration
points:
max_user_instances = Maximum number of devices - per user
max_user_watches = Maximum number of "watched" fds - per user
The current default for "max_user_watches" limits the memory used by epoll
to store "watches", to 1/32 of the amount of the low RAM. As example, a
256MB 32bit machine, will have "max_user_watches" set to roughly 90000.
That should be enough to not break existing heavy epoll users. The
default value for "max_user_instances" is set to 128, that should be
enough too.
This also changes the userspace, because a new error code can now come out
from EPOLL_CTL_ADD (-ENOSPC). The EMFILE from epoll_create() was already
listed, so that should be ok.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: use get_current_user()]
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegardno@ifi.uio.no>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-12-01 21:13:55 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2022-01-22 06:12:09 +00:00
|
|
|
static struct ctl_table epoll_table[] = {
|
epoll: introduce resource usage limits
It has been thought that the per-user file descriptors limit would also
limit the resources that a normal user can request via the epoll
interface. Vegard Nossum reported a very simple program (a modified
version attached) that can make a normal user to request a pretty large
amount of kernel memory, well within the its maximum number of fds. To
solve such problem, default limits are now imposed, and /proc based
configuration has been introduced. A new directory has been created,
named /proc/sys/fs/epoll/ and inside there, there are two configuration
points:
max_user_instances = Maximum number of devices - per user
max_user_watches = Maximum number of "watched" fds - per user
The current default for "max_user_watches" limits the memory used by epoll
to store "watches", to 1/32 of the amount of the low RAM. As example, a
256MB 32bit machine, will have "max_user_watches" set to roughly 90000.
That should be enough to not break existing heavy epoll users. The
default value for "max_user_instances" is set to 128, that should be
enough too.
This also changes the userspace, because a new error code can now come out
from EPOLL_CTL_ADD (-ENOSPC). The EMFILE from epoll_create() was already
listed, so that should be ok.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: use get_current_user()]
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegardno@ifi.uio.no>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-12-01 21:13:55 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.procname = "max_user_watches",
|
|
|
|
.data = &max_user_watches,
|
2011-01-13 01:00:01 +00:00
|
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(max_user_watches),
|
epoll: introduce resource usage limits
It has been thought that the per-user file descriptors limit would also
limit the resources that a normal user can request via the epoll
interface. Vegard Nossum reported a very simple program (a modified
version attached) that can make a normal user to request a pretty large
amount of kernel memory, well within the its maximum number of fds. To
solve such problem, default limits are now imposed, and /proc based
configuration has been introduced. A new directory has been created,
named /proc/sys/fs/epoll/ and inside there, there are two configuration
points:
max_user_instances = Maximum number of devices - per user
max_user_watches = Maximum number of "watched" fds - per user
The current default for "max_user_watches" limits the memory used by epoll
to store "watches", to 1/32 of the amount of the low RAM. As example, a
256MB 32bit machine, will have "max_user_watches" set to roughly 90000.
That should be enough to not break existing heavy epoll users. The
default value for "max_user_instances" is set to 128, that should be
enough too.
This also changes the userspace, because a new error code can now come out
from EPOLL_CTL_ADD (-ENOSPC). The EMFILE from epoll_create() was already
listed, so that should be ok.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: use get_current_user()]
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegardno@ifi.uio.no>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-12-01 21:13:55 +00:00
|
|
|
.mode = 0644,
|
2011-01-13 01:00:01 +00:00
|
|
|
.proc_handler = proc_doulongvec_minmax,
|
proc/sysctl: add shared variables for range check
In the sysctl code the proc_dointvec_minmax() function is often used to
validate the user supplied value between an allowed range. This
function uses the extra1 and extra2 members from struct ctl_table as
minimum and maximum allowed value.
On sysctl handler declaration, in every source file there are some
readonly variables containing just an integer which address is assigned
to the extra1 and extra2 members, so the sysctl range is enforced.
The special values 0, 1 and INT_MAX are very often used as range
boundary, leading duplication of variables like zero=0, one=1,
int_max=INT_MAX in different source files:
$ git grep -E '\.extra[12].*&(zero|one|int_max)' |wc -l
248
Add a const int array containing the most commonly used values, some
macros to refer more easily to the correct array member, and use them
instead of creating a local one for every object file.
This is the bloat-o-meter output comparing the old and new binary
compiled with the default Fedora config:
# scripts/bloat-o-meter -d vmlinux.o.old vmlinux.o
add/remove: 2/2 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 24/-188 (-164)
Data old new delta
sysctl_vals - 12 +12
__kstrtab_sysctl_vals - 12 +12
max 14 10 -4
int_max 16 - -16
one 68 - -68
zero 128 28 -100
Total: Before=20583249, After=20583085, chg -0.00%
[mcroce@redhat.com: tipc: remove two unused variables]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530091952.4108-1-mcroce@redhat.com
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c]
[arnd@arndb.de: proc/sysctl: make firmware loader table conditional]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617130014.1713870-1-arnd@arndb.de
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/eventpoll.c]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190430180111.10688-1-mcroce@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-18 22:58:50 +00:00
|
|
|
.extra1 = &long_zero,
|
2011-01-13 01:00:01 +00:00
|
|
|
.extra2 = &long_max,
|
epoll: introduce resource usage limits
It has been thought that the per-user file descriptors limit would also
limit the resources that a normal user can request via the epoll
interface. Vegard Nossum reported a very simple program (a modified
version attached) that can make a normal user to request a pretty large
amount of kernel memory, well within the its maximum number of fds. To
solve such problem, default limits are now imposed, and /proc based
configuration has been introduced. A new directory has been created,
named /proc/sys/fs/epoll/ and inside there, there are two configuration
points:
max_user_instances = Maximum number of devices - per user
max_user_watches = Maximum number of "watched" fds - per user
The current default for "max_user_watches" limits the memory used by epoll
to store "watches", to 1/32 of the amount of the low RAM. As example, a
256MB 32bit machine, will have "max_user_watches" set to roughly 90000.
That should be enough to not break existing heavy epoll users. The
default value for "max_user_instances" is set to 128, that should be
enough too.
This also changes the userspace, because a new error code can now come out
from EPOLL_CTL_ADD (-ENOSPC). The EMFILE from epoll_create() was already
listed, so that should be ok.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: use get_current_user()]
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegardno@ifi.uio.no>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-12-01 21:13:55 +00:00
|
|
|
},
|
2009-11-05 22:25:10 +00:00
|
|
|
{ }
|
epoll: introduce resource usage limits
It has been thought that the per-user file descriptors limit would also
limit the resources that a normal user can request via the epoll
interface. Vegard Nossum reported a very simple program (a modified
version attached) that can make a normal user to request a pretty large
amount of kernel memory, well within the its maximum number of fds. To
solve such problem, default limits are now imposed, and /proc based
configuration has been introduced. A new directory has been created,
named /proc/sys/fs/epoll/ and inside there, there are two configuration
points:
max_user_instances = Maximum number of devices - per user
max_user_watches = Maximum number of "watched" fds - per user
The current default for "max_user_watches" limits the memory used by epoll
to store "watches", to 1/32 of the amount of the low RAM. As example, a
256MB 32bit machine, will have "max_user_watches" set to roughly 90000.
That should be enough to not break existing heavy epoll users. The
default value for "max_user_instances" is set to 128, that should be
enough too.
This also changes the userspace, because a new error code can now come out
from EPOLL_CTL_ADD (-ENOSPC). The EMFILE from epoll_create() was already
listed, so that should be ok.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: use get_current_user()]
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegardno@ifi.uio.no>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-12-01 21:13:55 +00:00
|
|
|
};
|
2022-01-22 06:12:09 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void __init epoll_sysctls_init(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
register_sysctl("fs/epoll", epoll_table);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
#define epoll_sysctls_init() do { } while (0)
|
epoll: introduce resource usage limits
It has been thought that the per-user file descriptors limit would also
limit the resources that a normal user can request via the epoll
interface. Vegard Nossum reported a very simple program (a modified
version attached) that can make a normal user to request a pretty large
amount of kernel memory, well within the its maximum number of fds. To
solve such problem, default limits are now imposed, and /proc based
configuration has been introduced. A new directory has been created,
named /proc/sys/fs/epoll/ and inside there, there are two configuration
points:
max_user_instances = Maximum number of devices - per user
max_user_watches = Maximum number of "watched" fds - per user
The current default for "max_user_watches" limits the memory used by epoll
to store "watches", to 1/32 of the amount of the low RAM. As example, a
256MB 32bit machine, will have "max_user_watches" set to roughly 90000.
That should be enough to not break existing heavy epoll users. The
default value for "max_user_instances" is set to 128, that should be
enough too.
This also changes the userspace, because a new error code can now come out
from EPOLL_CTL_ADD (-ENOSPC). The EMFILE from epoll_create() was already
listed, so that should be ok.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: use get_current_user()]
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegardno@ifi.uio.no>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-12-01 21:13:55 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
|
|
|
|
|
epoll: limit paths
The current epoll code can be tickled to run basically indefinitely in
both loop detection path check (on ep_insert()), and in the wakeup paths.
The programs that tickle this behavior set up deeply linked networks of
epoll file descriptors that cause the epoll algorithms to traverse them
indefinitely. A couple of these sample programs have been previously
posted in this thread: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/25/297.
To fix the loop detection path check algorithms, I simply keep track of
the epoll nodes that have been already visited. Thus, the loop detection
becomes proportional to the number of epoll file descriptor and links.
This dramatically decreases the run-time of the loop check algorithm. In
one diabolical case I tried it reduced the run-time from 15 mintues (all
in kernel time) to .3 seconds.
Fixing the wakeup paths could be done at wakeup time in a similar manner
by keeping track of nodes that have already been visited, but the
complexity is harder, since there can be multiple wakeups on different
cpus...Thus, I've opted to limit the number of possible wakeup paths when
the paths are created.
This is accomplished, by noting that the end file descriptor points that
are found during the loop detection pass (from the newly added link), are
actually the sources for wakeup events. I keep a list of these file
descriptors and limit the number and length of these paths that emanate
from these 'source file descriptors'. In the current implemetation I
allow 1000 paths of length 1, 500 of length 2, 100 of length 3, 50 of
length 4 and 10 of length 5. Note that it is sufficient to check the
'source file descriptors' reachable from the newly added link, since no
other 'source file descriptors' will have newly added links. This allows
us to check only the wakeup paths that may have gotten too long, and not
re-check all possible wakeup paths on the system.
In terms of the path limit selection, I think its first worth noting that
the most common case for epoll, is probably the model where you have 1
epoll file descriptor that is monitoring n number of 'source file
descriptors'. In this case, each 'source file descriptor' has a 1 path of
length 1. Thus, I believe that the limits I'm proposing are quite
reasonable and in fact may be too generous. Thus, I'm hoping that the
proposed limits will not prevent any workloads that currently work to
fail.
In terms of locking, I have extended the use of the 'epmutex' to all
epoll_ctl add and remove operations. Currently its only used in a subset
of the add paths. I need to hold the epmutex, so that we can correctly
traverse a coherent graph, to check the number of paths. I believe that
this additional locking is probably ok, since its in the setup/teardown
paths, and doesn't affect the running paths, but it certainly is going to
add some extra overhead. Also, worth noting is that the epmuex was
recently added to the ep_ctl add operations in the initial path loop
detection code using the argument that it was not on a critical path.
Another thing to note here, is the length of epoll chains that is allowed.
Currently, eventpoll.c defines:
/* Maximum number of nesting allowed inside epoll sets */
#define EP_MAX_NESTS 4
This basically means that I am limited to a graph depth of 5 (EP_MAX_NESTS
+ 1). However, this limit is currently only enforced during the loop
check detection code, and only when the epoll file descriptors are added
in a certain order. Thus, this limit is currently easily bypassed. The
newly added check for wakeup paths, stricly limits the wakeup paths to a
length of 5, regardless of the order in which ep's are linked together.
Thus, a side-effect of the new code is a more consistent enforcement of
the graph depth.
Thus far, I've tested this, using the sample programs previously
mentioned, which now either return quickly or return -EINVAL. I've also
testing using the piptest.c epoll tester, which showed no difference in
performance. I've also created a number of different epoll networks and
tested that they behave as expectded.
I believe this solves the original diabolical test cases, while still
preserving the sane epoll nesting.
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Cc: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-01-13 01:17:43 +00:00
|
|
|
static const struct file_operations eventpoll_fops;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline int is_file_epoll(struct file *f)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return f->f_op == &eventpoll_fops;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-06-23 07:10:03 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2007-05-15 08:40:52 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Setup the structure that is used as key for the RB tree */
|
2005-06-23 07:10:03 +00:00
|
|
|
static inline void ep_set_ffd(struct epoll_filefd *ffd,
|
|
|
|
struct file *file, int fd)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ffd->file = file;
|
|
|
|
ffd->fd = fd;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-05-15 08:40:52 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Compare RB tree keys */
|
2005-06-23 07:10:03 +00:00
|
|
|
static inline int ep_cmp_ffd(struct epoll_filefd *p1,
|
|
|
|
struct epoll_filefd *p2)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return (p1->file > p2->file ? +1:
|
|
|
|
(p1->file < p2->file ? -1 : p1->fd - p2->fd));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Tells us if the item is currently linked */
|
2018-08-22 04:58:26 +00:00
|
|
|
static inline int ep_is_linked(struct epitem *epi)
|
2005-06-23 07:10:03 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2018-08-22 04:58:26 +00:00
|
|
|
return !list_empty(&epi->rdllink);
|
2005-06-23 07:10:03 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-06-20 10:06:13 +00:00
|
|
|
static inline struct eppoll_entry *ep_pwq_from_wait(wait_queue_entry_t *p)
|
2012-02-24 19:07:29 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return container_of(p, struct eppoll_entry, wait);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-06-23 07:10:03 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Get the "struct epitem" from a wait queue pointer */
|
2017-06-20 10:06:13 +00:00
|
|
|
static inline struct epitem *ep_item_from_wait(wait_queue_entry_t *p)
|
2005-06-23 07:10:03 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return container_of(p, struct eppoll_entry, wait)->base;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-03-22 23:34:46 +00:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* ep_events_available - Checks if ready events might be available.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* @ep: Pointer to the eventpoll context.
|
|
|
|
*
|
2021-03-01 22:25:51 +00:00
|
|
|
* Return: a value different than %zero if ready events are available,
|
|
|
|
* or %zero otherwise.
|
2011-03-22 23:34:46 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static inline int ep_events_available(struct eventpoll *ep)
|
|
|
|
{
|
fs/epoll: reduce the scope of wq lock in epoll_wait()
This patch aims at reducing ep wq.lock hold times in epoll_wait(2). For
the blocking case, there is no need to constantly take and drop the
spinlock, which is only needed to manipulate the waitqueue.
The call to ep_events_available() is now lockless, and only exposed to
benign races. Here, if false positive (returns available events and
does not see another thread deleting an epi from the list) we call into
send_events and then the list's state is correctly seen. Otoh, if a
false negative and we don't see a list_add_tail(), for example, from irq
callback, then it is rechecked again before blocking, which will see the
correct state.
In order for more accuracy to see concurrent list_del_init(), use the
list_empty_careful() variant -- of course, this won't be safe against
insertions from wakeup.
For the overflow list we obviously need to prevent load/store tearing as
we don't want to see partial values while the ready list is disabled.
[dave@stgolabs.net: forgotten fixlets]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181109155258.jxcr4t2pnz6zqct3@linux-r8p5
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181108051006.18751-6-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Suggested-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-03 23:27:15 +00:00
|
|
|
return !list_empty_careful(&ep->rdllist) ||
|
|
|
|
READ_ONCE(ep->ovflist) != EP_UNACTIVE_PTR;
|
2011-03-22 23:34:46 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-24 17:08:30 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_NET_RX_BUSY_POLL
|
|
|
|
static bool ep_busy_loop_end(void *p, unsigned long start_time)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct eventpoll *ep = p;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ep_events_available(ep) || busy_loop_timeout(start_time);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Busy poll if globally on and supporting sockets found && no events,
|
|
|
|
* busy loop will return if need_resched or ep_events_available.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* we must do our busy polling with irqs enabled
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2020-12-18 22:01:57 +00:00
|
|
|
static bool ep_busy_loop(struct eventpoll *ep, int nonblock)
|
2017-03-24 17:08:30 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned int napi_id = READ_ONCE(ep->napi_id);
|
|
|
|
|
2020-12-18 22:01:57 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((napi_id >= MIN_NAPI_ID) && net_busy_loop_on()) {
|
2020-11-30 18:51:57 +00:00
|
|
|
napi_busy_loop(napi_id, nonblock ? NULL : ep_busy_loop_end, ep, false,
|
|
|
|
BUSY_POLL_BUDGET);
|
2020-12-18 22:01:57 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ep_events_available(ep))
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Busy poll timed out. Drop NAPI ID for now, we can add
|
|
|
|
* it back in when we have moved a socket with a valid NAPI
|
|
|
|
* ID onto the ready list.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-03-24 17:08:30 +00:00
|
|
|
ep->napi_id = 0;
|
2020-12-18 22:01:57 +00:00
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
2017-03-24 17:08:30 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Set epoll busy poll NAPI ID from sk.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static inline void ep_set_busy_poll_napi_id(struct epitem *epi)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct eventpoll *ep;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int napi_id;
|
|
|
|
struct socket *sock;
|
|
|
|
struct sock *sk;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!net_busy_loop_on())
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
2020-12-04 11:36:04 +00:00
|
|
|
sock = sock_from_file(epi->ffd.file);
|
2017-03-24 17:08:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!sock)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sk = sock->sk;
|
|
|
|
if (!sk)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
napi_id = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_napi_id);
|
|
|
|
ep = epi->ep;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Non-NAPI IDs can be rejected
|
|
|
|
* or
|
|
|
|
* Nothing to do if we already have this ID
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (napi_id < MIN_NAPI_ID || napi_id == ep->napi_id)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* record NAPI ID for use in next busy poll */
|
|
|
|
ep->napi_id = napi_id;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-08-22 04:58:19 +00:00
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
|
2020-12-18 22:01:57 +00:00
|
|
|
static inline bool ep_busy_loop(struct eventpoll *ep, int nonblock)
|
2018-08-22 04:58:19 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2020-12-18 22:01:57 +00:00
|
|
|
return false;
|
2018-08-22 04:58:19 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline void ep_set_busy_poll_napi_id(struct epitem *epi)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_NET_RX_BUSY_POLL */
|
|
|
|
|
epoll: comment the funky #ifdef
Looking for a bug in -rt, I stumbled across this code here from: commit
2dfa4eeab0fc ("epoll keyed wakeups: teach epoll about hints coming with
the wakeup key"), specifically:
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCK_ALLOC
static inline void ep_wake_up_nested(wait_queue_head_t *wqueue,
unsigned long events, int subclass)
{
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave_nested(&wqueue->lock, flags, subclass);
wake_up_locked_poll(wqueue, events);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&wqueue->lock, flags);
}
#else
static inline void ep_wake_up_nested(wait_queue_head_t *wqueue,
unsigned long events, int subclass)
{
wake_up_poll(wqueue, events);
}
#endif
You change the function of ep_wake_up_nested() depending on whether
CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCK_ALLOC is set or not. This looks awfully suspicious,
and there's no comment to explain why. I initially thought that this
was trying to fool lockdep, and hiding a real bug.
Investigating it, I found the creation of wake_up_nested() (which no
longer exists) but was created for the sole purpose of epoll and its
strange wake ups, as explained in commit 0ccf831cbee9 ("lockdep:
annotate epoll")
Although the commit message says "annotate epoll" the change log is much
better at explaining what is happening than what is in the actual code.
Thus a comment is really necessary here. And to save the time of other
developers from having to go trudging through the git logs trying to
figure out why this code exists.
I took parts of the change log and placed it into a comment above the
affected code. This will make the description of what is happening more
visible to new developers that have to look at this code for the first
time.
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-03-23 22:02:27 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* As described in commit 0ccf831cb lockdep: annotate epoll
|
|
|
|
* the use of wait queues used by epoll is done in a very controlled
|
|
|
|
* manner. Wake ups can nest inside each other, but are never done
|
|
|
|
* with the same locking. For example:
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* dfd = socket(...);
|
|
|
|
* efd1 = epoll_create();
|
|
|
|
* efd2 = epoll_create();
|
|
|
|
* epoll_ctl(efd1, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, dfd, ...);
|
|
|
|
* epoll_ctl(efd2, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, efd1, ...);
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* When a packet arrives to the device underneath "dfd", the net code will
|
|
|
|
* issue a wake_up() on its poll wake list. Epoll (efd1) has installed a
|
|
|
|
* callback wakeup entry on that queue, and the wake_up() performed by the
|
|
|
|
* "dfd" net code will end up in ep_poll_callback(). At this point epoll
|
|
|
|
* (efd1) notices that it may have some event ready, so it needs to wake up
|
|
|
|
* the waiters on its poll wait list (efd2). So it calls ep_poll_safewake()
|
|
|
|
* that ends up in another wake_up(), after having checked about the
|
2023-03-12 09:25:22 +00:00
|
|
|
* recursion constraints. That are, no more than EP_MAX_NESTS, to avoid
|
|
|
|
* stack blasting.
|
epoll: comment the funky #ifdef
Looking for a bug in -rt, I stumbled across this code here from: commit
2dfa4eeab0fc ("epoll keyed wakeups: teach epoll about hints coming with
the wakeup key"), specifically:
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCK_ALLOC
static inline void ep_wake_up_nested(wait_queue_head_t *wqueue,
unsigned long events, int subclass)
{
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave_nested(&wqueue->lock, flags, subclass);
wake_up_locked_poll(wqueue, events);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&wqueue->lock, flags);
}
#else
static inline void ep_wake_up_nested(wait_queue_head_t *wqueue,
unsigned long events, int subclass)
{
wake_up_poll(wqueue, events);
}
#endif
You change the function of ep_wake_up_nested() depending on whether
CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCK_ALLOC is set or not. This looks awfully suspicious,
and there's no comment to explain why. I initially thought that this
was trying to fool lockdep, and hiding a real bug.
Investigating it, I found the creation of wake_up_nested() (which no
longer exists) but was created for the sole purpose of epoll and its
strange wake ups, as explained in commit 0ccf831cbee9 ("lockdep:
annotate epoll")
Although the commit message says "annotate epoll" the change log is much
better at explaining what is happening than what is in the actual code.
Thus a comment is really necessary here. And to save the time of other
developers from having to go trudging through the git logs trying to
figure out why this code exists.
I took parts of the change log and placed it into a comment above the
affected code. This will make the description of what is happening more
visible to new developers that have to look at this code for the first
time.
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-03-23 22:02:27 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* When CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCK_ALLOC is enabled, make sure lockdep can handle
|
|
|
|
* this special case of epoll.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2009-03-31 22:24:22 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCK_ALLOC
|
epoll: avoid calling ep_call_nested() from ep_poll_safewake()
ep_poll_safewake() is used to wakeup potentially nested epoll file
descriptors. The function uses ep_call_nested() to prevent entering the
same wake up queue more than once, and to prevent excessively deep
wakeup paths (deeper than EP_MAX_NESTS). However, this is not necessary
since we are already preventing these conditions during EPOLL_CTL_ADD.
This saves extra function calls, and avoids taking a global lock during
the ep_call_nested() calls.
I have, however, left ep_call_nested() for the CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCK_ALLOC
case, since ep_call_nested() keeps track of the nesting level, and this
is required by the call to spin_lock_irqsave_nested(). It would be nice
to remove the ep_call_nested() calls for the CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCK_ALLOC
case as well, however its not clear how to simply pass the nesting level
through multiple wake_up() levels without more surgery. In any case, I
don't think CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCK_ALLOC is generally used for production.
This patch, also apparently fixes a workload at Google that Salman Qazi
reported by completely removing the poll_safewake_ncalls->lock from
wakeup paths.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1507920533-8812-1-git-send-email-jbaron@akamai.com
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Salman Qazi <sqazi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-11-17 23:29:02 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2022-11-20 17:10:53 +00:00
|
|
|
static void ep_poll_safewake(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epitem *epi,
|
|
|
|
unsigned pollflags)
|
epoll: fix epoll's own poll
Fix a bug inside the epoll's f_op->poll() code, that returns POLLIN even
though there are no actual ready monitored fds. The bug shows up if you
add an epoll fd inside another fd container (poll, select, epoll).
The problem is that callback-based wake ups used by epoll does not carry
(patches will follow, to fix this) any information about the events that
actually happened. So the callback code, since it can't call the file*
->poll() inside the callback, chains the file* into a ready-list.
So, suppose you added an fd with EPOLLOUT only, and some data shows up on
the fd, the file* mapped by the fd will be added into the ready-list (via
wakeup callback). During normal epoll_wait() use, this condition is
sorted out at the time we're actually able to call the file*'s
f_op->poll().
Inside the old epoll's f_op->poll() though, only a quick check
!list_empty(ready-list) was performed, and this could have led to
reporting POLLIN even though no ready fds would show up at a following
epoll_wait(). In order to correctly report the ready status for an epoll
fd, the ready-list must be checked to see if any really available fd+event
would be ready in a following epoll_wait().
Operation (calling f_op->poll() from inside f_op->poll()) that, like wake
ups, must be handled with care because of the fact that epoll fds can be
added to other epoll fds.
Test code:
/*
* epoll_test by Davide Libenzi (Simple code to test epoll internals)
* Copyright (C) 2008 Davide Libenzi
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
*
* Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
*
*/
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <poll.h>
#include <sys/epoll.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#define EPWAIT_TIMEO (1 * 1000)
#ifndef POLLRDHUP
#define POLLRDHUP 0x2000
#endif
#define EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN 100L
#define EPOLL_TF_LOOP (1 << 0)
struct epoll_test_cfg {
long size;
long flags;
};
static int xepoll_create(int n) {
int epfd;
if ((epfd = epoll_create(n)) == -1) {
perror("epoll_create");
exit(2);
}
return epfd;
}
static void xepoll_ctl(int epfd, int cmd, int fd, struct epoll_event *evt) {
if (epoll_ctl(epfd, cmd, fd, evt) < 0) {
perror("epoll_ctl");
exit(3);
}
}
static void xpipe(int *fds) {
if (pipe(fds)) {
perror("pipe");
exit(4);
}
}
static pid_t xfork(void) {
pid_t pid;
if ((pid = fork()) == (pid_t) -1) {
perror("pipe");
exit(5);
}
return pid;
}
static int run_forked_proc(int (*proc)(void *), void *data) {
int status;
pid_t pid;
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0)
exit((*proc)(data));
if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status): -2;
}
static int check_events(int fd, int timeo) {
struct pollfd pfd;
fprintf(stdout, "Checking events for fd %d\n", fd);
memset(&pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd));
pfd.fd = fd;
pfd.events = POLLIN | POLLOUT;
if (poll(&pfd, 1, timeo) < 0) {
perror("poll()");
return 0;
}
if (pfd.revents & POLLIN)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLIN\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLOUT)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLOUT\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLERR)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLERR\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLHUP)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLHUP\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLRDHUP)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLRDHUP\n");
return pfd.revents;
}
static int epoll_test_tty(void *data) {
int epfd, ifd = fileno(stdin), res;
struct epoll_event evt;
if (check_events(ifd, 0) != POLLOUT) {
fprintf(stderr, "Something is cooking on STDIN (%d)\n", ifd);
return 1;
}
epfd = xepoll_create(1);
fprintf(stdout, "Created epoll fd (%d)\n", epfd);
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
xepoll_ctl(epfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, ifd, &evt);
if (check_events(epfd, 0) & POLLIN) {
res = epoll_wait(epfd, &evt, 1, 0);
if (res == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Epoll fd (%d) is ready when it shouldn't!\n",
epfd);
return 2;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int epoll_wakeup_chain(void *data) {
struct epoll_test_cfg *tcfg = data;
int i, res, epfd, bfd, nfd, pfds[2];
pid_t pid;
struct epoll_event evt;
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
epfd = bfd = xepoll_create(1);
for (i = 0; i < tcfg->size; i++) {
nfd = xepoll_create(1);
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, nfd, &evt);
bfd = nfd;
}
xpipe(pfds);
if (tcfg->flags & EPOLL_TF_LOOP)
{
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, epfd, &evt);
/*
* If we're testing for loop, we want that the wakeup
* triggered by the write to the pipe done in the child
* process, triggers a fake event. So we add the pipe
* read size with EPOLLOUT events. This will trigger
* an addition to the ready-list, but no real events
* will be there. The the epoll kernel code will proceed
* in calling f_op->poll() of the epfd, triggering the
* loop we want to test.
*/
evt.events = EPOLLOUT;
}
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, pfds[0], &evt);
/*
* The pipe write must come after the poll(2) call inside
* check_events(). This tests the nested wakeup code in
* fs/eventpoll.c:ep_poll_safewake()
* By having the check_events() (hence poll(2)) happens first,
* we have poll wait queue filled up, and the write(2) in the
* child will trigger the wakeup chain.
*/
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0) {
sleep(1);
write(pfds[1], "w", 1);
exit(0);
}
res = check_events(epfd, 2000) & POLLIN;
if (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return res;
}
static int epoll_poll_chain(void *data) {
struct epoll_test_cfg *tcfg = data;
int i, res, epfd, bfd, nfd, pfds[2];
pid_t pid;
struct epoll_event evt;
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
epfd = bfd = xepoll_create(1);
for (i = 0; i < tcfg->size; i++) {
nfd = xepoll_create(1);
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, nfd, &evt);
bfd = nfd;
}
xpipe(pfds);
if (tcfg->flags & EPOLL_TF_LOOP)
{
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, epfd, &evt);
/*
* If we're testing for loop, we want that the wakeup
* triggered by the write to the pipe done in the child
* process, triggers a fake event. So we add the pipe
* read size with EPOLLOUT events. This will trigger
* an addition to the ready-list, but no real events
* will be there. The the epoll kernel code will proceed
* in calling f_op->poll() of the epfd, triggering the
* loop we want to test.
*/
evt.events = EPOLLOUT;
}
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, pfds[0], &evt);
/*
* The pipe write mush come before the poll(2) call inside
* check_events(). This tests the nested f_op->poll calls code in
* fs/eventpoll.c:ep_eventpoll_poll()
* By having the pipe write(2) happen first, we make the kernel
* epoll code to load the ready lists, and the following poll(2)
* done inside check_events() will test nested poll code in
* ep_eventpoll_poll().
*/
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0) {
write(pfds[1], "w", 1);
exit(0);
}
sleep(1);
res = check_events(epfd, 1000) & POLLIN;
if (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return res;
}
int main(int ac, char **av) {
int error;
struct epoll_test_cfg tcfg;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing TTY events\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_test_tty, NULL);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing short wakeup chain\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == POLLIN ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing long wakeup chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing short poll chain\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == POLLIN ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing long poll chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = EPOLL_TF_LOOP;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing loopy wakeup chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = EPOLL_TF_LOOP;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing loopy poll chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Pavel Pisa <pisa@cmp.felk.cvut.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-03-31 22:24:10 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2020-04-07 03:11:23 +00:00
|
|
|
struct eventpoll *ep_src;
|
2019-12-05 00:52:12 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned long flags;
|
2020-04-07 03:11:23 +00:00
|
|
|
u8 nests = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* To set the subclass or nesting level for spin_lock_irqsave_nested()
|
|
|
|
* it might be natural to create a per-cpu nest count. However, since
|
|
|
|
* we can recurse on ep->poll_wait.lock, and a non-raw spinlock can
|
|
|
|
* schedule() in the -rt kernel, the per-cpu variable are no longer
|
|
|
|
* protected. Thus, we are introducing a per eventpoll nest field.
|
|
|
|
* If we are not being call from ep_poll_callback(), epi is NULL and
|
|
|
|
* we are at the first level of nesting, 0. Otherwise, we are being
|
|
|
|
* called from ep_poll_callback() and if a previous wakeup source is
|
|
|
|
* not an epoll file itself, we are at depth 1 since the wakeup source
|
|
|
|
* is depth 0. If the wakeup source is a previous epoll file in the
|
|
|
|
* wakeup chain then we use its nests value and record ours as
|
|
|
|
* nests + 1. The previous epoll file nests value is stable since its
|
|
|
|
* already holding its own poll_wait.lock.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (epi) {
|
|
|
|
if ((is_file_epoll(epi->ffd.file))) {
|
|
|
|
ep_src = epi->ffd.file->private_data;
|
|
|
|
nests = ep_src->nests;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
nests = 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
spin_lock_irqsave_nested(&ep->poll_wait.lock, flags, nests);
|
|
|
|
ep->nests = nests + 1;
|
2022-11-20 17:10:53 +00:00
|
|
|
wake_up_locked_poll(&ep->poll_wait, EPOLLIN | pollflags);
|
2020-04-07 03:11:23 +00:00
|
|
|
ep->nests = 0;
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ep->poll_wait.lock, flags);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
epoll: avoid calling ep_call_nested() from ep_poll_safewake()
ep_poll_safewake() is used to wakeup potentially nested epoll file
descriptors. The function uses ep_call_nested() to prevent entering the
same wake up queue more than once, and to prevent excessively deep
wakeup paths (deeper than EP_MAX_NESTS). However, this is not necessary
since we are already preventing these conditions during EPOLL_CTL_ADD.
This saves extra function calls, and avoids taking a global lock during
the ep_call_nested() calls.
I have, however, left ep_call_nested() for the CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCK_ALLOC
case, since ep_call_nested() keeps track of the nesting level, and this
is required by the call to spin_lock_irqsave_nested(). It would be nice
to remove the ep_call_nested() calls for the CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCK_ALLOC
case as well, however its not clear how to simply pass the nesting level
through multiple wake_up() levels without more surgery. In any case, I
don't think CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCK_ALLOC is generally used for production.
This patch, also apparently fixes a workload at Google that Salman Qazi
reported by completely removing the poll_safewake_ncalls->lock from
wakeup paths.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1507920533-8812-1-git-send-email-jbaron@akamai.com
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Salman Qazi <sqazi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-11-17 23:29:02 +00:00
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
|
2022-11-20 17:10:53 +00:00
|
|
|
static void ep_poll_safewake(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epitem *epi,
|
|
|
|
unsigned pollflags)
|
epoll: avoid calling ep_call_nested() from ep_poll_safewake()
ep_poll_safewake() is used to wakeup potentially nested epoll file
descriptors. The function uses ep_call_nested() to prevent entering the
same wake up queue more than once, and to prevent excessively deep
wakeup paths (deeper than EP_MAX_NESTS). However, this is not necessary
since we are already preventing these conditions during EPOLL_CTL_ADD.
This saves extra function calls, and avoids taking a global lock during
the ep_call_nested() calls.
I have, however, left ep_call_nested() for the CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCK_ALLOC
case, since ep_call_nested() keeps track of the nesting level, and this
is required by the call to spin_lock_irqsave_nested(). It would be nice
to remove the ep_call_nested() calls for the CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCK_ALLOC
case as well, however its not clear how to simply pass the nesting level
through multiple wake_up() levels without more surgery. In any case, I
don't think CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCK_ALLOC is generally used for production.
This patch, also apparently fixes a workload at Google that Salman Qazi
reported by completely removing the poll_safewake_ncalls->lock from
wakeup paths.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1507920533-8812-1-git-send-email-jbaron@akamai.com
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Salman Qazi <sqazi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-11-17 23:29:02 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2022-11-20 17:10:53 +00:00
|
|
|
wake_up_poll(&ep->poll_wait, EPOLLIN | pollflags);
|
epoll: avoid calling ep_call_nested() from ep_poll_safewake()
ep_poll_safewake() is used to wakeup potentially nested epoll file
descriptors. The function uses ep_call_nested() to prevent entering the
same wake up queue more than once, and to prevent excessively deep
wakeup paths (deeper than EP_MAX_NESTS). However, this is not necessary
since we are already preventing these conditions during EPOLL_CTL_ADD.
This saves extra function calls, and avoids taking a global lock during
the ep_call_nested() calls.
I have, however, left ep_call_nested() for the CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCK_ALLOC
case, since ep_call_nested() keeps track of the nesting level, and this
is required by the call to spin_lock_irqsave_nested(). It would be nice
to remove the ep_call_nested() calls for the CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCK_ALLOC
case as well, however its not clear how to simply pass the nesting level
through multiple wake_up() levels without more surgery. In any case, I
don't think CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCK_ALLOC is generally used for production.
This patch, also apparently fixes a workload at Google that Salman Qazi
reported by completely removing the poll_safewake_ncalls->lock from
wakeup paths.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1507920533-8812-1-git-send-email-jbaron@akamai.com
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Salman Qazi <sqazi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-11-17 23:29:02 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2012-02-24 19:07:29 +00:00
|
|
|
static void ep_remove_wait_queue(struct eppoll_entry *pwq)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
wait_queue_head_t *whead;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rcu_read_lock();
|
2017-09-01 16:55:33 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If it is cleared by POLLFREE, it should be rcu-safe.
|
|
|
|
* If we read NULL we need a barrier paired with
|
|
|
|
* smp_store_release() in ep_poll_callback(), otherwise
|
|
|
|
* we rely on whead->lock.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
whead = smp_load_acquire(&pwq->whead);
|
2012-02-24 19:07:29 +00:00
|
|
|
if (whead)
|
|
|
|
remove_wait_queue(whead, &pwq->wait);
|
|
|
|
rcu_read_unlock();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2009-03-31 22:24:15 +00:00
|
|
|
* This function unregisters poll callbacks from the associated file
|
epoll: use refcount to reduce ep_mutex contention
We are observing huge contention on the epmutex during an http
connection/rate test:
83.17% 0.25% nginx [kernel.kallsyms] [k] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
[...]
|--66.96%--__fput
|--60.04%--eventpoll_release_file
|--58.41%--__mutex_lock.isra.6
|--56.56%--osq_lock
The application is multi-threaded, creates a new epoll entry for
each incoming connection, and does not delete it before the
connection shutdown - that is, before the connection's fd close().
Many different threads compete frequently for the epmutex lock,
affecting the overall performance.
To reduce the contention this patch introduces explicit reference counting
for the eventpoll struct. Each registered event acquires a reference,
and references are released at ep_remove() time.
The eventpoll struct is released by whoever - among EP file close() and
and the monitored file close() drops its last reference.
Additionally, this introduces a new 'dying' flag to prevent races between
the EP file close() and the monitored file close().
ep_eventpoll_release() marks, under f_lock spinlock, each epitem as dying
before removing it, while EP file close() does not touch dying epitems.
The above is needed as both close operations could run concurrently and
drop the EP reference acquired via the epitem entry. Without the above
flag, the monitored file close() could reach the EP struct via the epitem
list while the epitem is still listed and then try to put it after its
disposal.
An alternative could be avoiding touching the references acquired via
the epitems at EP file close() time, but that could leave the EP struct
alive for potentially unlimited time after EP file close(), with nasty
side effects.
With all the above in place, we can drop the epmutex usage at disposal time.
Overall this produces a significant performance improvement in the
mentioned connection/rate scenario: the mutex operations disappear from
the topmost offenders in the perf report, and the measured connections/rate
grows by ~60%.
To make the change more readable this additionally renames ep_free() to
ep_clear_and_put(), and moves the actual memory cleanup in a separate
ep_free() helper.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/4a57788dcaf28f5eb4f8dfddcc3a8b172a7357bb.1679504153.git.pabeni@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Tested-by: Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhiat.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-03-22 16:57:02 +00:00
|
|
|
* descriptor. Must be called with "mtx" held.
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
static void ep_unregister_pollwait(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epitem *epi)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2020-09-02 15:45:57 +00:00
|
|
|
struct eppoll_entry **p = &epi->pwqlist;
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
struct eppoll_entry *pwq;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-09-02 15:45:57 +00:00
|
|
|
while ((pwq = *p) != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
*p = pwq->next;
|
2012-02-24 19:07:29 +00:00
|
|
|
ep_remove_wait_queue(pwq);
|
2009-03-31 22:24:15 +00:00
|
|
|
kmem_cache_free(pwq_cache, pwq);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-04-30 22:27:39 +00:00
|
|
|
/* call only when ep->mtx is held */
|
|
|
|
static inline struct wakeup_source *ep_wakeup_source(struct epitem *epi)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return rcu_dereference_check(epi->ws, lockdep_is_held(&epi->ep->mtx));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* call only when ep->mtx is held */
|
|
|
|
static inline void ep_pm_stay_awake(struct epitem *epi)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct wakeup_source *ws = ep_wakeup_source(epi);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ws)
|
|
|
|
__pm_stay_awake(ws);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline bool ep_has_wakeup_source(struct epitem *epi)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return rcu_access_pointer(epi->ws) ? true : false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* call when ep->mtx cannot be held (ep_poll_callback) */
|
|
|
|
static inline void ep_pm_stay_awake_rcu(struct epitem *epi)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct wakeup_source *ws;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rcu_read_lock();
|
|
|
|
ws = rcu_dereference(epi->ws);
|
|
|
|
if (ws)
|
|
|
|
__pm_stay_awake(ws);
|
|
|
|
rcu_read_unlock();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
epoll: fix epoll's own poll
Fix a bug inside the epoll's f_op->poll() code, that returns POLLIN even
though there are no actual ready monitored fds. The bug shows up if you
add an epoll fd inside another fd container (poll, select, epoll).
The problem is that callback-based wake ups used by epoll does not carry
(patches will follow, to fix this) any information about the events that
actually happened. So the callback code, since it can't call the file*
->poll() inside the callback, chains the file* into a ready-list.
So, suppose you added an fd with EPOLLOUT only, and some data shows up on
the fd, the file* mapped by the fd will be added into the ready-list (via
wakeup callback). During normal epoll_wait() use, this condition is
sorted out at the time we're actually able to call the file*'s
f_op->poll().
Inside the old epoll's f_op->poll() though, only a quick check
!list_empty(ready-list) was performed, and this could have led to
reporting POLLIN even though no ready fds would show up at a following
epoll_wait(). In order to correctly report the ready status for an epoll
fd, the ready-list must be checked to see if any really available fd+event
would be ready in a following epoll_wait().
Operation (calling f_op->poll() from inside f_op->poll()) that, like wake
ups, must be handled with care because of the fact that epoll fds can be
added to other epoll fds.
Test code:
/*
* epoll_test by Davide Libenzi (Simple code to test epoll internals)
* Copyright (C) 2008 Davide Libenzi
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
*
* Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
*
*/
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <poll.h>
#include <sys/epoll.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#define EPWAIT_TIMEO (1 * 1000)
#ifndef POLLRDHUP
#define POLLRDHUP 0x2000
#endif
#define EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN 100L
#define EPOLL_TF_LOOP (1 << 0)
struct epoll_test_cfg {
long size;
long flags;
};
static int xepoll_create(int n) {
int epfd;
if ((epfd = epoll_create(n)) == -1) {
perror("epoll_create");
exit(2);
}
return epfd;
}
static void xepoll_ctl(int epfd, int cmd, int fd, struct epoll_event *evt) {
if (epoll_ctl(epfd, cmd, fd, evt) < 0) {
perror("epoll_ctl");
exit(3);
}
}
static void xpipe(int *fds) {
if (pipe(fds)) {
perror("pipe");
exit(4);
}
}
static pid_t xfork(void) {
pid_t pid;
if ((pid = fork()) == (pid_t) -1) {
perror("pipe");
exit(5);
}
return pid;
}
static int run_forked_proc(int (*proc)(void *), void *data) {
int status;
pid_t pid;
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0)
exit((*proc)(data));
if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status): -2;
}
static int check_events(int fd, int timeo) {
struct pollfd pfd;
fprintf(stdout, "Checking events for fd %d\n", fd);
memset(&pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd));
pfd.fd = fd;
pfd.events = POLLIN | POLLOUT;
if (poll(&pfd, 1, timeo) < 0) {
perror("poll()");
return 0;
}
if (pfd.revents & POLLIN)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLIN\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLOUT)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLOUT\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLERR)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLERR\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLHUP)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLHUP\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLRDHUP)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLRDHUP\n");
return pfd.revents;
}
static int epoll_test_tty(void *data) {
int epfd, ifd = fileno(stdin), res;
struct epoll_event evt;
if (check_events(ifd, 0) != POLLOUT) {
fprintf(stderr, "Something is cooking on STDIN (%d)\n", ifd);
return 1;
}
epfd = xepoll_create(1);
fprintf(stdout, "Created epoll fd (%d)\n", epfd);
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
xepoll_ctl(epfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, ifd, &evt);
if (check_events(epfd, 0) & POLLIN) {
res = epoll_wait(epfd, &evt, 1, 0);
if (res == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Epoll fd (%d) is ready when it shouldn't!\n",
epfd);
return 2;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int epoll_wakeup_chain(void *data) {
struct epoll_test_cfg *tcfg = data;
int i, res, epfd, bfd, nfd, pfds[2];
pid_t pid;
struct epoll_event evt;
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
epfd = bfd = xepoll_create(1);
for (i = 0; i < tcfg->size; i++) {
nfd = xepoll_create(1);
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, nfd, &evt);
bfd = nfd;
}
xpipe(pfds);
if (tcfg->flags & EPOLL_TF_LOOP)
{
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, epfd, &evt);
/*
* If we're testing for loop, we want that the wakeup
* triggered by the write to the pipe done in the child
* process, triggers a fake event. So we add the pipe
* read size with EPOLLOUT events. This will trigger
* an addition to the ready-list, but no real events
* will be there. The the epoll kernel code will proceed
* in calling f_op->poll() of the epfd, triggering the
* loop we want to test.
*/
evt.events = EPOLLOUT;
}
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, pfds[0], &evt);
/*
* The pipe write must come after the poll(2) call inside
* check_events(). This tests the nested wakeup code in
* fs/eventpoll.c:ep_poll_safewake()
* By having the check_events() (hence poll(2)) happens first,
* we have poll wait queue filled up, and the write(2) in the
* child will trigger the wakeup chain.
*/
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0) {
sleep(1);
write(pfds[1], "w", 1);
exit(0);
}
res = check_events(epfd, 2000) & POLLIN;
if (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return res;
}
static int epoll_poll_chain(void *data) {
struct epoll_test_cfg *tcfg = data;
int i, res, epfd, bfd, nfd, pfds[2];
pid_t pid;
struct epoll_event evt;
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
epfd = bfd = xepoll_create(1);
for (i = 0; i < tcfg->size; i++) {
nfd = xepoll_create(1);
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, nfd, &evt);
bfd = nfd;
}
xpipe(pfds);
if (tcfg->flags & EPOLL_TF_LOOP)
{
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, epfd, &evt);
/*
* If we're testing for loop, we want that the wakeup
* triggered by the write to the pipe done in the child
* process, triggers a fake event. So we add the pipe
* read size with EPOLLOUT events. This will trigger
* an addition to the ready-list, but no real events
* will be there. The the epoll kernel code will proceed
* in calling f_op->poll() of the epfd, triggering the
* loop we want to test.
*/
evt.events = EPOLLOUT;
}
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, pfds[0], &evt);
/*
* The pipe write mush come before the poll(2) call inside
* check_events(). This tests the nested f_op->poll calls code in
* fs/eventpoll.c:ep_eventpoll_poll()
* By having the pipe write(2) happen first, we make the kernel
* epoll code to load the ready lists, and the following poll(2)
* done inside check_events() will test nested poll code in
* ep_eventpoll_poll().
*/
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0) {
write(pfds[1], "w", 1);
exit(0);
}
sleep(1);
res = check_events(epfd, 1000) & POLLIN;
if (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return res;
}
int main(int ac, char **av) {
int error;
struct epoll_test_cfg tcfg;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing TTY events\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_test_tty, NULL);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing short wakeup chain\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == POLLIN ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing long wakeup chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing short poll chain\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == POLLIN ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing long poll chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = EPOLL_TF_LOOP;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing loopy wakeup chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = EPOLL_TF_LOOP;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing loopy poll chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Pavel Pisa <pisa@cmp.felk.cvut.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-03-31 22:24:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-08-31 17:41:30 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* ep->mutex needs to be held because we could be hit by
|
|
|
|
* eventpoll_release_file() and epoll_ctl().
|
epoll: fix epoll's own poll
Fix a bug inside the epoll's f_op->poll() code, that returns POLLIN even
though there are no actual ready monitored fds. The bug shows up if you
add an epoll fd inside another fd container (poll, select, epoll).
The problem is that callback-based wake ups used by epoll does not carry
(patches will follow, to fix this) any information about the events that
actually happened. So the callback code, since it can't call the file*
->poll() inside the callback, chains the file* into a ready-list.
So, suppose you added an fd with EPOLLOUT only, and some data shows up on
the fd, the file* mapped by the fd will be added into the ready-list (via
wakeup callback). During normal epoll_wait() use, this condition is
sorted out at the time we're actually able to call the file*'s
f_op->poll().
Inside the old epoll's f_op->poll() though, only a quick check
!list_empty(ready-list) was performed, and this could have led to
reporting POLLIN even though no ready fds would show up at a following
epoll_wait(). In order to correctly report the ready status for an epoll
fd, the ready-list must be checked to see if any really available fd+event
would be ready in a following epoll_wait().
Operation (calling f_op->poll() from inside f_op->poll()) that, like wake
ups, must be handled with care because of the fact that epoll fds can be
added to other epoll fds.
Test code:
/*
* epoll_test by Davide Libenzi (Simple code to test epoll internals)
* Copyright (C) 2008 Davide Libenzi
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
*
* Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
*
*/
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <poll.h>
#include <sys/epoll.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#define EPWAIT_TIMEO (1 * 1000)
#ifndef POLLRDHUP
#define POLLRDHUP 0x2000
#endif
#define EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN 100L
#define EPOLL_TF_LOOP (1 << 0)
struct epoll_test_cfg {
long size;
long flags;
};
static int xepoll_create(int n) {
int epfd;
if ((epfd = epoll_create(n)) == -1) {
perror("epoll_create");
exit(2);
}
return epfd;
}
static void xepoll_ctl(int epfd, int cmd, int fd, struct epoll_event *evt) {
if (epoll_ctl(epfd, cmd, fd, evt) < 0) {
perror("epoll_ctl");
exit(3);
}
}
static void xpipe(int *fds) {
if (pipe(fds)) {
perror("pipe");
exit(4);
}
}
static pid_t xfork(void) {
pid_t pid;
if ((pid = fork()) == (pid_t) -1) {
perror("pipe");
exit(5);
}
return pid;
}
static int run_forked_proc(int (*proc)(void *), void *data) {
int status;
pid_t pid;
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0)
exit((*proc)(data));
if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status): -2;
}
static int check_events(int fd, int timeo) {
struct pollfd pfd;
fprintf(stdout, "Checking events for fd %d\n", fd);
memset(&pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd));
pfd.fd = fd;
pfd.events = POLLIN | POLLOUT;
if (poll(&pfd, 1, timeo) < 0) {
perror("poll()");
return 0;
}
if (pfd.revents & POLLIN)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLIN\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLOUT)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLOUT\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLERR)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLERR\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLHUP)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLHUP\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLRDHUP)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLRDHUP\n");
return pfd.revents;
}
static int epoll_test_tty(void *data) {
int epfd, ifd = fileno(stdin), res;
struct epoll_event evt;
if (check_events(ifd, 0) != POLLOUT) {
fprintf(stderr, "Something is cooking on STDIN (%d)\n", ifd);
return 1;
}
epfd = xepoll_create(1);
fprintf(stdout, "Created epoll fd (%d)\n", epfd);
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
xepoll_ctl(epfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, ifd, &evt);
if (check_events(epfd, 0) & POLLIN) {
res = epoll_wait(epfd, &evt, 1, 0);
if (res == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Epoll fd (%d) is ready when it shouldn't!\n",
epfd);
return 2;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int epoll_wakeup_chain(void *data) {
struct epoll_test_cfg *tcfg = data;
int i, res, epfd, bfd, nfd, pfds[2];
pid_t pid;
struct epoll_event evt;
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
epfd = bfd = xepoll_create(1);
for (i = 0; i < tcfg->size; i++) {
nfd = xepoll_create(1);
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, nfd, &evt);
bfd = nfd;
}
xpipe(pfds);
if (tcfg->flags & EPOLL_TF_LOOP)
{
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, epfd, &evt);
/*
* If we're testing for loop, we want that the wakeup
* triggered by the write to the pipe done in the child
* process, triggers a fake event. So we add the pipe
* read size with EPOLLOUT events. This will trigger
* an addition to the ready-list, but no real events
* will be there. The the epoll kernel code will proceed
* in calling f_op->poll() of the epfd, triggering the
* loop we want to test.
*/
evt.events = EPOLLOUT;
}
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, pfds[0], &evt);
/*
* The pipe write must come after the poll(2) call inside
* check_events(). This tests the nested wakeup code in
* fs/eventpoll.c:ep_poll_safewake()
* By having the check_events() (hence poll(2)) happens first,
* we have poll wait queue filled up, and the write(2) in the
* child will trigger the wakeup chain.
*/
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0) {
sleep(1);
write(pfds[1], "w", 1);
exit(0);
}
res = check_events(epfd, 2000) & POLLIN;
if (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return res;
}
static int epoll_poll_chain(void *data) {
struct epoll_test_cfg *tcfg = data;
int i, res, epfd, bfd, nfd, pfds[2];
pid_t pid;
struct epoll_event evt;
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
epfd = bfd = xepoll_create(1);
for (i = 0; i < tcfg->size; i++) {
nfd = xepoll_create(1);
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, nfd, &evt);
bfd = nfd;
}
xpipe(pfds);
if (tcfg->flags & EPOLL_TF_LOOP)
{
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, epfd, &evt);
/*
* If we're testing for loop, we want that the wakeup
* triggered by the write to the pipe done in the child
* process, triggers a fake event. So we add the pipe
* read size with EPOLLOUT events. This will trigger
* an addition to the ready-list, but no real events
* will be there. The the epoll kernel code will proceed
* in calling f_op->poll() of the epfd, triggering the
* loop we want to test.
*/
evt.events = EPOLLOUT;
}
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, pfds[0], &evt);
/*
* The pipe write mush come before the poll(2) call inside
* check_events(). This tests the nested f_op->poll calls code in
* fs/eventpoll.c:ep_eventpoll_poll()
* By having the pipe write(2) happen first, we make the kernel
* epoll code to load the ready lists, and the following poll(2)
* done inside check_events() will test nested poll code in
* ep_eventpoll_poll().
*/
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0) {
write(pfds[1], "w", 1);
exit(0);
}
sleep(1);
res = check_events(epfd, 1000) & POLLIN;
if (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return res;
}
int main(int ac, char **av) {
int error;
struct epoll_test_cfg tcfg;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing TTY events\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_test_tty, NULL);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing short wakeup chain\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == POLLIN ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing long wakeup chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing short poll chain\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == POLLIN ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing long poll chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = EPOLL_TF_LOOP;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing loopy wakeup chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = EPOLL_TF_LOOP;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing loopy poll chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Pavel Pisa <pisa@cmp.felk.cvut.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-03-31 22:24:10 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2020-08-31 17:41:30 +00:00
|
|
|
static void ep_start_scan(struct eventpoll *ep, struct list_head *txlist)
|
epoll: fix epoll's own poll
Fix a bug inside the epoll's f_op->poll() code, that returns POLLIN even
though there are no actual ready monitored fds. The bug shows up if you
add an epoll fd inside another fd container (poll, select, epoll).
The problem is that callback-based wake ups used by epoll does not carry
(patches will follow, to fix this) any information about the events that
actually happened. So the callback code, since it can't call the file*
->poll() inside the callback, chains the file* into a ready-list.
So, suppose you added an fd with EPOLLOUT only, and some data shows up on
the fd, the file* mapped by the fd will be added into the ready-list (via
wakeup callback). During normal epoll_wait() use, this condition is
sorted out at the time we're actually able to call the file*'s
f_op->poll().
Inside the old epoll's f_op->poll() though, only a quick check
!list_empty(ready-list) was performed, and this could have led to
reporting POLLIN even though no ready fds would show up at a following
epoll_wait(). In order to correctly report the ready status for an epoll
fd, the ready-list must be checked to see if any really available fd+event
would be ready in a following epoll_wait().
Operation (calling f_op->poll() from inside f_op->poll()) that, like wake
ups, must be handled with care because of the fact that epoll fds can be
added to other epoll fds.
Test code:
/*
* epoll_test by Davide Libenzi (Simple code to test epoll internals)
* Copyright (C) 2008 Davide Libenzi
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
*
* Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
*
*/
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <poll.h>
#include <sys/epoll.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#define EPWAIT_TIMEO (1 * 1000)
#ifndef POLLRDHUP
#define POLLRDHUP 0x2000
#endif
#define EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN 100L
#define EPOLL_TF_LOOP (1 << 0)
struct epoll_test_cfg {
long size;
long flags;
};
static int xepoll_create(int n) {
int epfd;
if ((epfd = epoll_create(n)) == -1) {
perror("epoll_create");
exit(2);
}
return epfd;
}
static void xepoll_ctl(int epfd, int cmd, int fd, struct epoll_event *evt) {
if (epoll_ctl(epfd, cmd, fd, evt) < 0) {
perror("epoll_ctl");
exit(3);
}
}
static void xpipe(int *fds) {
if (pipe(fds)) {
perror("pipe");
exit(4);
}
}
static pid_t xfork(void) {
pid_t pid;
if ((pid = fork()) == (pid_t) -1) {
perror("pipe");
exit(5);
}
return pid;
}
static int run_forked_proc(int (*proc)(void *), void *data) {
int status;
pid_t pid;
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0)
exit((*proc)(data));
if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status): -2;
}
static int check_events(int fd, int timeo) {
struct pollfd pfd;
fprintf(stdout, "Checking events for fd %d\n", fd);
memset(&pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd));
pfd.fd = fd;
pfd.events = POLLIN | POLLOUT;
if (poll(&pfd, 1, timeo) < 0) {
perror("poll()");
return 0;
}
if (pfd.revents & POLLIN)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLIN\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLOUT)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLOUT\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLERR)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLERR\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLHUP)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLHUP\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLRDHUP)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLRDHUP\n");
return pfd.revents;
}
static int epoll_test_tty(void *data) {
int epfd, ifd = fileno(stdin), res;
struct epoll_event evt;
if (check_events(ifd, 0) != POLLOUT) {
fprintf(stderr, "Something is cooking on STDIN (%d)\n", ifd);
return 1;
}
epfd = xepoll_create(1);
fprintf(stdout, "Created epoll fd (%d)\n", epfd);
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
xepoll_ctl(epfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, ifd, &evt);
if (check_events(epfd, 0) & POLLIN) {
res = epoll_wait(epfd, &evt, 1, 0);
if (res == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Epoll fd (%d) is ready when it shouldn't!\n",
epfd);
return 2;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int epoll_wakeup_chain(void *data) {
struct epoll_test_cfg *tcfg = data;
int i, res, epfd, bfd, nfd, pfds[2];
pid_t pid;
struct epoll_event evt;
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
epfd = bfd = xepoll_create(1);
for (i = 0; i < tcfg->size; i++) {
nfd = xepoll_create(1);
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, nfd, &evt);
bfd = nfd;
}
xpipe(pfds);
if (tcfg->flags & EPOLL_TF_LOOP)
{
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, epfd, &evt);
/*
* If we're testing for loop, we want that the wakeup
* triggered by the write to the pipe done in the child
* process, triggers a fake event. So we add the pipe
* read size with EPOLLOUT events. This will trigger
* an addition to the ready-list, but no real events
* will be there. The the epoll kernel code will proceed
* in calling f_op->poll() of the epfd, triggering the
* loop we want to test.
*/
evt.events = EPOLLOUT;
}
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, pfds[0], &evt);
/*
* The pipe write must come after the poll(2) call inside
* check_events(). This tests the nested wakeup code in
* fs/eventpoll.c:ep_poll_safewake()
* By having the check_events() (hence poll(2)) happens first,
* we have poll wait queue filled up, and the write(2) in the
* child will trigger the wakeup chain.
*/
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0) {
sleep(1);
write(pfds[1], "w", 1);
exit(0);
}
res = check_events(epfd, 2000) & POLLIN;
if (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return res;
}
static int epoll_poll_chain(void *data) {
struct epoll_test_cfg *tcfg = data;
int i, res, epfd, bfd, nfd, pfds[2];
pid_t pid;
struct epoll_event evt;
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
epfd = bfd = xepoll_create(1);
for (i = 0; i < tcfg->size; i++) {
nfd = xepoll_create(1);
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, nfd, &evt);
bfd = nfd;
}
xpipe(pfds);
if (tcfg->flags & EPOLL_TF_LOOP)
{
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, epfd, &evt);
/*
* If we're testing for loop, we want that the wakeup
* triggered by the write to the pipe done in the child
* process, triggers a fake event. So we add the pipe
* read size with EPOLLOUT events. This will trigger
* an addition to the ready-list, but no real events
* will be there. The the epoll kernel code will proceed
* in calling f_op->poll() of the epfd, triggering the
* loop we want to test.
*/
evt.events = EPOLLOUT;
}
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, pfds[0], &evt);
/*
* The pipe write mush come before the poll(2) call inside
* check_events(). This tests the nested f_op->poll calls code in
* fs/eventpoll.c:ep_eventpoll_poll()
* By having the pipe write(2) happen first, we make the kernel
* epoll code to load the ready lists, and the following poll(2)
* done inside check_events() will test nested poll code in
* ep_eventpoll_poll().
*/
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0) {
write(pfds[1], "w", 1);
exit(0);
}
sleep(1);
res = check_events(epfd, 1000) & POLLIN;
if (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return res;
}
int main(int ac, char **av) {
int error;
struct epoll_test_cfg tcfg;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing TTY events\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_test_tty, NULL);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing short wakeup chain\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == POLLIN ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing long wakeup chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing short poll chain\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == POLLIN ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing long poll chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = EPOLL_TF_LOOP;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing loopy wakeup chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = EPOLL_TF_LOOP;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing loopy poll chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Pavel Pisa <pisa@cmp.felk.cvut.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-03-31 22:24:10 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Steal the ready list, and re-init the original one to the
|
|
|
|
* empty list. Also, set ep->ovflist to NULL so that events
|
|
|
|
* happening while looping w/out locks, are not lost. We cannot
|
|
|
|
* have the poll callback to queue directly on ep->rdllist,
|
|
|
|
* because we want the "sproc" callback to be able to do it
|
|
|
|
* in a lockless way.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2020-08-31 17:41:30 +00:00
|
|
|
lockdep_assert_irqs_enabled();
|
2019-03-08 00:28:53 +00:00
|
|
|
write_lock_irq(&ep->lock);
|
2020-08-31 17:06:51 +00:00
|
|
|
list_splice_init(&ep->rdllist, txlist);
|
fs/epoll: reduce the scope of wq lock in epoll_wait()
This patch aims at reducing ep wq.lock hold times in epoll_wait(2). For
the blocking case, there is no need to constantly take and drop the
spinlock, which is only needed to manipulate the waitqueue.
The call to ep_events_available() is now lockless, and only exposed to
benign races. Here, if false positive (returns available events and
does not see another thread deleting an epi from the list) we call into
send_events and then the list's state is correctly seen. Otoh, if a
false negative and we don't see a list_add_tail(), for example, from irq
callback, then it is rechecked again before blocking, which will see the
correct state.
In order for more accuracy to see concurrent list_del_init(), use the
list_empty_careful() variant -- of course, this won't be safe against
insertions from wakeup.
For the overflow list we obviously need to prevent load/store tearing as
we don't want to see partial values while the ready list is disabled.
[dave@stgolabs.net: forgotten fixlets]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181109155258.jxcr4t2pnz6zqct3@linux-r8p5
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181108051006.18751-6-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Suggested-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-03 23:27:15 +00:00
|
|
|
WRITE_ONCE(ep->ovflist, NULL);
|
2019-03-08 00:28:53 +00:00
|
|
|
write_unlock_irq(&ep->lock);
|
2020-08-31 17:06:51 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
epoll: fix epoll's own poll
Fix a bug inside the epoll's f_op->poll() code, that returns POLLIN even
though there are no actual ready monitored fds. The bug shows up if you
add an epoll fd inside another fd container (poll, select, epoll).
The problem is that callback-based wake ups used by epoll does not carry
(patches will follow, to fix this) any information about the events that
actually happened. So the callback code, since it can't call the file*
->poll() inside the callback, chains the file* into a ready-list.
So, suppose you added an fd with EPOLLOUT only, and some data shows up on
the fd, the file* mapped by the fd will be added into the ready-list (via
wakeup callback). During normal epoll_wait() use, this condition is
sorted out at the time we're actually able to call the file*'s
f_op->poll().
Inside the old epoll's f_op->poll() though, only a quick check
!list_empty(ready-list) was performed, and this could have led to
reporting POLLIN even though no ready fds would show up at a following
epoll_wait(). In order to correctly report the ready status for an epoll
fd, the ready-list must be checked to see if any really available fd+event
would be ready in a following epoll_wait().
Operation (calling f_op->poll() from inside f_op->poll()) that, like wake
ups, must be handled with care because of the fact that epoll fds can be
added to other epoll fds.
Test code:
/*
* epoll_test by Davide Libenzi (Simple code to test epoll internals)
* Copyright (C) 2008 Davide Libenzi
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
*
* Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
*
*/
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <poll.h>
#include <sys/epoll.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#define EPWAIT_TIMEO (1 * 1000)
#ifndef POLLRDHUP
#define POLLRDHUP 0x2000
#endif
#define EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN 100L
#define EPOLL_TF_LOOP (1 << 0)
struct epoll_test_cfg {
long size;
long flags;
};
static int xepoll_create(int n) {
int epfd;
if ((epfd = epoll_create(n)) == -1) {
perror("epoll_create");
exit(2);
}
return epfd;
}
static void xepoll_ctl(int epfd, int cmd, int fd, struct epoll_event *evt) {
if (epoll_ctl(epfd, cmd, fd, evt) < 0) {
perror("epoll_ctl");
exit(3);
}
}
static void xpipe(int *fds) {
if (pipe(fds)) {
perror("pipe");
exit(4);
}
}
static pid_t xfork(void) {
pid_t pid;
if ((pid = fork()) == (pid_t) -1) {
perror("pipe");
exit(5);
}
return pid;
}
static int run_forked_proc(int (*proc)(void *), void *data) {
int status;
pid_t pid;
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0)
exit((*proc)(data));
if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status): -2;
}
static int check_events(int fd, int timeo) {
struct pollfd pfd;
fprintf(stdout, "Checking events for fd %d\n", fd);
memset(&pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd));
pfd.fd = fd;
pfd.events = POLLIN | POLLOUT;
if (poll(&pfd, 1, timeo) < 0) {
perror("poll()");
return 0;
}
if (pfd.revents & POLLIN)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLIN\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLOUT)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLOUT\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLERR)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLERR\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLHUP)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLHUP\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLRDHUP)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLRDHUP\n");
return pfd.revents;
}
static int epoll_test_tty(void *data) {
int epfd, ifd = fileno(stdin), res;
struct epoll_event evt;
if (check_events(ifd, 0) != POLLOUT) {
fprintf(stderr, "Something is cooking on STDIN (%d)\n", ifd);
return 1;
}
epfd = xepoll_create(1);
fprintf(stdout, "Created epoll fd (%d)\n", epfd);
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
xepoll_ctl(epfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, ifd, &evt);
if (check_events(epfd, 0) & POLLIN) {
res = epoll_wait(epfd, &evt, 1, 0);
if (res == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Epoll fd (%d) is ready when it shouldn't!\n",
epfd);
return 2;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int epoll_wakeup_chain(void *data) {
struct epoll_test_cfg *tcfg = data;
int i, res, epfd, bfd, nfd, pfds[2];
pid_t pid;
struct epoll_event evt;
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
epfd = bfd = xepoll_create(1);
for (i = 0; i < tcfg->size; i++) {
nfd = xepoll_create(1);
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, nfd, &evt);
bfd = nfd;
}
xpipe(pfds);
if (tcfg->flags & EPOLL_TF_LOOP)
{
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, epfd, &evt);
/*
* If we're testing for loop, we want that the wakeup
* triggered by the write to the pipe done in the child
* process, triggers a fake event. So we add the pipe
* read size with EPOLLOUT events. This will trigger
* an addition to the ready-list, but no real events
* will be there. The the epoll kernel code will proceed
* in calling f_op->poll() of the epfd, triggering the
* loop we want to test.
*/
evt.events = EPOLLOUT;
}
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, pfds[0], &evt);
/*
* The pipe write must come after the poll(2) call inside
* check_events(). This tests the nested wakeup code in
* fs/eventpoll.c:ep_poll_safewake()
* By having the check_events() (hence poll(2)) happens first,
* we have poll wait queue filled up, and the write(2) in the
* child will trigger the wakeup chain.
*/
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0) {
sleep(1);
write(pfds[1], "w", 1);
exit(0);
}
res = check_events(epfd, 2000) & POLLIN;
if (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return res;
}
static int epoll_poll_chain(void *data) {
struct epoll_test_cfg *tcfg = data;
int i, res, epfd, bfd, nfd, pfds[2];
pid_t pid;
struct epoll_event evt;
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
epfd = bfd = xepoll_create(1);
for (i = 0; i < tcfg->size; i++) {
nfd = xepoll_create(1);
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, nfd, &evt);
bfd = nfd;
}
xpipe(pfds);
if (tcfg->flags & EPOLL_TF_LOOP)
{
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, epfd, &evt);
/*
* If we're testing for loop, we want that the wakeup
* triggered by the write to the pipe done in the child
* process, triggers a fake event. So we add the pipe
* read size with EPOLLOUT events. This will trigger
* an addition to the ready-list, but no real events
* will be there. The the epoll kernel code will proceed
* in calling f_op->poll() of the epfd, triggering the
* loop we want to test.
*/
evt.events = EPOLLOUT;
}
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, pfds[0], &evt);
/*
* The pipe write mush come before the poll(2) call inside
* check_events(). This tests the nested f_op->poll calls code in
* fs/eventpoll.c:ep_eventpoll_poll()
* By having the pipe write(2) happen first, we make the kernel
* epoll code to load the ready lists, and the following poll(2)
* done inside check_events() will test nested poll code in
* ep_eventpoll_poll().
*/
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0) {
write(pfds[1], "w", 1);
exit(0);
}
sleep(1);
res = check_events(epfd, 1000) & POLLIN;
if (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return res;
}
int main(int ac, char **av) {
int error;
struct epoll_test_cfg tcfg;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing TTY events\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_test_tty, NULL);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing short wakeup chain\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == POLLIN ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing long wakeup chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing short poll chain\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == POLLIN ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing long poll chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = EPOLL_TF_LOOP;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing loopy wakeup chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = EPOLL_TF_LOOP;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing loopy poll chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Pavel Pisa <pisa@cmp.felk.cvut.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-03-31 22:24:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-08-31 17:06:51 +00:00
|
|
|
static void ep_done_scan(struct eventpoll *ep,
|
|
|
|
struct list_head *txlist)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct epitem *epi, *nepi;
|
epoll: fix epoll's own poll
Fix a bug inside the epoll's f_op->poll() code, that returns POLLIN even
though there are no actual ready monitored fds. The bug shows up if you
add an epoll fd inside another fd container (poll, select, epoll).
The problem is that callback-based wake ups used by epoll does not carry
(patches will follow, to fix this) any information about the events that
actually happened. So the callback code, since it can't call the file*
->poll() inside the callback, chains the file* into a ready-list.
So, suppose you added an fd with EPOLLOUT only, and some data shows up on
the fd, the file* mapped by the fd will be added into the ready-list (via
wakeup callback). During normal epoll_wait() use, this condition is
sorted out at the time we're actually able to call the file*'s
f_op->poll().
Inside the old epoll's f_op->poll() though, only a quick check
!list_empty(ready-list) was performed, and this could have led to
reporting POLLIN even though no ready fds would show up at a following
epoll_wait(). In order to correctly report the ready status for an epoll
fd, the ready-list must be checked to see if any really available fd+event
would be ready in a following epoll_wait().
Operation (calling f_op->poll() from inside f_op->poll()) that, like wake
ups, must be handled with care because of the fact that epoll fds can be
added to other epoll fds.
Test code:
/*
* epoll_test by Davide Libenzi (Simple code to test epoll internals)
* Copyright (C) 2008 Davide Libenzi
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
*
* Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
*
*/
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <poll.h>
#include <sys/epoll.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#define EPWAIT_TIMEO (1 * 1000)
#ifndef POLLRDHUP
#define POLLRDHUP 0x2000
#endif
#define EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN 100L
#define EPOLL_TF_LOOP (1 << 0)
struct epoll_test_cfg {
long size;
long flags;
};
static int xepoll_create(int n) {
int epfd;
if ((epfd = epoll_create(n)) == -1) {
perror("epoll_create");
exit(2);
}
return epfd;
}
static void xepoll_ctl(int epfd, int cmd, int fd, struct epoll_event *evt) {
if (epoll_ctl(epfd, cmd, fd, evt) < 0) {
perror("epoll_ctl");
exit(3);
}
}
static void xpipe(int *fds) {
if (pipe(fds)) {
perror("pipe");
exit(4);
}
}
static pid_t xfork(void) {
pid_t pid;
if ((pid = fork()) == (pid_t) -1) {
perror("pipe");
exit(5);
}
return pid;
}
static int run_forked_proc(int (*proc)(void *), void *data) {
int status;
pid_t pid;
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0)
exit((*proc)(data));
if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status): -2;
}
static int check_events(int fd, int timeo) {
struct pollfd pfd;
fprintf(stdout, "Checking events for fd %d\n", fd);
memset(&pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd));
pfd.fd = fd;
pfd.events = POLLIN | POLLOUT;
if (poll(&pfd, 1, timeo) < 0) {
perror("poll()");
return 0;
}
if (pfd.revents & POLLIN)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLIN\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLOUT)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLOUT\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLERR)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLERR\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLHUP)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLHUP\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLRDHUP)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLRDHUP\n");
return pfd.revents;
}
static int epoll_test_tty(void *data) {
int epfd, ifd = fileno(stdin), res;
struct epoll_event evt;
if (check_events(ifd, 0) != POLLOUT) {
fprintf(stderr, "Something is cooking on STDIN (%d)\n", ifd);
return 1;
}
epfd = xepoll_create(1);
fprintf(stdout, "Created epoll fd (%d)\n", epfd);
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
xepoll_ctl(epfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, ifd, &evt);
if (check_events(epfd, 0) & POLLIN) {
res = epoll_wait(epfd, &evt, 1, 0);
if (res == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Epoll fd (%d) is ready when it shouldn't!\n",
epfd);
return 2;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int epoll_wakeup_chain(void *data) {
struct epoll_test_cfg *tcfg = data;
int i, res, epfd, bfd, nfd, pfds[2];
pid_t pid;
struct epoll_event evt;
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
epfd = bfd = xepoll_create(1);
for (i = 0; i < tcfg->size; i++) {
nfd = xepoll_create(1);
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, nfd, &evt);
bfd = nfd;
}
xpipe(pfds);
if (tcfg->flags & EPOLL_TF_LOOP)
{
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, epfd, &evt);
/*
* If we're testing for loop, we want that the wakeup
* triggered by the write to the pipe done in the child
* process, triggers a fake event. So we add the pipe
* read size with EPOLLOUT events. This will trigger
* an addition to the ready-list, but no real events
* will be there. The the epoll kernel code will proceed
* in calling f_op->poll() of the epfd, triggering the
* loop we want to test.
*/
evt.events = EPOLLOUT;
}
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, pfds[0], &evt);
/*
* The pipe write must come after the poll(2) call inside
* check_events(). This tests the nested wakeup code in
* fs/eventpoll.c:ep_poll_safewake()
* By having the check_events() (hence poll(2)) happens first,
* we have poll wait queue filled up, and the write(2) in the
* child will trigger the wakeup chain.
*/
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0) {
sleep(1);
write(pfds[1], "w", 1);
exit(0);
}
res = check_events(epfd, 2000) & POLLIN;
if (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return res;
}
static int epoll_poll_chain(void *data) {
struct epoll_test_cfg *tcfg = data;
int i, res, epfd, bfd, nfd, pfds[2];
pid_t pid;
struct epoll_event evt;
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
epfd = bfd = xepoll_create(1);
for (i = 0; i < tcfg->size; i++) {
nfd = xepoll_create(1);
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, nfd, &evt);
bfd = nfd;
}
xpipe(pfds);
if (tcfg->flags & EPOLL_TF_LOOP)
{
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, epfd, &evt);
/*
* If we're testing for loop, we want that the wakeup
* triggered by the write to the pipe done in the child
* process, triggers a fake event. So we add the pipe
* read size with EPOLLOUT events. This will trigger
* an addition to the ready-list, but no real events
* will be there. The the epoll kernel code will proceed
* in calling f_op->poll() of the epfd, triggering the
* loop we want to test.
*/
evt.events = EPOLLOUT;
}
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, pfds[0], &evt);
/*
* The pipe write mush come before the poll(2) call inside
* check_events(). This tests the nested f_op->poll calls code in
* fs/eventpoll.c:ep_eventpoll_poll()
* By having the pipe write(2) happen first, we make the kernel
* epoll code to load the ready lists, and the following poll(2)
* done inside check_events() will test nested poll code in
* ep_eventpoll_poll().
*/
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0) {
write(pfds[1], "w", 1);
exit(0);
}
sleep(1);
res = check_events(epfd, 1000) & POLLIN;
if (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return res;
}
int main(int ac, char **av) {
int error;
struct epoll_test_cfg tcfg;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing TTY events\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_test_tty, NULL);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing short wakeup chain\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == POLLIN ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing long wakeup chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing short poll chain\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == POLLIN ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing long poll chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = EPOLL_TF_LOOP;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing loopy wakeup chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = EPOLL_TF_LOOP;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing loopy poll chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Pavel Pisa <pisa@cmp.felk.cvut.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-03-31 22:24:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-03-08 00:28:53 +00:00
|
|
|
write_lock_irq(&ep->lock);
|
epoll: fix epoll's own poll
Fix a bug inside the epoll's f_op->poll() code, that returns POLLIN even
though there are no actual ready monitored fds. The bug shows up if you
add an epoll fd inside another fd container (poll, select, epoll).
The problem is that callback-based wake ups used by epoll does not carry
(patches will follow, to fix this) any information about the events that
actually happened. So the callback code, since it can't call the file*
->poll() inside the callback, chains the file* into a ready-list.
So, suppose you added an fd with EPOLLOUT only, and some data shows up on
the fd, the file* mapped by the fd will be added into the ready-list (via
wakeup callback). During normal epoll_wait() use, this condition is
sorted out at the time we're actually able to call the file*'s
f_op->poll().
Inside the old epoll's f_op->poll() though, only a quick check
!list_empty(ready-list) was performed, and this could have led to
reporting POLLIN even though no ready fds would show up at a following
epoll_wait(). In order to correctly report the ready status for an epoll
fd, the ready-list must be checked to see if any really available fd+event
would be ready in a following epoll_wait().
Operation (calling f_op->poll() from inside f_op->poll()) that, like wake
ups, must be handled with care because of the fact that epoll fds can be
added to other epoll fds.
Test code:
/*
* epoll_test by Davide Libenzi (Simple code to test epoll internals)
* Copyright (C) 2008 Davide Libenzi
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
*
* Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
*
*/
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <poll.h>
#include <sys/epoll.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#define EPWAIT_TIMEO (1 * 1000)
#ifndef POLLRDHUP
#define POLLRDHUP 0x2000
#endif
#define EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN 100L
#define EPOLL_TF_LOOP (1 << 0)
struct epoll_test_cfg {
long size;
long flags;
};
static int xepoll_create(int n) {
int epfd;
if ((epfd = epoll_create(n)) == -1) {
perror("epoll_create");
exit(2);
}
return epfd;
}
static void xepoll_ctl(int epfd, int cmd, int fd, struct epoll_event *evt) {
if (epoll_ctl(epfd, cmd, fd, evt) < 0) {
perror("epoll_ctl");
exit(3);
}
}
static void xpipe(int *fds) {
if (pipe(fds)) {
perror("pipe");
exit(4);
}
}
static pid_t xfork(void) {
pid_t pid;
if ((pid = fork()) == (pid_t) -1) {
perror("pipe");
exit(5);
}
return pid;
}
static int run_forked_proc(int (*proc)(void *), void *data) {
int status;
pid_t pid;
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0)
exit((*proc)(data));
if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status): -2;
}
static int check_events(int fd, int timeo) {
struct pollfd pfd;
fprintf(stdout, "Checking events for fd %d\n", fd);
memset(&pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd));
pfd.fd = fd;
pfd.events = POLLIN | POLLOUT;
if (poll(&pfd, 1, timeo) < 0) {
perror("poll()");
return 0;
}
if (pfd.revents & POLLIN)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLIN\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLOUT)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLOUT\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLERR)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLERR\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLHUP)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLHUP\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLRDHUP)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLRDHUP\n");
return pfd.revents;
}
static int epoll_test_tty(void *data) {
int epfd, ifd = fileno(stdin), res;
struct epoll_event evt;
if (check_events(ifd, 0) != POLLOUT) {
fprintf(stderr, "Something is cooking on STDIN (%d)\n", ifd);
return 1;
}
epfd = xepoll_create(1);
fprintf(stdout, "Created epoll fd (%d)\n", epfd);
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
xepoll_ctl(epfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, ifd, &evt);
if (check_events(epfd, 0) & POLLIN) {
res = epoll_wait(epfd, &evt, 1, 0);
if (res == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Epoll fd (%d) is ready when it shouldn't!\n",
epfd);
return 2;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int epoll_wakeup_chain(void *data) {
struct epoll_test_cfg *tcfg = data;
int i, res, epfd, bfd, nfd, pfds[2];
pid_t pid;
struct epoll_event evt;
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
epfd = bfd = xepoll_create(1);
for (i = 0; i < tcfg->size; i++) {
nfd = xepoll_create(1);
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, nfd, &evt);
bfd = nfd;
}
xpipe(pfds);
if (tcfg->flags & EPOLL_TF_LOOP)
{
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, epfd, &evt);
/*
* If we're testing for loop, we want that the wakeup
* triggered by the write to the pipe done in the child
* process, triggers a fake event. So we add the pipe
* read size with EPOLLOUT events. This will trigger
* an addition to the ready-list, but no real events
* will be there. The the epoll kernel code will proceed
* in calling f_op->poll() of the epfd, triggering the
* loop we want to test.
*/
evt.events = EPOLLOUT;
}
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, pfds[0], &evt);
/*
* The pipe write must come after the poll(2) call inside
* check_events(). This tests the nested wakeup code in
* fs/eventpoll.c:ep_poll_safewake()
* By having the check_events() (hence poll(2)) happens first,
* we have poll wait queue filled up, and the write(2) in the
* child will trigger the wakeup chain.
*/
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0) {
sleep(1);
write(pfds[1], "w", 1);
exit(0);
}
res = check_events(epfd, 2000) & POLLIN;
if (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return res;
}
static int epoll_poll_chain(void *data) {
struct epoll_test_cfg *tcfg = data;
int i, res, epfd, bfd, nfd, pfds[2];
pid_t pid;
struct epoll_event evt;
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
epfd = bfd = xepoll_create(1);
for (i = 0; i < tcfg->size; i++) {
nfd = xepoll_create(1);
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, nfd, &evt);
bfd = nfd;
}
xpipe(pfds);
if (tcfg->flags & EPOLL_TF_LOOP)
{
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, epfd, &evt);
/*
* If we're testing for loop, we want that the wakeup
* triggered by the write to the pipe done in the child
* process, triggers a fake event. So we add the pipe
* read size with EPOLLOUT events. This will trigger
* an addition to the ready-list, but no real events
* will be there. The the epoll kernel code will proceed
* in calling f_op->poll() of the epfd, triggering the
* loop we want to test.
*/
evt.events = EPOLLOUT;
}
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, pfds[0], &evt);
/*
* The pipe write mush come before the poll(2) call inside
* check_events(). This tests the nested f_op->poll calls code in
* fs/eventpoll.c:ep_eventpoll_poll()
* By having the pipe write(2) happen first, we make the kernel
* epoll code to load the ready lists, and the following poll(2)
* done inside check_events() will test nested poll code in
* ep_eventpoll_poll().
*/
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0) {
write(pfds[1], "w", 1);
exit(0);
}
sleep(1);
res = check_events(epfd, 1000) & POLLIN;
if (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return res;
}
int main(int ac, char **av) {
int error;
struct epoll_test_cfg tcfg;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing TTY events\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_test_tty, NULL);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing short wakeup chain\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == POLLIN ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing long wakeup chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing short poll chain\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == POLLIN ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing long poll chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = EPOLL_TF_LOOP;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing loopy wakeup chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = EPOLL_TF_LOOP;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing loopy poll chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Pavel Pisa <pisa@cmp.felk.cvut.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-03-31 22:24:10 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* During the time we spent inside the "sproc" callback, some
|
|
|
|
* other events might have been queued by the poll callback.
|
|
|
|
* We re-insert them inside the main ready-list here.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
fs/epoll: reduce the scope of wq lock in epoll_wait()
This patch aims at reducing ep wq.lock hold times in epoll_wait(2). For
the blocking case, there is no need to constantly take and drop the
spinlock, which is only needed to manipulate the waitqueue.
The call to ep_events_available() is now lockless, and only exposed to
benign races. Here, if false positive (returns available events and
does not see another thread deleting an epi from the list) we call into
send_events and then the list's state is correctly seen. Otoh, if a
false negative and we don't see a list_add_tail(), for example, from irq
callback, then it is rechecked again before blocking, which will see the
correct state.
In order for more accuracy to see concurrent list_del_init(), use the
list_empty_careful() variant -- of course, this won't be safe against
insertions from wakeup.
For the overflow list we obviously need to prevent load/store tearing as
we don't want to see partial values while the ready list is disabled.
[dave@stgolabs.net: forgotten fixlets]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181109155258.jxcr4t2pnz6zqct3@linux-r8p5
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181108051006.18751-6-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Suggested-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-03 23:27:15 +00:00
|
|
|
for (nepi = READ_ONCE(ep->ovflist); (epi = nepi) != NULL;
|
epoll: fix epoll's own poll
Fix a bug inside the epoll's f_op->poll() code, that returns POLLIN even
though there are no actual ready monitored fds. The bug shows up if you
add an epoll fd inside another fd container (poll, select, epoll).
The problem is that callback-based wake ups used by epoll does not carry
(patches will follow, to fix this) any information about the events that
actually happened. So the callback code, since it can't call the file*
->poll() inside the callback, chains the file* into a ready-list.
So, suppose you added an fd with EPOLLOUT only, and some data shows up on
the fd, the file* mapped by the fd will be added into the ready-list (via
wakeup callback). During normal epoll_wait() use, this condition is
sorted out at the time we're actually able to call the file*'s
f_op->poll().
Inside the old epoll's f_op->poll() though, only a quick check
!list_empty(ready-list) was performed, and this could have led to
reporting POLLIN even though no ready fds would show up at a following
epoll_wait(). In order to correctly report the ready status for an epoll
fd, the ready-list must be checked to see if any really available fd+event
would be ready in a following epoll_wait().
Operation (calling f_op->poll() from inside f_op->poll()) that, like wake
ups, must be handled with care because of the fact that epoll fds can be
added to other epoll fds.
Test code:
/*
* epoll_test by Davide Libenzi (Simple code to test epoll internals)
* Copyright (C) 2008 Davide Libenzi
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
*
* Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
*
*/
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <poll.h>
#include <sys/epoll.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#define EPWAIT_TIMEO (1 * 1000)
#ifndef POLLRDHUP
#define POLLRDHUP 0x2000
#endif
#define EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN 100L
#define EPOLL_TF_LOOP (1 << 0)
struct epoll_test_cfg {
long size;
long flags;
};
static int xepoll_create(int n) {
int epfd;
if ((epfd = epoll_create(n)) == -1) {
perror("epoll_create");
exit(2);
}
return epfd;
}
static void xepoll_ctl(int epfd, int cmd, int fd, struct epoll_event *evt) {
if (epoll_ctl(epfd, cmd, fd, evt) < 0) {
perror("epoll_ctl");
exit(3);
}
}
static void xpipe(int *fds) {
if (pipe(fds)) {
perror("pipe");
exit(4);
}
}
static pid_t xfork(void) {
pid_t pid;
if ((pid = fork()) == (pid_t) -1) {
perror("pipe");
exit(5);
}
return pid;
}
static int run_forked_proc(int (*proc)(void *), void *data) {
int status;
pid_t pid;
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0)
exit((*proc)(data));
if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status): -2;
}
static int check_events(int fd, int timeo) {
struct pollfd pfd;
fprintf(stdout, "Checking events for fd %d\n", fd);
memset(&pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd));
pfd.fd = fd;
pfd.events = POLLIN | POLLOUT;
if (poll(&pfd, 1, timeo) < 0) {
perror("poll()");
return 0;
}
if (pfd.revents & POLLIN)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLIN\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLOUT)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLOUT\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLERR)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLERR\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLHUP)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLHUP\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLRDHUP)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLRDHUP\n");
return pfd.revents;
}
static int epoll_test_tty(void *data) {
int epfd, ifd = fileno(stdin), res;
struct epoll_event evt;
if (check_events(ifd, 0) != POLLOUT) {
fprintf(stderr, "Something is cooking on STDIN (%d)\n", ifd);
return 1;
}
epfd = xepoll_create(1);
fprintf(stdout, "Created epoll fd (%d)\n", epfd);
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
xepoll_ctl(epfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, ifd, &evt);
if (check_events(epfd, 0) & POLLIN) {
res = epoll_wait(epfd, &evt, 1, 0);
if (res == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Epoll fd (%d) is ready when it shouldn't!\n",
epfd);
return 2;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int epoll_wakeup_chain(void *data) {
struct epoll_test_cfg *tcfg = data;
int i, res, epfd, bfd, nfd, pfds[2];
pid_t pid;
struct epoll_event evt;
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
epfd = bfd = xepoll_create(1);
for (i = 0; i < tcfg->size; i++) {
nfd = xepoll_create(1);
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, nfd, &evt);
bfd = nfd;
}
xpipe(pfds);
if (tcfg->flags & EPOLL_TF_LOOP)
{
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, epfd, &evt);
/*
* If we're testing for loop, we want that the wakeup
* triggered by the write to the pipe done in the child
* process, triggers a fake event. So we add the pipe
* read size with EPOLLOUT events. This will trigger
* an addition to the ready-list, but no real events
* will be there. The the epoll kernel code will proceed
* in calling f_op->poll() of the epfd, triggering the
* loop we want to test.
*/
evt.events = EPOLLOUT;
}
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, pfds[0], &evt);
/*
* The pipe write must come after the poll(2) call inside
* check_events(). This tests the nested wakeup code in
* fs/eventpoll.c:ep_poll_safewake()
* By having the check_events() (hence poll(2)) happens first,
* we have poll wait queue filled up, and the write(2) in the
* child will trigger the wakeup chain.
*/
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0) {
sleep(1);
write(pfds[1], "w", 1);
exit(0);
}
res = check_events(epfd, 2000) & POLLIN;
if (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return res;
}
static int epoll_poll_chain(void *data) {
struct epoll_test_cfg *tcfg = data;
int i, res, epfd, bfd, nfd, pfds[2];
pid_t pid;
struct epoll_event evt;
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
epfd = bfd = xepoll_create(1);
for (i = 0; i < tcfg->size; i++) {
nfd = xepoll_create(1);
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, nfd, &evt);
bfd = nfd;
}
xpipe(pfds);
if (tcfg->flags & EPOLL_TF_LOOP)
{
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, epfd, &evt);
/*
* If we're testing for loop, we want that the wakeup
* triggered by the write to the pipe done in the child
* process, triggers a fake event. So we add the pipe
* read size with EPOLLOUT events. This will trigger
* an addition to the ready-list, but no real events
* will be there. The the epoll kernel code will proceed
* in calling f_op->poll() of the epfd, triggering the
* loop we want to test.
*/
evt.events = EPOLLOUT;
}
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, pfds[0], &evt);
/*
* The pipe write mush come before the poll(2) call inside
* check_events(). This tests the nested f_op->poll calls code in
* fs/eventpoll.c:ep_eventpoll_poll()
* By having the pipe write(2) happen first, we make the kernel
* epoll code to load the ready lists, and the following poll(2)
* done inside check_events() will test nested poll code in
* ep_eventpoll_poll().
*/
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0) {
write(pfds[1], "w", 1);
exit(0);
}
sleep(1);
res = check_events(epfd, 1000) & POLLIN;
if (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return res;
}
int main(int ac, char **av) {
int error;
struct epoll_test_cfg tcfg;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing TTY events\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_test_tty, NULL);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing short wakeup chain\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == POLLIN ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing long wakeup chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing short poll chain\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == POLLIN ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing long poll chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = EPOLL_TF_LOOP;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing loopy wakeup chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = EPOLL_TF_LOOP;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing loopy poll chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Pavel Pisa <pisa@cmp.felk.cvut.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-03-31 22:24:10 +00:00
|
|
|
nepi = epi->next, epi->next = EP_UNACTIVE_PTR) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We need to check if the item is already in the list.
|
|
|
|
* During the "sproc" callback execution time, items are
|
|
|
|
* queued into ->ovflist but the "txlist" might already
|
|
|
|
* contain them, and the list_splice() below takes care of them.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2018-08-22 04:58:26 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!ep_is_linked(epi)) {
|
2019-03-08 00:28:46 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* ->ovflist is LIFO, so we have to reverse it in order
|
|
|
|
* to keep in FIFO.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
list_add(&epi->rdllink, &ep->rdllist);
|
2013-04-30 22:27:39 +00:00
|
|
|
ep_pm_stay_awake(epi);
|
2012-05-01 19:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
epoll: fix epoll's own poll
Fix a bug inside the epoll's f_op->poll() code, that returns POLLIN even
though there are no actual ready monitored fds. The bug shows up if you
add an epoll fd inside another fd container (poll, select, epoll).
The problem is that callback-based wake ups used by epoll does not carry
(patches will follow, to fix this) any information about the events that
actually happened. So the callback code, since it can't call the file*
->poll() inside the callback, chains the file* into a ready-list.
So, suppose you added an fd with EPOLLOUT only, and some data shows up on
the fd, the file* mapped by the fd will be added into the ready-list (via
wakeup callback). During normal epoll_wait() use, this condition is
sorted out at the time we're actually able to call the file*'s
f_op->poll().
Inside the old epoll's f_op->poll() though, only a quick check
!list_empty(ready-list) was performed, and this could have led to
reporting POLLIN even though no ready fds would show up at a following
epoll_wait(). In order to correctly report the ready status for an epoll
fd, the ready-list must be checked to see if any really available fd+event
would be ready in a following epoll_wait().
Operation (calling f_op->poll() from inside f_op->poll()) that, like wake
ups, must be handled with care because of the fact that epoll fds can be
added to other epoll fds.
Test code:
/*
* epoll_test by Davide Libenzi (Simple code to test epoll internals)
* Copyright (C) 2008 Davide Libenzi
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
*
* Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
*
*/
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <poll.h>
#include <sys/epoll.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#define EPWAIT_TIMEO (1 * 1000)
#ifndef POLLRDHUP
#define POLLRDHUP 0x2000
#endif
#define EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN 100L
#define EPOLL_TF_LOOP (1 << 0)
struct epoll_test_cfg {
long size;
long flags;
};
static int xepoll_create(int n) {
int epfd;
if ((epfd = epoll_create(n)) == -1) {
perror("epoll_create");
exit(2);
}
return epfd;
}
static void xepoll_ctl(int epfd, int cmd, int fd, struct epoll_event *evt) {
if (epoll_ctl(epfd, cmd, fd, evt) < 0) {
perror("epoll_ctl");
exit(3);
}
}
static void xpipe(int *fds) {
if (pipe(fds)) {
perror("pipe");
exit(4);
}
}
static pid_t xfork(void) {
pid_t pid;
if ((pid = fork()) == (pid_t) -1) {
perror("pipe");
exit(5);
}
return pid;
}
static int run_forked_proc(int (*proc)(void *), void *data) {
int status;
pid_t pid;
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0)
exit((*proc)(data));
if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status): -2;
}
static int check_events(int fd, int timeo) {
struct pollfd pfd;
fprintf(stdout, "Checking events for fd %d\n", fd);
memset(&pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd));
pfd.fd = fd;
pfd.events = POLLIN | POLLOUT;
if (poll(&pfd, 1, timeo) < 0) {
perror("poll()");
return 0;
}
if (pfd.revents & POLLIN)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLIN\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLOUT)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLOUT\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLERR)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLERR\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLHUP)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLHUP\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLRDHUP)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLRDHUP\n");
return pfd.revents;
}
static int epoll_test_tty(void *data) {
int epfd, ifd = fileno(stdin), res;
struct epoll_event evt;
if (check_events(ifd, 0) != POLLOUT) {
fprintf(stderr, "Something is cooking on STDIN (%d)\n", ifd);
return 1;
}
epfd = xepoll_create(1);
fprintf(stdout, "Created epoll fd (%d)\n", epfd);
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
xepoll_ctl(epfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, ifd, &evt);
if (check_events(epfd, 0) & POLLIN) {
res = epoll_wait(epfd, &evt, 1, 0);
if (res == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Epoll fd (%d) is ready when it shouldn't!\n",
epfd);
return 2;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int epoll_wakeup_chain(void *data) {
struct epoll_test_cfg *tcfg = data;
int i, res, epfd, bfd, nfd, pfds[2];
pid_t pid;
struct epoll_event evt;
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
epfd = bfd = xepoll_create(1);
for (i = 0; i < tcfg->size; i++) {
nfd = xepoll_create(1);
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, nfd, &evt);
bfd = nfd;
}
xpipe(pfds);
if (tcfg->flags & EPOLL_TF_LOOP)
{
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, epfd, &evt);
/*
* If we're testing for loop, we want that the wakeup
* triggered by the write to the pipe done in the child
* process, triggers a fake event. So we add the pipe
* read size with EPOLLOUT events. This will trigger
* an addition to the ready-list, but no real events
* will be there. The the epoll kernel code will proceed
* in calling f_op->poll() of the epfd, triggering the
* loop we want to test.
*/
evt.events = EPOLLOUT;
}
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, pfds[0], &evt);
/*
* The pipe write must come after the poll(2) call inside
* check_events(). This tests the nested wakeup code in
* fs/eventpoll.c:ep_poll_safewake()
* By having the check_events() (hence poll(2)) happens first,
* we have poll wait queue filled up, and the write(2) in the
* child will trigger the wakeup chain.
*/
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0) {
sleep(1);
write(pfds[1], "w", 1);
exit(0);
}
res = check_events(epfd, 2000) & POLLIN;
if (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return res;
}
static int epoll_poll_chain(void *data) {
struct epoll_test_cfg *tcfg = data;
int i, res, epfd, bfd, nfd, pfds[2];
pid_t pid;
struct epoll_event evt;
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
epfd = bfd = xepoll_create(1);
for (i = 0; i < tcfg->size; i++) {
nfd = xepoll_create(1);
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, nfd, &evt);
bfd = nfd;
}
xpipe(pfds);
if (tcfg->flags & EPOLL_TF_LOOP)
{
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, epfd, &evt);
/*
* If we're testing for loop, we want that the wakeup
* triggered by the write to the pipe done in the child
* process, triggers a fake event. So we add the pipe
* read size with EPOLLOUT events. This will trigger
* an addition to the ready-list, but no real events
* will be there. The the epoll kernel code will proceed
* in calling f_op->poll() of the epfd, triggering the
* loop we want to test.
*/
evt.events = EPOLLOUT;
}
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, pfds[0], &evt);
/*
* The pipe write mush come before the poll(2) call inside
* check_events(). This tests the nested f_op->poll calls code in
* fs/eventpoll.c:ep_eventpoll_poll()
* By having the pipe write(2) happen first, we make the kernel
* epoll code to load the ready lists, and the following poll(2)
* done inside check_events() will test nested poll code in
* ep_eventpoll_poll().
*/
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0) {
write(pfds[1], "w", 1);
exit(0);
}
sleep(1);
res = check_events(epfd, 1000) & POLLIN;
if (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return res;
}
int main(int ac, char **av) {
int error;
struct epoll_test_cfg tcfg;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing TTY events\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_test_tty, NULL);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing short wakeup chain\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == POLLIN ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing long wakeup chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing short poll chain\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == POLLIN ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing long poll chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = EPOLL_TF_LOOP;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing loopy wakeup chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = EPOLL_TF_LOOP;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing loopy poll chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Pavel Pisa <pisa@cmp.felk.cvut.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-03-31 22:24:10 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We need to set back ep->ovflist to EP_UNACTIVE_PTR, so that after
|
|
|
|
* releasing the lock, events will be queued in the normal way inside
|
|
|
|
* ep->rdllist.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
fs/epoll: reduce the scope of wq lock in epoll_wait()
This patch aims at reducing ep wq.lock hold times in epoll_wait(2). For
the blocking case, there is no need to constantly take and drop the
spinlock, which is only needed to manipulate the waitqueue.
The call to ep_events_available() is now lockless, and only exposed to
benign races. Here, if false positive (returns available events and
does not see another thread deleting an epi from the list) we call into
send_events and then the list's state is correctly seen. Otoh, if a
false negative and we don't see a list_add_tail(), for example, from irq
callback, then it is rechecked again before blocking, which will see the
correct state.
In order for more accuracy to see concurrent list_del_init(), use the
list_empty_careful() variant -- of course, this won't be safe against
insertions from wakeup.
For the overflow list we obviously need to prevent load/store tearing as
we don't want to see partial values while the ready list is disabled.
[dave@stgolabs.net: forgotten fixlets]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181109155258.jxcr4t2pnz6zqct3@linux-r8p5
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181108051006.18751-6-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Suggested-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-03 23:27:15 +00:00
|
|
|
WRITE_ONCE(ep->ovflist, EP_UNACTIVE_PTR);
|
epoll: fix epoll's own poll
Fix a bug inside the epoll's f_op->poll() code, that returns POLLIN even
though there are no actual ready monitored fds. The bug shows up if you
add an epoll fd inside another fd container (poll, select, epoll).
The problem is that callback-based wake ups used by epoll does not carry
(patches will follow, to fix this) any information about the events that
actually happened. So the callback code, since it can't call the file*
->poll() inside the callback, chains the file* into a ready-list.
So, suppose you added an fd with EPOLLOUT only, and some data shows up on
the fd, the file* mapped by the fd will be added into the ready-list (via
wakeup callback). During normal epoll_wait() use, this condition is
sorted out at the time we're actually able to call the file*'s
f_op->poll().
Inside the old epoll's f_op->poll() though, only a quick check
!list_empty(ready-list) was performed, and this could have led to
reporting POLLIN even though no ready fds would show up at a following
epoll_wait(). In order to correctly report the ready status for an epoll
fd, the ready-list must be checked to see if any really available fd+event
would be ready in a following epoll_wait().
Operation (calling f_op->poll() from inside f_op->poll()) that, like wake
ups, must be handled with care because of the fact that epoll fds can be
added to other epoll fds.
Test code:
/*
* epoll_test by Davide Libenzi (Simple code to test epoll internals)
* Copyright (C) 2008 Davide Libenzi
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
*
* Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
*
*/
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <poll.h>
#include <sys/epoll.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#define EPWAIT_TIMEO (1 * 1000)
#ifndef POLLRDHUP
#define POLLRDHUP 0x2000
#endif
#define EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN 100L
#define EPOLL_TF_LOOP (1 << 0)
struct epoll_test_cfg {
long size;
long flags;
};
static int xepoll_create(int n) {
int epfd;
if ((epfd = epoll_create(n)) == -1) {
perror("epoll_create");
exit(2);
}
return epfd;
}
static void xepoll_ctl(int epfd, int cmd, int fd, struct epoll_event *evt) {
if (epoll_ctl(epfd, cmd, fd, evt) < 0) {
perror("epoll_ctl");
exit(3);
}
}
static void xpipe(int *fds) {
if (pipe(fds)) {
perror("pipe");
exit(4);
}
}
static pid_t xfork(void) {
pid_t pid;
if ((pid = fork()) == (pid_t) -1) {
perror("pipe");
exit(5);
}
return pid;
}
static int run_forked_proc(int (*proc)(void *), void *data) {
int status;
pid_t pid;
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0)
exit((*proc)(data));
if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status): -2;
}
static int check_events(int fd, int timeo) {
struct pollfd pfd;
fprintf(stdout, "Checking events for fd %d\n", fd);
memset(&pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd));
pfd.fd = fd;
pfd.events = POLLIN | POLLOUT;
if (poll(&pfd, 1, timeo) < 0) {
perror("poll()");
return 0;
}
if (pfd.revents & POLLIN)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLIN\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLOUT)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLOUT\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLERR)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLERR\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLHUP)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLHUP\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLRDHUP)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLRDHUP\n");
return pfd.revents;
}
static int epoll_test_tty(void *data) {
int epfd, ifd = fileno(stdin), res;
struct epoll_event evt;
if (check_events(ifd, 0) != POLLOUT) {
fprintf(stderr, "Something is cooking on STDIN (%d)\n", ifd);
return 1;
}
epfd = xepoll_create(1);
fprintf(stdout, "Created epoll fd (%d)\n", epfd);
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
xepoll_ctl(epfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, ifd, &evt);
if (check_events(epfd, 0) & POLLIN) {
res = epoll_wait(epfd, &evt, 1, 0);
if (res == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Epoll fd (%d) is ready when it shouldn't!\n",
epfd);
return 2;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int epoll_wakeup_chain(void *data) {
struct epoll_test_cfg *tcfg = data;
int i, res, epfd, bfd, nfd, pfds[2];
pid_t pid;
struct epoll_event evt;
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
epfd = bfd = xepoll_create(1);
for (i = 0; i < tcfg->size; i++) {
nfd = xepoll_create(1);
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, nfd, &evt);
bfd = nfd;
}
xpipe(pfds);
if (tcfg->flags & EPOLL_TF_LOOP)
{
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, epfd, &evt);
/*
* If we're testing for loop, we want that the wakeup
* triggered by the write to the pipe done in the child
* process, triggers a fake event. So we add the pipe
* read size with EPOLLOUT events. This will trigger
* an addition to the ready-list, but no real events
* will be there. The the epoll kernel code will proceed
* in calling f_op->poll() of the epfd, triggering the
* loop we want to test.
*/
evt.events = EPOLLOUT;
}
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, pfds[0], &evt);
/*
* The pipe write must come after the poll(2) call inside
* check_events(). This tests the nested wakeup code in
* fs/eventpoll.c:ep_poll_safewake()
* By having the check_events() (hence poll(2)) happens first,
* we have poll wait queue filled up, and the write(2) in the
* child will trigger the wakeup chain.
*/
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0) {
sleep(1);
write(pfds[1], "w", 1);
exit(0);
}
res = check_events(epfd, 2000) & POLLIN;
if (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return res;
}
static int epoll_poll_chain(void *data) {
struct epoll_test_cfg *tcfg = data;
int i, res, epfd, bfd, nfd, pfds[2];
pid_t pid;
struct epoll_event evt;
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
epfd = bfd = xepoll_create(1);
for (i = 0; i < tcfg->size; i++) {
nfd = xepoll_create(1);
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, nfd, &evt);
bfd = nfd;
}
xpipe(pfds);
if (tcfg->flags & EPOLL_TF_LOOP)
{
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, epfd, &evt);
/*
* If we're testing for loop, we want that the wakeup
* triggered by the write to the pipe done in the child
* process, triggers a fake event. So we add the pipe
* read size with EPOLLOUT events. This will trigger
* an addition to the ready-list, but no real events
* will be there. The the epoll kernel code will proceed
* in calling f_op->poll() of the epfd, triggering the
* loop we want to test.
*/
evt.events = EPOLLOUT;
}
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, pfds[0], &evt);
/*
* The pipe write mush come before the poll(2) call inside
* check_events(). This tests the nested f_op->poll calls code in
* fs/eventpoll.c:ep_eventpoll_poll()
* By having the pipe write(2) happen first, we make the kernel
* epoll code to load the ready lists, and the following poll(2)
* done inside check_events() will test nested poll code in
* ep_eventpoll_poll().
*/
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0) {
write(pfds[1], "w", 1);
exit(0);
}
sleep(1);
res = check_events(epfd, 1000) & POLLIN;
if (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return res;
}
int main(int ac, char **av) {
int error;
struct epoll_test_cfg tcfg;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing TTY events\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_test_tty, NULL);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing short wakeup chain\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == POLLIN ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing long wakeup chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing short poll chain\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == POLLIN ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing long poll chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = EPOLL_TF_LOOP;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing loopy wakeup chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = EPOLL_TF_LOOP;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing loopy poll chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Pavel Pisa <pisa@cmp.felk.cvut.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-03-31 22:24:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Quickly re-inject items left on "txlist".
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2020-08-31 17:06:51 +00:00
|
|
|
list_splice(txlist, &ep->rdllist);
|
2012-05-01 19:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
__pm_relax(ep->ws);
|
2021-05-07 01:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!list_empty(&ep->rdllist)) {
|
|
|
|
if (waitqueue_active(&ep->wq))
|
|
|
|
wake_up(&ep->wq);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-03-08 00:28:53 +00:00
|
|
|
write_unlock_irq(&ep->lock);
|
epoll: fix epoll's own poll
Fix a bug inside the epoll's f_op->poll() code, that returns POLLIN even
though there are no actual ready monitored fds. The bug shows up if you
add an epoll fd inside another fd container (poll, select, epoll).
The problem is that callback-based wake ups used by epoll does not carry
(patches will follow, to fix this) any information about the events that
actually happened. So the callback code, since it can't call the file*
->poll() inside the callback, chains the file* into a ready-list.
So, suppose you added an fd with EPOLLOUT only, and some data shows up on
the fd, the file* mapped by the fd will be added into the ready-list (via
wakeup callback). During normal epoll_wait() use, this condition is
sorted out at the time we're actually able to call the file*'s
f_op->poll().
Inside the old epoll's f_op->poll() though, only a quick check
!list_empty(ready-list) was performed, and this could have led to
reporting POLLIN even though no ready fds would show up at a following
epoll_wait(). In order to correctly report the ready status for an epoll
fd, the ready-list must be checked to see if any really available fd+event
would be ready in a following epoll_wait().
Operation (calling f_op->poll() from inside f_op->poll()) that, like wake
ups, must be handled with care because of the fact that epoll fds can be
added to other epoll fds.
Test code:
/*
* epoll_test by Davide Libenzi (Simple code to test epoll internals)
* Copyright (C) 2008 Davide Libenzi
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
*
* Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
*
*/
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <poll.h>
#include <sys/epoll.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#define EPWAIT_TIMEO (1 * 1000)
#ifndef POLLRDHUP
#define POLLRDHUP 0x2000
#endif
#define EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN 100L
#define EPOLL_TF_LOOP (1 << 0)
struct epoll_test_cfg {
long size;
long flags;
};
static int xepoll_create(int n) {
int epfd;
if ((epfd = epoll_create(n)) == -1) {
perror("epoll_create");
exit(2);
}
return epfd;
}
static void xepoll_ctl(int epfd, int cmd, int fd, struct epoll_event *evt) {
if (epoll_ctl(epfd, cmd, fd, evt) < 0) {
perror("epoll_ctl");
exit(3);
}
}
static void xpipe(int *fds) {
if (pipe(fds)) {
perror("pipe");
exit(4);
}
}
static pid_t xfork(void) {
pid_t pid;
if ((pid = fork()) == (pid_t) -1) {
perror("pipe");
exit(5);
}
return pid;
}
static int run_forked_proc(int (*proc)(void *), void *data) {
int status;
pid_t pid;
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0)
exit((*proc)(data));
if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status): -2;
}
static int check_events(int fd, int timeo) {
struct pollfd pfd;
fprintf(stdout, "Checking events for fd %d\n", fd);
memset(&pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd));
pfd.fd = fd;
pfd.events = POLLIN | POLLOUT;
if (poll(&pfd, 1, timeo) < 0) {
perror("poll()");
return 0;
}
if (pfd.revents & POLLIN)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLIN\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLOUT)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLOUT\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLERR)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLERR\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLHUP)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLHUP\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLRDHUP)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLRDHUP\n");
return pfd.revents;
}
static int epoll_test_tty(void *data) {
int epfd, ifd = fileno(stdin), res;
struct epoll_event evt;
if (check_events(ifd, 0) != POLLOUT) {
fprintf(stderr, "Something is cooking on STDIN (%d)\n", ifd);
return 1;
}
epfd = xepoll_create(1);
fprintf(stdout, "Created epoll fd (%d)\n", epfd);
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
xepoll_ctl(epfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, ifd, &evt);
if (check_events(epfd, 0) & POLLIN) {
res = epoll_wait(epfd, &evt, 1, 0);
if (res == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Epoll fd (%d) is ready when it shouldn't!\n",
epfd);
return 2;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int epoll_wakeup_chain(void *data) {
struct epoll_test_cfg *tcfg = data;
int i, res, epfd, bfd, nfd, pfds[2];
pid_t pid;
struct epoll_event evt;
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
epfd = bfd = xepoll_create(1);
for (i = 0; i < tcfg->size; i++) {
nfd = xepoll_create(1);
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, nfd, &evt);
bfd = nfd;
}
xpipe(pfds);
if (tcfg->flags & EPOLL_TF_LOOP)
{
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, epfd, &evt);
/*
* If we're testing for loop, we want that the wakeup
* triggered by the write to the pipe done in the child
* process, triggers a fake event. So we add the pipe
* read size with EPOLLOUT events. This will trigger
* an addition to the ready-list, but no real events
* will be there. The the epoll kernel code will proceed
* in calling f_op->poll() of the epfd, triggering the
* loop we want to test.
*/
evt.events = EPOLLOUT;
}
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, pfds[0], &evt);
/*
* The pipe write must come after the poll(2) call inside
* check_events(). This tests the nested wakeup code in
* fs/eventpoll.c:ep_poll_safewake()
* By having the check_events() (hence poll(2)) happens first,
* we have poll wait queue filled up, and the write(2) in the
* child will trigger the wakeup chain.
*/
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0) {
sleep(1);
write(pfds[1], "w", 1);
exit(0);
}
res = check_events(epfd, 2000) & POLLIN;
if (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return res;
}
static int epoll_poll_chain(void *data) {
struct epoll_test_cfg *tcfg = data;
int i, res, epfd, bfd, nfd, pfds[2];
pid_t pid;
struct epoll_event evt;
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
epfd = bfd = xepoll_create(1);
for (i = 0; i < tcfg->size; i++) {
nfd = xepoll_create(1);
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, nfd, &evt);
bfd = nfd;
}
xpipe(pfds);
if (tcfg->flags & EPOLL_TF_LOOP)
{
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, epfd, &evt);
/*
* If we're testing for loop, we want that the wakeup
* triggered by the write to the pipe done in the child
* process, triggers a fake event. So we add the pipe
* read size with EPOLLOUT events. This will trigger
* an addition to the ready-list, but no real events
* will be there. The the epoll kernel code will proceed
* in calling f_op->poll() of the epfd, triggering the
* loop we want to test.
*/
evt.events = EPOLLOUT;
}
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, pfds[0], &evt);
/*
* The pipe write mush come before the poll(2) call inside
* check_events(). This tests the nested f_op->poll calls code in
* fs/eventpoll.c:ep_eventpoll_poll()
* By having the pipe write(2) happen first, we make the kernel
* epoll code to load the ready lists, and the following poll(2)
* done inside check_events() will test nested poll code in
* ep_eventpoll_poll().
*/
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0) {
write(pfds[1], "w", 1);
exit(0);
}
sleep(1);
res = check_events(epfd, 1000) & POLLIN;
if (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return res;
}
int main(int ac, char **av) {
int error;
struct epoll_test_cfg tcfg;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing TTY events\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_test_tty, NULL);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing short wakeup chain\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == POLLIN ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing long wakeup chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing short poll chain\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == POLLIN ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing long poll chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = EPOLL_TF_LOOP;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing loopy wakeup chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = EPOLL_TF_LOOP;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing loopy poll chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Pavel Pisa <pisa@cmp.felk.cvut.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-03-31 22:24:10 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-11-12 23:10:16 +00:00
|
|
|
static void epi_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *head)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct epitem *epi = container_of(head, struct epitem, rcu);
|
|
|
|
kmem_cache_free(epi_cache, epi);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
epoll: use refcount to reduce ep_mutex contention
We are observing huge contention on the epmutex during an http
connection/rate test:
83.17% 0.25% nginx [kernel.kallsyms] [k] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
[...]
|--66.96%--__fput
|--60.04%--eventpoll_release_file
|--58.41%--__mutex_lock.isra.6
|--56.56%--osq_lock
The application is multi-threaded, creates a new epoll entry for
each incoming connection, and does not delete it before the
connection shutdown - that is, before the connection's fd close().
Many different threads compete frequently for the epmutex lock,
affecting the overall performance.
To reduce the contention this patch introduces explicit reference counting
for the eventpoll struct. Each registered event acquires a reference,
and references are released at ep_remove() time.
The eventpoll struct is released by whoever - among EP file close() and
and the monitored file close() drops its last reference.
Additionally, this introduces a new 'dying' flag to prevent races between
the EP file close() and the monitored file close().
ep_eventpoll_release() marks, under f_lock spinlock, each epitem as dying
before removing it, while EP file close() does not touch dying epitems.
The above is needed as both close operations could run concurrently and
drop the EP reference acquired via the epitem entry. Without the above
flag, the monitored file close() could reach the EP struct via the epitem
list while the epitem is still listed and then try to put it after its
disposal.
An alternative could be avoiding touching the references acquired via
the epitems at EP file close() time, but that could leave the EP struct
alive for potentially unlimited time after EP file close(), with nasty
side effects.
With all the above in place, we can drop the epmutex usage at disposal time.
Overall this produces a significant performance improvement in the
mentioned connection/rate scenario: the mutex operations disappear from
the topmost offenders in the perf report, and the measured connections/rate
grows by ~60%.
To make the change more readable this additionally renames ep_free() to
ep_clear_and_put(), and moves the actual memory cleanup in a separate
ep_free() helper.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/4a57788dcaf28f5eb4f8dfddcc3a8b172a7357bb.1679504153.git.pabeni@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Tested-by: Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhiat.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-03-22 16:57:02 +00:00
|
|
|
static void ep_get(struct eventpoll *ep)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
refcount_inc(&ep->refcount);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Returns true if the event poll can be disposed
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static bool ep_refcount_dec_and_test(struct eventpoll *ep)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (!refcount_dec_and_test(&ep->refcount))
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
WARN_ON_ONCE(!RB_EMPTY_ROOT(&ep->rbr.rb_root));
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void ep_free(struct eventpoll *ep)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
mutex_destroy(&ep->mtx);
|
|
|
|
free_uid(ep->user);
|
|
|
|
wakeup_source_unregister(ep->ws);
|
|
|
|
kfree(ep);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Removes a "struct epitem" from the eventpoll RB tree and deallocates
|
2007-05-15 08:40:47 +00:00
|
|
|
* all the associated resources. Must be called with "mtx" held.
|
epoll: use refcount to reduce ep_mutex contention
We are observing huge contention on the epmutex during an http
connection/rate test:
83.17% 0.25% nginx [kernel.kallsyms] [k] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
[...]
|--66.96%--__fput
|--60.04%--eventpoll_release_file
|--58.41%--__mutex_lock.isra.6
|--56.56%--osq_lock
The application is multi-threaded, creates a new epoll entry for
each incoming connection, and does not delete it before the
connection shutdown - that is, before the connection's fd close().
Many different threads compete frequently for the epmutex lock,
affecting the overall performance.
To reduce the contention this patch introduces explicit reference counting
for the eventpoll struct. Each registered event acquires a reference,
and references are released at ep_remove() time.
The eventpoll struct is released by whoever - among EP file close() and
and the monitored file close() drops its last reference.
Additionally, this introduces a new 'dying' flag to prevent races between
the EP file close() and the monitored file close().
ep_eventpoll_release() marks, under f_lock spinlock, each epitem as dying
before removing it, while EP file close() does not touch dying epitems.
The above is needed as both close operations could run concurrently and
drop the EP reference acquired via the epitem entry. Without the above
flag, the monitored file close() could reach the EP struct via the epitem
list while the epitem is still listed and then try to put it after its
disposal.
An alternative could be avoiding touching the references acquired via
the epitems at EP file close() time, but that could leave the EP struct
alive for potentially unlimited time after EP file close(), with nasty
side effects.
With all the above in place, we can drop the epmutex usage at disposal time.
Overall this produces a significant performance improvement in the
mentioned connection/rate scenario: the mutex operations disappear from
the topmost offenders in the perf report, and the measured connections/rate
grows by ~60%.
To make the change more readable this additionally renames ep_free() to
ep_clear_and_put(), and moves the actual memory cleanup in a separate
ep_free() helper.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/4a57788dcaf28f5eb4f8dfddcc3a8b172a7357bb.1679504153.git.pabeni@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Tested-by: Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhiat.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-03-22 16:57:02 +00:00
|
|
|
* If the dying flag is set, do the removal only if force is true.
|
|
|
|
* This prevents ep_clear_and_put() from dropping all the ep references
|
|
|
|
* while running concurrently with eventpoll_release_file().
|
|
|
|
* Returns true if the eventpoll can be disposed.
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
epoll: use refcount to reduce ep_mutex contention
We are observing huge contention on the epmutex during an http
connection/rate test:
83.17% 0.25% nginx [kernel.kallsyms] [k] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
[...]
|--66.96%--__fput
|--60.04%--eventpoll_release_file
|--58.41%--__mutex_lock.isra.6
|--56.56%--osq_lock
The application is multi-threaded, creates a new epoll entry for
each incoming connection, and does not delete it before the
connection shutdown - that is, before the connection's fd close().
Many different threads compete frequently for the epmutex lock,
affecting the overall performance.
To reduce the contention this patch introduces explicit reference counting
for the eventpoll struct. Each registered event acquires a reference,
and references are released at ep_remove() time.
The eventpoll struct is released by whoever - among EP file close() and
and the monitored file close() drops its last reference.
Additionally, this introduces a new 'dying' flag to prevent races between
the EP file close() and the monitored file close().
ep_eventpoll_release() marks, under f_lock spinlock, each epitem as dying
before removing it, while EP file close() does not touch dying epitems.
The above is needed as both close operations could run concurrently and
drop the EP reference acquired via the epitem entry. Without the above
flag, the monitored file close() could reach the EP struct via the epitem
list while the epitem is still listed and then try to put it after its
disposal.
An alternative could be avoiding touching the references acquired via
the epitems at EP file close() time, but that could leave the EP struct
alive for potentially unlimited time after EP file close(), with nasty
side effects.
With all the above in place, we can drop the epmutex usage at disposal time.
Overall this produces a significant performance improvement in the
mentioned connection/rate scenario: the mutex operations disappear from
the topmost offenders in the perf report, and the measured connections/rate
grows by ~60%.
To make the change more readable this additionally renames ep_free() to
ep_clear_and_put(), and moves the actual memory cleanup in a separate
ep_free() helper.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/4a57788dcaf28f5eb4f8dfddcc3a8b172a7357bb.1679504153.git.pabeni@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Tested-by: Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhiat.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-03-22 16:57:02 +00:00
|
|
|
static bool __ep_remove(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epitem *epi, bool force)
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct file *file = epi->ffd.file;
|
epoll: take epitem list out of struct file
Move the head of epitem list out of struct file; for epoll ones it's
moved into struct eventpoll (->refs there), for non-epoll - into
the new object (struct epitem_head). In place of ->f_ep_links we
leave a pointer to the list head (->f_ep).
->f_ep is protected by ->f_lock and it's zeroed as soon as the list
of epitems becomes empty (that can happen only in ep_remove() by
now).
The list of files for reverse path check is *not* going through
struct file now - it's a single-linked list going through epitem_head
instances. It's terminated by ERR_PTR(-1) (== EP_UNACTIVE_POINTER),
so the elements of list can be distinguished by head->next != NULL.
epitem_head instances are allocated at ep_insert() time (by
attach_epitem()) and freed either by ep_remove() (if it empties
the set of epitems *and* epitem_head does not belong to the
reverse path check list) or by clear_tfile_check_list() when
the list is emptied (if the set of epitems is empty by that
point). Allocations are done from a separate slab - minimal kmalloc()
size is too large on some architectures.
As the result, we trim struct file _and_ get rid of the games with
temporary file references.
Locking and barriers are interesting (aren't they always); see unlist_file()
and ep_remove() for details. The non-obvious part is that ep_remove() needs
to decide if it will be the one to free the damn thing *before* actually
storing NULL to head->epitems.first - that's what smp_load_acquire is for
in there. unlist_file() lockless path is safe, since we hit it only if
we observe NULL in head->epitems.first and whoever had done that store is
guaranteed to have observed non-NULL in head->next. IOW, their last access
had been the store of NULL into ->epitems.first and we can safely free
the sucker. OTOH, we are under rcu_read_lock() and both epitem and
epitem->file have their freeing RCU-delayed. So if we see non-NULL
->epitems.first, we can grab ->f_lock (all epitems in there share the
same struct file) and safely recheck the emptiness of ->epitems; again,
->next is still non-NULL, so ep_remove() couldn't have freed head yet.
->f_lock serializes us wrt ep_remove(); the rest is trivial.
Note that once head->epitems becomes NULL, nothing can get inserted into
it - the only remaining reference to head after that point is from the
reverse path check list.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-10-02 00:45:51 +00:00
|
|
|
struct epitems_head *to_free;
|
|
|
|
struct hlist_head *head;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-08-22 04:56:45 +00:00
|
|
|
lockdep_assert_irqs_enabled();
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2018-08-22 04:56:26 +00:00
|
|
|
* Removes poll wait queue hooks.
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
ep_unregister_pollwait(ep, epi);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Remove the current item from the list of epoll hooks */
|
2009-02-06 20:52:43 +00:00
|
|
|
spin_lock(&file->f_lock);
|
epoll: use refcount to reduce ep_mutex contention
We are observing huge contention on the epmutex during an http
connection/rate test:
83.17% 0.25% nginx [kernel.kallsyms] [k] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
[...]
|--66.96%--__fput
|--60.04%--eventpoll_release_file
|--58.41%--__mutex_lock.isra.6
|--56.56%--osq_lock
The application is multi-threaded, creates a new epoll entry for
each incoming connection, and does not delete it before the
connection shutdown - that is, before the connection's fd close().
Many different threads compete frequently for the epmutex lock,
affecting the overall performance.
To reduce the contention this patch introduces explicit reference counting
for the eventpoll struct. Each registered event acquires a reference,
and references are released at ep_remove() time.
The eventpoll struct is released by whoever - among EP file close() and
and the monitored file close() drops its last reference.
Additionally, this introduces a new 'dying' flag to prevent races between
the EP file close() and the monitored file close().
ep_eventpoll_release() marks, under f_lock spinlock, each epitem as dying
before removing it, while EP file close() does not touch dying epitems.
The above is needed as both close operations could run concurrently and
drop the EP reference acquired via the epitem entry. Without the above
flag, the monitored file close() could reach the EP struct via the epitem
list while the epitem is still listed and then try to put it after its
disposal.
An alternative could be avoiding touching the references acquired via
the epitems at EP file close() time, but that could leave the EP struct
alive for potentially unlimited time after EP file close(), with nasty
side effects.
With all the above in place, we can drop the epmutex usage at disposal time.
Overall this produces a significant performance improvement in the
mentioned connection/rate scenario: the mutex operations disappear from
the topmost offenders in the perf report, and the measured connections/rate
grows by ~60%.
To make the change more readable this additionally renames ep_free() to
ep_clear_and_put(), and moves the actual memory cleanup in a separate
ep_free() helper.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/4a57788dcaf28f5eb4f8dfddcc3a8b172a7357bb.1679504153.git.pabeni@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Tested-by: Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhiat.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-03-22 16:57:02 +00:00
|
|
|
if (epi->dying && !force) {
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock(&file->f_lock);
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
epoll: take epitem list out of struct file
Move the head of epitem list out of struct file; for epoll ones it's
moved into struct eventpoll (->refs there), for non-epoll - into
the new object (struct epitem_head). In place of ->f_ep_links we
leave a pointer to the list head (->f_ep).
->f_ep is protected by ->f_lock and it's zeroed as soon as the list
of epitems becomes empty (that can happen only in ep_remove() by
now).
The list of files for reverse path check is *not* going through
struct file now - it's a single-linked list going through epitem_head
instances. It's terminated by ERR_PTR(-1) (== EP_UNACTIVE_POINTER),
so the elements of list can be distinguished by head->next != NULL.
epitem_head instances are allocated at ep_insert() time (by
attach_epitem()) and freed either by ep_remove() (if it empties
the set of epitems *and* epitem_head does not belong to the
reverse path check list) or by clear_tfile_check_list() when
the list is emptied (if the set of epitems is empty by that
point). Allocations are done from a separate slab - minimal kmalloc()
size is too large on some architectures.
As the result, we trim struct file _and_ get rid of the games with
temporary file references.
Locking and barriers are interesting (aren't they always); see unlist_file()
and ep_remove() for details. The non-obvious part is that ep_remove() needs
to decide if it will be the one to free the damn thing *before* actually
storing NULL to head->epitems.first - that's what smp_load_acquire is for
in there. unlist_file() lockless path is safe, since we hit it only if
we observe NULL in head->epitems.first and whoever had done that store is
guaranteed to have observed non-NULL in head->next. IOW, their last access
had been the store of NULL into ->epitems.first and we can safely free
the sucker. OTOH, we are under rcu_read_lock() and both epitem and
epitem->file have their freeing RCU-delayed. So if we see non-NULL
->epitems.first, we can grab ->f_lock (all epitems in there share the
same struct file) and safely recheck the emptiness of ->epitems; again,
->next is still non-NULL, so ep_remove() couldn't have freed head yet.
->f_lock serializes us wrt ep_remove(); the rest is trivial.
Note that once head->epitems becomes NULL, nothing can get inserted into
it - the only remaining reference to head after that point is from the
reverse path check list.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-10-02 00:45:51 +00:00
|
|
|
to_free = NULL;
|
|
|
|
head = file->f_ep;
|
|
|
|
if (head->first == &epi->fllink && !epi->fllink.next) {
|
|
|
|
file->f_ep = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (!is_file_epoll(file)) {
|
|
|
|
struct epitems_head *v;
|
|
|
|
v = container_of(head, struct epitems_head, epitems);
|
|
|
|
if (!smp_load_acquire(&v->next))
|
|
|
|
to_free = v;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2020-09-27 15:18:30 +00:00
|
|
|
hlist_del_rcu(&epi->fllink);
|
2009-02-06 20:52:43 +00:00
|
|
|
spin_unlock(&file->f_lock);
|
epoll: take epitem list out of struct file
Move the head of epitem list out of struct file; for epoll ones it's
moved into struct eventpoll (->refs there), for non-epoll - into
the new object (struct epitem_head). In place of ->f_ep_links we
leave a pointer to the list head (->f_ep).
->f_ep is protected by ->f_lock and it's zeroed as soon as the list
of epitems becomes empty (that can happen only in ep_remove() by
now).
The list of files for reverse path check is *not* going through
struct file now - it's a single-linked list going through epitem_head
instances. It's terminated by ERR_PTR(-1) (== EP_UNACTIVE_POINTER),
so the elements of list can be distinguished by head->next != NULL.
epitem_head instances are allocated at ep_insert() time (by
attach_epitem()) and freed either by ep_remove() (if it empties
the set of epitems *and* epitem_head does not belong to the
reverse path check list) or by clear_tfile_check_list() when
the list is emptied (if the set of epitems is empty by that
point). Allocations are done from a separate slab - minimal kmalloc()
size is too large on some architectures.
As the result, we trim struct file _and_ get rid of the games with
temporary file references.
Locking and barriers are interesting (aren't they always); see unlist_file()
and ep_remove() for details. The non-obvious part is that ep_remove() needs
to decide if it will be the one to free the damn thing *before* actually
storing NULL to head->epitems.first - that's what smp_load_acquire is for
in there. unlist_file() lockless path is safe, since we hit it only if
we observe NULL in head->epitems.first and whoever had done that store is
guaranteed to have observed non-NULL in head->next. IOW, their last access
had been the store of NULL into ->epitems.first and we can safely free
the sucker. OTOH, we are under rcu_read_lock() and both epitem and
epitem->file have their freeing RCU-delayed. So if we see non-NULL
->epitems.first, we can grab ->f_lock (all epitems in there share the
same struct file) and safely recheck the emptiness of ->epitems; again,
->next is still non-NULL, so ep_remove() couldn't have freed head yet.
->f_lock serializes us wrt ep_remove(); the rest is trivial.
Note that once head->epitems becomes NULL, nothing can get inserted into
it - the only remaining reference to head after that point is from the
reverse path check list.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-10-02 00:45:51 +00:00
|
|
|
free_ephead(to_free);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-09-08 23:15:18 +00:00
|
|
|
rb_erase_cached(&epi->rbn, &ep->rbr);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-03-08 00:28:53 +00:00
|
|
|
write_lock_irq(&ep->lock);
|
2018-08-22 04:58:26 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ep_is_linked(epi))
|
2007-05-15 08:40:47 +00:00
|
|
|
list_del_init(&epi->rdllink);
|
2019-03-08 00:28:53 +00:00
|
|
|
write_unlock_irq(&ep->lock);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2013-04-30 22:27:39 +00:00
|
|
|
wakeup_source_unregister(ep_wakeup_source(epi));
|
2013-11-12 23:10:16 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* At this point it is safe to free the eventpoll item. Use the union
|
|
|
|
* field epi->rcu, since we are trying to minimize the size of
|
|
|
|
* 'struct epitem'. The 'rbn' field is no longer in use. Protected by
|
|
|
|
* ep->mtx. The rcu read side, reverse_path_check_proc(), does not make
|
|
|
|
* use of the rbn field.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
call_rcu(&epi->rcu, epi_rcu_free);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-09-08 03:00:00 +00:00
|
|
|
percpu_counter_dec(&ep->user->epoll_watches);
|
epoll: use refcount to reduce ep_mutex contention
We are observing huge contention on the epmutex during an http
connection/rate test:
83.17% 0.25% nginx [kernel.kallsyms] [k] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
[...]
|--66.96%--__fput
|--60.04%--eventpoll_release_file
|--58.41%--__mutex_lock.isra.6
|--56.56%--osq_lock
The application is multi-threaded, creates a new epoll entry for
each incoming connection, and does not delete it before the
connection shutdown - that is, before the connection's fd close().
Many different threads compete frequently for the epmutex lock,
affecting the overall performance.
To reduce the contention this patch introduces explicit reference counting
for the eventpoll struct. Each registered event acquires a reference,
and references are released at ep_remove() time.
The eventpoll struct is released by whoever - among EP file close() and
and the monitored file close() drops its last reference.
Additionally, this introduces a new 'dying' flag to prevent races between
the EP file close() and the monitored file close().
ep_eventpoll_release() marks, under f_lock spinlock, each epitem as dying
before removing it, while EP file close() does not touch dying epitems.
The above is needed as both close operations could run concurrently and
drop the EP reference acquired via the epitem entry. Without the above
flag, the monitored file close() could reach the EP struct via the epitem
list while the epitem is still listed and then try to put it after its
disposal.
An alternative could be avoiding touching the references acquired via
the epitems at EP file close() time, but that could leave the EP struct
alive for potentially unlimited time after EP file close(), with nasty
side effects.
With all the above in place, we can drop the epmutex usage at disposal time.
Overall this produces a significant performance improvement in the
mentioned connection/rate scenario: the mutex operations disappear from
the topmost offenders in the perf report, and the measured connections/rate
grows by ~60%.
To make the change more readable this additionally renames ep_free() to
ep_clear_and_put(), and moves the actual memory cleanup in a separate
ep_free() helper.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/4a57788dcaf28f5eb4f8dfddcc3a8b172a7357bb.1679504153.git.pabeni@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Tested-by: Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhiat.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-03-22 16:57:02 +00:00
|
|
|
return ep_refcount_dec_and_test(ep);
|
|
|
|
}
|
epoll: introduce resource usage limits
It has been thought that the per-user file descriptors limit would also
limit the resources that a normal user can request via the epoll
interface. Vegard Nossum reported a very simple program (a modified
version attached) that can make a normal user to request a pretty large
amount of kernel memory, well within the its maximum number of fds. To
solve such problem, default limits are now imposed, and /proc based
configuration has been introduced. A new directory has been created,
named /proc/sys/fs/epoll/ and inside there, there are two configuration
points:
max_user_instances = Maximum number of devices - per user
max_user_watches = Maximum number of "watched" fds - per user
The current default for "max_user_watches" limits the memory used by epoll
to store "watches", to 1/32 of the amount of the low RAM. As example, a
256MB 32bit machine, will have "max_user_watches" set to roughly 90000.
That should be enough to not break existing heavy epoll users. The
default value for "max_user_instances" is set to 128, that should be
enough too.
This also changes the userspace, because a new error code can now come out
from EPOLL_CTL_ADD (-ENOSPC). The EMFILE from epoll_create() was already
listed, so that should be ok.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: use get_current_user()]
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegardno@ifi.uio.no>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-12-01 21:13:55 +00:00
|
|
|
|
epoll: use refcount to reduce ep_mutex contention
We are observing huge contention on the epmutex during an http
connection/rate test:
83.17% 0.25% nginx [kernel.kallsyms] [k] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
[...]
|--66.96%--__fput
|--60.04%--eventpoll_release_file
|--58.41%--__mutex_lock.isra.6
|--56.56%--osq_lock
The application is multi-threaded, creates a new epoll entry for
each incoming connection, and does not delete it before the
connection shutdown - that is, before the connection's fd close().
Many different threads compete frequently for the epmutex lock,
affecting the overall performance.
To reduce the contention this patch introduces explicit reference counting
for the eventpoll struct. Each registered event acquires a reference,
and references are released at ep_remove() time.
The eventpoll struct is released by whoever - among EP file close() and
and the monitored file close() drops its last reference.
Additionally, this introduces a new 'dying' flag to prevent races between
the EP file close() and the monitored file close().
ep_eventpoll_release() marks, under f_lock spinlock, each epitem as dying
before removing it, while EP file close() does not touch dying epitems.
The above is needed as both close operations could run concurrently and
drop the EP reference acquired via the epitem entry. Without the above
flag, the monitored file close() could reach the EP struct via the epitem
list while the epitem is still listed and then try to put it after its
disposal.
An alternative could be avoiding touching the references acquired via
the epitems at EP file close() time, but that could leave the EP struct
alive for potentially unlimited time after EP file close(), with nasty
side effects.
With all the above in place, we can drop the epmutex usage at disposal time.
Overall this produces a significant performance improvement in the
mentioned connection/rate scenario: the mutex operations disappear from
the topmost offenders in the perf report, and the measured connections/rate
grows by ~60%.
To make the change more readable this additionally renames ep_free() to
ep_clear_and_put(), and moves the actual memory cleanup in a separate
ep_free() helper.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/4a57788dcaf28f5eb4f8dfddcc3a8b172a7357bb.1679504153.git.pabeni@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Tested-by: Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhiat.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-03-22 16:57:02 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* ep_remove variant for callers owing an additional reference to the ep
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void ep_remove_safe(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epitem *epi)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
WARN_ON_ONCE(__ep_remove(ep, epi, false));
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
epoll: use refcount to reduce ep_mutex contention
We are observing huge contention on the epmutex during an http
connection/rate test:
83.17% 0.25% nginx [kernel.kallsyms] [k] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
[...]
|--66.96%--__fput
|--60.04%--eventpoll_release_file
|--58.41%--__mutex_lock.isra.6
|--56.56%--osq_lock
The application is multi-threaded, creates a new epoll entry for
each incoming connection, and does not delete it before the
connection shutdown - that is, before the connection's fd close().
Many different threads compete frequently for the epmutex lock,
affecting the overall performance.
To reduce the contention this patch introduces explicit reference counting
for the eventpoll struct. Each registered event acquires a reference,
and references are released at ep_remove() time.
The eventpoll struct is released by whoever - among EP file close() and
and the monitored file close() drops its last reference.
Additionally, this introduces a new 'dying' flag to prevent races between
the EP file close() and the monitored file close().
ep_eventpoll_release() marks, under f_lock spinlock, each epitem as dying
before removing it, while EP file close() does not touch dying epitems.
The above is needed as both close operations could run concurrently and
drop the EP reference acquired via the epitem entry. Without the above
flag, the monitored file close() could reach the EP struct via the epitem
list while the epitem is still listed and then try to put it after its
disposal.
An alternative could be avoiding touching the references acquired via
the epitems at EP file close() time, but that could leave the EP struct
alive for potentially unlimited time after EP file close(), with nasty
side effects.
With all the above in place, we can drop the epmutex usage at disposal time.
Overall this produces a significant performance improvement in the
mentioned connection/rate scenario: the mutex operations disappear from
the topmost offenders in the perf report, and the measured connections/rate
grows by ~60%.
To make the change more readable this additionally renames ep_free() to
ep_clear_and_put(), and moves the actual memory cleanup in a separate
ep_free() helper.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/4a57788dcaf28f5eb4f8dfddcc3a8b172a7357bb.1679504153.git.pabeni@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Tested-by: Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhiat.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-03-22 16:57:02 +00:00
|
|
|
static void ep_clear_and_put(struct eventpoll *ep)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
epoll: use refcount to reduce ep_mutex contention
We are observing huge contention on the epmutex during an http
connection/rate test:
83.17% 0.25% nginx [kernel.kallsyms] [k] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
[...]
|--66.96%--__fput
|--60.04%--eventpoll_release_file
|--58.41%--__mutex_lock.isra.6
|--56.56%--osq_lock
The application is multi-threaded, creates a new epoll entry for
each incoming connection, and does not delete it before the
connection shutdown - that is, before the connection's fd close().
Many different threads compete frequently for the epmutex lock,
affecting the overall performance.
To reduce the contention this patch introduces explicit reference counting
for the eventpoll struct. Each registered event acquires a reference,
and references are released at ep_remove() time.
The eventpoll struct is released by whoever - among EP file close() and
and the monitored file close() drops its last reference.
Additionally, this introduces a new 'dying' flag to prevent races between
the EP file close() and the monitored file close().
ep_eventpoll_release() marks, under f_lock spinlock, each epitem as dying
before removing it, while EP file close() does not touch dying epitems.
The above is needed as both close operations could run concurrently and
drop the EP reference acquired via the epitem entry. Without the above
flag, the monitored file close() could reach the EP struct via the epitem
list while the epitem is still listed and then try to put it after its
disposal.
An alternative could be avoiding touching the references acquired via
the epitems at EP file close() time, but that could leave the EP struct
alive for potentially unlimited time after EP file close(), with nasty
side effects.
With all the above in place, we can drop the epmutex usage at disposal time.
Overall this produces a significant performance improvement in the
mentioned connection/rate scenario: the mutex operations disappear from
the topmost offenders in the perf report, and the measured connections/rate
grows by ~60%.
To make the change more readable this additionally renames ep_free() to
ep_clear_and_put(), and moves the actual memory cleanup in a separate
ep_free() helper.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/4a57788dcaf28f5eb4f8dfddcc3a8b172a7357bb.1679504153.git.pabeni@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Tested-by: Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhiat.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-03-22 16:57:02 +00:00
|
|
|
struct rb_node *rbp, *next;
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
struct epitem *epi;
|
epoll: use refcount to reduce ep_mutex contention
We are observing huge contention on the epmutex during an http
connection/rate test:
83.17% 0.25% nginx [kernel.kallsyms] [k] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
[...]
|--66.96%--__fput
|--60.04%--eventpoll_release_file
|--58.41%--__mutex_lock.isra.6
|--56.56%--osq_lock
The application is multi-threaded, creates a new epoll entry for
each incoming connection, and does not delete it before the
connection shutdown - that is, before the connection's fd close().
Many different threads compete frequently for the epmutex lock,
affecting the overall performance.
To reduce the contention this patch introduces explicit reference counting
for the eventpoll struct. Each registered event acquires a reference,
and references are released at ep_remove() time.
The eventpoll struct is released by whoever - among EP file close() and
and the monitored file close() drops its last reference.
Additionally, this introduces a new 'dying' flag to prevent races between
the EP file close() and the monitored file close().
ep_eventpoll_release() marks, under f_lock spinlock, each epitem as dying
before removing it, while EP file close() does not touch dying epitems.
The above is needed as both close operations could run concurrently and
drop the EP reference acquired via the epitem entry. Without the above
flag, the monitored file close() could reach the EP struct via the epitem
list while the epitem is still listed and then try to put it after its
disposal.
An alternative could be avoiding touching the references acquired via
the epitems at EP file close() time, but that could leave the EP struct
alive for potentially unlimited time after EP file close(), with nasty
side effects.
With all the above in place, we can drop the epmutex usage at disposal time.
Overall this produces a significant performance improvement in the
mentioned connection/rate scenario: the mutex operations disappear from
the topmost offenders in the perf report, and the measured connections/rate
grows by ~60%.
To make the change more readable this additionally renames ep_free() to
ep_clear_and_put(), and moves the actual memory cleanup in a separate
ep_free() helper.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/4a57788dcaf28f5eb4f8dfddcc3a8b172a7357bb.1679504153.git.pabeni@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Tested-by: Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhiat.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-03-22 16:57:02 +00:00
|
|
|
bool dispose;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
/* We need to release all tasks waiting for these file */
|
|
|
|
if (waitqueue_active(&ep->poll_wait))
|
2022-11-20 17:10:53 +00:00
|
|
|
ep_poll_safewake(ep, NULL, 0);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
epoll: use refcount to reduce ep_mutex contention
We are observing huge contention on the epmutex during an http
connection/rate test:
83.17% 0.25% nginx [kernel.kallsyms] [k] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
[...]
|--66.96%--__fput
|--60.04%--eventpoll_release_file
|--58.41%--__mutex_lock.isra.6
|--56.56%--osq_lock
The application is multi-threaded, creates a new epoll entry for
each incoming connection, and does not delete it before the
connection shutdown - that is, before the connection's fd close().
Many different threads compete frequently for the epmutex lock,
affecting the overall performance.
To reduce the contention this patch introduces explicit reference counting
for the eventpoll struct. Each registered event acquires a reference,
and references are released at ep_remove() time.
The eventpoll struct is released by whoever - among EP file close() and
and the monitored file close() drops its last reference.
Additionally, this introduces a new 'dying' flag to prevent races between
the EP file close() and the monitored file close().
ep_eventpoll_release() marks, under f_lock spinlock, each epitem as dying
before removing it, while EP file close() does not touch dying epitems.
The above is needed as both close operations could run concurrently and
drop the EP reference acquired via the epitem entry. Without the above
flag, the monitored file close() could reach the EP struct via the epitem
list while the epitem is still listed and then try to put it after its
disposal.
An alternative could be avoiding touching the references acquired via
the epitems at EP file close() time, but that could leave the EP struct
alive for potentially unlimited time after EP file close(), with nasty
side effects.
With all the above in place, we can drop the epmutex usage at disposal time.
Overall this produces a significant performance improvement in the
mentioned connection/rate scenario: the mutex operations disappear from
the topmost offenders in the perf report, and the measured connections/rate
grows by ~60%.
To make the change more readable this additionally renames ep_free() to
ep_clear_and_put(), and moves the actual memory cleanup in a separate
ep_free() helper.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/4a57788dcaf28f5eb4f8dfddcc3a8b172a7357bb.1679504153.git.pabeni@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Tested-by: Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhiat.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-03-22 16:57:02 +00:00
|
|
|
mutex_lock(&ep->mtx);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
* Walks through the whole tree by unregistering poll callbacks.
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-09-08 23:15:18 +00:00
|
|
|
for (rbp = rb_first_cached(&ep->rbr); rbp; rbp = rb_next(rbp)) {
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
epi = rb_entry(rbp, struct epitem, rbn);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ep_unregister_pollwait(ep, epi);
|
2013-09-11 21:24:06 +00:00
|
|
|
cond_resched();
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
epoll: use refcount to reduce ep_mutex contention
We are observing huge contention on the epmutex during an http
connection/rate test:
83.17% 0.25% nginx [kernel.kallsyms] [k] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
[...]
|--66.96%--__fput
|--60.04%--eventpoll_release_file
|--58.41%--__mutex_lock.isra.6
|--56.56%--osq_lock
The application is multi-threaded, creates a new epoll entry for
each incoming connection, and does not delete it before the
connection shutdown - that is, before the connection's fd close().
Many different threads compete frequently for the epmutex lock,
affecting the overall performance.
To reduce the contention this patch introduces explicit reference counting
for the eventpoll struct. Each registered event acquires a reference,
and references are released at ep_remove() time.
The eventpoll struct is released by whoever - among EP file close() and
and the monitored file close() drops its last reference.
Additionally, this introduces a new 'dying' flag to prevent races between
the EP file close() and the monitored file close().
ep_eventpoll_release() marks, under f_lock spinlock, each epitem as dying
before removing it, while EP file close() does not touch dying epitems.
The above is needed as both close operations could run concurrently and
drop the EP reference acquired via the epitem entry. Without the above
flag, the monitored file close() could reach the EP struct via the epitem
list while the epitem is still listed and then try to put it after its
disposal.
An alternative could be avoiding touching the references acquired via
the epitems at EP file close() time, but that could leave the EP struct
alive for potentially unlimited time after EP file close(), with nasty
side effects.
With all the above in place, we can drop the epmutex usage at disposal time.
Overall this produces a significant performance improvement in the
mentioned connection/rate scenario: the mutex operations disappear from
the topmost offenders in the perf report, and the measured connections/rate
grows by ~60%.
To make the change more readable this additionally renames ep_free() to
ep_clear_and_put(), and moves the actual memory cleanup in a separate
ep_free() helper.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/4a57788dcaf28f5eb4f8dfddcc3a8b172a7357bb.1679504153.git.pabeni@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Tested-by: Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhiat.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-03-22 16:57:02 +00:00
|
|
|
* Walks through the whole tree and try to free each "struct epitem".
|
|
|
|
* Note that ep_remove_safe() will not remove the epitem in case of a
|
|
|
|
* racing eventpoll_release_file(); the latter will do the removal.
|
|
|
|
* At this point we are sure no poll callbacks will be lingering around.
|
|
|
|
* Since we still own a reference to the eventpoll struct, the loop can't
|
|
|
|
* dispose it.
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
epoll: use refcount to reduce ep_mutex contention
We are observing huge contention on the epmutex during an http
connection/rate test:
83.17% 0.25% nginx [kernel.kallsyms] [k] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
[...]
|--66.96%--__fput
|--60.04%--eventpoll_release_file
|--58.41%--__mutex_lock.isra.6
|--56.56%--osq_lock
The application is multi-threaded, creates a new epoll entry for
each incoming connection, and does not delete it before the
connection shutdown - that is, before the connection's fd close().
Many different threads compete frequently for the epmutex lock,
affecting the overall performance.
To reduce the contention this patch introduces explicit reference counting
for the eventpoll struct. Each registered event acquires a reference,
and references are released at ep_remove() time.
The eventpoll struct is released by whoever - among EP file close() and
and the monitored file close() drops its last reference.
Additionally, this introduces a new 'dying' flag to prevent races between
the EP file close() and the monitored file close().
ep_eventpoll_release() marks, under f_lock spinlock, each epitem as dying
before removing it, while EP file close() does not touch dying epitems.
The above is needed as both close operations could run concurrently and
drop the EP reference acquired via the epitem entry. Without the above
flag, the monitored file close() could reach the EP struct via the epitem
list while the epitem is still listed and then try to put it after its
disposal.
An alternative could be avoiding touching the references acquired via
the epitems at EP file close() time, but that could leave the EP struct
alive for potentially unlimited time after EP file close(), with nasty
side effects.
With all the above in place, we can drop the epmutex usage at disposal time.
Overall this produces a significant performance improvement in the
mentioned connection/rate scenario: the mutex operations disappear from
the topmost offenders in the perf report, and the measured connections/rate
grows by ~60%.
To make the change more readable this additionally renames ep_free() to
ep_clear_and_put(), and moves the actual memory cleanup in a separate
ep_free() helper.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/4a57788dcaf28f5eb4f8dfddcc3a8b172a7357bb.1679504153.git.pabeni@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Tested-by: Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhiat.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-03-22 16:57:02 +00:00
|
|
|
for (rbp = rb_first_cached(&ep->rbr); rbp; rbp = next) {
|
|
|
|
next = rb_next(rbp);
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
epi = rb_entry(rbp, struct epitem, rbn);
|
epoll: use refcount to reduce ep_mutex contention
We are observing huge contention on the epmutex during an http
connection/rate test:
83.17% 0.25% nginx [kernel.kallsyms] [k] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
[...]
|--66.96%--__fput
|--60.04%--eventpoll_release_file
|--58.41%--__mutex_lock.isra.6
|--56.56%--osq_lock
The application is multi-threaded, creates a new epoll entry for
each incoming connection, and does not delete it before the
connection shutdown - that is, before the connection's fd close().
Many different threads compete frequently for the epmutex lock,
affecting the overall performance.
To reduce the contention this patch introduces explicit reference counting
for the eventpoll struct. Each registered event acquires a reference,
and references are released at ep_remove() time.
The eventpoll struct is released by whoever - among EP file close() and
and the monitored file close() drops its last reference.
Additionally, this introduces a new 'dying' flag to prevent races between
the EP file close() and the monitored file close().
ep_eventpoll_release() marks, under f_lock spinlock, each epitem as dying
before removing it, while EP file close() does not touch dying epitems.
The above is needed as both close operations could run concurrently and
drop the EP reference acquired via the epitem entry. Without the above
flag, the monitored file close() could reach the EP struct via the epitem
list while the epitem is still listed and then try to put it after its
disposal.
An alternative could be avoiding touching the references acquired via
the epitems at EP file close() time, but that could leave the EP struct
alive for potentially unlimited time after EP file close(), with nasty
side effects.
With all the above in place, we can drop the epmutex usage at disposal time.
Overall this produces a significant performance improvement in the
mentioned connection/rate scenario: the mutex operations disappear from
the topmost offenders in the perf report, and the measured connections/rate
grows by ~60%.
To make the change more readable this additionally renames ep_free() to
ep_clear_and_put(), and moves the actual memory cleanup in a separate
ep_free() helper.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/4a57788dcaf28f5eb4f8dfddcc3a8b172a7357bb.1679504153.git.pabeni@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Tested-by: Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhiat.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-03-22 16:57:02 +00:00
|
|
|
ep_remove_safe(ep, epi);
|
2013-09-11 21:24:06 +00:00
|
|
|
cond_resched();
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
epoll: use refcount to reduce ep_mutex contention
We are observing huge contention on the epmutex during an http
connection/rate test:
83.17% 0.25% nginx [kernel.kallsyms] [k] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
[...]
|--66.96%--__fput
|--60.04%--eventpoll_release_file
|--58.41%--__mutex_lock.isra.6
|--56.56%--osq_lock
The application is multi-threaded, creates a new epoll entry for
each incoming connection, and does not delete it before the
connection shutdown - that is, before the connection's fd close().
Many different threads compete frequently for the epmutex lock,
affecting the overall performance.
To reduce the contention this patch introduces explicit reference counting
for the eventpoll struct. Each registered event acquires a reference,
and references are released at ep_remove() time.
The eventpoll struct is released by whoever - among EP file close() and
and the monitored file close() drops its last reference.
Additionally, this introduces a new 'dying' flag to prevent races between
the EP file close() and the monitored file close().
ep_eventpoll_release() marks, under f_lock spinlock, each epitem as dying
before removing it, while EP file close() does not touch dying epitems.
The above is needed as both close operations could run concurrently and
drop the EP reference acquired via the epitem entry. Without the above
flag, the monitored file close() could reach the EP struct via the epitem
list while the epitem is still listed and then try to put it after its
disposal.
An alternative could be avoiding touching the references acquired via
the epitems at EP file close() time, but that could leave the EP struct
alive for potentially unlimited time after EP file close(), with nasty
side effects.
With all the above in place, we can drop the epmutex usage at disposal time.
Overall this produces a significant performance improvement in the
mentioned connection/rate scenario: the mutex operations disappear from
the topmost offenders in the perf report, and the measured connections/rate
grows by ~60%.
To make the change more readable this additionally renames ep_free() to
ep_clear_and_put(), and moves the actual memory cleanup in a separate
ep_free() helper.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/4a57788dcaf28f5eb4f8dfddcc3a8b172a7357bb.1679504153.git.pabeni@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Tested-by: Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhiat.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-03-22 16:57:02 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dispose = ep_refcount_dec_and_test(ep);
|
2013-04-30 22:27:40 +00:00
|
|
|
mutex_unlock(&ep->mtx);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
epoll: use refcount to reduce ep_mutex contention
We are observing huge contention on the epmutex during an http
connection/rate test:
83.17% 0.25% nginx [kernel.kallsyms] [k] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
[...]
|--66.96%--__fput
|--60.04%--eventpoll_release_file
|--58.41%--__mutex_lock.isra.6
|--56.56%--osq_lock
The application is multi-threaded, creates a new epoll entry for
each incoming connection, and does not delete it before the
connection shutdown - that is, before the connection's fd close().
Many different threads compete frequently for the epmutex lock,
affecting the overall performance.
To reduce the contention this patch introduces explicit reference counting
for the eventpoll struct. Each registered event acquires a reference,
and references are released at ep_remove() time.
The eventpoll struct is released by whoever - among EP file close() and
and the monitored file close() drops its last reference.
Additionally, this introduces a new 'dying' flag to prevent races between
the EP file close() and the monitored file close().
ep_eventpoll_release() marks, under f_lock spinlock, each epitem as dying
before removing it, while EP file close() does not touch dying epitems.
The above is needed as both close operations could run concurrently and
drop the EP reference acquired via the epitem entry. Without the above
flag, the monitored file close() could reach the EP struct via the epitem
list while the epitem is still listed and then try to put it after its
disposal.
An alternative could be avoiding touching the references acquired via
the epitems at EP file close() time, but that could leave the EP struct
alive for potentially unlimited time after EP file close(), with nasty
side effects.
With all the above in place, we can drop the epmutex usage at disposal time.
Overall this produces a significant performance improvement in the
mentioned connection/rate scenario: the mutex operations disappear from
the topmost offenders in the perf report, and the measured connections/rate
grows by ~60%.
To make the change more readable this additionally renames ep_free() to
ep_clear_and_put(), and moves the actual memory cleanup in a separate
ep_free() helper.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/4a57788dcaf28f5eb4f8dfddcc3a8b172a7357bb.1679504153.git.pabeni@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Tested-by: Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhiat.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-03-22 16:57:02 +00:00
|
|
|
if (dispose)
|
|
|
|
ep_free(ep);
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
static int ep_eventpoll_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct eventpoll *ep = file->private_data;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2007-05-15 08:40:57 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ep)
|
epoll: use refcount to reduce ep_mutex contention
We are observing huge contention on the epmutex during an http
connection/rate test:
83.17% 0.25% nginx [kernel.kallsyms] [k] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
[...]
|--66.96%--__fput
|--60.04%--eventpoll_release_file
|--58.41%--__mutex_lock.isra.6
|--56.56%--osq_lock
The application is multi-threaded, creates a new epoll entry for
each incoming connection, and does not delete it before the
connection shutdown - that is, before the connection's fd close().
Many different threads compete frequently for the epmutex lock,
affecting the overall performance.
To reduce the contention this patch introduces explicit reference counting
for the eventpoll struct. Each registered event acquires a reference,
and references are released at ep_remove() time.
The eventpoll struct is released by whoever - among EP file close() and
and the monitored file close() drops its last reference.
Additionally, this introduces a new 'dying' flag to prevent races between
the EP file close() and the monitored file close().
ep_eventpoll_release() marks, under f_lock spinlock, each epitem as dying
before removing it, while EP file close() does not touch dying epitems.
The above is needed as both close operations could run concurrently and
drop the EP reference acquired via the epitem entry. Without the above
flag, the monitored file close() could reach the EP struct via the epitem
list while the epitem is still listed and then try to put it after its
disposal.
An alternative could be avoiding touching the references acquired via
the epitems at EP file close() time, but that could leave the EP struct
alive for potentially unlimited time after EP file close(), with nasty
side effects.
With all the above in place, we can drop the epmutex usage at disposal time.
Overall this produces a significant performance improvement in the
mentioned connection/rate scenario: the mutex operations disappear from
the topmost offenders in the perf report, and the measured connections/rate
grows by ~60%.
To make the change more readable this additionally renames ep_free() to
ep_clear_and_put(), and moves the actual memory cleanup in a separate
ep_free() helper.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/4a57788dcaf28f5eb4f8dfddcc3a8b172a7357bb.1679504153.git.pabeni@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Tested-by: Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhiat.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-03-22 16:57:02 +00:00
|
|
|
ep_clear_and_put(ep);
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-09-26 22:48:57 +00:00
|
|
|
static __poll_t ep_item_poll(const struct epitem *epi, poll_table *pt, int depth);
|
epoll: remove ep_call_nested() from ep_eventpoll_poll()
The use of ep_call_nested() in ep_eventpoll_poll(), which is the .poll
routine for an epoll fd, is used to prevent excessively deep epoll
nesting, and to prevent circular paths.
However, we are already preventing these conditions during
EPOLL_CTL_ADD. In terms of too deep epoll chains, we do in fact allow
deep nesting of the epoll fds themselves (deeper than EP_MAX_NESTS),
however we don't allow more than EP_MAX_NESTS when an epoll file
descriptor is actually connected to a wakeup source. Thus, we do not
require the use of ep_call_nested(), since ep_eventpoll_poll(), which is
called via ep_scan_ready_list() only continues nesting if there are
events available.
Since ep_call_nested() is implemented using a global lock, applications
that make use of nested epoll can see large performance improvements
with this change.
Davidlohr said:
: Improvements are quite obscene actually, such as for the following
: epoll_wait() benchmark with 2 level nesting on a 80 core IvyBridge:
:
: ncpus vanilla dirty delta
: 1 2447092 3028315 +23.75%
: 4 231265 2986954 +1191.57%
: 8 121631 2898796 +2283.27%
: 16 59749 2902056 +4757.07%
: 32 26837 2326314 +8568.30%
: 64 12926 1341281 +10276.61%
:
: (http://linux-scalability.org/epoll/epoll-test.c)
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509430214-5599-1-git-send-email-jbaron@akamai.com
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Salman Qazi <sqazi@google.com>
Cc: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-11-17 23:29:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-09-26 22:32:48 +00:00
|
|
|
static __poll_t __ep_eventpoll_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait, int depth)
|
epoll: fix epoll's own poll
Fix a bug inside the epoll's f_op->poll() code, that returns POLLIN even
though there are no actual ready monitored fds. The bug shows up if you
add an epoll fd inside another fd container (poll, select, epoll).
The problem is that callback-based wake ups used by epoll does not carry
(patches will follow, to fix this) any information about the events that
actually happened. So the callback code, since it can't call the file*
->poll() inside the callback, chains the file* into a ready-list.
So, suppose you added an fd with EPOLLOUT only, and some data shows up on
the fd, the file* mapped by the fd will be added into the ready-list (via
wakeup callback). During normal epoll_wait() use, this condition is
sorted out at the time we're actually able to call the file*'s
f_op->poll().
Inside the old epoll's f_op->poll() though, only a quick check
!list_empty(ready-list) was performed, and this could have led to
reporting POLLIN even though no ready fds would show up at a following
epoll_wait(). In order to correctly report the ready status for an epoll
fd, the ready-list must be checked to see if any really available fd+event
would be ready in a following epoll_wait().
Operation (calling f_op->poll() from inside f_op->poll()) that, like wake
ups, must be handled with care because of the fact that epoll fds can be
added to other epoll fds.
Test code:
/*
* epoll_test by Davide Libenzi (Simple code to test epoll internals)
* Copyright (C) 2008 Davide Libenzi
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
*
* Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
*
*/
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <poll.h>
#include <sys/epoll.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#define EPWAIT_TIMEO (1 * 1000)
#ifndef POLLRDHUP
#define POLLRDHUP 0x2000
#endif
#define EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN 100L
#define EPOLL_TF_LOOP (1 << 0)
struct epoll_test_cfg {
long size;
long flags;
};
static int xepoll_create(int n) {
int epfd;
if ((epfd = epoll_create(n)) == -1) {
perror("epoll_create");
exit(2);
}
return epfd;
}
static void xepoll_ctl(int epfd, int cmd, int fd, struct epoll_event *evt) {
if (epoll_ctl(epfd, cmd, fd, evt) < 0) {
perror("epoll_ctl");
exit(3);
}
}
static void xpipe(int *fds) {
if (pipe(fds)) {
perror("pipe");
exit(4);
}
}
static pid_t xfork(void) {
pid_t pid;
if ((pid = fork()) == (pid_t) -1) {
perror("pipe");
exit(5);
}
return pid;
}
static int run_forked_proc(int (*proc)(void *), void *data) {
int status;
pid_t pid;
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0)
exit((*proc)(data));
if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status): -2;
}
static int check_events(int fd, int timeo) {
struct pollfd pfd;
fprintf(stdout, "Checking events for fd %d\n", fd);
memset(&pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd));
pfd.fd = fd;
pfd.events = POLLIN | POLLOUT;
if (poll(&pfd, 1, timeo) < 0) {
perror("poll()");
return 0;
}
if (pfd.revents & POLLIN)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLIN\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLOUT)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLOUT\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLERR)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLERR\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLHUP)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLHUP\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLRDHUP)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLRDHUP\n");
return pfd.revents;
}
static int epoll_test_tty(void *data) {
int epfd, ifd = fileno(stdin), res;
struct epoll_event evt;
if (check_events(ifd, 0) != POLLOUT) {
fprintf(stderr, "Something is cooking on STDIN (%d)\n", ifd);
return 1;
}
epfd = xepoll_create(1);
fprintf(stdout, "Created epoll fd (%d)\n", epfd);
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
xepoll_ctl(epfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, ifd, &evt);
if (check_events(epfd, 0) & POLLIN) {
res = epoll_wait(epfd, &evt, 1, 0);
if (res == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Epoll fd (%d) is ready when it shouldn't!\n",
epfd);
return 2;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int epoll_wakeup_chain(void *data) {
struct epoll_test_cfg *tcfg = data;
int i, res, epfd, bfd, nfd, pfds[2];
pid_t pid;
struct epoll_event evt;
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
epfd = bfd = xepoll_create(1);
for (i = 0; i < tcfg->size; i++) {
nfd = xepoll_create(1);
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, nfd, &evt);
bfd = nfd;
}
xpipe(pfds);
if (tcfg->flags & EPOLL_TF_LOOP)
{
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, epfd, &evt);
/*
* If we're testing for loop, we want that the wakeup
* triggered by the write to the pipe done in the child
* process, triggers a fake event. So we add the pipe
* read size with EPOLLOUT events. This will trigger
* an addition to the ready-list, but no real events
* will be there. The the epoll kernel code will proceed
* in calling f_op->poll() of the epfd, triggering the
* loop we want to test.
*/
evt.events = EPOLLOUT;
}
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, pfds[0], &evt);
/*
* The pipe write must come after the poll(2) call inside
* check_events(). This tests the nested wakeup code in
* fs/eventpoll.c:ep_poll_safewake()
* By having the check_events() (hence poll(2)) happens first,
* we have poll wait queue filled up, and the write(2) in the
* child will trigger the wakeup chain.
*/
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0) {
sleep(1);
write(pfds[1], "w", 1);
exit(0);
}
res = check_events(epfd, 2000) & POLLIN;
if (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return res;
}
static int epoll_poll_chain(void *data) {
struct epoll_test_cfg *tcfg = data;
int i, res, epfd, bfd, nfd, pfds[2];
pid_t pid;
struct epoll_event evt;
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
epfd = bfd = xepoll_create(1);
for (i = 0; i < tcfg->size; i++) {
nfd = xepoll_create(1);
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, nfd, &evt);
bfd = nfd;
}
xpipe(pfds);
if (tcfg->flags & EPOLL_TF_LOOP)
{
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, epfd, &evt);
/*
* If we're testing for loop, we want that the wakeup
* triggered by the write to the pipe done in the child
* process, triggers a fake event. So we add the pipe
* read size with EPOLLOUT events. This will trigger
* an addition to the ready-list, but no real events
* will be there. The the epoll kernel code will proceed
* in calling f_op->poll() of the epfd, triggering the
* loop we want to test.
*/
evt.events = EPOLLOUT;
}
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, pfds[0], &evt);
/*
* The pipe write mush come before the poll(2) call inside
* check_events(). This tests the nested f_op->poll calls code in
* fs/eventpoll.c:ep_eventpoll_poll()
* By having the pipe write(2) happen first, we make the kernel
* epoll code to load the ready lists, and the following poll(2)
* done inside check_events() will test nested poll code in
* ep_eventpoll_poll().
*/
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0) {
write(pfds[1], "w", 1);
exit(0);
}
sleep(1);
res = check_events(epfd, 1000) & POLLIN;
if (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return res;
}
int main(int ac, char **av) {
int error;
struct epoll_test_cfg tcfg;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing TTY events\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_test_tty, NULL);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing short wakeup chain\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == POLLIN ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing long wakeup chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing short poll chain\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == POLLIN ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing long poll chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = EPOLL_TF_LOOP;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing loopy wakeup chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = EPOLL_TF_LOOP;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing loopy poll chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Pavel Pisa <pisa@cmp.felk.cvut.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-03-31 22:24:10 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2020-09-26 22:32:48 +00:00
|
|
|
struct eventpoll *ep = file->private_data;
|
|
|
|
LIST_HEAD(txlist);
|
epoll: fix epoll's own poll
Fix a bug inside the epoll's f_op->poll() code, that returns POLLIN even
though there are no actual ready monitored fds. The bug shows up if you
add an epoll fd inside another fd container (poll, select, epoll).
The problem is that callback-based wake ups used by epoll does not carry
(patches will follow, to fix this) any information about the events that
actually happened. So the callback code, since it can't call the file*
->poll() inside the callback, chains the file* into a ready-list.
So, suppose you added an fd with EPOLLOUT only, and some data shows up on
the fd, the file* mapped by the fd will be added into the ready-list (via
wakeup callback). During normal epoll_wait() use, this condition is
sorted out at the time we're actually able to call the file*'s
f_op->poll().
Inside the old epoll's f_op->poll() though, only a quick check
!list_empty(ready-list) was performed, and this could have led to
reporting POLLIN even though no ready fds would show up at a following
epoll_wait(). In order to correctly report the ready status for an epoll
fd, the ready-list must be checked to see if any really available fd+event
would be ready in a following epoll_wait().
Operation (calling f_op->poll() from inside f_op->poll()) that, like wake
ups, must be handled with care because of the fact that epoll fds can be
added to other epoll fds.
Test code:
/*
* epoll_test by Davide Libenzi (Simple code to test epoll internals)
* Copyright (C) 2008 Davide Libenzi
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
*
* Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
*
*/
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <poll.h>
#include <sys/epoll.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#define EPWAIT_TIMEO (1 * 1000)
#ifndef POLLRDHUP
#define POLLRDHUP 0x2000
#endif
#define EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN 100L
#define EPOLL_TF_LOOP (1 << 0)
struct epoll_test_cfg {
long size;
long flags;
};
static int xepoll_create(int n) {
int epfd;
if ((epfd = epoll_create(n)) == -1) {
perror("epoll_create");
exit(2);
}
return epfd;
}
static void xepoll_ctl(int epfd, int cmd, int fd, struct epoll_event *evt) {
if (epoll_ctl(epfd, cmd, fd, evt) < 0) {
perror("epoll_ctl");
exit(3);
}
}
static void xpipe(int *fds) {
if (pipe(fds)) {
perror("pipe");
exit(4);
}
}
static pid_t xfork(void) {
pid_t pid;
if ((pid = fork()) == (pid_t) -1) {
perror("pipe");
exit(5);
}
return pid;
}
static int run_forked_proc(int (*proc)(void *), void *data) {
int status;
pid_t pid;
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0)
exit((*proc)(data));
if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status): -2;
}
static int check_events(int fd, int timeo) {
struct pollfd pfd;
fprintf(stdout, "Checking events for fd %d\n", fd);
memset(&pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd));
pfd.fd = fd;
pfd.events = POLLIN | POLLOUT;
if (poll(&pfd, 1, timeo) < 0) {
perror("poll()");
return 0;
}
if (pfd.revents & POLLIN)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLIN\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLOUT)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLOUT\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLERR)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLERR\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLHUP)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLHUP\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLRDHUP)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLRDHUP\n");
return pfd.revents;
}
static int epoll_test_tty(void *data) {
int epfd, ifd = fileno(stdin), res;
struct epoll_event evt;
if (check_events(ifd, 0) != POLLOUT) {
fprintf(stderr, "Something is cooking on STDIN (%d)\n", ifd);
return 1;
}
epfd = xepoll_create(1);
fprintf(stdout, "Created epoll fd (%d)\n", epfd);
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
xepoll_ctl(epfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, ifd, &evt);
if (check_events(epfd, 0) & POLLIN) {
res = epoll_wait(epfd, &evt, 1, 0);
if (res == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Epoll fd (%d) is ready when it shouldn't!\n",
epfd);
return 2;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int epoll_wakeup_chain(void *data) {
struct epoll_test_cfg *tcfg = data;
int i, res, epfd, bfd, nfd, pfds[2];
pid_t pid;
struct epoll_event evt;
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
epfd = bfd = xepoll_create(1);
for (i = 0; i < tcfg->size; i++) {
nfd = xepoll_create(1);
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, nfd, &evt);
bfd = nfd;
}
xpipe(pfds);
if (tcfg->flags & EPOLL_TF_LOOP)
{
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, epfd, &evt);
/*
* If we're testing for loop, we want that the wakeup
* triggered by the write to the pipe done in the child
* process, triggers a fake event. So we add the pipe
* read size with EPOLLOUT events. This will trigger
* an addition to the ready-list, but no real events
* will be there. The the epoll kernel code will proceed
* in calling f_op->poll() of the epfd, triggering the
* loop we want to test.
*/
evt.events = EPOLLOUT;
}
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, pfds[0], &evt);
/*
* The pipe write must come after the poll(2) call inside
* check_events(). This tests the nested wakeup code in
* fs/eventpoll.c:ep_poll_safewake()
* By having the check_events() (hence poll(2)) happens first,
* we have poll wait queue filled up, and the write(2) in the
* child will trigger the wakeup chain.
*/
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0) {
sleep(1);
write(pfds[1], "w", 1);
exit(0);
}
res = check_events(epfd, 2000) & POLLIN;
if (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return res;
}
static int epoll_poll_chain(void *data) {
struct epoll_test_cfg *tcfg = data;
int i, res, epfd, bfd, nfd, pfds[2];
pid_t pid;
struct epoll_event evt;
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
epfd = bfd = xepoll_create(1);
for (i = 0; i < tcfg->size; i++) {
nfd = xepoll_create(1);
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, nfd, &evt);
bfd = nfd;
}
xpipe(pfds);
if (tcfg->flags & EPOLL_TF_LOOP)
{
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, epfd, &evt);
/*
* If we're testing for loop, we want that the wakeup
* triggered by the write to the pipe done in the child
* process, triggers a fake event. So we add the pipe
* read size with EPOLLOUT events. This will trigger
* an addition to the ready-list, but no real events
* will be there. The the epoll kernel code will proceed
* in calling f_op->poll() of the epfd, triggering the
* loop we want to test.
*/
evt.events = EPOLLOUT;
}
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, pfds[0], &evt);
/*
* The pipe write mush come before the poll(2) call inside
* check_events(). This tests the nested f_op->poll calls code in
* fs/eventpoll.c:ep_eventpoll_poll()
* By having the pipe write(2) happen first, we make the kernel
* epoll code to load the ready lists, and the following poll(2)
* done inside check_events() will test nested poll code in
* ep_eventpoll_poll().
*/
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0) {
write(pfds[1], "w", 1);
exit(0);
}
sleep(1);
res = check_events(epfd, 1000) & POLLIN;
if (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return res;
}
int main(int ac, char **av) {
int error;
struct epoll_test_cfg tcfg;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing TTY events\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_test_tty, NULL);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing short wakeup chain\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == POLLIN ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing long wakeup chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing short poll chain\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == POLLIN ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing long poll chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = EPOLL_TF_LOOP;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing loopy wakeup chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = EPOLL_TF_LOOP;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing loopy poll chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Pavel Pisa <pisa@cmp.felk.cvut.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-03-31 22:24:10 +00:00
|
|
|
struct epitem *epi, *tmp;
|
poll: add poll_requested_events() and poll_does_not_wait() functions
In some cases the poll() implementation in a driver has to do different
things depending on the events the caller wants to poll for. An example
is when a driver needs to start a DMA engine if the caller polls for
POLLIN, but doesn't want to do that if POLLIN is not requested but instead
only POLLOUT or POLLPRI is requested. This is something that can happen
in the video4linux subsystem among others.
Unfortunately, the current epoll/poll/select implementation doesn't
provide that information reliably. The poll_table_struct does have it: it
has a key field with the event mask. But once a poll() call matches one
or more bits of that mask any following poll() calls are passed a NULL
poll_table pointer.
Also, the eventpoll implementation always left the key field at ~0 instead
of using the requested events mask.
This was changed in eventpoll.c so the key field now contains the actual
events that should be polled for as set by the caller.
The solution to the NULL poll_table pointer is to set the qproc field to
NULL in poll_table once poll() matches the events, not the poll_table
pointer itself. That way drivers can obtain the mask through a new
poll_requested_events inline.
The poll_table_struct can still be NULL since some kernel code calls it
internally (netfs_state_poll() in ./drivers/staging/pohmelfs/netfs.h). In
that case poll_requested_events() returns ~0 (i.e. all events).
Very rarely drivers might want to know whether poll_wait will actually
wait. If another earlier file descriptor in the set already matched the
events the caller wanted to wait for, then the kernel will return from the
select() call without waiting. This might be useful information in order
to avoid doing expensive work.
A new helper function poll_does_not_wait() is added that drivers can use
to detect this situation. This is now used in sock_poll_wait() in
include/net/sock.h. This was the only place in the kernel that needed
this information.
Drivers should no longer access any of the poll_table internals, but use
the poll_requested_events() and poll_does_not_wait() access functions
instead. In order to enforce that the poll_table fields are now prepended
with an underscore and a comment was added warning against using them
directly.
This required a change in unix_dgram_poll() in unix/af_unix.c which used
the key field to get the requested events. It's been replaced by a call
to poll_requested_events().
For qproc it was especially important to change its name since the
behavior of that field changes with this patch since this function pointer
can now be NULL when that wasn't possible in the past.
Any driver accessing the qproc or key fields directly will now fail to compile.
Some notes regarding the correctness of this patch: the driver's poll()
function is called with a 'struct poll_table_struct *wait' argument. This
pointer may or may not be NULL, drivers can never rely on it being one or
the other as that depends on whether or not an earlier file descriptor in
the select()'s fdset matched the requested events.
There are only three things a driver can do with the wait argument:
1) obtain the key field:
events = wait ? wait->key : ~0;
This will still work although it should be replaced with the new
poll_requested_events() function (which does exactly the same).
This will now even work better, since wait is no longer set to NULL
unnecessarily.
2) use the qproc callback. This could be deadly since qproc can now be
NULL. Renaming qproc should prevent this from happening. There are no
kernel drivers that actually access this callback directly, BTW.
3) test whether wait == NULL to determine whether poll would return without
waiting. This is no longer sufficient as the correct test is now
wait == NULL || wait->_qproc == NULL.
However, the worst that can happen here is a slight performance hit in
the case where wait != NULL and wait->_qproc == NULL. In that case the
driver will assume that poll_wait() will actually add the fd to the set
of waiting file descriptors. Of course, poll_wait() will not do that
since it tests for wait->_qproc. This will not break anything, though.
There is only one place in the whole kernel where this happens
(sock_poll_wait() in include/net/sock.h) and that code will be replaced
by a call to poll_does_not_wait() in the next patch.
Note that even if wait->_qproc != NULL drivers cannot rely on poll_wait()
actually waiting. The next file descriptor from the set might match the
event mask and thus any possible waits will never happen.
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hans.verkuil@cisco.com>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Reviewed-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@infradead.org>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-03-23 22:02:27 +00:00
|
|
|
poll_table pt;
|
2020-09-26 22:48:57 +00:00
|
|
|
__poll_t res = 0;
|
epoll: fix epoll's own poll
Fix a bug inside the epoll's f_op->poll() code, that returns POLLIN even
though there are no actual ready monitored fds. The bug shows up if you
add an epoll fd inside another fd container (poll, select, epoll).
The problem is that callback-based wake ups used by epoll does not carry
(patches will follow, to fix this) any information about the events that
actually happened. So the callback code, since it can't call the file*
->poll() inside the callback, chains the file* into a ready-list.
So, suppose you added an fd with EPOLLOUT only, and some data shows up on
the fd, the file* mapped by the fd will be added into the ready-list (via
wakeup callback). During normal epoll_wait() use, this condition is
sorted out at the time we're actually able to call the file*'s
f_op->poll().
Inside the old epoll's f_op->poll() though, only a quick check
!list_empty(ready-list) was performed, and this could have led to
reporting POLLIN even though no ready fds would show up at a following
epoll_wait(). In order to correctly report the ready status for an epoll
fd, the ready-list must be checked to see if any really available fd+event
would be ready in a following epoll_wait().
Operation (calling f_op->poll() from inside f_op->poll()) that, like wake
ups, must be handled with care because of the fact that epoll fds can be
added to other epoll fds.
Test code:
/*
* epoll_test by Davide Libenzi (Simple code to test epoll internals)
* Copyright (C) 2008 Davide Libenzi
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
*
* Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
*
*/
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <poll.h>
#include <sys/epoll.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#define EPWAIT_TIMEO (1 * 1000)
#ifndef POLLRDHUP
#define POLLRDHUP 0x2000
#endif
#define EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN 100L
#define EPOLL_TF_LOOP (1 << 0)
struct epoll_test_cfg {
long size;
long flags;
};
static int xepoll_create(int n) {
int epfd;
if ((epfd = epoll_create(n)) == -1) {
perror("epoll_create");
exit(2);
}
return epfd;
}
static void xepoll_ctl(int epfd, int cmd, int fd, struct epoll_event *evt) {
if (epoll_ctl(epfd, cmd, fd, evt) < 0) {
perror("epoll_ctl");
exit(3);
}
}
static void xpipe(int *fds) {
if (pipe(fds)) {
perror("pipe");
exit(4);
}
}
static pid_t xfork(void) {
pid_t pid;
if ((pid = fork()) == (pid_t) -1) {
perror("pipe");
exit(5);
}
return pid;
}
static int run_forked_proc(int (*proc)(void *), void *data) {
int status;
pid_t pid;
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0)
exit((*proc)(data));
if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status): -2;
}
static int check_events(int fd, int timeo) {
struct pollfd pfd;
fprintf(stdout, "Checking events for fd %d\n", fd);
memset(&pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd));
pfd.fd = fd;
pfd.events = POLLIN | POLLOUT;
if (poll(&pfd, 1, timeo) < 0) {
perror("poll()");
return 0;
}
if (pfd.revents & POLLIN)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLIN\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLOUT)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLOUT\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLERR)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLERR\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLHUP)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLHUP\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLRDHUP)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLRDHUP\n");
return pfd.revents;
}
static int epoll_test_tty(void *data) {
int epfd, ifd = fileno(stdin), res;
struct epoll_event evt;
if (check_events(ifd, 0) != POLLOUT) {
fprintf(stderr, "Something is cooking on STDIN (%d)\n", ifd);
return 1;
}
epfd = xepoll_create(1);
fprintf(stdout, "Created epoll fd (%d)\n", epfd);
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
xepoll_ctl(epfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, ifd, &evt);
if (check_events(epfd, 0) & POLLIN) {
res = epoll_wait(epfd, &evt, 1, 0);
if (res == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Epoll fd (%d) is ready when it shouldn't!\n",
epfd);
return 2;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int epoll_wakeup_chain(void *data) {
struct epoll_test_cfg *tcfg = data;
int i, res, epfd, bfd, nfd, pfds[2];
pid_t pid;
struct epoll_event evt;
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
epfd = bfd = xepoll_create(1);
for (i = 0; i < tcfg->size; i++) {
nfd = xepoll_create(1);
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, nfd, &evt);
bfd = nfd;
}
xpipe(pfds);
if (tcfg->flags & EPOLL_TF_LOOP)
{
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, epfd, &evt);
/*
* If we're testing for loop, we want that the wakeup
* triggered by the write to the pipe done in the child
* process, triggers a fake event. So we add the pipe
* read size with EPOLLOUT events. This will trigger
* an addition to the ready-list, but no real events
* will be there. The the epoll kernel code will proceed
* in calling f_op->poll() of the epfd, triggering the
* loop we want to test.
*/
evt.events = EPOLLOUT;
}
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, pfds[0], &evt);
/*
* The pipe write must come after the poll(2) call inside
* check_events(). This tests the nested wakeup code in
* fs/eventpoll.c:ep_poll_safewake()
* By having the check_events() (hence poll(2)) happens first,
* we have poll wait queue filled up, and the write(2) in the
* child will trigger the wakeup chain.
*/
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0) {
sleep(1);
write(pfds[1], "w", 1);
exit(0);
}
res = check_events(epfd, 2000) & POLLIN;
if (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return res;
}
static int epoll_poll_chain(void *data) {
struct epoll_test_cfg *tcfg = data;
int i, res, epfd, bfd, nfd, pfds[2];
pid_t pid;
struct epoll_event evt;
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
epfd = bfd = xepoll_create(1);
for (i = 0; i < tcfg->size; i++) {
nfd = xepoll_create(1);
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, nfd, &evt);
bfd = nfd;
}
xpipe(pfds);
if (tcfg->flags & EPOLL_TF_LOOP)
{
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, epfd, &evt);
/*
* If we're testing for loop, we want that the wakeup
* triggered by the write to the pipe done in the child
* process, triggers a fake event. So we add the pipe
* read size with EPOLLOUT events. This will trigger
* an addition to the ready-list, but no real events
* will be there. The the epoll kernel code will proceed
* in calling f_op->poll() of the epfd, triggering the
* loop we want to test.
*/
evt.events = EPOLLOUT;
}
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, pfds[0], &evt);
/*
* The pipe write mush come before the poll(2) call inside
* check_events(). This tests the nested f_op->poll calls code in
* fs/eventpoll.c:ep_eventpoll_poll()
* By having the pipe write(2) happen first, we make the kernel
* epoll code to load the ready lists, and the following poll(2)
* done inside check_events() will test nested poll code in
* ep_eventpoll_poll().
*/
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0) {
write(pfds[1], "w", 1);
exit(0);
}
sleep(1);
res = check_events(epfd, 1000) & POLLIN;
if (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return res;
}
int main(int ac, char **av) {
int error;
struct epoll_test_cfg tcfg;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing TTY events\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_test_tty, NULL);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing short wakeup chain\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == POLLIN ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing long wakeup chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing short poll chain\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == POLLIN ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing long poll chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = EPOLL_TF_LOOP;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing loopy wakeup chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = EPOLL_TF_LOOP;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing loopy poll chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Pavel Pisa <pisa@cmp.felk.cvut.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-03-31 22:24:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
poll: add poll_requested_events() and poll_does_not_wait() functions
In some cases the poll() implementation in a driver has to do different
things depending on the events the caller wants to poll for. An example
is when a driver needs to start a DMA engine if the caller polls for
POLLIN, but doesn't want to do that if POLLIN is not requested but instead
only POLLOUT or POLLPRI is requested. This is something that can happen
in the video4linux subsystem among others.
Unfortunately, the current epoll/poll/select implementation doesn't
provide that information reliably. The poll_table_struct does have it: it
has a key field with the event mask. But once a poll() call matches one
or more bits of that mask any following poll() calls are passed a NULL
poll_table pointer.
Also, the eventpoll implementation always left the key field at ~0 instead
of using the requested events mask.
This was changed in eventpoll.c so the key field now contains the actual
events that should be polled for as set by the caller.
The solution to the NULL poll_table pointer is to set the qproc field to
NULL in poll_table once poll() matches the events, not the poll_table
pointer itself. That way drivers can obtain the mask through a new
poll_requested_events inline.
The poll_table_struct can still be NULL since some kernel code calls it
internally (netfs_state_poll() in ./drivers/staging/pohmelfs/netfs.h). In
that case poll_requested_events() returns ~0 (i.e. all events).
Very rarely drivers might want to know whether poll_wait will actually
wait. If another earlier file descriptor in the set already matched the
events the caller wanted to wait for, then the kernel will return from the
select() call without waiting. This might be useful information in order
to avoid doing expensive work.
A new helper function poll_does_not_wait() is added that drivers can use
to detect this situation. This is now used in sock_poll_wait() in
include/net/sock.h. This was the only place in the kernel that needed
this information.
Drivers should no longer access any of the poll_table internals, but use
the poll_requested_events() and poll_does_not_wait() access functions
instead. In order to enforce that the poll_table fields are now prepended
with an underscore and a comment was added warning against using them
directly.
This required a change in unix_dgram_poll() in unix/af_unix.c which used
the key field to get the requested events. It's been replaced by a call
to poll_requested_events().
For qproc it was especially important to change its name since the
behavior of that field changes with this patch since this function pointer
can now be NULL when that wasn't possible in the past.
Any driver accessing the qproc or key fields directly will now fail to compile.
Some notes regarding the correctness of this patch: the driver's poll()
function is called with a 'struct poll_table_struct *wait' argument. This
pointer may or may not be NULL, drivers can never rely on it being one or
the other as that depends on whether or not an earlier file descriptor in
the select()'s fdset matched the requested events.
There are only three things a driver can do with the wait argument:
1) obtain the key field:
events = wait ? wait->key : ~0;
This will still work although it should be replaced with the new
poll_requested_events() function (which does exactly the same).
This will now even work better, since wait is no longer set to NULL
unnecessarily.
2) use the qproc callback. This could be deadly since qproc can now be
NULL. Renaming qproc should prevent this from happening. There are no
kernel drivers that actually access this callback directly, BTW.
3) test whether wait == NULL to determine whether poll would return without
waiting. This is no longer sufficient as the correct test is now
wait == NULL || wait->_qproc == NULL.
However, the worst that can happen here is a slight performance hit in
the case where wait != NULL and wait->_qproc == NULL. In that case the
driver will assume that poll_wait() will actually add the fd to the set
of waiting file descriptors. Of course, poll_wait() will not do that
since it tests for wait->_qproc. This will not break anything, though.
There is only one place in the whole kernel where this happens
(sock_poll_wait() in include/net/sock.h) and that code will be replaced
by a call to poll_does_not_wait() in the next patch.
Note that even if wait->_qproc != NULL drivers cannot rely on poll_wait()
actually waiting. The next file descriptor from the set might match the
event mask and thus any possible waits will never happen.
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hans.verkuil@cisco.com>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Reviewed-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@infradead.org>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-03-23 22:02:27 +00:00
|
|
|
init_poll_funcptr(&pt, NULL);
|
2013-04-30 22:27:42 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-09-26 22:32:48 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Insert inside our poll wait queue */
|
|
|
|
poll_wait(file, &ep->poll_wait, wait);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Proceed to find out if wanted events are really available inside
|
|
|
|
* the ready list.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
mutex_lock_nested(&ep->mtx, depth);
|
|
|
|
ep_start_scan(ep, &txlist);
|
2020-09-26 22:48:57 +00:00
|
|
|
list_for_each_entry_safe(epi, tmp, &txlist, rdllink) {
|
|
|
|
if (ep_item_poll(epi, &pt, depth + 1)) {
|
|
|
|
res = EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
epoll: remove ep_call_nested() from ep_eventpoll_poll()
The use of ep_call_nested() in ep_eventpoll_poll(), which is the .poll
routine for an epoll fd, is used to prevent excessively deep epoll
nesting, and to prevent circular paths.
However, we are already preventing these conditions during
EPOLL_CTL_ADD. In terms of too deep epoll chains, we do in fact allow
deep nesting of the epoll fds themselves (deeper than EP_MAX_NESTS),
however we don't allow more than EP_MAX_NESTS when an epoll file
descriptor is actually connected to a wakeup source. Thus, we do not
require the use of ep_call_nested(), since ep_eventpoll_poll(), which is
called via ep_scan_ready_list() only continues nesting if there are
events available.
Since ep_call_nested() is implemented using a global lock, applications
that make use of nested epoll can see large performance improvements
with this change.
Davidlohr said:
: Improvements are quite obscene actually, such as for the following
: epoll_wait() benchmark with 2 level nesting on a 80 core IvyBridge:
:
: ncpus vanilla dirty delta
: 1 2447092 3028315 +23.75%
: 4 231265 2986954 +1191.57%
: 8 121631 2898796 +2283.27%
: 16 59749 2902056 +4757.07%
: 32 26837 2326314 +8568.30%
: 64 12926 1341281 +10276.61%
:
: (http://linux-scalability.org/epoll/epoll-test.c)
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509430214-5599-1-git-send-email-jbaron@akamai.com
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Salman Qazi <sqazi@google.com>
Cc: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-11-17 23:29:06 +00:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
epoll: fix epoll's own poll
Fix a bug inside the epoll's f_op->poll() code, that returns POLLIN even
though there are no actual ready monitored fds. The bug shows up if you
add an epoll fd inside another fd container (poll, select, epoll).
The problem is that callback-based wake ups used by epoll does not carry
(patches will follow, to fix this) any information about the events that
actually happened. So the callback code, since it can't call the file*
->poll() inside the callback, chains the file* into a ready-list.
So, suppose you added an fd with EPOLLOUT only, and some data shows up on
the fd, the file* mapped by the fd will be added into the ready-list (via
wakeup callback). During normal epoll_wait() use, this condition is
sorted out at the time we're actually able to call the file*'s
f_op->poll().
Inside the old epoll's f_op->poll() though, only a quick check
!list_empty(ready-list) was performed, and this could have led to
reporting POLLIN even though no ready fds would show up at a following
epoll_wait(). In order to correctly report the ready status for an epoll
fd, the ready-list must be checked to see if any really available fd+event
would be ready in a following epoll_wait().
Operation (calling f_op->poll() from inside f_op->poll()) that, like wake
ups, must be handled with care because of the fact that epoll fds can be
added to other epoll fds.
Test code:
/*
* epoll_test by Davide Libenzi (Simple code to test epoll internals)
* Copyright (C) 2008 Davide Libenzi
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
*
* Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
*
*/
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <poll.h>
#include <sys/epoll.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#define EPWAIT_TIMEO (1 * 1000)
#ifndef POLLRDHUP
#define POLLRDHUP 0x2000
#endif
#define EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN 100L
#define EPOLL_TF_LOOP (1 << 0)
struct epoll_test_cfg {
long size;
long flags;
};
static int xepoll_create(int n) {
int epfd;
if ((epfd = epoll_create(n)) == -1) {
perror("epoll_create");
exit(2);
}
return epfd;
}
static void xepoll_ctl(int epfd, int cmd, int fd, struct epoll_event *evt) {
if (epoll_ctl(epfd, cmd, fd, evt) < 0) {
perror("epoll_ctl");
exit(3);
}
}
static void xpipe(int *fds) {
if (pipe(fds)) {
perror("pipe");
exit(4);
}
}
static pid_t xfork(void) {
pid_t pid;
if ((pid = fork()) == (pid_t) -1) {
perror("pipe");
exit(5);
}
return pid;
}
static int run_forked_proc(int (*proc)(void *), void *data) {
int status;
pid_t pid;
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0)
exit((*proc)(data));
if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status): -2;
}
static int check_events(int fd, int timeo) {
struct pollfd pfd;
fprintf(stdout, "Checking events for fd %d\n", fd);
memset(&pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd));
pfd.fd = fd;
pfd.events = POLLIN | POLLOUT;
if (poll(&pfd, 1, timeo) < 0) {
perror("poll()");
return 0;
}
if (pfd.revents & POLLIN)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLIN\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLOUT)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLOUT\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLERR)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLERR\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLHUP)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLHUP\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLRDHUP)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLRDHUP\n");
return pfd.revents;
}
static int epoll_test_tty(void *data) {
int epfd, ifd = fileno(stdin), res;
struct epoll_event evt;
if (check_events(ifd, 0) != POLLOUT) {
fprintf(stderr, "Something is cooking on STDIN (%d)\n", ifd);
return 1;
}
epfd = xepoll_create(1);
fprintf(stdout, "Created epoll fd (%d)\n", epfd);
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
xepoll_ctl(epfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, ifd, &evt);
if (check_events(epfd, 0) & POLLIN) {
res = epoll_wait(epfd, &evt, 1, 0);
if (res == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Epoll fd (%d) is ready when it shouldn't!\n",
epfd);
return 2;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int epoll_wakeup_chain(void *data) {
struct epoll_test_cfg *tcfg = data;
int i, res, epfd, bfd, nfd, pfds[2];
pid_t pid;
struct epoll_event evt;
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
epfd = bfd = xepoll_create(1);
for (i = 0; i < tcfg->size; i++) {
nfd = xepoll_create(1);
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, nfd, &evt);
bfd = nfd;
}
xpipe(pfds);
if (tcfg->flags & EPOLL_TF_LOOP)
{
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, epfd, &evt);
/*
* If we're testing for loop, we want that the wakeup
* triggered by the write to the pipe done in the child
* process, triggers a fake event. So we add the pipe
* read size with EPOLLOUT events. This will trigger
* an addition to the ready-list, but no real events
* will be there. The the epoll kernel code will proceed
* in calling f_op->poll() of the epfd, triggering the
* loop we want to test.
*/
evt.events = EPOLLOUT;
}
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, pfds[0], &evt);
/*
* The pipe write must come after the poll(2) call inside
* check_events(). This tests the nested wakeup code in
* fs/eventpoll.c:ep_poll_safewake()
* By having the check_events() (hence poll(2)) happens first,
* we have poll wait queue filled up, and the write(2) in the
* child will trigger the wakeup chain.
*/
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0) {
sleep(1);
write(pfds[1], "w", 1);
exit(0);
}
res = check_events(epfd, 2000) & POLLIN;
if (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return res;
}
static int epoll_poll_chain(void *data) {
struct epoll_test_cfg *tcfg = data;
int i, res, epfd, bfd, nfd, pfds[2];
pid_t pid;
struct epoll_event evt;
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
epfd = bfd = xepoll_create(1);
for (i = 0; i < tcfg->size; i++) {
nfd = xepoll_create(1);
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, nfd, &evt);
bfd = nfd;
}
xpipe(pfds);
if (tcfg->flags & EPOLL_TF_LOOP)
{
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, epfd, &evt);
/*
* If we're testing for loop, we want that the wakeup
* triggered by the write to the pipe done in the child
* process, triggers a fake event. So we add the pipe
* read size with EPOLLOUT events. This will trigger
* an addition to the ready-list, but no real events
* will be there. The the epoll kernel code will proceed
* in calling f_op->poll() of the epfd, triggering the
* loop we want to test.
*/
evt.events = EPOLLOUT;
}
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, pfds[0], &evt);
/*
* The pipe write mush come before the poll(2) call inside
* check_events(). This tests the nested f_op->poll calls code in
* fs/eventpoll.c:ep_eventpoll_poll()
* By having the pipe write(2) happen first, we make the kernel
* epoll code to load the ready lists, and the following poll(2)
* done inside check_events() will test nested poll code in
* ep_eventpoll_poll().
*/
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0) {
write(pfds[1], "w", 1);
exit(0);
}
sleep(1);
res = check_events(epfd, 1000) & POLLIN;
if (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return res;
}
int main(int ac, char **av) {
int error;
struct epoll_test_cfg tcfg;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing TTY events\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_test_tty, NULL);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing short wakeup chain\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == POLLIN ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing long wakeup chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing short poll chain\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == POLLIN ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing long poll chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = EPOLL_TF_LOOP;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing loopy wakeup chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = EPOLL_TF_LOOP;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing loopy poll chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Pavel Pisa <pisa@cmp.felk.cvut.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-03-31 22:24:10 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Item has been dropped into the ready list by the poll
|
|
|
|
* callback, but it's not actually ready, as far as
|
|
|
|
* caller requested events goes. We can remove it here.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2013-04-30 22:27:39 +00:00
|
|
|
__pm_relax(ep_wakeup_source(epi));
|
epoll: fix epoll's own poll
Fix a bug inside the epoll's f_op->poll() code, that returns POLLIN even
though there are no actual ready monitored fds. The bug shows up if you
add an epoll fd inside another fd container (poll, select, epoll).
The problem is that callback-based wake ups used by epoll does not carry
(patches will follow, to fix this) any information about the events that
actually happened. So the callback code, since it can't call the file*
->poll() inside the callback, chains the file* into a ready-list.
So, suppose you added an fd with EPOLLOUT only, and some data shows up on
the fd, the file* mapped by the fd will be added into the ready-list (via
wakeup callback). During normal epoll_wait() use, this condition is
sorted out at the time we're actually able to call the file*'s
f_op->poll().
Inside the old epoll's f_op->poll() though, only a quick check
!list_empty(ready-list) was performed, and this could have led to
reporting POLLIN even though no ready fds would show up at a following
epoll_wait(). In order to correctly report the ready status for an epoll
fd, the ready-list must be checked to see if any really available fd+event
would be ready in a following epoll_wait().
Operation (calling f_op->poll() from inside f_op->poll()) that, like wake
ups, must be handled with care because of the fact that epoll fds can be
added to other epoll fds.
Test code:
/*
* epoll_test by Davide Libenzi (Simple code to test epoll internals)
* Copyright (C) 2008 Davide Libenzi
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
*
* Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
*
*/
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <poll.h>
#include <sys/epoll.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#define EPWAIT_TIMEO (1 * 1000)
#ifndef POLLRDHUP
#define POLLRDHUP 0x2000
#endif
#define EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN 100L
#define EPOLL_TF_LOOP (1 << 0)
struct epoll_test_cfg {
long size;
long flags;
};
static int xepoll_create(int n) {
int epfd;
if ((epfd = epoll_create(n)) == -1) {
perror("epoll_create");
exit(2);
}
return epfd;
}
static void xepoll_ctl(int epfd, int cmd, int fd, struct epoll_event *evt) {
if (epoll_ctl(epfd, cmd, fd, evt) < 0) {
perror("epoll_ctl");
exit(3);
}
}
static void xpipe(int *fds) {
if (pipe(fds)) {
perror("pipe");
exit(4);
}
}
static pid_t xfork(void) {
pid_t pid;
if ((pid = fork()) == (pid_t) -1) {
perror("pipe");
exit(5);
}
return pid;
}
static int run_forked_proc(int (*proc)(void *), void *data) {
int status;
pid_t pid;
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0)
exit((*proc)(data));
if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status): -2;
}
static int check_events(int fd, int timeo) {
struct pollfd pfd;
fprintf(stdout, "Checking events for fd %d\n", fd);
memset(&pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd));
pfd.fd = fd;
pfd.events = POLLIN | POLLOUT;
if (poll(&pfd, 1, timeo) < 0) {
perror("poll()");
return 0;
}
if (pfd.revents & POLLIN)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLIN\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLOUT)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLOUT\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLERR)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLERR\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLHUP)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLHUP\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLRDHUP)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLRDHUP\n");
return pfd.revents;
}
static int epoll_test_tty(void *data) {
int epfd, ifd = fileno(stdin), res;
struct epoll_event evt;
if (check_events(ifd, 0) != POLLOUT) {
fprintf(stderr, "Something is cooking on STDIN (%d)\n", ifd);
return 1;
}
epfd = xepoll_create(1);
fprintf(stdout, "Created epoll fd (%d)\n", epfd);
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
xepoll_ctl(epfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, ifd, &evt);
if (check_events(epfd, 0) & POLLIN) {
res = epoll_wait(epfd, &evt, 1, 0);
if (res == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Epoll fd (%d) is ready when it shouldn't!\n",
epfd);
return 2;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int epoll_wakeup_chain(void *data) {
struct epoll_test_cfg *tcfg = data;
int i, res, epfd, bfd, nfd, pfds[2];
pid_t pid;
struct epoll_event evt;
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
epfd = bfd = xepoll_create(1);
for (i = 0; i < tcfg->size; i++) {
nfd = xepoll_create(1);
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, nfd, &evt);
bfd = nfd;
}
xpipe(pfds);
if (tcfg->flags & EPOLL_TF_LOOP)
{
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, epfd, &evt);
/*
* If we're testing for loop, we want that the wakeup
* triggered by the write to the pipe done in the child
* process, triggers a fake event. So we add the pipe
* read size with EPOLLOUT events. This will trigger
* an addition to the ready-list, but no real events
* will be there. The the epoll kernel code will proceed
* in calling f_op->poll() of the epfd, triggering the
* loop we want to test.
*/
evt.events = EPOLLOUT;
}
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, pfds[0], &evt);
/*
* The pipe write must come after the poll(2) call inside
* check_events(). This tests the nested wakeup code in
* fs/eventpoll.c:ep_poll_safewake()
* By having the check_events() (hence poll(2)) happens first,
* we have poll wait queue filled up, and the write(2) in the
* child will trigger the wakeup chain.
*/
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0) {
sleep(1);
write(pfds[1], "w", 1);
exit(0);
}
res = check_events(epfd, 2000) & POLLIN;
if (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return res;
}
static int epoll_poll_chain(void *data) {
struct epoll_test_cfg *tcfg = data;
int i, res, epfd, bfd, nfd, pfds[2];
pid_t pid;
struct epoll_event evt;
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
epfd = bfd = xepoll_create(1);
for (i = 0; i < tcfg->size; i++) {
nfd = xepoll_create(1);
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, nfd, &evt);
bfd = nfd;
}
xpipe(pfds);
if (tcfg->flags & EPOLL_TF_LOOP)
{
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, epfd, &evt);
/*
* If we're testing for loop, we want that the wakeup
* triggered by the write to the pipe done in the child
* process, triggers a fake event. So we add the pipe
* read size with EPOLLOUT events. This will trigger
* an addition to the ready-list, but no real events
* will be there. The the epoll kernel code will proceed
* in calling f_op->poll() of the epfd, triggering the
* loop we want to test.
*/
evt.events = EPOLLOUT;
}
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, pfds[0], &evt);
/*
* The pipe write mush come before the poll(2) call inside
* check_events(). This tests the nested f_op->poll calls code in
* fs/eventpoll.c:ep_eventpoll_poll()
* By having the pipe write(2) happen first, we make the kernel
* epoll code to load the ready lists, and the following poll(2)
* done inside check_events() will test nested poll code in
* ep_eventpoll_poll().
*/
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0) {
write(pfds[1], "w", 1);
exit(0);
}
sleep(1);
res = check_events(epfd, 1000) & POLLIN;
if (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return res;
}
int main(int ac, char **av) {
int error;
struct epoll_test_cfg tcfg;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing TTY events\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_test_tty, NULL);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing short wakeup chain\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == POLLIN ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing long wakeup chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing short poll chain\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == POLLIN ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing long poll chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = EPOLL_TF_LOOP;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing loopy wakeup chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = EPOLL_TF_LOOP;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing loopy poll chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Pavel Pisa <pisa@cmp.felk.cvut.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-03-31 22:24:10 +00:00
|
|
|
list_del_init(&epi->rdllink);
|
2009-03-31 22:24:11 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
epoll: fix epoll's own poll
Fix a bug inside the epoll's f_op->poll() code, that returns POLLIN even
though there are no actual ready monitored fds. The bug shows up if you
add an epoll fd inside another fd container (poll, select, epoll).
The problem is that callback-based wake ups used by epoll does not carry
(patches will follow, to fix this) any information about the events that
actually happened. So the callback code, since it can't call the file*
->poll() inside the callback, chains the file* into a ready-list.
So, suppose you added an fd with EPOLLOUT only, and some data shows up on
the fd, the file* mapped by the fd will be added into the ready-list (via
wakeup callback). During normal epoll_wait() use, this condition is
sorted out at the time we're actually able to call the file*'s
f_op->poll().
Inside the old epoll's f_op->poll() though, only a quick check
!list_empty(ready-list) was performed, and this could have led to
reporting POLLIN even though no ready fds would show up at a following
epoll_wait(). In order to correctly report the ready status for an epoll
fd, the ready-list must be checked to see if any really available fd+event
would be ready in a following epoll_wait().
Operation (calling f_op->poll() from inside f_op->poll()) that, like wake
ups, must be handled with care because of the fact that epoll fds can be
added to other epoll fds.
Test code:
/*
* epoll_test by Davide Libenzi (Simple code to test epoll internals)
* Copyright (C) 2008 Davide Libenzi
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
*
* Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
*
*/
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <poll.h>
#include <sys/epoll.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#define EPWAIT_TIMEO (1 * 1000)
#ifndef POLLRDHUP
#define POLLRDHUP 0x2000
#endif
#define EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN 100L
#define EPOLL_TF_LOOP (1 << 0)
struct epoll_test_cfg {
long size;
long flags;
};
static int xepoll_create(int n) {
int epfd;
if ((epfd = epoll_create(n)) == -1) {
perror("epoll_create");
exit(2);
}
return epfd;
}
static void xepoll_ctl(int epfd, int cmd, int fd, struct epoll_event *evt) {
if (epoll_ctl(epfd, cmd, fd, evt) < 0) {
perror("epoll_ctl");
exit(3);
}
}
static void xpipe(int *fds) {
if (pipe(fds)) {
perror("pipe");
exit(4);
}
}
static pid_t xfork(void) {
pid_t pid;
if ((pid = fork()) == (pid_t) -1) {
perror("pipe");
exit(5);
}
return pid;
}
static int run_forked_proc(int (*proc)(void *), void *data) {
int status;
pid_t pid;
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0)
exit((*proc)(data));
if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status): -2;
}
static int check_events(int fd, int timeo) {
struct pollfd pfd;
fprintf(stdout, "Checking events for fd %d\n", fd);
memset(&pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd));
pfd.fd = fd;
pfd.events = POLLIN | POLLOUT;
if (poll(&pfd, 1, timeo) < 0) {
perror("poll()");
return 0;
}
if (pfd.revents & POLLIN)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLIN\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLOUT)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLOUT\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLERR)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLERR\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLHUP)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLHUP\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLRDHUP)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLRDHUP\n");
return pfd.revents;
}
static int epoll_test_tty(void *data) {
int epfd, ifd = fileno(stdin), res;
struct epoll_event evt;
if (check_events(ifd, 0) != POLLOUT) {
fprintf(stderr, "Something is cooking on STDIN (%d)\n", ifd);
return 1;
}
epfd = xepoll_create(1);
fprintf(stdout, "Created epoll fd (%d)\n", epfd);
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
xepoll_ctl(epfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, ifd, &evt);
if (check_events(epfd, 0) & POLLIN) {
res = epoll_wait(epfd, &evt, 1, 0);
if (res == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Epoll fd (%d) is ready when it shouldn't!\n",
epfd);
return 2;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int epoll_wakeup_chain(void *data) {
struct epoll_test_cfg *tcfg = data;
int i, res, epfd, bfd, nfd, pfds[2];
pid_t pid;
struct epoll_event evt;
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
epfd = bfd = xepoll_create(1);
for (i = 0; i < tcfg->size; i++) {
nfd = xepoll_create(1);
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, nfd, &evt);
bfd = nfd;
}
xpipe(pfds);
if (tcfg->flags & EPOLL_TF_LOOP)
{
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, epfd, &evt);
/*
* If we're testing for loop, we want that the wakeup
* triggered by the write to the pipe done in the child
* process, triggers a fake event. So we add the pipe
* read size with EPOLLOUT events. This will trigger
* an addition to the ready-list, but no real events
* will be there. The the epoll kernel code will proceed
* in calling f_op->poll() of the epfd, triggering the
* loop we want to test.
*/
evt.events = EPOLLOUT;
}
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, pfds[0], &evt);
/*
* The pipe write must come after the poll(2) call inside
* check_events(). This tests the nested wakeup code in
* fs/eventpoll.c:ep_poll_safewake()
* By having the check_events() (hence poll(2)) happens first,
* we have poll wait queue filled up, and the write(2) in the
* child will trigger the wakeup chain.
*/
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0) {
sleep(1);
write(pfds[1], "w", 1);
exit(0);
}
res = check_events(epfd, 2000) & POLLIN;
if (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return res;
}
static int epoll_poll_chain(void *data) {
struct epoll_test_cfg *tcfg = data;
int i, res, epfd, bfd, nfd, pfds[2];
pid_t pid;
struct epoll_event evt;
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
epfd = bfd = xepoll_create(1);
for (i = 0; i < tcfg->size; i++) {
nfd = xepoll_create(1);
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, nfd, &evt);
bfd = nfd;
}
xpipe(pfds);
if (tcfg->flags & EPOLL_TF_LOOP)
{
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, epfd, &evt);
/*
* If we're testing for loop, we want that the wakeup
* triggered by the write to the pipe done in the child
* process, triggers a fake event. So we add the pipe
* read size with EPOLLOUT events. This will trigger
* an addition to the ready-list, but no real events
* will be there. The the epoll kernel code will proceed
* in calling f_op->poll() of the epfd, triggering the
* loop we want to test.
*/
evt.events = EPOLLOUT;
}
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, pfds[0], &evt);
/*
* The pipe write mush come before the poll(2) call inside
* check_events(). This tests the nested f_op->poll calls code in
* fs/eventpoll.c:ep_eventpoll_poll()
* By having the pipe write(2) happen first, we make the kernel
* epoll code to load the ready lists, and the following poll(2)
* done inside check_events() will test nested poll code in
* ep_eventpoll_poll().
*/
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0) {
write(pfds[1], "w", 1);
exit(0);
}
sleep(1);
res = check_events(epfd, 1000) & POLLIN;
if (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return res;
}
int main(int ac, char **av) {
int error;
struct epoll_test_cfg tcfg;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing TTY events\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_test_tty, NULL);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing short wakeup chain\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == POLLIN ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing long wakeup chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing short poll chain\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == POLLIN ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing long poll chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = EPOLL_TF_LOOP;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing loopy wakeup chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = EPOLL_TF_LOOP;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing loopy poll chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Pavel Pisa <pisa@cmp.felk.cvut.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-03-31 22:24:10 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2020-09-26 22:32:48 +00:00
|
|
|
ep_done_scan(ep, &txlist);
|
|
|
|
mutex_unlock(&ep->mtx);
|
|
|
|
return res;
|
epoll: fix epoll's own poll
Fix a bug inside the epoll's f_op->poll() code, that returns POLLIN even
though there are no actual ready monitored fds. The bug shows up if you
add an epoll fd inside another fd container (poll, select, epoll).
The problem is that callback-based wake ups used by epoll does not carry
(patches will follow, to fix this) any information about the events that
actually happened. So the callback code, since it can't call the file*
->poll() inside the callback, chains the file* into a ready-list.
So, suppose you added an fd with EPOLLOUT only, and some data shows up on
the fd, the file* mapped by the fd will be added into the ready-list (via
wakeup callback). During normal epoll_wait() use, this condition is
sorted out at the time we're actually able to call the file*'s
f_op->poll().
Inside the old epoll's f_op->poll() though, only a quick check
!list_empty(ready-list) was performed, and this could have led to
reporting POLLIN even though no ready fds would show up at a following
epoll_wait(). In order to correctly report the ready status for an epoll
fd, the ready-list must be checked to see if any really available fd+event
would be ready in a following epoll_wait().
Operation (calling f_op->poll() from inside f_op->poll()) that, like wake
ups, must be handled with care because of the fact that epoll fds can be
added to other epoll fds.
Test code:
/*
* epoll_test by Davide Libenzi (Simple code to test epoll internals)
* Copyright (C) 2008 Davide Libenzi
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
*
* Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
*
*/
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <poll.h>
#include <sys/epoll.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#define EPWAIT_TIMEO (1 * 1000)
#ifndef POLLRDHUP
#define POLLRDHUP 0x2000
#endif
#define EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN 100L
#define EPOLL_TF_LOOP (1 << 0)
struct epoll_test_cfg {
long size;
long flags;
};
static int xepoll_create(int n) {
int epfd;
if ((epfd = epoll_create(n)) == -1) {
perror("epoll_create");
exit(2);
}
return epfd;
}
static void xepoll_ctl(int epfd, int cmd, int fd, struct epoll_event *evt) {
if (epoll_ctl(epfd, cmd, fd, evt) < 0) {
perror("epoll_ctl");
exit(3);
}
}
static void xpipe(int *fds) {
if (pipe(fds)) {
perror("pipe");
exit(4);
}
}
static pid_t xfork(void) {
pid_t pid;
if ((pid = fork()) == (pid_t) -1) {
perror("pipe");
exit(5);
}
return pid;
}
static int run_forked_proc(int (*proc)(void *), void *data) {
int status;
pid_t pid;
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0)
exit((*proc)(data));
if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status): -2;
}
static int check_events(int fd, int timeo) {
struct pollfd pfd;
fprintf(stdout, "Checking events for fd %d\n", fd);
memset(&pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd));
pfd.fd = fd;
pfd.events = POLLIN | POLLOUT;
if (poll(&pfd, 1, timeo) < 0) {
perror("poll()");
return 0;
}
if (pfd.revents & POLLIN)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLIN\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLOUT)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLOUT\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLERR)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLERR\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLHUP)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLHUP\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLRDHUP)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLRDHUP\n");
return pfd.revents;
}
static int epoll_test_tty(void *data) {
int epfd, ifd = fileno(stdin), res;
struct epoll_event evt;
if (check_events(ifd, 0) != POLLOUT) {
fprintf(stderr, "Something is cooking on STDIN (%d)\n", ifd);
return 1;
}
epfd = xepoll_create(1);
fprintf(stdout, "Created epoll fd (%d)\n", epfd);
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
xepoll_ctl(epfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, ifd, &evt);
if (check_events(epfd, 0) & POLLIN) {
res = epoll_wait(epfd, &evt, 1, 0);
if (res == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Epoll fd (%d) is ready when it shouldn't!\n",
epfd);
return 2;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int epoll_wakeup_chain(void *data) {
struct epoll_test_cfg *tcfg = data;
int i, res, epfd, bfd, nfd, pfds[2];
pid_t pid;
struct epoll_event evt;
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
epfd = bfd = xepoll_create(1);
for (i = 0; i < tcfg->size; i++) {
nfd = xepoll_create(1);
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, nfd, &evt);
bfd = nfd;
}
xpipe(pfds);
if (tcfg->flags & EPOLL_TF_LOOP)
{
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, epfd, &evt);
/*
* If we're testing for loop, we want that the wakeup
* triggered by the write to the pipe done in the child
* process, triggers a fake event. So we add the pipe
* read size with EPOLLOUT events. This will trigger
* an addition to the ready-list, but no real events
* will be there. The the epoll kernel code will proceed
* in calling f_op->poll() of the epfd, triggering the
* loop we want to test.
*/
evt.events = EPOLLOUT;
}
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, pfds[0], &evt);
/*
* The pipe write must come after the poll(2) call inside
* check_events(). This tests the nested wakeup code in
* fs/eventpoll.c:ep_poll_safewake()
* By having the check_events() (hence poll(2)) happens first,
* we have poll wait queue filled up, and the write(2) in the
* child will trigger the wakeup chain.
*/
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0) {
sleep(1);
write(pfds[1], "w", 1);
exit(0);
}
res = check_events(epfd, 2000) & POLLIN;
if (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return res;
}
static int epoll_poll_chain(void *data) {
struct epoll_test_cfg *tcfg = data;
int i, res, epfd, bfd, nfd, pfds[2];
pid_t pid;
struct epoll_event evt;
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
epfd = bfd = xepoll_create(1);
for (i = 0; i < tcfg->size; i++) {
nfd = xepoll_create(1);
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, nfd, &evt);
bfd = nfd;
}
xpipe(pfds);
if (tcfg->flags & EPOLL_TF_LOOP)
{
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, epfd, &evt);
/*
* If we're testing for loop, we want that the wakeup
* triggered by the write to the pipe done in the child
* process, triggers a fake event. So we add the pipe
* read size with EPOLLOUT events. This will trigger
* an addition to the ready-list, but no real events
* will be there. The the epoll kernel code will proceed
* in calling f_op->poll() of the epfd, triggering the
* loop we want to test.
*/
evt.events = EPOLLOUT;
}
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, pfds[0], &evt);
/*
* The pipe write mush come before the poll(2) call inside
* check_events(). This tests the nested f_op->poll calls code in
* fs/eventpoll.c:ep_eventpoll_poll()
* By having the pipe write(2) happen first, we make the kernel
* epoll code to load the ready lists, and the following poll(2)
* done inside check_events() will test nested poll code in
* ep_eventpoll_poll().
*/
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0) {
write(pfds[1], "w", 1);
exit(0);
}
sleep(1);
res = check_events(epfd, 1000) & POLLIN;
if (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return res;
}
int main(int ac, char **av) {
int error;
struct epoll_test_cfg tcfg;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing TTY events\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_test_tty, NULL);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing short wakeup chain\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == POLLIN ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing long wakeup chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing short poll chain\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == POLLIN ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing long poll chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = EPOLL_TF_LOOP;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing loopy wakeup chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = EPOLL_TF_LOOP;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing loopy poll chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Pavel Pisa <pisa@cmp.felk.cvut.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-03-31 22:24:10 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
epoll: remove ep_call_nested() from ep_eventpoll_poll()
The use of ep_call_nested() in ep_eventpoll_poll(), which is the .poll
routine for an epoll fd, is used to prevent excessively deep epoll
nesting, and to prevent circular paths.
However, we are already preventing these conditions during
EPOLL_CTL_ADD. In terms of too deep epoll chains, we do in fact allow
deep nesting of the epoll fds themselves (deeper than EP_MAX_NESTS),
however we don't allow more than EP_MAX_NESTS when an epoll file
descriptor is actually connected to a wakeup source. Thus, we do not
require the use of ep_call_nested(), since ep_eventpoll_poll(), which is
called via ep_scan_ready_list() only continues nesting if there are
events available.
Since ep_call_nested() is implemented using a global lock, applications
that make use of nested epoll can see large performance improvements
with this change.
Davidlohr said:
: Improvements are quite obscene actually, such as for the following
: epoll_wait() benchmark with 2 level nesting on a 80 core IvyBridge:
:
: ncpus vanilla dirty delta
: 1 2447092 3028315 +23.75%
: 4 231265 2986954 +1191.57%
: 8 121631 2898796 +2283.27%
: 16 59749 2902056 +4757.07%
: 32 26837 2326314 +8568.30%
: 64 12926 1341281 +10276.61%
:
: (http://linux-scalability.org/epoll/epoll-test.c)
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509430214-5599-1-git-send-email-jbaron@akamai.com
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Salman Qazi <sqazi@google.com>
Cc: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-11-17 23:29:06 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Differs from ep_eventpoll_poll() in that internal callers already have
|
|
|
|
* the ep->mtx so we need to start from depth=1, such that mutex_lock_nested()
|
|
|
|
* is correctly annotated.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2018-02-01 20:24:58 +00:00
|
|
|
static __poll_t ep_item_poll(const struct epitem *epi, poll_table *pt,
|
2017-11-29 00:43:33 +00:00
|
|
|
int depth)
|
2018-06-14 22:32:07 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2020-09-26 22:32:48 +00:00
|
|
|
struct file *file = epi->ffd.file;
|
2020-08-31 17:16:39 +00:00
|
|
|
__poll_t res;
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2013-04-30 22:27:42 +00:00
|
|
|
pt->_key = epi->event.events;
|
2020-09-26 22:32:48 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!is_file_epoll(file))
|
|
|
|
res = vfs_poll(file, pt);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
res = __ep_eventpoll_poll(file, pt, depth);
|
2020-08-31 17:16:39 +00:00
|
|
|
return res & epi->event.events;
|
2013-04-30 22:27:42 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2018-06-28 16:43:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static __poll_t ep_eventpoll_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
|
2018-06-14 22:32:07 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2020-09-26 22:32:48 +00:00
|
|
|
return __ep_eventpoll_poll(file, wait, 0);
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-12-18 00:05:02 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
|
2014-09-29 23:08:25 +00:00
|
|
|
static void ep_show_fdinfo(struct seq_file *m, struct file *f)
|
2012-12-18 00:05:02 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct eventpoll *ep = f->private_data;
|
|
|
|
struct rb_node *rbp;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mutex_lock(&ep->mtx);
|
2017-09-08 23:15:18 +00:00
|
|
|
for (rbp = rb_first_cached(&ep->rbr); rbp; rbp = rb_next(rbp)) {
|
2012-12-18 00:05:02 +00:00
|
|
|
struct epitem *epi = rb_entry(rbp, struct epitem, rbn);
|
2017-07-12 21:34:25 +00:00
|
|
|
struct inode *inode = file_inode(epi->ffd.file);
|
2012-12-18 00:05:02 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-07-12 21:34:25 +00:00
|
|
|
seq_printf(m, "tfd: %8d events: %8x data: %16llx "
|
|
|
|
" pos:%lli ino:%lx sdev:%x\n",
|
2014-09-29 23:08:25 +00:00
|
|
|
epi->ffd.fd, epi->event.events,
|
2017-07-12 21:34:25 +00:00
|
|
|
(long long)epi->event.data,
|
|
|
|
(long long)epi->ffd.file->f_pos,
|
|
|
|
inode->i_ino, inode->i_sb->s_dev);
|
2014-09-29 23:08:25 +00:00
|
|
|
if (seq_has_overflowed(m))
|
2012-12-18 00:05:02 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mutex_unlock(&ep->mtx);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
/* File callbacks that implement the eventpoll file behaviour */
|
|
|
|
static const struct file_operations eventpoll_fops = {
|
2012-12-18 00:05:02 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
|
|
|
|
.show_fdinfo = ep_show_fdinfo,
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
.release = ep_eventpoll_release,
|
2018-06-28 16:43:44 +00:00
|
|
|
.poll = ep_eventpoll_poll,
|
llseek: automatically add .llseek fop
All file_operations should get a .llseek operation so we can make
nonseekable_open the default for future file operations without a
.llseek pointer.
The three cases that we can automatically detect are no_llseek, seq_lseek
and default_llseek. For cases where we can we can automatically prove that
the file offset is always ignored, we use noop_llseek, which maintains
the current behavior of not returning an error from a seek.
New drivers should normally not use noop_llseek but instead use no_llseek
and call nonseekable_open at open time. Existing drivers can be converted
to do the same when the maintainer knows for certain that no user code
relies on calling seek on the device file.
The generated code is often incorrectly indented and right now contains
comments that clarify for each added line why a specific variant was
chosen. In the version that gets submitted upstream, the comments will
be gone and I will manually fix the indentation, because there does not
seem to be a way to do that using coccinelle.
Some amount of new code is currently sitting in linux-next that should get
the same modifications, which I will do at the end of the merge window.
Many thanks to Julia Lawall for helping me learn to write a semantic
patch that does all this.
===== begin semantic patch =====
// This adds an llseek= method to all file operations,
// as a preparation for making no_llseek the default.
//
// The rules are
// - use no_llseek explicitly if we do nonseekable_open
// - use seq_lseek for sequential files
// - use default_llseek if we know we access f_pos
// - use noop_llseek if we know we don't access f_pos,
// but we still want to allow users to call lseek
//
@ open1 exists @
identifier nested_open;
@@
nested_open(...)
{
<+...
nonseekable_open(...)
...+>
}
@ open exists@
identifier open_f;
identifier i, f;
identifier open1.nested_open;
@@
int open_f(struct inode *i, struct file *f)
{
<+...
(
nonseekable_open(...)
|
nested_open(...)
)
...+>
}
@ read disable optional_qualifier exists @
identifier read_f;
identifier f, p, s, off;
type ssize_t, size_t, loff_t;
expression E;
identifier func;
@@
ssize_t read_f(struct file *f, char *p, size_t s, loff_t *off)
{
<+...
(
*off = E
|
*off += E
|
func(..., off, ...)
|
E = *off
)
...+>
}
@ read_no_fpos disable optional_qualifier exists @
identifier read_f;
identifier f, p, s, off;
type ssize_t, size_t, loff_t;
@@
ssize_t read_f(struct file *f, char *p, size_t s, loff_t *off)
{
... when != off
}
@ write @
identifier write_f;
identifier f, p, s, off;
type ssize_t, size_t, loff_t;
expression E;
identifier func;
@@
ssize_t write_f(struct file *f, const char *p, size_t s, loff_t *off)
{
<+...
(
*off = E
|
*off += E
|
func(..., off, ...)
|
E = *off
)
...+>
}
@ write_no_fpos @
identifier write_f;
identifier f, p, s, off;
type ssize_t, size_t, loff_t;
@@
ssize_t write_f(struct file *f, const char *p, size_t s, loff_t *off)
{
... when != off
}
@ fops0 @
identifier fops;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
};
@ has_llseek depends on fops0 @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier llseek_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
.llseek = llseek_f,
...
};
@ has_read depends on fops0 @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier read_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
.read = read_f,
...
};
@ has_write depends on fops0 @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier write_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
.write = write_f,
...
};
@ has_open depends on fops0 @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier open_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
.open = open_f,
...
};
// use no_llseek if we call nonseekable_open
////////////////////////////////////////////
@ nonseekable1 depends on !has_llseek && has_open @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier nso ~= "nonseekable_open";
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
... .open = nso, ...
+.llseek = no_llseek, /* nonseekable */
};
@ nonseekable2 depends on !has_llseek @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier open.open_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
... .open = open_f, ...
+.llseek = no_llseek, /* open uses nonseekable */
};
// use seq_lseek for sequential files
/////////////////////////////////////
@ seq depends on !has_llseek @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier sr ~= "seq_read";
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
... .read = sr, ...
+.llseek = seq_lseek, /* we have seq_read */
};
// use default_llseek if there is a readdir
///////////////////////////////////////////
@ fops1 depends on !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier readdir_e;
@@
// any other fop is used that changes pos
struct file_operations fops = {
... .readdir = readdir_e, ...
+.llseek = default_llseek, /* readdir is present */
};
// use default_llseek if at least one of read/write touches f_pos
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
@ fops2 depends on !fops1 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier read.read_f;
@@
// read fops use offset
struct file_operations fops = {
... .read = read_f, ...
+.llseek = default_llseek, /* read accesses f_pos */
};
@ fops3 depends on !fops1 && !fops2 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier write.write_f;
@@
// write fops use offset
struct file_operations fops = {
... .write = write_f, ...
+ .llseek = default_llseek, /* write accesses f_pos */
};
// Use noop_llseek if neither read nor write accesses f_pos
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
@ fops4 depends on !fops1 && !fops2 && !fops3 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier read_no_fpos.read_f;
identifier write_no_fpos.write_f;
@@
// write fops use offset
struct file_operations fops = {
...
.write = write_f,
.read = read_f,
...
+.llseek = noop_llseek, /* read and write both use no f_pos */
};
@ depends on has_write && !has_read && !fops1 && !fops2 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier write_no_fpos.write_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
... .write = write_f, ...
+.llseek = noop_llseek, /* write uses no f_pos */
};
@ depends on has_read && !has_write && !fops1 && !fops2 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier read_no_fpos.read_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
... .read = read_f, ...
+.llseek = noop_llseek, /* read uses no f_pos */
};
@ depends on !has_read && !has_write && !fops1 && !fops2 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
+.llseek = noop_llseek, /* no read or write fn */
};
===== End semantic patch =====
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Julia Lawall <julia@diku.dk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
2010-08-15 16:52:59 +00:00
|
|
|
.llseek = noop_llseek,
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2006-10-11 08:21:44 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
* This is called from eventpoll_release() to unlink files from the eventpoll
|
|
|
|
* interface. We need to have this facility to cleanup correctly files that are
|
|
|
|
* closed without being removed from the eventpoll interface.
|
2006-10-11 08:21:44 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
void eventpoll_release_file(struct file *file)
|
2006-10-11 08:21:44 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
struct eventpoll *ep;
|
2020-09-27 15:18:30 +00:00
|
|
|
struct epitem *epi;
|
epoll: use refcount to reduce ep_mutex contention
We are observing huge contention on the epmutex during an http
connection/rate test:
83.17% 0.25% nginx [kernel.kallsyms] [k] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
[...]
|--66.96%--__fput
|--60.04%--eventpoll_release_file
|--58.41%--__mutex_lock.isra.6
|--56.56%--osq_lock
The application is multi-threaded, creates a new epoll entry for
each incoming connection, and does not delete it before the
connection shutdown - that is, before the connection's fd close().
Many different threads compete frequently for the epmutex lock,
affecting the overall performance.
To reduce the contention this patch introduces explicit reference counting
for the eventpoll struct. Each registered event acquires a reference,
and references are released at ep_remove() time.
The eventpoll struct is released by whoever - among EP file close() and
and the monitored file close() drops its last reference.
Additionally, this introduces a new 'dying' flag to prevent races between
the EP file close() and the monitored file close().
ep_eventpoll_release() marks, under f_lock spinlock, each epitem as dying
before removing it, while EP file close() does not touch dying epitems.
The above is needed as both close operations could run concurrently and
drop the EP reference acquired via the epitem entry. Without the above
flag, the monitored file close() could reach the EP struct via the epitem
list while the epitem is still listed and then try to put it after its
disposal.
An alternative could be avoiding touching the references acquired via
the epitems at EP file close() time, but that could leave the EP struct
alive for potentially unlimited time after EP file close(), with nasty
side effects.
With all the above in place, we can drop the epmutex usage at disposal time.
Overall this produces a significant performance improvement in the
mentioned connection/rate scenario: the mutex operations disappear from
the topmost offenders in the perf report, and the measured connections/rate
grows by ~60%.
To make the change more readable this additionally renames ep_free() to
ep_clear_and_put(), and moves the actual memory cleanup in a separate
ep_free() helper.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/4a57788dcaf28f5eb4f8dfddcc3a8b172a7357bb.1679504153.git.pabeni@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Tested-by: Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhiat.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-03-22 16:57:02 +00:00
|
|
|
bool dispose;
|
2006-10-11 08:21:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
epoll: use refcount to reduce ep_mutex contention
We are observing huge contention on the epmutex during an http
connection/rate test:
83.17% 0.25% nginx [kernel.kallsyms] [k] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
[...]
|--66.96%--__fput
|--60.04%--eventpoll_release_file
|--58.41%--__mutex_lock.isra.6
|--56.56%--osq_lock
The application is multi-threaded, creates a new epoll entry for
each incoming connection, and does not delete it before the
connection shutdown - that is, before the connection's fd close().
Many different threads compete frequently for the epmutex lock,
affecting the overall performance.
To reduce the contention this patch introduces explicit reference counting
for the eventpoll struct. Each registered event acquires a reference,
and references are released at ep_remove() time.
The eventpoll struct is released by whoever - among EP file close() and
and the monitored file close() drops its last reference.
Additionally, this introduces a new 'dying' flag to prevent races between
the EP file close() and the monitored file close().
ep_eventpoll_release() marks, under f_lock spinlock, each epitem as dying
before removing it, while EP file close() does not touch dying epitems.
The above is needed as both close operations could run concurrently and
drop the EP reference acquired via the epitem entry. Without the above
flag, the monitored file close() could reach the EP struct via the epitem
list while the epitem is still listed and then try to put it after its
disposal.
An alternative could be avoiding touching the references acquired via
the epitems at EP file close() time, but that could leave the EP struct
alive for potentially unlimited time after EP file close(), with nasty
side effects.
With all the above in place, we can drop the epmutex usage at disposal time.
Overall this produces a significant performance improvement in the
mentioned connection/rate scenario: the mutex operations disappear from
the topmost offenders in the perf report, and the measured connections/rate
grows by ~60%.
To make the change more readable this additionally renames ep_free() to
ep_clear_and_put(), and moves the actual memory cleanup in a separate
ep_free() helper.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/4a57788dcaf28f5eb4f8dfddcc3a8b172a7357bb.1679504153.git.pabeni@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Tested-by: Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhiat.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-03-22 16:57:02 +00:00
|
|
|
* Use the 'dying' flag to prevent a concurrent ep_clear_and_put() from
|
|
|
|
* touching the epitems list before eventpoll_release_file() can access
|
|
|
|
* the ep->mtx.
|
2006-10-11 08:21:44 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
epoll: use refcount to reduce ep_mutex contention
We are observing huge contention on the epmutex during an http
connection/rate test:
83.17% 0.25% nginx [kernel.kallsyms] [k] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
[...]
|--66.96%--__fput
|--60.04%--eventpoll_release_file
|--58.41%--__mutex_lock.isra.6
|--56.56%--osq_lock
The application is multi-threaded, creates a new epoll entry for
each incoming connection, and does not delete it before the
connection shutdown - that is, before the connection's fd close().
Many different threads compete frequently for the epmutex lock,
affecting the overall performance.
To reduce the contention this patch introduces explicit reference counting
for the eventpoll struct. Each registered event acquires a reference,
and references are released at ep_remove() time.
The eventpoll struct is released by whoever - among EP file close() and
and the monitored file close() drops its last reference.
Additionally, this introduces a new 'dying' flag to prevent races between
the EP file close() and the monitored file close().
ep_eventpoll_release() marks, under f_lock spinlock, each epitem as dying
before removing it, while EP file close() does not touch dying epitems.
The above is needed as both close operations could run concurrently and
drop the EP reference acquired via the epitem entry. Without the above
flag, the monitored file close() could reach the EP struct via the epitem
list while the epitem is still listed and then try to put it after its
disposal.
An alternative could be avoiding touching the references acquired via
the epitems at EP file close() time, but that could leave the EP struct
alive for potentially unlimited time after EP file close(), with nasty
side effects.
With all the above in place, we can drop the epmutex usage at disposal time.
Overall this produces a significant performance improvement in the
mentioned connection/rate scenario: the mutex operations disappear from
the topmost offenders in the perf report, and the measured connections/rate
grows by ~60%.
To make the change more readable this additionally renames ep_free() to
ep_clear_and_put(), and moves the actual memory cleanup in a separate
ep_free() helper.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/4a57788dcaf28f5eb4f8dfddcc3a8b172a7357bb.1679504153.git.pabeni@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Tested-by: Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhiat.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-03-22 16:57:02 +00:00
|
|
|
again:
|
|
|
|
spin_lock(&file->f_lock);
|
|
|
|
if (file->f_ep && file->f_ep->first) {
|
|
|
|
epi = hlist_entry(file->f_ep->first, struct epitem, fllink);
|
|
|
|
epi->dying = true;
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock(&file->f_lock);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* ep access is safe as we still own a reference to the ep
|
|
|
|
* struct
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
ep = epi->ep;
|
epoll: use refcount to reduce ep_mutex contention
We are observing huge contention on the epmutex during an http
connection/rate test:
83.17% 0.25% nginx [kernel.kallsyms] [k] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
[...]
|--66.96%--__fput
|--60.04%--eventpoll_release_file
|--58.41%--__mutex_lock.isra.6
|--56.56%--osq_lock
The application is multi-threaded, creates a new epoll entry for
each incoming connection, and does not delete it before the
connection shutdown - that is, before the connection's fd close().
Many different threads compete frequently for the epmutex lock,
affecting the overall performance.
To reduce the contention this patch introduces explicit reference counting
for the eventpoll struct. Each registered event acquires a reference,
and references are released at ep_remove() time.
The eventpoll struct is released by whoever - among EP file close() and
and the monitored file close() drops its last reference.
Additionally, this introduces a new 'dying' flag to prevent races between
the EP file close() and the monitored file close().
ep_eventpoll_release() marks, under f_lock spinlock, each epitem as dying
before removing it, while EP file close() does not touch dying epitems.
The above is needed as both close operations could run concurrently and
drop the EP reference acquired via the epitem entry. Without the above
flag, the monitored file close() could reach the EP struct via the epitem
list while the epitem is still listed and then try to put it after its
disposal.
An alternative could be avoiding touching the references acquired via
the epitems at EP file close() time, but that could leave the EP struct
alive for potentially unlimited time after EP file close(), with nasty
side effects.
With all the above in place, we can drop the epmutex usage at disposal time.
Overall this produces a significant performance improvement in the
mentioned connection/rate scenario: the mutex operations disappear from
the topmost offenders in the perf report, and the measured connections/rate
grows by ~60%.
To make the change more readable this additionally renames ep_free() to
ep_clear_and_put(), and moves the actual memory cleanup in a separate
ep_free() helper.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/4a57788dcaf28f5eb4f8dfddcc3a8b172a7357bb.1679504153.git.pabeni@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Tested-by: Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhiat.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-03-22 16:57:02 +00:00
|
|
|
mutex_lock(&ep->mtx);
|
|
|
|
dispose = __ep_remove(ep, epi, true);
|
2007-05-15 08:40:41 +00:00
|
|
|
mutex_unlock(&ep->mtx);
|
epoll: use refcount to reduce ep_mutex contention
We are observing huge contention on the epmutex during an http
connection/rate test:
83.17% 0.25% nginx [kernel.kallsyms] [k] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
[...]
|--66.96%--__fput
|--60.04%--eventpoll_release_file
|--58.41%--__mutex_lock.isra.6
|--56.56%--osq_lock
The application is multi-threaded, creates a new epoll entry for
each incoming connection, and does not delete it before the
connection shutdown - that is, before the connection's fd close().
Many different threads compete frequently for the epmutex lock,
affecting the overall performance.
To reduce the contention this patch introduces explicit reference counting
for the eventpoll struct. Each registered event acquires a reference,
and references are released at ep_remove() time.
The eventpoll struct is released by whoever - among EP file close() and
and the monitored file close() drops its last reference.
Additionally, this introduces a new 'dying' flag to prevent races between
the EP file close() and the monitored file close().
ep_eventpoll_release() marks, under f_lock spinlock, each epitem as dying
before removing it, while EP file close() does not touch dying epitems.
The above is needed as both close operations could run concurrently and
drop the EP reference acquired via the epitem entry. Without the above
flag, the monitored file close() could reach the EP struct via the epitem
list while the epitem is still listed and then try to put it after its
disposal.
An alternative could be avoiding touching the references acquired via
the epitems at EP file close() time, but that could leave the EP struct
alive for potentially unlimited time after EP file close(), with nasty
side effects.
With all the above in place, we can drop the epmutex usage at disposal time.
Overall this produces a significant performance improvement in the
mentioned connection/rate scenario: the mutex operations disappear from
the topmost offenders in the perf report, and the measured connections/rate
grows by ~60%.
To make the change more readable this additionally renames ep_free() to
ep_clear_and_put(), and moves the actual memory cleanup in a separate
ep_free() helper.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/4a57788dcaf28f5eb4f8dfddcc3a8b172a7357bb.1679504153.git.pabeni@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Tested-by: Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhiat.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-03-22 16:57:02 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (dispose)
|
|
|
|
ep_free(ep);
|
|
|
|
goto again;
|
2006-10-11 08:21:44 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
epoll: use refcount to reduce ep_mutex contention
We are observing huge contention on the epmutex during an http
connection/rate test:
83.17% 0.25% nginx [kernel.kallsyms] [k] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
[...]
|--66.96%--__fput
|--60.04%--eventpoll_release_file
|--58.41%--__mutex_lock.isra.6
|--56.56%--osq_lock
The application is multi-threaded, creates a new epoll entry for
each incoming connection, and does not delete it before the
connection shutdown - that is, before the connection's fd close().
Many different threads compete frequently for the epmutex lock,
affecting the overall performance.
To reduce the contention this patch introduces explicit reference counting
for the eventpoll struct. Each registered event acquires a reference,
and references are released at ep_remove() time.
The eventpoll struct is released by whoever - among EP file close() and
and the monitored file close() drops its last reference.
Additionally, this introduces a new 'dying' flag to prevent races between
the EP file close() and the monitored file close().
ep_eventpoll_release() marks, under f_lock spinlock, each epitem as dying
before removing it, while EP file close() does not touch dying epitems.
The above is needed as both close operations could run concurrently and
drop the EP reference acquired via the epitem entry. Without the above
flag, the monitored file close() could reach the EP struct via the epitem
list while the epitem is still listed and then try to put it after its
disposal.
An alternative could be avoiding touching the references acquired via
the epitems at EP file close() time, but that could leave the EP struct
alive for potentially unlimited time after EP file close(), with nasty
side effects.
With all the above in place, we can drop the epmutex usage at disposal time.
Overall this produces a significant performance improvement in the
mentioned connection/rate scenario: the mutex operations disappear from
the topmost offenders in the perf report, and the measured connections/rate
grows by ~60%.
To make the change more readable this additionally renames ep_free() to
ep_clear_and_put(), and moves the actual memory cleanup in a separate
ep_free() helper.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/4a57788dcaf28f5eb4f8dfddcc3a8b172a7357bb.1679504153.git.pabeni@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Tested-by: Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhiat.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-03-22 16:57:02 +00:00
|
|
|
spin_unlock(&file->f_lock);
|
2006-10-11 08:21:44 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-09-17 02:28:06 +00:00
|
|
|
static int ep_alloc(struct eventpoll **pep)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
epoll: introduce resource usage limits
It has been thought that the per-user file descriptors limit would also
limit the resources that a normal user can request via the epoll
interface. Vegard Nossum reported a very simple program (a modified
version attached) that can make a normal user to request a pretty large
amount of kernel memory, well within the its maximum number of fds. To
solve such problem, default limits are now imposed, and /proc based
configuration has been introduced. A new directory has been created,
named /proc/sys/fs/epoll/ and inside there, there are two configuration
points:
max_user_instances = Maximum number of devices - per user
max_user_watches = Maximum number of "watched" fds - per user
The current default for "max_user_watches" limits the memory used by epoll
to store "watches", to 1/32 of the amount of the low RAM. As example, a
256MB 32bit machine, will have "max_user_watches" set to roughly 90000.
That should be enough to not break existing heavy epoll users. The
default value for "max_user_instances" is set to 128, that should be
enough too.
This also changes the userspace, because a new error code can now come out
from EPOLL_CTL_ADD (-ENOSPC). The EMFILE from epoll_create() was already
listed, so that should be ok.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: use get_current_user()]
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegardno@ifi.uio.no>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-12-01 21:13:55 +00:00
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
struct user_struct *user;
|
|
|
|
struct eventpoll *ep;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
epoll: introduce resource usage limits
It has been thought that the per-user file descriptors limit would also
limit the resources that a normal user can request via the epoll
interface. Vegard Nossum reported a very simple program (a modified
version attached) that can make a normal user to request a pretty large
amount of kernel memory, well within the its maximum number of fds. To
solve such problem, default limits are now imposed, and /proc based
configuration has been introduced. A new directory has been created,
named /proc/sys/fs/epoll/ and inside there, there are two configuration
points:
max_user_instances = Maximum number of devices - per user
max_user_watches = Maximum number of "watched" fds - per user
The current default for "max_user_watches" limits the memory used by epoll
to store "watches", to 1/32 of the amount of the low RAM. As example, a
256MB 32bit machine, will have "max_user_watches" set to roughly 90000.
That should be enough to not break existing heavy epoll users. The
default value for "max_user_instances" is set to 128, that should be
enough too.
This also changes the userspace, because a new error code can now come out
from EPOLL_CTL_ADD (-ENOSPC). The EMFILE from epoll_create() was already
listed, so that should be ok.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: use get_current_user()]
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegardno@ifi.uio.no>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-12-01 21:13:55 +00:00
|
|
|
user = get_current_user();
|
|
|
|
error = -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
ep = kzalloc(sizeof(*ep), GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(!ep))
|
|
|
|
goto free_uid;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2007-05-15 08:40:41 +00:00
|
|
|
mutex_init(&ep->mtx);
|
2019-03-08 00:28:53 +00:00
|
|
|
rwlock_init(&ep->lock);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
init_waitqueue_head(&ep->wq);
|
|
|
|
init_waitqueue_head(&ep->poll_wait);
|
|
|
|
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ep->rdllist);
|
2017-09-08 23:15:18 +00:00
|
|
|
ep->rbr = RB_ROOT_CACHED;
|
2007-05-15 08:40:41 +00:00
|
|
|
ep->ovflist = EP_UNACTIVE_PTR;
|
epoll: introduce resource usage limits
It has been thought that the per-user file descriptors limit would also
limit the resources that a normal user can request via the epoll
interface. Vegard Nossum reported a very simple program (a modified
version attached) that can make a normal user to request a pretty large
amount of kernel memory, well within the its maximum number of fds. To
solve such problem, default limits are now imposed, and /proc based
configuration has been introduced. A new directory has been created,
named /proc/sys/fs/epoll/ and inside there, there are two configuration
points:
max_user_instances = Maximum number of devices - per user
max_user_watches = Maximum number of "watched" fds - per user
The current default for "max_user_watches" limits the memory used by epoll
to store "watches", to 1/32 of the amount of the low RAM. As example, a
256MB 32bit machine, will have "max_user_watches" set to roughly 90000.
That should be enough to not break existing heavy epoll users. The
default value for "max_user_instances" is set to 128, that should be
enough too.
This also changes the userspace, because a new error code can now come out
from EPOLL_CTL_ADD (-ENOSPC). The EMFILE from epoll_create() was already
listed, so that should be ok.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: use get_current_user()]
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegardno@ifi.uio.no>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-12-01 21:13:55 +00:00
|
|
|
ep->user = user;
|
epoll: use refcount to reduce ep_mutex contention
We are observing huge contention on the epmutex during an http
connection/rate test:
83.17% 0.25% nginx [kernel.kallsyms] [k] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
[...]
|--66.96%--__fput
|--60.04%--eventpoll_release_file
|--58.41%--__mutex_lock.isra.6
|--56.56%--osq_lock
The application is multi-threaded, creates a new epoll entry for
each incoming connection, and does not delete it before the
connection shutdown - that is, before the connection's fd close().
Many different threads compete frequently for the epmutex lock,
affecting the overall performance.
To reduce the contention this patch introduces explicit reference counting
for the eventpoll struct. Each registered event acquires a reference,
and references are released at ep_remove() time.
The eventpoll struct is released by whoever - among EP file close() and
and the monitored file close() drops its last reference.
Additionally, this introduces a new 'dying' flag to prevent races between
the EP file close() and the monitored file close().
ep_eventpoll_release() marks, under f_lock spinlock, each epitem as dying
before removing it, while EP file close() does not touch dying epitems.
The above is needed as both close operations could run concurrently and
drop the EP reference acquired via the epitem entry. Without the above
flag, the monitored file close() could reach the EP struct via the epitem
list while the epitem is still listed and then try to put it after its
disposal.
An alternative could be avoiding touching the references acquired via
the epitems at EP file close() time, but that could leave the EP struct
alive for potentially unlimited time after EP file close(), with nasty
side effects.
With all the above in place, we can drop the epmutex usage at disposal time.
Overall this produces a significant performance improvement in the
mentioned connection/rate scenario: the mutex operations disappear from
the topmost offenders in the perf report, and the measured connections/rate
grows by ~60%.
To make the change more readable this additionally renames ep_free() to
ep_clear_and_put(), and moves the actual memory cleanup in a separate
ep_free() helper.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/4a57788dcaf28f5eb4f8dfddcc3a8b172a7357bb.1679504153.git.pabeni@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Tested-by: Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhiat.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-03-22 16:57:02 +00:00
|
|
|
refcount_set(&ep->refcount, 1);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-09-17 02:28:06 +00:00
|
|
|
*pep = ep;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
epoll: introduce resource usage limits
It has been thought that the per-user file descriptors limit would also
limit the resources that a normal user can request via the epoll
interface. Vegard Nossum reported a very simple program (a modified
version attached) that can make a normal user to request a pretty large
amount of kernel memory, well within the its maximum number of fds. To
solve such problem, default limits are now imposed, and /proc based
configuration has been introduced. A new directory has been created,
named /proc/sys/fs/epoll/ and inside there, there are two configuration
points:
max_user_instances = Maximum number of devices - per user
max_user_watches = Maximum number of "watched" fds - per user
The current default for "max_user_watches" limits the memory used by epoll
to store "watches", to 1/32 of the amount of the low RAM. As example, a
256MB 32bit machine, will have "max_user_watches" set to roughly 90000.
That should be enough to not break existing heavy epoll users. The
default value for "max_user_instances" is set to 128, that should be
enough too.
This also changes the userspace, because a new error code can now come out
from EPOLL_CTL_ADD (-ENOSPC). The EMFILE from epoll_create() was already
listed, so that should be ok.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: use get_current_user()]
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegardno@ifi.uio.no>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-12-01 21:13:55 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
free_uid:
|
|
|
|
free_uid(user);
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2007-05-15 08:40:47 +00:00
|
|
|
* Search the file inside the eventpoll tree. The RB tree operations
|
|
|
|
* are protected by the "mtx" mutex, and ep_find() must be called with
|
|
|
|
* "mtx" held.
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static struct epitem *ep_find(struct eventpoll *ep, struct file *file, int fd)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int kcmp;
|
|
|
|
struct rb_node *rbp;
|
|
|
|
struct epitem *epi, *epir = NULL;
|
|
|
|
struct epoll_filefd ffd;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-06-23 07:10:03 +00:00
|
|
|
ep_set_ffd(&ffd, file, fd);
|
2017-09-08 23:15:18 +00:00
|
|
|
for (rbp = ep->rbr.rb_root.rb_node; rbp; ) {
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
epi = rb_entry(rbp, struct epitem, rbn);
|
2005-06-23 07:10:03 +00:00
|
|
|
kcmp = ep_cmp_ffd(&ffd, &epi->ffd);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (kcmp > 0)
|
|
|
|
rbp = rbp->rb_right;
|
|
|
|
else if (kcmp < 0)
|
|
|
|
rbp = rbp->rb_left;
|
|
|
|
else {
|
|
|
|
epir = epi;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return epir;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-02-05 22:00:12 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_KCMP
|
2017-07-12 21:34:28 +00:00
|
|
|
static struct epitem *ep_find_tfd(struct eventpoll *ep, int tfd, unsigned long toff)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct rb_node *rbp;
|
|
|
|
struct epitem *epi;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-09-08 23:15:18 +00:00
|
|
|
for (rbp = rb_first_cached(&ep->rbr); rbp; rbp = rb_next(rbp)) {
|
2017-07-12 21:34:28 +00:00
|
|
|
epi = rb_entry(rbp, struct epitem, rbn);
|
|
|
|
if (epi->ffd.fd == tfd) {
|
|
|
|
if (toff == 0)
|
|
|
|
return epi;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
toff--;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cond_resched();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct file *get_epoll_tfile_raw_ptr(struct file *file, int tfd,
|
|
|
|
unsigned long toff)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct file *file_raw;
|
|
|
|
struct eventpoll *ep;
|
|
|
|
struct epitem *epi;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!is_file_epoll(file))
|
|
|
|
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ep = file->private_data;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mutex_lock(&ep->mtx);
|
|
|
|
epi = ep_find_tfd(ep, tfd, toff);
|
|
|
|
if (epi)
|
|
|
|
file_raw = epi->ffd.file;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
file_raw = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
|
|
|
|
mutex_unlock(&ep->mtx);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return file_raw;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2021-02-05 22:00:12 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_KCMP */
|
2017-07-12 21:34:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-03-01 22:25:51 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2019-03-08 00:28:53 +00:00
|
|
|
* Adds a new entry to the tail of the list in a lockless way, i.e.
|
|
|
|
* multiple CPUs are allowed to call this function concurrently.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Beware: it is necessary to prevent any other modifications of the
|
|
|
|
* existing list until all changes are completed, in other words
|
|
|
|
* concurrent list_add_tail_lockless() calls should be protected
|
|
|
|
* with a read lock, where write lock acts as a barrier which
|
|
|
|
* makes sure all list_add_tail_lockless() calls are fully
|
|
|
|
* completed.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Also an element can be locklessly added to the list only in one
|
2021-03-01 22:25:51 +00:00
|
|
|
* direction i.e. either to the tail or to the head, otherwise
|
2019-03-08 00:28:53 +00:00
|
|
|
* concurrent access will corrupt the list.
|
|
|
|
*
|
2021-03-01 22:25:51 +00:00
|
|
|
* Return: %false if element has been already added to the list, %true
|
2019-03-08 00:28:53 +00:00
|
|
|
* otherwise.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static inline bool list_add_tail_lockless(struct list_head *new,
|
|
|
|
struct list_head *head)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct list_head *prev;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* This is simple 'new->next = head' operation, but cmpxchg()
|
|
|
|
* is used in order to detect that same element has been just
|
|
|
|
* added to the list from another CPU: the winner observes
|
|
|
|
* new->next == new.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2022-07-14 17:32:55 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!try_cmpxchg(&new->next, &new, head))
|
2019-03-08 00:28:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Initially ->next of a new element must be updated with the head
|
|
|
|
* (we are inserting to the tail) and only then pointers are atomically
|
|
|
|
* exchanged. XCHG guarantees memory ordering, thus ->next should be
|
|
|
|
* updated before pointers are actually swapped and pointers are
|
|
|
|
* swapped before prev->next is updated.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
prev = xchg(&head->prev, new);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* It is safe to modify prev->next and new->prev, because a new element
|
|
|
|
* is added only to the tail and new->next is updated before XCHG.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
prev->next = new;
|
|
|
|
new->prev = prev;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-03-01 22:25:51 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2019-03-08 00:28:53 +00:00
|
|
|
* Chains a new epi entry to the tail of the ep->ovflist in a lockless way,
|
|
|
|
* i.e. multiple CPUs are allowed to call this function concurrently.
|
|
|
|
*
|
2021-03-01 22:25:51 +00:00
|
|
|
* Return: %false if epi element has been already chained, %true otherwise.
|
2019-03-08 00:28:53 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static inline bool chain_epi_lockless(struct epitem *epi)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct eventpoll *ep = epi->ep;
|
|
|
|
|
2020-05-08 01:35:59 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Fast preliminary check */
|
|
|
|
if (epi->next != EP_UNACTIVE_PTR)
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
|
2019-03-08 00:28:53 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Check that the same epi has not been just chained from another CPU */
|
|
|
|
if (cmpxchg(&epi->next, EP_UNACTIVE_PTR, NULL) != EP_UNACTIVE_PTR)
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Atomically exchange tail */
|
|
|
|
epi->next = xchg(&ep->ovflist, epi);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
* This is the callback that is passed to the wait queue wakeup
|
2011-01-30 21:42:29 +00:00
|
|
|
* mechanism. It is called by the stored file descriptors when they
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
* have events to report.
|
2019-03-08 00:28:53 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
2021-03-01 22:25:51 +00:00
|
|
|
* This callback takes a read lock in order not to contend with concurrent
|
|
|
|
* events from another file descriptor, thus all modifications to ->rdllist
|
2019-03-08 00:28:53 +00:00
|
|
|
* or ->ovflist are lockless. Read lock is paired with the write lock from
|
|
|
|
* ep_scan_ready_list(), which stops all list modifications and guarantees
|
|
|
|
* that lists state is seen correctly.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Another thing worth to mention is that ep_poll_callback() can be called
|
|
|
|
* concurrently for the same @epi from different CPUs if poll table was inited
|
|
|
|
* with several wait queues entries. Plural wakeup from different CPUs of a
|
|
|
|
* single wait queue is serialized by wq.lock, but the case when multiple wait
|
|
|
|
* queues are used should be detected accordingly. This is detected using
|
|
|
|
* cmpxchg() operation.
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-06-20 10:06:13 +00:00
|
|
|
static int ep_poll_callback(wait_queue_entry_t *wait, unsigned mode, int sync, void *key)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
int pwake = 0;
|
|
|
|
struct epitem *epi = ep_item_from_wait(wait);
|
|
|
|
struct eventpoll *ep = epi->ep;
|
2017-07-04 00:14:56 +00:00
|
|
|
__poll_t pollflags = key_to_poll(key);
|
2019-03-08 00:28:53 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned long flags;
|
2016-01-20 22:59:24 +00:00
|
|
|
int ewake = 0;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-03-08 00:28:53 +00:00
|
|
|
read_lock_irqsave(&ep->lock, flags);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-03-24 17:08:30 +00:00
|
|
|
ep_set_busy_poll_napi_id(epi);
|
|
|
|
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If the event mask does not contain any poll(2) event, we consider the
|
|
|
|
* descriptor to be disabled. This condition is likely the effect of the
|
|
|
|
* EPOLLONESHOT bit that disables the descriptor when an event is received,
|
|
|
|
* until the next EPOLL_CTL_MOD will be issued.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!(epi->event.events & ~EP_PRIVATE_BITS))
|
2007-05-15 08:40:41 +00:00
|
|
|
goto out_unlock;
|
|
|
|
|
2009-03-31 22:24:22 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Check the events coming with the callback. At this stage, not
|
|
|
|
* every device reports the events in the "key" parameter of the
|
|
|
|
* callback. We need to be able to handle both cases here, hence the
|
|
|
|
* test for "key" != NULL before the event match test.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-07-04 00:14:56 +00:00
|
|
|
if (pollflags && !(pollflags & epi->event.events))
|
2009-03-31 22:24:22 +00:00
|
|
|
goto out_unlock;
|
|
|
|
|
2007-05-15 08:40:41 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2011-01-30 21:42:29 +00:00
|
|
|
* If we are transferring events to userspace, we can hold no locks
|
2007-05-15 08:40:41 +00:00
|
|
|
* (because we're accessing user memory, and because of linux f_op->poll()
|
2011-01-30 21:42:29 +00:00
|
|
|
* semantics). All the events that happen during that period of time are
|
2007-05-15 08:40:41 +00:00
|
|
|
* chained in ep->ovflist and requeued later on.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
fs/epoll: reduce the scope of wq lock in epoll_wait()
This patch aims at reducing ep wq.lock hold times in epoll_wait(2). For
the blocking case, there is no need to constantly take and drop the
spinlock, which is only needed to manipulate the waitqueue.
The call to ep_events_available() is now lockless, and only exposed to
benign races. Here, if false positive (returns available events and
does not see another thread deleting an epi from the list) we call into
send_events and then the list's state is correctly seen. Otoh, if a
false negative and we don't see a list_add_tail(), for example, from irq
callback, then it is rechecked again before blocking, which will see the
correct state.
In order for more accuracy to see concurrent list_del_init(), use the
list_empty_careful() variant -- of course, this won't be safe against
insertions from wakeup.
For the overflow list we obviously need to prevent load/store tearing as
we don't want to see partial values while the ready list is disabled.
[dave@stgolabs.net: forgotten fixlets]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181109155258.jxcr4t2pnz6zqct3@linux-r8p5
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181108051006.18751-6-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Suggested-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-03 23:27:15 +00:00
|
|
|
if (READ_ONCE(ep->ovflist) != EP_UNACTIVE_PTR) {
|
2020-05-08 01:35:59 +00:00
|
|
|
if (chain_epi_lockless(epi))
|
|
|
|
ep_pm_stay_awake_rcu(epi);
|
|
|
|
} else if (!ep_is_linked(epi)) {
|
|
|
|
/* In the usual case, add event to ready list. */
|
|
|
|
if (list_add_tail_lockless(&epi->rdllink, &ep->rdllist))
|
2019-03-08 00:28:49 +00:00
|
|
|
ep_pm_stay_awake_rcu(epi);
|
2012-05-01 19:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Wake up ( if active ) both the eventpoll wait list and the ->poll()
|
|
|
|
* wait list.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2016-01-20 22:59:24 +00:00
|
|
|
if (waitqueue_active(&ep->wq)) {
|
epoll: restrict EPOLLEXCLUSIVE to POLLIN and POLLOUT
In the current implementation of the EPOLLEXCLUSIVE flag (added for
4.5-rc1), if epoll waiters create different POLL* sets and register them
as exclusive against the same target fd, the current implementation will
stop waking any further waiters once it finds the first idle waiter.
This means that waiters could miss wakeups in certain cases.
For example, when we wake up a pipe for reading we do:
wake_up_interruptible_sync_poll(&pipe->wait, POLLIN | POLLRDNORM); So if
one epoll set or epfd is added to pipe p with POLLIN and a second set
epfd2 is added to pipe p with POLLRDNORM, only epfd may receive the
wakeup since the current implementation will stop after it finds any
intersection of events with a waiter that is blocked in epoll_wait().
We could potentially address this by requiring all epoll waiters that
are added to p be required to pass the same set of POLL* events. IE the
first EPOLL_CTL_ADD that passes EPOLLEXCLUSIVE establishes the set POLL*
flags to be used by any other epfds that are added as EPOLLEXCLUSIVE.
However, I think it might be somewhat confusing interface as we would
have to reference count the number of users for that set, and so
userspace would have to keep track of that count, or we would need a
more involved interface. It also adds some shared state that we'd have
store somewhere. I don't think anybody will want to bloat
__wait_queue_head for this.
I think what we could do instead, is to simply restrict EPOLLEXCLUSIVE
such that it can only be specified with EPOLLIN and/or EPOLLOUT. So
that way if the wakeup includes 'POLLIN' and not 'POLLOUT', we can stop
once we hit the first idle waiter that specifies the EPOLLIN bit, since
any remaining waiters that only have 'POLLOUT' set wouldn't need to be
woken. Likewise, we can do the same thing if 'POLLOUT' is in the wakeup
bit set and not 'POLLIN'. If both 'POLLOUT' and 'POLLIN' are set in the
wake bit set (there is at least one example of this I saw in fs/pipe.c),
then we just wake the entire exclusive list. Having both 'POLLOUT' and
'POLLIN' both set should not be on any performance critical path, so I
think that's ok (in fs/pipe.c its in pipe_release()). We also continue
to include EPOLLERR and EPOLLHUP by default in any exclusive set. Thus,
the user can specify EPOLLERR and/or EPOLLHUP but is not required to do
so.
Since epoll waiters may be interested in other events as well besides
EPOLLIN, EPOLLOUT, EPOLLERR and EPOLLHUP, these can still be added by
doing a 'dup' call on the target fd and adding that as one normally
would with EPOLL_CTL_ADD. Since I think that the POLLIN and POLLOUT
events are what we are interest in balancing, I think that the 'dup'
thing could perhaps be added to only one of the waiter threads.
However, I think that EPOLLIN, EPOLLOUT, EPOLLERR and EPOLLHUP should be
sufficient for the majority of use-cases.
Since EPOLLEXCLUSIVE is intended to be used with a target fd shared
among multiple epfds, where between 1 and n of the epfds may receive an
event, it does not satisfy the semantics of EPOLLONESHOT where only 1
epfd would get an event. Thus, it is not allowed to be specified in
conjunction with EPOLLEXCLUSIVE.
EPOLL_CTL_MOD is also not allowed if the fd was previously added as
EPOLLEXCLUSIVE. It seems with the limited number of flags to not be as
interesting, but this could be relaxed at some further point.
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Tested-by: Madars Vitolins <m@silodev.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ftp.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric Wong <normalperson@yhbt.net>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-02-05 23:37:04 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((epi->event.events & EPOLLEXCLUSIVE) &&
|
2017-07-04 00:14:56 +00:00
|
|
|
!(pollflags & POLLFREE)) {
|
|
|
|
switch (pollflags & EPOLLINOUT_BITS) {
|
2018-02-11 22:34:03 +00:00
|
|
|
case EPOLLIN:
|
|
|
|
if (epi->event.events & EPOLLIN)
|
epoll: restrict EPOLLEXCLUSIVE to POLLIN and POLLOUT
In the current implementation of the EPOLLEXCLUSIVE flag (added for
4.5-rc1), if epoll waiters create different POLL* sets and register them
as exclusive against the same target fd, the current implementation will
stop waking any further waiters once it finds the first idle waiter.
This means that waiters could miss wakeups in certain cases.
For example, when we wake up a pipe for reading we do:
wake_up_interruptible_sync_poll(&pipe->wait, POLLIN | POLLRDNORM); So if
one epoll set or epfd is added to pipe p with POLLIN and a second set
epfd2 is added to pipe p with POLLRDNORM, only epfd may receive the
wakeup since the current implementation will stop after it finds any
intersection of events with a waiter that is blocked in epoll_wait().
We could potentially address this by requiring all epoll waiters that
are added to p be required to pass the same set of POLL* events. IE the
first EPOLL_CTL_ADD that passes EPOLLEXCLUSIVE establishes the set POLL*
flags to be used by any other epfds that are added as EPOLLEXCLUSIVE.
However, I think it might be somewhat confusing interface as we would
have to reference count the number of users for that set, and so
userspace would have to keep track of that count, or we would need a
more involved interface. It also adds some shared state that we'd have
store somewhere. I don't think anybody will want to bloat
__wait_queue_head for this.
I think what we could do instead, is to simply restrict EPOLLEXCLUSIVE
such that it can only be specified with EPOLLIN and/or EPOLLOUT. So
that way if the wakeup includes 'POLLIN' and not 'POLLOUT', we can stop
once we hit the first idle waiter that specifies the EPOLLIN bit, since
any remaining waiters that only have 'POLLOUT' set wouldn't need to be
woken. Likewise, we can do the same thing if 'POLLOUT' is in the wakeup
bit set and not 'POLLIN'. If both 'POLLOUT' and 'POLLIN' are set in the
wake bit set (there is at least one example of this I saw in fs/pipe.c),
then we just wake the entire exclusive list. Having both 'POLLOUT' and
'POLLIN' both set should not be on any performance critical path, so I
think that's ok (in fs/pipe.c its in pipe_release()). We also continue
to include EPOLLERR and EPOLLHUP by default in any exclusive set. Thus,
the user can specify EPOLLERR and/or EPOLLHUP but is not required to do
so.
Since epoll waiters may be interested in other events as well besides
EPOLLIN, EPOLLOUT, EPOLLERR and EPOLLHUP, these can still be added by
doing a 'dup' call on the target fd and adding that as one normally
would with EPOLL_CTL_ADD. Since I think that the POLLIN and POLLOUT
events are what we are interest in balancing, I think that the 'dup'
thing could perhaps be added to only one of the waiter threads.
However, I think that EPOLLIN, EPOLLOUT, EPOLLERR and EPOLLHUP should be
sufficient for the majority of use-cases.
Since EPOLLEXCLUSIVE is intended to be used with a target fd shared
among multiple epfds, where between 1 and n of the epfds may receive an
event, it does not satisfy the semantics of EPOLLONESHOT where only 1
epfd would get an event. Thus, it is not allowed to be specified in
conjunction with EPOLLEXCLUSIVE.
EPOLL_CTL_MOD is also not allowed if the fd was previously added as
EPOLLEXCLUSIVE. It seems with the limited number of flags to not be as
interesting, but this could be relaxed at some further point.
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Tested-by: Madars Vitolins <m@silodev.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ftp.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric Wong <normalperson@yhbt.net>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-02-05 23:37:04 +00:00
|
|
|
ewake = 1;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2018-02-11 22:34:03 +00:00
|
|
|
case EPOLLOUT:
|
|
|
|
if (epi->event.events & EPOLLOUT)
|
epoll: restrict EPOLLEXCLUSIVE to POLLIN and POLLOUT
In the current implementation of the EPOLLEXCLUSIVE flag (added for
4.5-rc1), if epoll waiters create different POLL* sets and register them
as exclusive against the same target fd, the current implementation will
stop waking any further waiters once it finds the first idle waiter.
This means that waiters could miss wakeups in certain cases.
For example, when we wake up a pipe for reading we do:
wake_up_interruptible_sync_poll(&pipe->wait, POLLIN | POLLRDNORM); So if
one epoll set or epfd is added to pipe p with POLLIN and a second set
epfd2 is added to pipe p with POLLRDNORM, only epfd may receive the
wakeup since the current implementation will stop after it finds any
intersection of events with a waiter that is blocked in epoll_wait().
We could potentially address this by requiring all epoll waiters that
are added to p be required to pass the same set of POLL* events. IE the
first EPOLL_CTL_ADD that passes EPOLLEXCLUSIVE establishes the set POLL*
flags to be used by any other epfds that are added as EPOLLEXCLUSIVE.
However, I think it might be somewhat confusing interface as we would
have to reference count the number of users for that set, and so
userspace would have to keep track of that count, or we would need a
more involved interface. It also adds some shared state that we'd have
store somewhere. I don't think anybody will want to bloat
__wait_queue_head for this.
I think what we could do instead, is to simply restrict EPOLLEXCLUSIVE
such that it can only be specified with EPOLLIN and/or EPOLLOUT. So
that way if the wakeup includes 'POLLIN' and not 'POLLOUT', we can stop
once we hit the first idle waiter that specifies the EPOLLIN bit, since
any remaining waiters that only have 'POLLOUT' set wouldn't need to be
woken. Likewise, we can do the same thing if 'POLLOUT' is in the wakeup
bit set and not 'POLLIN'. If both 'POLLOUT' and 'POLLIN' are set in the
wake bit set (there is at least one example of this I saw in fs/pipe.c),
then we just wake the entire exclusive list. Having both 'POLLOUT' and
'POLLIN' both set should not be on any performance critical path, so I
think that's ok (in fs/pipe.c its in pipe_release()). We also continue
to include EPOLLERR and EPOLLHUP by default in any exclusive set. Thus,
the user can specify EPOLLERR and/or EPOLLHUP but is not required to do
so.
Since epoll waiters may be interested in other events as well besides
EPOLLIN, EPOLLOUT, EPOLLERR and EPOLLHUP, these can still be added by
doing a 'dup' call on the target fd and adding that as one normally
would with EPOLL_CTL_ADD. Since I think that the POLLIN and POLLOUT
events are what we are interest in balancing, I think that the 'dup'
thing could perhaps be added to only one of the waiter threads.
However, I think that EPOLLIN, EPOLLOUT, EPOLLERR and EPOLLHUP should be
sufficient for the majority of use-cases.
Since EPOLLEXCLUSIVE is intended to be used with a target fd shared
among multiple epfds, where between 1 and n of the epfds may receive an
event, it does not satisfy the semantics of EPOLLONESHOT where only 1
epfd would get an event. Thus, it is not allowed to be specified in
conjunction with EPOLLEXCLUSIVE.
EPOLL_CTL_MOD is also not allowed if the fd was previously added as
EPOLLEXCLUSIVE. It seems with the limited number of flags to not be as
interesting, but this could be relaxed at some further point.
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Tested-by: Madars Vitolins <m@silodev.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ftp.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric Wong <normalperson@yhbt.net>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-02-05 23:37:04 +00:00
|
|
|
ewake = 1;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 0:
|
|
|
|
ewake = 1;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2019-03-08 00:28:53 +00:00
|
|
|
wake_up(&ep->wq);
|
2016-01-20 22:59:24 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
if (waitqueue_active(&ep->poll_wait))
|
|
|
|
pwake++;
|
|
|
|
|
2007-05-15 08:40:41 +00:00
|
|
|
out_unlock:
|
2019-03-08 00:28:53 +00:00
|
|
|
read_unlock_irqrestore(&ep->lock, flags);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
/* We have to call this outside the lock */
|
|
|
|
if (pwake)
|
2022-11-20 17:10:53 +00:00
|
|
|
ep_poll_safewake(ep, epi, pollflags & EPOLL_URING_WAKE);
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-09-01 16:55:33 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!(epi->event.events & EPOLLEXCLUSIVE))
|
|
|
|
ewake = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-07-04 00:14:56 +00:00
|
|
|
if (pollflags & POLLFREE) {
|
2017-09-01 16:55:33 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If we race with ep_remove_wait_queue() it can miss
|
|
|
|
* ->whead = NULL and do another remove_wait_queue() after
|
|
|
|
* us, so we can't use __remove_wait_queue().
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
list_del_init(&wait->entry);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
epoll: use refcount to reduce ep_mutex contention
We are observing huge contention on the epmutex during an http
connection/rate test:
83.17% 0.25% nginx [kernel.kallsyms] [k] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
[...]
|--66.96%--__fput
|--60.04%--eventpoll_release_file
|--58.41%--__mutex_lock.isra.6
|--56.56%--osq_lock
The application is multi-threaded, creates a new epoll entry for
each incoming connection, and does not delete it before the
connection shutdown - that is, before the connection's fd close().
Many different threads compete frequently for the epmutex lock,
affecting the overall performance.
To reduce the contention this patch introduces explicit reference counting
for the eventpoll struct. Each registered event acquires a reference,
and references are released at ep_remove() time.
The eventpoll struct is released by whoever - among EP file close() and
and the monitored file close() drops its last reference.
Additionally, this introduces a new 'dying' flag to prevent races between
the EP file close() and the monitored file close().
ep_eventpoll_release() marks, under f_lock spinlock, each epitem as dying
before removing it, while EP file close() does not touch dying epitems.
The above is needed as both close operations could run concurrently and
drop the EP reference acquired via the epitem entry. Without the above
flag, the monitored file close() could reach the EP struct via the epitem
list while the epitem is still listed and then try to put it after its
disposal.
An alternative could be avoiding touching the references acquired via
the epitems at EP file close() time, but that could leave the EP struct
alive for potentially unlimited time after EP file close(), with nasty
side effects.
With all the above in place, we can drop the epmutex usage at disposal time.
Overall this produces a significant performance improvement in the
mentioned connection/rate scenario: the mutex operations disappear from
the topmost offenders in the perf report, and the measured connections/rate
grows by ~60%.
To make the change more readable this additionally renames ep_free() to
ep_clear_and_put(), and moves the actual memory cleanup in a separate
ep_free() helper.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/4a57788dcaf28f5eb4f8dfddcc3a8b172a7357bb.1679504153.git.pabeni@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Tested-by: Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhiat.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-03-22 16:57:02 +00:00
|
|
|
* ->whead != NULL protects us from the race with
|
|
|
|
* ep_clear_and_put() or ep_remove(), ep_remove_wait_queue()
|
|
|
|
* takes whead->lock held by the caller. Once we nullify it,
|
|
|
|
* nothing protects ep/epi or even wait.
|
2017-09-01 16:55:33 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
smp_store_release(&ep_pwq_from_wait(wait)->whead, NULL);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-01-20 22:59:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-09-01 16:55:33 +00:00
|
|
|
return ewake;
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* This is the callback that is used to add our wait queue to the
|
|
|
|
* target file wakeup lists.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void ep_ptable_queue_proc(struct file *file, wait_queue_head_t *whead,
|
|
|
|
poll_table *pt)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2020-09-02 15:55:09 +00:00
|
|
|
struct ep_pqueue *epq = container_of(pt, struct ep_pqueue, pt);
|
|
|
|
struct epitem *epi = epq->epi;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
struct eppoll_entry *pwq;
|
|
|
|
|
2020-09-02 15:55:09 +00:00
|
|
|
if (unlikely(!epi)) // an earlier allocation has failed
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pwq = kmem_cache_alloc(pwq_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(!pwq)) {
|
|
|
|
epq->epi = NULL;
|
|
|
|
return;
|
2009-03-31 22:24:11 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2020-09-02 15:55:09 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
init_waitqueue_func_entry(&pwq->wait, ep_poll_callback);
|
|
|
|
pwq->whead = whead;
|
|
|
|
pwq->base = epi;
|
|
|
|
if (epi->event.events & EPOLLEXCLUSIVE)
|
|
|
|
add_wait_queue_exclusive(whead, &pwq->wait);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
add_wait_queue(whead, &pwq->wait);
|
|
|
|
pwq->next = epi->pwqlist;
|
|
|
|
epi->pwqlist = pwq;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void ep_rbtree_insert(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epitem *epi)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int kcmp;
|
2017-09-08 23:15:18 +00:00
|
|
|
struct rb_node **p = &ep->rbr.rb_root.rb_node, *parent = NULL;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
struct epitem *epic;
|
2017-09-08 23:15:18 +00:00
|
|
|
bool leftmost = true;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (*p) {
|
|
|
|
parent = *p;
|
|
|
|
epic = rb_entry(parent, struct epitem, rbn);
|
2005-06-23 07:10:03 +00:00
|
|
|
kcmp = ep_cmp_ffd(&epi->ffd, &epic->ffd);
|
2017-09-08 23:15:18 +00:00
|
|
|
if (kcmp > 0) {
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
p = &parent->rb_right;
|
2017-09-08 23:15:18 +00:00
|
|
|
leftmost = false;
|
|
|
|
} else
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
p = &parent->rb_left;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rb_link_node(&epi->rbn, parent, p);
|
2017-09-08 23:15:18 +00:00
|
|
|
rb_insert_color_cached(&epi->rbn, &ep->rbr, leftmost);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
revert "epoll: support for disabling items, and a self-test app"
Revert commit 03a7beb55b9f ("epoll: support for disabling items, and a
self-test app") pending resolution of the issues identified by Michael
Kerrisk, copied below.
We'll revisit this for 3.8.
: I've taken a look at this patch as it currently stands in 3.7-rc1, and
: done a bit of testing. (By the way, the test program
: tools/testing/selftests/epoll/test_epoll.c does not compile...)
:
: There are one or two places where the behavior seems a little strange,
: so I have a question or two at the end of this mail. But other than
: that, I want to check my understanding so that the interface can be
: correctly documented.
:
: Just to go though my understanding, the problem is the following
: scenario in a multithreaded application:
:
: 1. Multiple threads are performing epoll_wait() operations,
: and maintaining a user-space cache that contains information
: corresponding to each file descriptor being monitored by
: epoll_wait().
:
: 2. At some point, a thread wants to delete (EPOLL_CTL_DEL)
: a file descriptor from the epoll interest list, and
: delete the corresponding record from the user-space cache.
:
: 3. The problem with (2) is that some other thread may have
: previously done an epoll_wait() that retrieved information
: about the fd in question, and may be in the middle of using
: information in the cache that relates to that fd. Thus,
: there is a potential race.
:
: 4. The race can't solved purely in user space, because doing
: so would require applying a mutex across the epoll_wait()
: call, which would of course blow thread concurrency.
:
: Right?
:
: Your solution is the EPOLL_CTL_DISABLE operation. I want to
: confirm my understanding about how to use this flag, since
: the description that has accompanied the patches so far
: has been a bit sparse
:
: 0. In the scenario you're concerned about, deleting a file
: descriptor means (safely) doing the following:
: (a) Deleting the file descriptor from the epoll interest list
: using EPOLL_CTL_DEL
: (b) Deleting the corresponding record in the user-space cache
:
: 1. It's only meaningful to use this EPOLL_CTL_DISABLE in
: conjunction with EPOLLONESHOT.
:
: 2. Using EPOLL_CTL_DISABLE without using EPOLLONESHOT in
: conjunction is a logical error.
:
: 3. The correct way to code multithreaded applications using
: EPOLL_CTL_DISABLE and EPOLLONESHOT is as follows:
:
: a. All EPOLL_CTL_ADD and EPOLL_CTL_MOD operations should
: should EPOLLONESHOT.
:
: b. When a thread wants to delete a file descriptor, it
: should do the following:
:
: [1] Call epoll_ctl(EPOLL_CTL_DISABLE)
: [2] If the return status from epoll_ctl(EPOLL_CTL_DISABLE)
: was zero, then the file descriptor can be safely
: deleted by the thread that made this call.
: [3] If the epoll_ctl(EPOLL_CTL_DISABLE) fails with EBUSY,
: then the descriptor is in use. In this case, the calling
: thread should set a flag in the user-space cache to
: indicate that the thread that is using the descriptor
: should perform the deletion operation.
:
: Is all of the above correct?
:
: The implementation depends on checking on whether
: (events & ~EP_PRIVATE_BITS) == 0
: This replies on the fact that EPOLL_CTL_AD and EPOLL_CTL_MOD always
: set EPOLLHUP and EPOLLERR in the 'events' mask, and EPOLLONESHOT
: causes those flags (as well as all others in ~EP_PRIVATE_BITS) to be
: cleared.
:
: A corollary to the previous paragraph is that using EPOLL_CTL_DISABLE
: is only useful in conjunction with EPOLLONESHOT. However, as things
: stand, one can use EPOLL_CTL_DISABLE on a file descriptor that does
: not have EPOLLONESHOT set in 'events' This results in the following
: (slightly surprising) behavior:
:
: (a) The first call to epoll_ctl(EPOLL_CTL_DISABLE) returns 0
: (the indicator that the file descriptor can be safely deleted).
: (b) The next call to epoll_ctl(EPOLL_CTL_DISABLE) fails with EBUSY.
:
: This doesn't seem particularly useful, and in fact is probably an
: indication that the user made a logic error: they should only be using
: epoll_ctl(EPOLL_CTL_DISABLE) on a file descriptor for which
: EPOLLONESHOT was set in 'events'. If that is correct, then would it
: not make sense to return an error to user space for this case?
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: "Paton J. Lewis" <palewis@adobe.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-11-08 23:53:35 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
epoll: limit paths
The current epoll code can be tickled to run basically indefinitely in
both loop detection path check (on ep_insert()), and in the wakeup paths.
The programs that tickle this behavior set up deeply linked networks of
epoll file descriptors that cause the epoll algorithms to traverse them
indefinitely. A couple of these sample programs have been previously
posted in this thread: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/25/297.
To fix the loop detection path check algorithms, I simply keep track of
the epoll nodes that have been already visited. Thus, the loop detection
becomes proportional to the number of epoll file descriptor and links.
This dramatically decreases the run-time of the loop check algorithm. In
one diabolical case I tried it reduced the run-time from 15 mintues (all
in kernel time) to .3 seconds.
Fixing the wakeup paths could be done at wakeup time in a similar manner
by keeping track of nodes that have already been visited, but the
complexity is harder, since there can be multiple wakeups on different
cpus...Thus, I've opted to limit the number of possible wakeup paths when
the paths are created.
This is accomplished, by noting that the end file descriptor points that
are found during the loop detection pass (from the newly added link), are
actually the sources for wakeup events. I keep a list of these file
descriptors and limit the number and length of these paths that emanate
from these 'source file descriptors'. In the current implemetation I
allow 1000 paths of length 1, 500 of length 2, 100 of length 3, 50 of
length 4 and 10 of length 5. Note that it is sufficient to check the
'source file descriptors' reachable from the newly added link, since no
other 'source file descriptors' will have newly added links. This allows
us to check only the wakeup paths that may have gotten too long, and not
re-check all possible wakeup paths on the system.
In terms of the path limit selection, I think its first worth noting that
the most common case for epoll, is probably the model where you have 1
epoll file descriptor that is monitoring n number of 'source file
descriptors'. In this case, each 'source file descriptor' has a 1 path of
length 1. Thus, I believe that the limits I'm proposing are quite
reasonable and in fact may be too generous. Thus, I'm hoping that the
proposed limits will not prevent any workloads that currently work to
fail.
In terms of locking, I have extended the use of the 'epmutex' to all
epoll_ctl add and remove operations. Currently its only used in a subset
of the add paths. I need to hold the epmutex, so that we can correctly
traverse a coherent graph, to check the number of paths. I believe that
this additional locking is probably ok, since its in the setup/teardown
paths, and doesn't affect the running paths, but it certainly is going to
add some extra overhead. Also, worth noting is that the epmuex was
recently added to the ep_ctl add operations in the initial path loop
detection code using the argument that it was not on a critical path.
Another thing to note here, is the length of epoll chains that is allowed.
Currently, eventpoll.c defines:
/* Maximum number of nesting allowed inside epoll sets */
#define EP_MAX_NESTS 4
This basically means that I am limited to a graph depth of 5 (EP_MAX_NESTS
+ 1). However, this limit is currently only enforced during the loop
check detection code, and only when the epoll file descriptors are added
in a certain order. Thus, this limit is currently easily bypassed. The
newly added check for wakeup paths, stricly limits the wakeup paths to a
length of 5, regardless of the order in which ep's are linked together.
Thus, a side-effect of the new code is a more consistent enforcement of
the graph depth.
Thus far, I've tested this, using the sample programs previously
mentioned, which now either return quickly or return -EINVAL. I've also
testing using the piptest.c epoll tester, which showed no difference in
performance. I've also created a number of different epoll networks and
tested that they behave as expectded.
I believe this solves the original diabolical test cases, while still
preserving the sane epoll nesting.
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Cc: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-01-13 01:17:43 +00:00
|
|
|
#define PATH_ARR_SIZE 5
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* These are the number paths of length 1 to 5, that we are allowing to emanate
|
|
|
|
* from a single file of interest. For example, we allow 1000 paths of length
|
|
|
|
* 1, to emanate from each file of interest. This essentially represents the
|
|
|
|
* potential wakeup paths, which need to be limited in order to avoid massive
|
|
|
|
* uncontrolled wakeup storms. The common use case should be a single ep which
|
|
|
|
* is connected to n file sources. In this case each file source has 1 path
|
|
|
|
* of length 1. Thus, the numbers below should be more than sufficient. These
|
|
|
|
* path limits are enforced during an EPOLL_CTL_ADD operation, since a modify
|
2023-04-11 23:41:59 +00:00
|
|
|
* and delete can't add additional paths. Protected by the epnested_mutex.
|
epoll: limit paths
The current epoll code can be tickled to run basically indefinitely in
both loop detection path check (on ep_insert()), and in the wakeup paths.
The programs that tickle this behavior set up deeply linked networks of
epoll file descriptors that cause the epoll algorithms to traverse them
indefinitely. A couple of these sample programs have been previously
posted in this thread: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/25/297.
To fix the loop detection path check algorithms, I simply keep track of
the epoll nodes that have been already visited. Thus, the loop detection
becomes proportional to the number of epoll file descriptor and links.
This dramatically decreases the run-time of the loop check algorithm. In
one diabolical case I tried it reduced the run-time from 15 mintues (all
in kernel time) to .3 seconds.
Fixing the wakeup paths could be done at wakeup time in a similar manner
by keeping track of nodes that have already been visited, but the
complexity is harder, since there can be multiple wakeups on different
cpus...Thus, I've opted to limit the number of possible wakeup paths when
the paths are created.
This is accomplished, by noting that the end file descriptor points that
are found during the loop detection pass (from the newly added link), are
actually the sources for wakeup events. I keep a list of these file
descriptors and limit the number and length of these paths that emanate
from these 'source file descriptors'. In the current implemetation I
allow 1000 paths of length 1, 500 of length 2, 100 of length 3, 50 of
length 4 and 10 of length 5. Note that it is sufficient to check the
'source file descriptors' reachable from the newly added link, since no
other 'source file descriptors' will have newly added links. This allows
us to check only the wakeup paths that may have gotten too long, and not
re-check all possible wakeup paths on the system.
In terms of the path limit selection, I think its first worth noting that
the most common case for epoll, is probably the model where you have 1
epoll file descriptor that is monitoring n number of 'source file
descriptors'. In this case, each 'source file descriptor' has a 1 path of
length 1. Thus, I believe that the limits I'm proposing are quite
reasonable and in fact may be too generous. Thus, I'm hoping that the
proposed limits will not prevent any workloads that currently work to
fail.
In terms of locking, I have extended the use of the 'epmutex' to all
epoll_ctl add and remove operations. Currently its only used in a subset
of the add paths. I need to hold the epmutex, so that we can correctly
traverse a coherent graph, to check the number of paths. I believe that
this additional locking is probably ok, since its in the setup/teardown
paths, and doesn't affect the running paths, but it certainly is going to
add some extra overhead. Also, worth noting is that the epmuex was
recently added to the ep_ctl add operations in the initial path loop
detection code using the argument that it was not on a critical path.
Another thing to note here, is the length of epoll chains that is allowed.
Currently, eventpoll.c defines:
/* Maximum number of nesting allowed inside epoll sets */
#define EP_MAX_NESTS 4
This basically means that I am limited to a graph depth of 5 (EP_MAX_NESTS
+ 1). However, this limit is currently only enforced during the loop
check detection code, and only when the epoll file descriptors are added
in a certain order. Thus, this limit is currently easily bypassed. The
newly added check for wakeup paths, stricly limits the wakeup paths to a
length of 5, regardless of the order in which ep's are linked together.
Thus, a side-effect of the new code is a more consistent enforcement of
the graph depth.
Thus far, I've tested this, using the sample programs previously
mentioned, which now either return quickly or return -EINVAL. I've also
testing using the piptest.c epoll tester, which showed no difference in
performance. I've also created a number of different epoll networks and
tested that they behave as expectded.
I believe this solves the original diabolical test cases, while still
preserving the sane epoll nesting.
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Cc: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-01-13 01:17:43 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static const int path_limits[PATH_ARR_SIZE] = { 1000, 500, 100, 50, 10 };
|
|
|
|
static int path_count[PATH_ARR_SIZE];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int path_count_inc(int nests)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2012-03-16 20:34:03 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Allow an arbitrary number of depth 1 paths */
|
|
|
|
if (nests == 0)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
epoll: limit paths
The current epoll code can be tickled to run basically indefinitely in
both loop detection path check (on ep_insert()), and in the wakeup paths.
The programs that tickle this behavior set up deeply linked networks of
epoll file descriptors that cause the epoll algorithms to traverse them
indefinitely. A couple of these sample programs have been previously
posted in this thread: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/25/297.
To fix the loop detection path check algorithms, I simply keep track of
the epoll nodes that have been already visited. Thus, the loop detection
becomes proportional to the number of epoll file descriptor and links.
This dramatically decreases the run-time of the loop check algorithm. In
one diabolical case I tried it reduced the run-time from 15 mintues (all
in kernel time) to .3 seconds.
Fixing the wakeup paths could be done at wakeup time in a similar manner
by keeping track of nodes that have already been visited, but the
complexity is harder, since there can be multiple wakeups on different
cpus...Thus, I've opted to limit the number of possible wakeup paths when
the paths are created.
This is accomplished, by noting that the end file descriptor points that
are found during the loop detection pass (from the newly added link), are
actually the sources for wakeup events. I keep a list of these file
descriptors and limit the number and length of these paths that emanate
from these 'source file descriptors'. In the current implemetation I
allow 1000 paths of length 1, 500 of length 2, 100 of length 3, 50 of
length 4 and 10 of length 5. Note that it is sufficient to check the
'source file descriptors' reachable from the newly added link, since no
other 'source file descriptors' will have newly added links. This allows
us to check only the wakeup paths that may have gotten too long, and not
re-check all possible wakeup paths on the system.
In terms of the path limit selection, I think its first worth noting that
the most common case for epoll, is probably the model where you have 1
epoll file descriptor that is monitoring n number of 'source file
descriptors'. In this case, each 'source file descriptor' has a 1 path of
length 1. Thus, I believe that the limits I'm proposing are quite
reasonable and in fact may be too generous. Thus, I'm hoping that the
proposed limits will not prevent any workloads that currently work to
fail.
In terms of locking, I have extended the use of the 'epmutex' to all
epoll_ctl add and remove operations. Currently its only used in a subset
of the add paths. I need to hold the epmutex, so that we can correctly
traverse a coherent graph, to check the number of paths. I believe that
this additional locking is probably ok, since its in the setup/teardown
paths, and doesn't affect the running paths, but it certainly is going to
add some extra overhead. Also, worth noting is that the epmuex was
recently added to the ep_ctl add operations in the initial path loop
detection code using the argument that it was not on a critical path.
Another thing to note here, is the length of epoll chains that is allowed.
Currently, eventpoll.c defines:
/* Maximum number of nesting allowed inside epoll sets */
#define EP_MAX_NESTS 4
This basically means that I am limited to a graph depth of 5 (EP_MAX_NESTS
+ 1). However, this limit is currently only enforced during the loop
check detection code, and only when the epoll file descriptors are added
in a certain order. Thus, this limit is currently easily bypassed. The
newly added check for wakeup paths, stricly limits the wakeup paths to a
length of 5, regardless of the order in which ep's are linked together.
Thus, a side-effect of the new code is a more consistent enforcement of
the graph depth.
Thus far, I've tested this, using the sample programs previously
mentioned, which now either return quickly or return -EINVAL. I've also
testing using the piptest.c epoll tester, which showed no difference in
performance. I've also created a number of different epoll networks and
tested that they behave as expectded.
I believe this solves the original diabolical test cases, while still
preserving the sane epoll nesting.
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Cc: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-01-13 01:17:43 +00:00
|
|
|
if (++path_count[nests] > path_limits[nests])
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void path_count_init(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < PATH_ARR_SIZE; i++)
|
|
|
|
path_count[i] = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
epoll: take epitem list out of struct file
Move the head of epitem list out of struct file; for epoll ones it's
moved into struct eventpoll (->refs there), for non-epoll - into
the new object (struct epitem_head). In place of ->f_ep_links we
leave a pointer to the list head (->f_ep).
->f_ep is protected by ->f_lock and it's zeroed as soon as the list
of epitems becomes empty (that can happen only in ep_remove() by
now).
The list of files for reverse path check is *not* going through
struct file now - it's a single-linked list going through epitem_head
instances. It's terminated by ERR_PTR(-1) (== EP_UNACTIVE_POINTER),
so the elements of list can be distinguished by head->next != NULL.
epitem_head instances are allocated at ep_insert() time (by
attach_epitem()) and freed either by ep_remove() (if it empties
the set of epitems *and* epitem_head does not belong to the
reverse path check list) or by clear_tfile_check_list() when
the list is emptied (if the set of epitems is empty by that
point). Allocations are done from a separate slab - minimal kmalloc()
size is too large on some architectures.
As the result, we trim struct file _and_ get rid of the games with
temporary file references.
Locking and barriers are interesting (aren't they always); see unlist_file()
and ep_remove() for details. The non-obvious part is that ep_remove() needs
to decide if it will be the one to free the damn thing *before* actually
storing NULL to head->epitems.first - that's what smp_load_acquire is for
in there. unlist_file() lockless path is safe, since we hit it only if
we observe NULL in head->epitems.first and whoever had done that store is
guaranteed to have observed non-NULL in head->next. IOW, their last access
had been the store of NULL into ->epitems.first and we can safely free
the sucker. OTOH, we are under rcu_read_lock() and both epitem and
epitem->file have their freeing RCU-delayed. So if we see non-NULL
->epitems.first, we can grab ->f_lock (all epitems in there share the
same struct file) and safely recheck the emptiness of ->epitems; again,
->next is still non-NULL, so ep_remove() couldn't have freed head yet.
->f_lock serializes us wrt ep_remove(); the rest is trivial.
Note that once head->epitems becomes NULL, nothing can get inserted into
it - the only remaining reference to head after that point is from the
reverse path check list.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-10-02 00:45:51 +00:00
|
|
|
static int reverse_path_check_proc(struct hlist_head *refs, int depth)
|
epoll: limit paths
The current epoll code can be tickled to run basically indefinitely in
both loop detection path check (on ep_insert()), and in the wakeup paths.
The programs that tickle this behavior set up deeply linked networks of
epoll file descriptors that cause the epoll algorithms to traverse them
indefinitely. A couple of these sample programs have been previously
posted in this thread: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/25/297.
To fix the loop detection path check algorithms, I simply keep track of
the epoll nodes that have been already visited. Thus, the loop detection
becomes proportional to the number of epoll file descriptor and links.
This dramatically decreases the run-time of the loop check algorithm. In
one diabolical case I tried it reduced the run-time from 15 mintues (all
in kernel time) to .3 seconds.
Fixing the wakeup paths could be done at wakeup time in a similar manner
by keeping track of nodes that have already been visited, but the
complexity is harder, since there can be multiple wakeups on different
cpus...Thus, I've opted to limit the number of possible wakeup paths when
the paths are created.
This is accomplished, by noting that the end file descriptor points that
are found during the loop detection pass (from the newly added link), are
actually the sources for wakeup events. I keep a list of these file
descriptors and limit the number and length of these paths that emanate
from these 'source file descriptors'. In the current implemetation I
allow 1000 paths of length 1, 500 of length 2, 100 of length 3, 50 of
length 4 and 10 of length 5. Note that it is sufficient to check the
'source file descriptors' reachable from the newly added link, since no
other 'source file descriptors' will have newly added links. This allows
us to check only the wakeup paths that may have gotten too long, and not
re-check all possible wakeup paths on the system.
In terms of the path limit selection, I think its first worth noting that
the most common case for epoll, is probably the model where you have 1
epoll file descriptor that is monitoring n number of 'source file
descriptors'. In this case, each 'source file descriptor' has a 1 path of
length 1. Thus, I believe that the limits I'm proposing are quite
reasonable and in fact may be too generous. Thus, I'm hoping that the
proposed limits will not prevent any workloads that currently work to
fail.
In terms of locking, I have extended the use of the 'epmutex' to all
epoll_ctl add and remove operations. Currently its only used in a subset
of the add paths. I need to hold the epmutex, so that we can correctly
traverse a coherent graph, to check the number of paths. I believe that
this additional locking is probably ok, since its in the setup/teardown
paths, and doesn't affect the running paths, but it certainly is going to
add some extra overhead. Also, worth noting is that the epmuex was
recently added to the ep_ctl add operations in the initial path loop
detection code using the argument that it was not on a critical path.
Another thing to note here, is the length of epoll chains that is allowed.
Currently, eventpoll.c defines:
/* Maximum number of nesting allowed inside epoll sets */
#define EP_MAX_NESTS 4
This basically means that I am limited to a graph depth of 5 (EP_MAX_NESTS
+ 1). However, this limit is currently only enforced during the loop
check detection code, and only when the epoll file descriptors are added
in a certain order. Thus, this limit is currently easily bypassed. The
newly added check for wakeup paths, stricly limits the wakeup paths to a
length of 5, regardless of the order in which ep's are linked together.
Thus, a side-effect of the new code is a more consistent enforcement of
the graph depth.
Thus far, I've tested this, using the sample programs previously
mentioned, which now either return quickly or return -EINVAL. I've also
testing using the piptest.c epoll tester, which showed no difference in
performance. I've also created a number of different epoll networks and
tested that they behave as expectded.
I believe this solves the original diabolical test cases, while still
preserving the sane epoll nesting.
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Cc: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-01-13 01:17:43 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int error = 0;
|
|
|
|
struct epitem *epi;
|
|
|
|
|
2020-09-25 23:48:56 +00:00
|
|
|
if (depth > EP_MAX_NESTS) /* too deep nesting */
|
2020-08-23 03:08:37 +00:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
|
2013-11-12 23:10:16 +00:00
|
|
|
/* CTL_DEL can remove links here, but that can't increase our count */
|
epoll: take epitem list out of struct file
Move the head of epitem list out of struct file; for epoll ones it's
moved into struct eventpoll (->refs there), for non-epoll - into
the new object (struct epitem_head). In place of ->f_ep_links we
leave a pointer to the list head (->f_ep).
->f_ep is protected by ->f_lock and it's zeroed as soon as the list
of epitems becomes empty (that can happen only in ep_remove() by
now).
The list of files for reverse path check is *not* going through
struct file now - it's a single-linked list going through epitem_head
instances. It's terminated by ERR_PTR(-1) (== EP_UNACTIVE_POINTER),
so the elements of list can be distinguished by head->next != NULL.
epitem_head instances are allocated at ep_insert() time (by
attach_epitem()) and freed either by ep_remove() (if it empties
the set of epitems *and* epitem_head does not belong to the
reverse path check list) or by clear_tfile_check_list() when
the list is emptied (if the set of epitems is empty by that
point). Allocations are done from a separate slab - minimal kmalloc()
size is too large on some architectures.
As the result, we trim struct file _and_ get rid of the games with
temporary file references.
Locking and barriers are interesting (aren't they always); see unlist_file()
and ep_remove() for details. The non-obvious part is that ep_remove() needs
to decide if it will be the one to free the damn thing *before* actually
storing NULL to head->epitems.first - that's what smp_load_acquire is for
in there. unlist_file() lockless path is safe, since we hit it only if
we observe NULL in head->epitems.first and whoever had done that store is
guaranteed to have observed non-NULL in head->next. IOW, their last access
had been the store of NULL into ->epitems.first and we can safely free
the sucker. OTOH, we are under rcu_read_lock() and both epitem and
epitem->file have their freeing RCU-delayed. So if we see non-NULL
->epitems.first, we can grab ->f_lock (all epitems in there share the
same struct file) and safely recheck the emptiness of ->epitems; again,
->next is still non-NULL, so ep_remove() couldn't have freed head yet.
->f_lock serializes us wrt ep_remove(); the rest is trivial.
Note that once head->epitems becomes NULL, nothing can get inserted into
it - the only remaining reference to head after that point is from the
reverse path check list.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-10-02 00:45:51 +00:00
|
|
|
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(epi, refs, fllink) {
|
|
|
|
struct hlist_head *refs = &epi->ep->refs;
|
|
|
|
if (hlist_empty(refs))
|
2020-09-26 19:54:05 +00:00
|
|
|
error = path_count_inc(depth);
|
|
|
|
else
|
epoll: take epitem list out of struct file
Move the head of epitem list out of struct file; for epoll ones it's
moved into struct eventpoll (->refs there), for non-epoll - into
the new object (struct epitem_head). In place of ->f_ep_links we
leave a pointer to the list head (->f_ep).
->f_ep is protected by ->f_lock and it's zeroed as soon as the list
of epitems becomes empty (that can happen only in ep_remove() by
now).
The list of files for reverse path check is *not* going through
struct file now - it's a single-linked list going through epitem_head
instances. It's terminated by ERR_PTR(-1) (== EP_UNACTIVE_POINTER),
so the elements of list can be distinguished by head->next != NULL.
epitem_head instances are allocated at ep_insert() time (by
attach_epitem()) and freed either by ep_remove() (if it empties
the set of epitems *and* epitem_head does not belong to the
reverse path check list) or by clear_tfile_check_list() when
the list is emptied (if the set of epitems is empty by that
point). Allocations are done from a separate slab - minimal kmalloc()
size is too large on some architectures.
As the result, we trim struct file _and_ get rid of the games with
temporary file references.
Locking and barriers are interesting (aren't they always); see unlist_file()
and ep_remove() for details. The non-obvious part is that ep_remove() needs
to decide if it will be the one to free the damn thing *before* actually
storing NULL to head->epitems.first - that's what smp_load_acquire is for
in there. unlist_file() lockless path is safe, since we hit it only if
we observe NULL in head->epitems.first and whoever had done that store is
guaranteed to have observed non-NULL in head->next. IOW, their last access
had been the store of NULL into ->epitems.first and we can safely free
the sucker. OTOH, we are under rcu_read_lock() and both epitem and
epitem->file have their freeing RCU-delayed. So if we see non-NULL
->epitems.first, we can grab ->f_lock (all epitems in there share the
same struct file) and safely recheck the emptiness of ->epitems; again,
->next is still non-NULL, so ep_remove() couldn't have freed head yet.
->f_lock serializes us wrt ep_remove(); the rest is trivial.
Note that once head->epitems becomes NULL, nothing can get inserted into
it - the only remaining reference to head after that point is from the
reverse path check list.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-10-02 00:45:51 +00:00
|
|
|
error = reverse_path_check_proc(refs, depth + 1);
|
2020-09-26 19:54:05 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
epoll: limit paths
The current epoll code can be tickled to run basically indefinitely in
both loop detection path check (on ep_insert()), and in the wakeup paths.
The programs that tickle this behavior set up deeply linked networks of
epoll file descriptors that cause the epoll algorithms to traverse them
indefinitely. A couple of these sample programs have been previously
posted in this thread: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/25/297.
To fix the loop detection path check algorithms, I simply keep track of
the epoll nodes that have been already visited. Thus, the loop detection
becomes proportional to the number of epoll file descriptor and links.
This dramatically decreases the run-time of the loop check algorithm. In
one diabolical case I tried it reduced the run-time from 15 mintues (all
in kernel time) to .3 seconds.
Fixing the wakeup paths could be done at wakeup time in a similar manner
by keeping track of nodes that have already been visited, but the
complexity is harder, since there can be multiple wakeups on different
cpus...Thus, I've opted to limit the number of possible wakeup paths when
the paths are created.
This is accomplished, by noting that the end file descriptor points that
are found during the loop detection pass (from the newly added link), are
actually the sources for wakeup events. I keep a list of these file
descriptors and limit the number and length of these paths that emanate
from these 'source file descriptors'. In the current implemetation I
allow 1000 paths of length 1, 500 of length 2, 100 of length 3, 50 of
length 4 and 10 of length 5. Note that it is sufficient to check the
'source file descriptors' reachable from the newly added link, since no
other 'source file descriptors' will have newly added links. This allows
us to check only the wakeup paths that may have gotten too long, and not
re-check all possible wakeup paths on the system.
In terms of the path limit selection, I think its first worth noting that
the most common case for epoll, is probably the model where you have 1
epoll file descriptor that is monitoring n number of 'source file
descriptors'. In this case, each 'source file descriptor' has a 1 path of
length 1. Thus, I believe that the limits I'm proposing are quite
reasonable and in fact may be too generous. Thus, I'm hoping that the
proposed limits will not prevent any workloads that currently work to
fail.
In terms of locking, I have extended the use of the 'epmutex' to all
epoll_ctl add and remove operations. Currently its only used in a subset
of the add paths. I need to hold the epmutex, so that we can correctly
traverse a coherent graph, to check the number of paths. I believe that
this additional locking is probably ok, since its in the setup/teardown
paths, and doesn't affect the running paths, but it certainly is going to
add some extra overhead. Also, worth noting is that the epmuex was
recently added to the ep_ctl add operations in the initial path loop
detection code using the argument that it was not on a critical path.
Another thing to note here, is the length of epoll chains that is allowed.
Currently, eventpoll.c defines:
/* Maximum number of nesting allowed inside epoll sets */
#define EP_MAX_NESTS 4
This basically means that I am limited to a graph depth of 5 (EP_MAX_NESTS
+ 1). However, this limit is currently only enforced during the loop
check detection code, and only when the epoll file descriptors are added
in a certain order. Thus, this limit is currently easily bypassed. The
newly added check for wakeup paths, stricly limits the wakeup paths to a
length of 5, regardless of the order in which ep's are linked together.
Thus, a side-effect of the new code is a more consistent enforcement of
the graph depth.
Thus far, I've tested this, using the sample programs previously
mentioned, which now either return quickly or return -EINVAL. I've also
testing using the piptest.c epoll tester, which showed no difference in
performance. I've also created a number of different epoll networks and
tested that they behave as expectded.
I believe this solves the original diabolical test cases, while still
preserving the sane epoll nesting.
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Cc: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-01-13 01:17:43 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
epoll: take epitem list out of struct file
Move the head of epitem list out of struct file; for epoll ones it's
moved into struct eventpoll (->refs there), for non-epoll - into
the new object (struct epitem_head). In place of ->f_ep_links we
leave a pointer to the list head (->f_ep).
->f_ep is protected by ->f_lock and it's zeroed as soon as the list
of epitems becomes empty (that can happen only in ep_remove() by
now).
The list of files for reverse path check is *not* going through
struct file now - it's a single-linked list going through epitem_head
instances. It's terminated by ERR_PTR(-1) (== EP_UNACTIVE_POINTER),
so the elements of list can be distinguished by head->next != NULL.
epitem_head instances are allocated at ep_insert() time (by
attach_epitem()) and freed either by ep_remove() (if it empties
the set of epitems *and* epitem_head does not belong to the
reverse path check list) or by clear_tfile_check_list() when
the list is emptied (if the set of epitems is empty by that
point). Allocations are done from a separate slab - minimal kmalloc()
size is too large on some architectures.
As the result, we trim struct file _and_ get rid of the games with
temporary file references.
Locking and barriers are interesting (aren't they always); see unlist_file()
and ep_remove() for details. The non-obvious part is that ep_remove() needs
to decide if it will be the one to free the damn thing *before* actually
storing NULL to head->epitems.first - that's what smp_load_acquire is for
in there. unlist_file() lockless path is safe, since we hit it only if
we observe NULL in head->epitems.first and whoever had done that store is
guaranteed to have observed non-NULL in head->next. IOW, their last access
had been the store of NULL into ->epitems.first and we can safely free
the sucker. OTOH, we are under rcu_read_lock() and both epitem and
epitem->file have their freeing RCU-delayed. So if we see non-NULL
->epitems.first, we can grab ->f_lock (all epitems in there share the
same struct file) and safely recheck the emptiness of ->epitems; again,
->next is still non-NULL, so ep_remove() couldn't have freed head yet.
->f_lock serializes us wrt ep_remove(); the rest is trivial.
Note that once head->epitems becomes NULL, nothing can get inserted into
it - the only remaining reference to head after that point is from the
reverse path check list.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-10-02 00:45:51 +00:00
|
|
|
* reverse_path_check - The tfile_check_list is list of epitem_head, which have
|
epoll: limit paths
The current epoll code can be tickled to run basically indefinitely in
both loop detection path check (on ep_insert()), and in the wakeup paths.
The programs that tickle this behavior set up deeply linked networks of
epoll file descriptors that cause the epoll algorithms to traverse them
indefinitely. A couple of these sample programs have been previously
posted in this thread: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/25/297.
To fix the loop detection path check algorithms, I simply keep track of
the epoll nodes that have been already visited. Thus, the loop detection
becomes proportional to the number of epoll file descriptor and links.
This dramatically decreases the run-time of the loop check algorithm. In
one diabolical case I tried it reduced the run-time from 15 mintues (all
in kernel time) to .3 seconds.
Fixing the wakeup paths could be done at wakeup time in a similar manner
by keeping track of nodes that have already been visited, but the
complexity is harder, since there can be multiple wakeups on different
cpus...Thus, I've opted to limit the number of possible wakeup paths when
the paths are created.
This is accomplished, by noting that the end file descriptor points that
are found during the loop detection pass (from the newly added link), are
actually the sources for wakeup events. I keep a list of these file
descriptors and limit the number and length of these paths that emanate
from these 'source file descriptors'. In the current implemetation I
allow 1000 paths of length 1, 500 of length 2, 100 of length 3, 50 of
length 4 and 10 of length 5. Note that it is sufficient to check the
'source file descriptors' reachable from the newly added link, since no
other 'source file descriptors' will have newly added links. This allows
us to check only the wakeup paths that may have gotten too long, and not
re-check all possible wakeup paths on the system.
In terms of the path limit selection, I think its first worth noting that
the most common case for epoll, is probably the model where you have 1
epoll file descriptor that is monitoring n number of 'source file
descriptors'. In this case, each 'source file descriptor' has a 1 path of
length 1. Thus, I believe that the limits I'm proposing are quite
reasonable and in fact may be too generous. Thus, I'm hoping that the
proposed limits will not prevent any workloads that currently work to
fail.
In terms of locking, I have extended the use of the 'epmutex' to all
epoll_ctl add and remove operations. Currently its only used in a subset
of the add paths. I need to hold the epmutex, so that we can correctly
traverse a coherent graph, to check the number of paths. I believe that
this additional locking is probably ok, since its in the setup/teardown
paths, and doesn't affect the running paths, but it certainly is going to
add some extra overhead. Also, worth noting is that the epmuex was
recently added to the ep_ctl add operations in the initial path loop
detection code using the argument that it was not on a critical path.
Another thing to note here, is the length of epoll chains that is allowed.
Currently, eventpoll.c defines:
/* Maximum number of nesting allowed inside epoll sets */
#define EP_MAX_NESTS 4
This basically means that I am limited to a graph depth of 5 (EP_MAX_NESTS
+ 1). However, this limit is currently only enforced during the loop
check detection code, and only when the epoll file descriptors are added
in a certain order. Thus, this limit is currently easily bypassed. The
newly added check for wakeup paths, stricly limits the wakeup paths to a
length of 5, regardless of the order in which ep's are linked together.
Thus, a side-effect of the new code is a more consistent enforcement of
the graph depth.
Thus far, I've tested this, using the sample programs previously
mentioned, which now either return quickly or return -EINVAL. I've also
testing using the piptest.c epoll tester, which showed no difference in
performance. I've also created a number of different epoll networks and
tested that they behave as expectded.
I believe this solves the original diabolical test cases, while still
preserving the sane epoll nesting.
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Cc: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-01-13 01:17:43 +00:00
|
|
|
* links that are proposed to be newly added. We need to
|
|
|
|
* make sure that those added links don't add too many
|
|
|
|
* paths such that we will spend all our time waking up
|
|
|
|
* eventpoll objects.
|
|
|
|
*
|
2021-03-01 22:25:51 +00:00
|
|
|
* Return: %zero if the proposed links don't create too many paths,
|
|
|
|
* %-1 otherwise.
|
epoll: limit paths
The current epoll code can be tickled to run basically indefinitely in
both loop detection path check (on ep_insert()), and in the wakeup paths.
The programs that tickle this behavior set up deeply linked networks of
epoll file descriptors that cause the epoll algorithms to traverse them
indefinitely. A couple of these sample programs have been previously
posted in this thread: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/25/297.
To fix the loop detection path check algorithms, I simply keep track of
the epoll nodes that have been already visited. Thus, the loop detection
becomes proportional to the number of epoll file descriptor and links.
This dramatically decreases the run-time of the loop check algorithm. In
one diabolical case I tried it reduced the run-time from 15 mintues (all
in kernel time) to .3 seconds.
Fixing the wakeup paths could be done at wakeup time in a similar manner
by keeping track of nodes that have already been visited, but the
complexity is harder, since there can be multiple wakeups on different
cpus...Thus, I've opted to limit the number of possible wakeup paths when
the paths are created.
This is accomplished, by noting that the end file descriptor points that
are found during the loop detection pass (from the newly added link), are
actually the sources for wakeup events. I keep a list of these file
descriptors and limit the number and length of these paths that emanate
from these 'source file descriptors'. In the current implemetation I
allow 1000 paths of length 1, 500 of length 2, 100 of length 3, 50 of
length 4 and 10 of length 5. Note that it is sufficient to check the
'source file descriptors' reachable from the newly added link, since no
other 'source file descriptors' will have newly added links. This allows
us to check only the wakeup paths that may have gotten too long, and not
re-check all possible wakeup paths on the system.
In terms of the path limit selection, I think its first worth noting that
the most common case for epoll, is probably the model where you have 1
epoll file descriptor that is monitoring n number of 'source file
descriptors'. In this case, each 'source file descriptor' has a 1 path of
length 1. Thus, I believe that the limits I'm proposing are quite
reasonable and in fact may be too generous. Thus, I'm hoping that the
proposed limits will not prevent any workloads that currently work to
fail.
In terms of locking, I have extended the use of the 'epmutex' to all
epoll_ctl add and remove operations. Currently its only used in a subset
of the add paths. I need to hold the epmutex, so that we can correctly
traverse a coherent graph, to check the number of paths. I believe that
this additional locking is probably ok, since its in the setup/teardown
paths, and doesn't affect the running paths, but it certainly is going to
add some extra overhead. Also, worth noting is that the epmuex was
recently added to the ep_ctl add operations in the initial path loop
detection code using the argument that it was not on a critical path.
Another thing to note here, is the length of epoll chains that is allowed.
Currently, eventpoll.c defines:
/* Maximum number of nesting allowed inside epoll sets */
#define EP_MAX_NESTS 4
This basically means that I am limited to a graph depth of 5 (EP_MAX_NESTS
+ 1). However, this limit is currently only enforced during the loop
check detection code, and only when the epoll file descriptors are added
in a certain order. Thus, this limit is currently easily bypassed. The
newly added check for wakeup paths, stricly limits the wakeup paths to a
length of 5, regardless of the order in which ep's are linked together.
Thus, a side-effect of the new code is a more consistent enforcement of
the graph depth.
Thus far, I've tested this, using the sample programs previously
mentioned, which now either return quickly or return -EINVAL. I've also
testing using the piptest.c epoll tester, which showed no difference in
performance. I've also created a number of different epoll networks and
tested that they behave as expectded.
I believe this solves the original diabolical test cases, while still
preserving the sane epoll nesting.
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Cc: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-01-13 01:17:43 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int reverse_path_check(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
epoll: take epitem list out of struct file
Move the head of epitem list out of struct file; for epoll ones it's
moved into struct eventpoll (->refs there), for non-epoll - into
the new object (struct epitem_head). In place of ->f_ep_links we
leave a pointer to the list head (->f_ep).
->f_ep is protected by ->f_lock and it's zeroed as soon as the list
of epitems becomes empty (that can happen only in ep_remove() by
now).
The list of files for reverse path check is *not* going through
struct file now - it's a single-linked list going through epitem_head
instances. It's terminated by ERR_PTR(-1) (== EP_UNACTIVE_POINTER),
so the elements of list can be distinguished by head->next != NULL.
epitem_head instances are allocated at ep_insert() time (by
attach_epitem()) and freed either by ep_remove() (if it empties
the set of epitems *and* epitem_head does not belong to the
reverse path check list) or by clear_tfile_check_list() when
the list is emptied (if the set of epitems is empty by that
point). Allocations are done from a separate slab - minimal kmalloc()
size is too large on some architectures.
As the result, we trim struct file _and_ get rid of the games with
temporary file references.
Locking and barriers are interesting (aren't they always); see unlist_file()
and ep_remove() for details. The non-obvious part is that ep_remove() needs
to decide if it will be the one to free the damn thing *before* actually
storing NULL to head->epitems.first - that's what smp_load_acquire is for
in there. unlist_file() lockless path is safe, since we hit it only if
we observe NULL in head->epitems.first and whoever had done that store is
guaranteed to have observed non-NULL in head->next. IOW, their last access
had been the store of NULL into ->epitems.first and we can safely free
the sucker. OTOH, we are under rcu_read_lock() and both epitem and
epitem->file have their freeing RCU-delayed. So if we see non-NULL
->epitems.first, we can grab ->f_lock (all epitems in there share the
same struct file) and safely recheck the emptiness of ->epitems; again,
->next is still non-NULL, so ep_remove() couldn't have freed head yet.
->f_lock serializes us wrt ep_remove(); the rest is trivial.
Note that once head->epitems becomes NULL, nothing can get inserted into
it - the only remaining reference to head after that point is from the
reverse path check list.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-10-02 00:45:51 +00:00
|
|
|
struct epitems_head *p;
|
epoll: limit paths
The current epoll code can be tickled to run basically indefinitely in
both loop detection path check (on ep_insert()), and in the wakeup paths.
The programs that tickle this behavior set up deeply linked networks of
epoll file descriptors that cause the epoll algorithms to traverse them
indefinitely. A couple of these sample programs have been previously
posted in this thread: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/25/297.
To fix the loop detection path check algorithms, I simply keep track of
the epoll nodes that have been already visited. Thus, the loop detection
becomes proportional to the number of epoll file descriptor and links.
This dramatically decreases the run-time of the loop check algorithm. In
one diabolical case I tried it reduced the run-time from 15 mintues (all
in kernel time) to .3 seconds.
Fixing the wakeup paths could be done at wakeup time in a similar manner
by keeping track of nodes that have already been visited, but the
complexity is harder, since there can be multiple wakeups on different
cpus...Thus, I've opted to limit the number of possible wakeup paths when
the paths are created.
This is accomplished, by noting that the end file descriptor points that
are found during the loop detection pass (from the newly added link), are
actually the sources for wakeup events. I keep a list of these file
descriptors and limit the number and length of these paths that emanate
from these 'source file descriptors'. In the current implemetation I
allow 1000 paths of length 1, 500 of length 2, 100 of length 3, 50 of
length 4 and 10 of length 5. Note that it is sufficient to check the
'source file descriptors' reachable from the newly added link, since no
other 'source file descriptors' will have newly added links. This allows
us to check only the wakeup paths that may have gotten too long, and not
re-check all possible wakeup paths on the system.
In terms of the path limit selection, I think its first worth noting that
the most common case for epoll, is probably the model where you have 1
epoll file descriptor that is monitoring n number of 'source file
descriptors'. In this case, each 'source file descriptor' has a 1 path of
length 1. Thus, I believe that the limits I'm proposing are quite
reasonable and in fact may be too generous. Thus, I'm hoping that the
proposed limits will not prevent any workloads that currently work to
fail.
In terms of locking, I have extended the use of the 'epmutex' to all
epoll_ctl add and remove operations. Currently its only used in a subset
of the add paths. I need to hold the epmutex, so that we can correctly
traverse a coherent graph, to check the number of paths. I believe that
this additional locking is probably ok, since its in the setup/teardown
paths, and doesn't affect the running paths, but it certainly is going to
add some extra overhead. Also, worth noting is that the epmuex was
recently added to the ep_ctl add operations in the initial path loop
detection code using the argument that it was not on a critical path.
Another thing to note here, is the length of epoll chains that is allowed.
Currently, eventpoll.c defines:
/* Maximum number of nesting allowed inside epoll sets */
#define EP_MAX_NESTS 4
This basically means that I am limited to a graph depth of 5 (EP_MAX_NESTS
+ 1). However, this limit is currently only enforced during the loop
check detection code, and only when the epoll file descriptors are added
in a certain order. Thus, this limit is currently easily bypassed. The
newly added check for wakeup paths, stricly limits the wakeup paths to a
length of 5, regardless of the order in which ep's are linked together.
Thus, a side-effect of the new code is a more consistent enforcement of
the graph depth.
Thus far, I've tested this, using the sample programs previously
mentioned, which now either return quickly or return -EINVAL. I've also
testing using the piptest.c epoll tester, which showed no difference in
performance. I've also created a number of different epoll networks and
tested that they behave as expectded.
I believe this solves the original diabolical test cases, while still
preserving the sane epoll nesting.
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Cc: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-01-13 01:17:43 +00:00
|
|
|
|
epoll: take epitem list out of struct file
Move the head of epitem list out of struct file; for epoll ones it's
moved into struct eventpoll (->refs there), for non-epoll - into
the new object (struct epitem_head). In place of ->f_ep_links we
leave a pointer to the list head (->f_ep).
->f_ep is protected by ->f_lock and it's zeroed as soon as the list
of epitems becomes empty (that can happen only in ep_remove() by
now).
The list of files for reverse path check is *not* going through
struct file now - it's a single-linked list going through epitem_head
instances. It's terminated by ERR_PTR(-1) (== EP_UNACTIVE_POINTER),
so the elements of list can be distinguished by head->next != NULL.
epitem_head instances are allocated at ep_insert() time (by
attach_epitem()) and freed either by ep_remove() (if it empties
the set of epitems *and* epitem_head does not belong to the
reverse path check list) or by clear_tfile_check_list() when
the list is emptied (if the set of epitems is empty by that
point). Allocations are done from a separate slab - minimal kmalloc()
size is too large on some architectures.
As the result, we trim struct file _and_ get rid of the games with
temporary file references.
Locking and barriers are interesting (aren't they always); see unlist_file()
and ep_remove() for details. The non-obvious part is that ep_remove() needs
to decide if it will be the one to free the damn thing *before* actually
storing NULL to head->epitems.first - that's what smp_load_acquire is for
in there. unlist_file() lockless path is safe, since we hit it only if
we observe NULL in head->epitems.first and whoever had done that store is
guaranteed to have observed non-NULL in head->next. IOW, their last access
had been the store of NULL into ->epitems.first and we can safely free
the sucker. OTOH, we are under rcu_read_lock() and both epitem and
epitem->file have their freeing RCU-delayed. So if we see non-NULL
->epitems.first, we can grab ->f_lock (all epitems in there share the
same struct file) and safely recheck the emptiness of ->epitems; again,
->next is still non-NULL, so ep_remove() couldn't have freed head yet.
->f_lock serializes us wrt ep_remove(); the rest is trivial.
Note that once head->epitems becomes NULL, nothing can get inserted into
it - the only remaining reference to head after that point is from the
reverse path check list.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-10-02 00:45:51 +00:00
|
|
|
for (p = tfile_check_list; p != EP_UNACTIVE_PTR; p = p->next) {
|
|
|
|
int error;
|
epoll: limit paths
The current epoll code can be tickled to run basically indefinitely in
both loop detection path check (on ep_insert()), and in the wakeup paths.
The programs that tickle this behavior set up deeply linked networks of
epoll file descriptors that cause the epoll algorithms to traverse them
indefinitely. A couple of these sample programs have been previously
posted in this thread: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/25/297.
To fix the loop detection path check algorithms, I simply keep track of
the epoll nodes that have been already visited. Thus, the loop detection
becomes proportional to the number of epoll file descriptor and links.
This dramatically decreases the run-time of the loop check algorithm. In
one diabolical case I tried it reduced the run-time from 15 mintues (all
in kernel time) to .3 seconds.
Fixing the wakeup paths could be done at wakeup time in a similar manner
by keeping track of nodes that have already been visited, but the
complexity is harder, since there can be multiple wakeups on different
cpus...Thus, I've opted to limit the number of possible wakeup paths when
the paths are created.
This is accomplished, by noting that the end file descriptor points that
are found during the loop detection pass (from the newly added link), are
actually the sources for wakeup events. I keep a list of these file
descriptors and limit the number and length of these paths that emanate
from these 'source file descriptors'. In the current implemetation I
allow 1000 paths of length 1, 500 of length 2, 100 of length 3, 50 of
length 4 and 10 of length 5. Note that it is sufficient to check the
'source file descriptors' reachable from the newly added link, since no
other 'source file descriptors' will have newly added links. This allows
us to check only the wakeup paths that may have gotten too long, and not
re-check all possible wakeup paths on the system.
In terms of the path limit selection, I think its first worth noting that
the most common case for epoll, is probably the model where you have 1
epoll file descriptor that is monitoring n number of 'source file
descriptors'. In this case, each 'source file descriptor' has a 1 path of
length 1. Thus, I believe that the limits I'm proposing are quite
reasonable and in fact may be too generous. Thus, I'm hoping that the
proposed limits will not prevent any workloads that currently work to
fail.
In terms of locking, I have extended the use of the 'epmutex' to all
epoll_ctl add and remove operations. Currently its only used in a subset
of the add paths. I need to hold the epmutex, so that we can correctly
traverse a coherent graph, to check the number of paths. I believe that
this additional locking is probably ok, since its in the setup/teardown
paths, and doesn't affect the running paths, but it certainly is going to
add some extra overhead. Also, worth noting is that the epmuex was
recently added to the ep_ctl add operations in the initial path loop
detection code using the argument that it was not on a critical path.
Another thing to note here, is the length of epoll chains that is allowed.
Currently, eventpoll.c defines:
/* Maximum number of nesting allowed inside epoll sets */
#define EP_MAX_NESTS 4
This basically means that I am limited to a graph depth of 5 (EP_MAX_NESTS
+ 1). However, this limit is currently only enforced during the loop
check detection code, and only when the epoll file descriptors are added
in a certain order. Thus, this limit is currently easily bypassed. The
newly added check for wakeup paths, stricly limits the wakeup paths to a
length of 5, regardless of the order in which ep's are linked together.
Thus, a side-effect of the new code is a more consistent enforcement of
the graph depth.
Thus far, I've tested this, using the sample programs previously
mentioned, which now either return quickly or return -EINVAL. I've also
testing using the piptest.c epoll tester, which showed no difference in
performance. I've also created a number of different epoll networks and
tested that they behave as expectded.
I believe this solves the original diabolical test cases, while still
preserving the sane epoll nesting.
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Cc: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-01-13 01:17:43 +00:00
|
|
|
path_count_init();
|
2020-10-01 18:11:00 +00:00
|
|
|
rcu_read_lock();
|
epoll: take epitem list out of struct file
Move the head of epitem list out of struct file; for epoll ones it's
moved into struct eventpoll (->refs there), for non-epoll - into
the new object (struct epitem_head). In place of ->f_ep_links we
leave a pointer to the list head (->f_ep).
->f_ep is protected by ->f_lock and it's zeroed as soon as the list
of epitems becomes empty (that can happen only in ep_remove() by
now).
The list of files for reverse path check is *not* going through
struct file now - it's a single-linked list going through epitem_head
instances. It's terminated by ERR_PTR(-1) (== EP_UNACTIVE_POINTER),
so the elements of list can be distinguished by head->next != NULL.
epitem_head instances are allocated at ep_insert() time (by
attach_epitem()) and freed either by ep_remove() (if it empties
the set of epitems *and* epitem_head does not belong to the
reverse path check list) or by clear_tfile_check_list() when
the list is emptied (if the set of epitems is empty by that
point). Allocations are done from a separate slab - minimal kmalloc()
size is too large on some architectures.
As the result, we trim struct file _and_ get rid of the games with
temporary file references.
Locking and barriers are interesting (aren't they always); see unlist_file()
and ep_remove() for details. The non-obvious part is that ep_remove() needs
to decide if it will be the one to free the damn thing *before* actually
storing NULL to head->epitems.first - that's what smp_load_acquire is for
in there. unlist_file() lockless path is safe, since we hit it only if
we observe NULL in head->epitems.first and whoever had done that store is
guaranteed to have observed non-NULL in head->next. IOW, their last access
had been the store of NULL into ->epitems.first and we can safely free
the sucker. OTOH, we are under rcu_read_lock() and both epitem and
epitem->file have their freeing RCU-delayed. So if we see non-NULL
->epitems.first, we can grab ->f_lock (all epitems in there share the
same struct file) and safely recheck the emptiness of ->epitems; again,
->next is still non-NULL, so ep_remove() couldn't have freed head yet.
->f_lock serializes us wrt ep_remove(); the rest is trivial.
Note that once head->epitems becomes NULL, nothing can get inserted into
it - the only remaining reference to head after that point is from the
reverse path check list.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-10-02 00:45:51 +00:00
|
|
|
error = reverse_path_check_proc(&p->epitems, 0);
|
2020-10-01 18:11:00 +00:00
|
|
|
rcu_read_unlock();
|
epoll: limit paths
The current epoll code can be tickled to run basically indefinitely in
both loop detection path check (on ep_insert()), and in the wakeup paths.
The programs that tickle this behavior set up deeply linked networks of
epoll file descriptors that cause the epoll algorithms to traverse them
indefinitely. A couple of these sample programs have been previously
posted in this thread: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/25/297.
To fix the loop detection path check algorithms, I simply keep track of
the epoll nodes that have been already visited. Thus, the loop detection
becomes proportional to the number of epoll file descriptor and links.
This dramatically decreases the run-time of the loop check algorithm. In
one diabolical case I tried it reduced the run-time from 15 mintues (all
in kernel time) to .3 seconds.
Fixing the wakeup paths could be done at wakeup time in a similar manner
by keeping track of nodes that have already been visited, but the
complexity is harder, since there can be multiple wakeups on different
cpus...Thus, I've opted to limit the number of possible wakeup paths when
the paths are created.
This is accomplished, by noting that the end file descriptor points that
are found during the loop detection pass (from the newly added link), are
actually the sources for wakeup events. I keep a list of these file
descriptors and limit the number and length of these paths that emanate
from these 'source file descriptors'. In the current implemetation I
allow 1000 paths of length 1, 500 of length 2, 100 of length 3, 50 of
length 4 and 10 of length 5. Note that it is sufficient to check the
'source file descriptors' reachable from the newly added link, since no
other 'source file descriptors' will have newly added links. This allows
us to check only the wakeup paths that may have gotten too long, and not
re-check all possible wakeup paths on the system.
In terms of the path limit selection, I think its first worth noting that
the most common case for epoll, is probably the model where you have 1
epoll file descriptor that is monitoring n number of 'source file
descriptors'. In this case, each 'source file descriptor' has a 1 path of
length 1. Thus, I believe that the limits I'm proposing are quite
reasonable and in fact may be too generous. Thus, I'm hoping that the
proposed limits will not prevent any workloads that currently work to
fail.
In terms of locking, I have extended the use of the 'epmutex' to all
epoll_ctl add and remove operations. Currently its only used in a subset
of the add paths. I need to hold the epmutex, so that we can correctly
traverse a coherent graph, to check the number of paths. I believe that
this additional locking is probably ok, since its in the setup/teardown
paths, and doesn't affect the running paths, but it certainly is going to
add some extra overhead. Also, worth noting is that the epmuex was
recently added to the ep_ctl add operations in the initial path loop
detection code using the argument that it was not on a critical path.
Another thing to note here, is the length of epoll chains that is allowed.
Currently, eventpoll.c defines:
/* Maximum number of nesting allowed inside epoll sets */
#define EP_MAX_NESTS 4
This basically means that I am limited to a graph depth of 5 (EP_MAX_NESTS
+ 1). However, this limit is currently only enforced during the loop
check detection code, and only when the epoll file descriptors are added
in a certain order. Thus, this limit is currently easily bypassed. The
newly added check for wakeup paths, stricly limits the wakeup paths to a
length of 5, regardless of the order in which ep's are linked together.
Thus, a side-effect of the new code is a more consistent enforcement of
the graph depth.
Thus far, I've tested this, using the sample programs previously
mentioned, which now either return quickly or return -EINVAL. I've also
testing using the piptest.c epoll tester, which showed no difference in
performance. I've also created a number of different epoll networks and
tested that they behave as expectded.
I believe this solves the original diabolical test cases, while still
preserving the sane epoll nesting.
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Cc: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-01-13 01:17:43 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error)
|
epoll: take epitem list out of struct file
Move the head of epitem list out of struct file; for epoll ones it's
moved into struct eventpoll (->refs there), for non-epoll - into
the new object (struct epitem_head). In place of ->f_ep_links we
leave a pointer to the list head (->f_ep).
->f_ep is protected by ->f_lock and it's zeroed as soon as the list
of epitems becomes empty (that can happen only in ep_remove() by
now).
The list of files for reverse path check is *not* going through
struct file now - it's a single-linked list going through epitem_head
instances. It's terminated by ERR_PTR(-1) (== EP_UNACTIVE_POINTER),
so the elements of list can be distinguished by head->next != NULL.
epitem_head instances are allocated at ep_insert() time (by
attach_epitem()) and freed either by ep_remove() (if it empties
the set of epitems *and* epitem_head does not belong to the
reverse path check list) or by clear_tfile_check_list() when
the list is emptied (if the set of epitems is empty by that
point). Allocations are done from a separate slab - minimal kmalloc()
size is too large on some architectures.
As the result, we trim struct file _and_ get rid of the games with
temporary file references.
Locking and barriers are interesting (aren't they always); see unlist_file()
and ep_remove() for details. The non-obvious part is that ep_remove() needs
to decide if it will be the one to free the damn thing *before* actually
storing NULL to head->epitems.first - that's what smp_load_acquire is for
in there. unlist_file() lockless path is safe, since we hit it only if
we observe NULL in head->epitems.first and whoever had done that store is
guaranteed to have observed non-NULL in head->next. IOW, their last access
had been the store of NULL into ->epitems.first and we can safely free
the sucker. OTOH, we are under rcu_read_lock() and both epitem and
epitem->file have their freeing RCU-delayed. So if we see non-NULL
->epitems.first, we can grab ->f_lock (all epitems in there share the
same struct file) and safely recheck the emptiness of ->epitems; again,
->next is still non-NULL, so ep_remove() couldn't have freed head yet.
->f_lock serializes us wrt ep_remove(); the rest is trivial.
Note that once head->epitems becomes NULL, nothing can get inserted into
it - the only remaining reference to head after that point is from the
reverse path check list.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-10-02 00:45:51 +00:00
|
|
|
return error;
|
epoll: limit paths
The current epoll code can be tickled to run basically indefinitely in
both loop detection path check (on ep_insert()), and in the wakeup paths.
The programs that tickle this behavior set up deeply linked networks of
epoll file descriptors that cause the epoll algorithms to traverse them
indefinitely. A couple of these sample programs have been previously
posted in this thread: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/25/297.
To fix the loop detection path check algorithms, I simply keep track of
the epoll nodes that have been already visited. Thus, the loop detection
becomes proportional to the number of epoll file descriptor and links.
This dramatically decreases the run-time of the loop check algorithm. In
one diabolical case I tried it reduced the run-time from 15 mintues (all
in kernel time) to .3 seconds.
Fixing the wakeup paths could be done at wakeup time in a similar manner
by keeping track of nodes that have already been visited, but the
complexity is harder, since there can be multiple wakeups on different
cpus...Thus, I've opted to limit the number of possible wakeup paths when
the paths are created.
This is accomplished, by noting that the end file descriptor points that
are found during the loop detection pass (from the newly added link), are
actually the sources for wakeup events. I keep a list of these file
descriptors and limit the number and length of these paths that emanate
from these 'source file descriptors'. In the current implemetation I
allow 1000 paths of length 1, 500 of length 2, 100 of length 3, 50 of
length 4 and 10 of length 5. Note that it is sufficient to check the
'source file descriptors' reachable from the newly added link, since no
other 'source file descriptors' will have newly added links. This allows
us to check only the wakeup paths that may have gotten too long, and not
re-check all possible wakeup paths on the system.
In terms of the path limit selection, I think its first worth noting that
the most common case for epoll, is probably the model where you have 1
epoll file descriptor that is monitoring n number of 'source file
descriptors'. In this case, each 'source file descriptor' has a 1 path of
length 1. Thus, I believe that the limits I'm proposing are quite
reasonable and in fact may be too generous. Thus, I'm hoping that the
proposed limits will not prevent any workloads that currently work to
fail.
In terms of locking, I have extended the use of the 'epmutex' to all
epoll_ctl add and remove operations. Currently its only used in a subset
of the add paths. I need to hold the epmutex, so that we can correctly
traverse a coherent graph, to check the number of paths. I believe that
this additional locking is probably ok, since its in the setup/teardown
paths, and doesn't affect the running paths, but it certainly is going to
add some extra overhead. Also, worth noting is that the epmuex was
recently added to the ep_ctl add operations in the initial path loop
detection code using the argument that it was not on a critical path.
Another thing to note here, is the length of epoll chains that is allowed.
Currently, eventpoll.c defines:
/* Maximum number of nesting allowed inside epoll sets */
#define EP_MAX_NESTS 4
This basically means that I am limited to a graph depth of 5 (EP_MAX_NESTS
+ 1). However, this limit is currently only enforced during the loop
check detection code, and only when the epoll file descriptors are added
in a certain order. Thus, this limit is currently easily bypassed. The
newly added check for wakeup paths, stricly limits the wakeup paths to a
length of 5, regardless of the order in which ep's are linked together.
Thus, a side-effect of the new code is a more consistent enforcement of
the graph depth.
Thus far, I've tested this, using the sample programs previously
mentioned, which now either return quickly or return -EINVAL. I've also
testing using the piptest.c epoll tester, which showed no difference in
performance. I've also created a number of different epoll networks and
tested that they behave as expectded.
I believe this solves the original diabolical test cases, while still
preserving the sane epoll nesting.
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Cc: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-01-13 01:17:43 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
epoll: take epitem list out of struct file
Move the head of epitem list out of struct file; for epoll ones it's
moved into struct eventpoll (->refs there), for non-epoll - into
the new object (struct epitem_head). In place of ->f_ep_links we
leave a pointer to the list head (->f_ep).
->f_ep is protected by ->f_lock and it's zeroed as soon as the list
of epitems becomes empty (that can happen only in ep_remove() by
now).
The list of files for reverse path check is *not* going through
struct file now - it's a single-linked list going through epitem_head
instances. It's terminated by ERR_PTR(-1) (== EP_UNACTIVE_POINTER),
so the elements of list can be distinguished by head->next != NULL.
epitem_head instances are allocated at ep_insert() time (by
attach_epitem()) and freed either by ep_remove() (if it empties
the set of epitems *and* epitem_head does not belong to the
reverse path check list) or by clear_tfile_check_list() when
the list is emptied (if the set of epitems is empty by that
point). Allocations are done from a separate slab - minimal kmalloc()
size is too large on some architectures.
As the result, we trim struct file _and_ get rid of the games with
temporary file references.
Locking and barriers are interesting (aren't they always); see unlist_file()
and ep_remove() for details. The non-obvious part is that ep_remove() needs
to decide if it will be the one to free the damn thing *before* actually
storing NULL to head->epitems.first - that's what smp_load_acquire is for
in there. unlist_file() lockless path is safe, since we hit it only if
we observe NULL in head->epitems.first and whoever had done that store is
guaranteed to have observed non-NULL in head->next. IOW, their last access
had been the store of NULL into ->epitems.first and we can safely free
the sucker. OTOH, we are under rcu_read_lock() and both epitem and
epitem->file have their freeing RCU-delayed. So if we see non-NULL
->epitems.first, we can grab ->f_lock (all epitems in there share the
same struct file) and safely recheck the emptiness of ->epitems; again,
->next is still non-NULL, so ep_remove() couldn't have freed head yet.
->f_lock serializes us wrt ep_remove(); the rest is trivial.
Note that once head->epitems becomes NULL, nothing can get inserted into
it - the only remaining reference to head after that point is from the
reverse path check list.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-10-02 00:45:51 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
epoll: limit paths
The current epoll code can be tickled to run basically indefinitely in
both loop detection path check (on ep_insert()), and in the wakeup paths.
The programs that tickle this behavior set up deeply linked networks of
epoll file descriptors that cause the epoll algorithms to traverse them
indefinitely. A couple of these sample programs have been previously
posted in this thread: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/25/297.
To fix the loop detection path check algorithms, I simply keep track of
the epoll nodes that have been already visited. Thus, the loop detection
becomes proportional to the number of epoll file descriptor and links.
This dramatically decreases the run-time of the loop check algorithm. In
one diabolical case I tried it reduced the run-time from 15 mintues (all
in kernel time) to .3 seconds.
Fixing the wakeup paths could be done at wakeup time in a similar manner
by keeping track of nodes that have already been visited, but the
complexity is harder, since there can be multiple wakeups on different
cpus...Thus, I've opted to limit the number of possible wakeup paths when
the paths are created.
This is accomplished, by noting that the end file descriptor points that
are found during the loop detection pass (from the newly added link), are
actually the sources for wakeup events. I keep a list of these file
descriptors and limit the number and length of these paths that emanate
from these 'source file descriptors'. In the current implemetation I
allow 1000 paths of length 1, 500 of length 2, 100 of length 3, 50 of
length 4 and 10 of length 5. Note that it is sufficient to check the
'source file descriptors' reachable from the newly added link, since no
other 'source file descriptors' will have newly added links. This allows
us to check only the wakeup paths that may have gotten too long, and not
re-check all possible wakeup paths on the system.
In terms of the path limit selection, I think its first worth noting that
the most common case for epoll, is probably the model where you have 1
epoll file descriptor that is monitoring n number of 'source file
descriptors'. In this case, each 'source file descriptor' has a 1 path of
length 1. Thus, I believe that the limits I'm proposing are quite
reasonable and in fact may be too generous. Thus, I'm hoping that the
proposed limits will not prevent any workloads that currently work to
fail.
In terms of locking, I have extended the use of the 'epmutex' to all
epoll_ctl add and remove operations. Currently its only used in a subset
of the add paths. I need to hold the epmutex, so that we can correctly
traverse a coherent graph, to check the number of paths. I believe that
this additional locking is probably ok, since its in the setup/teardown
paths, and doesn't affect the running paths, but it certainly is going to
add some extra overhead. Also, worth noting is that the epmuex was
recently added to the ep_ctl add operations in the initial path loop
detection code using the argument that it was not on a critical path.
Another thing to note here, is the length of epoll chains that is allowed.
Currently, eventpoll.c defines:
/* Maximum number of nesting allowed inside epoll sets */
#define EP_MAX_NESTS 4
This basically means that I am limited to a graph depth of 5 (EP_MAX_NESTS
+ 1). However, this limit is currently only enforced during the loop
check detection code, and only when the epoll file descriptors are added
in a certain order. Thus, this limit is currently easily bypassed. The
newly added check for wakeup paths, stricly limits the wakeup paths to a
length of 5, regardless of the order in which ep's are linked together.
Thus, a side-effect of the new code is a more consistent enforcement of
the graph depth.
Thus far, I've tested this, using the sample programs previously
mentioned, which now either return quickly or return -EINVAL. I've also
testing using the piptest.c epoll tester, which showed no difference in
performance. I've also created a number of different epoll networks and
tested that they behave as expectded.
I believe this solves the original diabolical test cases, while still
preserving the sane epoll nesting.
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Cc: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-01-13 01:17:43 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-05-01 19:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
static int ep_create_wakeup_source(struct epitem *epi)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2020-09-24 23:41:58 +00:00
|
|
|
struct name_snapshot n;
|
2013-04-30 22:27:39 +00:00
|
|
|
struct wakeup_source *ws;
|
2012-05-01 19:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!epi->ep->ws) {
|
2019-08-07 01:48:46 +00:00
|
|
|
epi->ep->ws = wakeup_source_register(NULL, "eventpoll");
|
2012-05-01 19:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!epi->ep->ws)
|
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-09-24 23:41:58 +00:00
|
|
|
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&n, epi->ffd.file->f_path.dentry);
|
|
|
|
ws = wakeup_source_register(NULL, n.name.name);
|
|
|
|
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&n);
|
2013-04-30 22:27:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!ws)
|
2012-05-01 19:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
2013-04-30 22:27:39 +00:00
|
|
|
rcu_assign_pointer(epi->ws, ws);
|
2012-05-01 19:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-04-30 22:27:39 +00:00
|
|
|
/* rare code path, only used when EPOLL_CTL_MOD removes a wakeup source */
|
|
|
|
static noinline void ep_destroy_wakeup_source(struct epitem *epi)
|
2012-05-01 19:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2013-04-30 22:27:39 +00:00
|
|
|
struct wakeup_source *ws = ep_wakeup_source(epi);
|
|
|
|
|
2013-04-30 22:27:43 +00:00
|
|
|
RCU_INIT_POINTER(epi->ws, NULL);
|
2013-04-30 22:27:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* wait for ep_pm_stay_awake_rcu to finish, synchronize_rcu is
|
|
|
|
* used internally by wakeup_source_remove, too (called by
|
|
|
|
* wakeup_source_unregister), so we cannot use call_rcu
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
synchronize_rcu();
|
|
|
|
wakeup_source_unregister(ws);
|
2012-05-01 19:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
epoll: take epitem list out of struct file
Move the head of epitem list out of struct file; for epoll ones it's
moved into struct eventpoll (->refs there), for non-epoll - into
the new object (struct epitem_head). In place of ->f_ep_links we
leave a pointer to the list head (->f_ep).
->f_ep is protected by ->f_lock and it's zeroed as soon as the list
of epitems becomes empty (that can happen only in ep_remove() by
now).
The list of files for reverse path check is *not* going through
struct file now - it's a single-linked list going through epitem_head
instances. It's terminated by ERR_PTR(-1) (== EP_UNACTIVE_POINTER),
so the elements of list can be distinguished by head->next != NULL.
epitem_head instances are allocated at ep_insert() time (by
attach_epitem()) and freed either by ep_remove() (if it empties
the set of epitems *and* epitem_head does not belong to the
reverse path check list) or by clear_tfile_check_list() when
the list is emptied (if the set of epitems is empty by that
point). Allocations are done from a separate slab - minimal kmalloc()
size is too large on some architectures.
As the result, we trim struct file _and_ get rid of the games with
temporary file references.
Locking and barriers are interesting (aren't they always); see unlist_file()
and ep_remove() for details. The non-obvious part is that ep_remove() needs
to decide if it will be the one to free the damn thing *before* actually
storing NULL to head->epitems.first - that's what smp_load_acquire is for
in there. unlist_file() lockless path is safe, since we hit it only if
we observe NULL in head->epitems.first and whoever had done that store is
guaranteed to have observed non-NULL in head->next. IOW, their last access
had been the store of NULL into ->epitems.first and we can safely free
the sucker. OTOH, we are under rcu_read_lock() and both epitem and
epitem->file have their freeing RCU-delayed. So if we see non-NULL
->epitems.first, we can grab ->f_lock (all epitems in there share the
same struct file) and safely recheck the emptiness of ->epitems; again,
->next is still non-NULL, so ep_remove() couldn't have freed head yet.
->f_lock serializes us wrt ep_remove(); the rest is trivial.
Note that once head->epitems becomes NULL, nothing can get inserted into
it - the only remaining reference to head after that point is from the
reverse path check list.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-10-02 00:45:51 +00:00
|
|
|
static int attach_epitem(struct file *file, struct epitem *epi)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct epitems_head *to_free = NULL;
|
|
|
|
struct hlist_head *head = NULL;
|
|
|
|
struct eventpoll *ep = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (is_file_epoll(file))
|
|
|
|
ep = file->private_data;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ep) {
|
|
|
|
head = &ep->refs;
|
|
|
|
} else if (!READ_ONCE(file->f_ep)) {
|
|
|
|
allocate:
|
|
|
|
to_free = kmem_cache_zalloc(ephead_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
|
|
if (!to_free)
|
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
head = &to_free->epitems;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
spin_lock(&file->f_lock);
|
|
|
|
if (!file->f_ep) {
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(!head)) {
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock(&file->f_lock);
|
|
|
|
goto allocate;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
file->f_ep = head;
|
|
|
|
to_free = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hlist_add_head_rcu(&epi->fllink, file->f_ep);
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock(&file->f_lock);
|
|
|
|
free_ephead(to_free);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-05-15 08:40:47 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Must be called with "mtx" held.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-11-29 00:43:33 +00:00
|
|
|
static int ep_insert(struct eventpoll *ep, const struct epoll_event *event,
|
2013-11-12 23:10:18 +00:00
|
|
|
struct file *tfile, int fd, int full_check)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2018-02-01 20:24:58 +00:00
|
|
|
int error, pwake = 0;
|
|
|
|
__poll_t revents;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
struct epitem *epi;
|
|
|
|
struct ep_pqueue epq;
|
2020-09-26 22:15:26 +00:00
|
|
|
struct eventpoll *tep = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (is_file_epoll(tfile))
|
|
|
|
tep = tfile->private_data;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-08-22 04:56:45 +00:00
|
|
|
lockdep_assert_irqs_enabled();
|
|
|
|
|
2021-09-08 03:00:00 +00:00
|
|
|
if (unlikely(percpu_counter_compare(&ep->user->epoll_watches,
|
|
|
|
max_user_watches) >= 0))
|
epoll: introduce resource usage limits
It has been thought that the per-user file descriptors limit would also
limit the resources that a normal user can request via the epoll
interface. Vegard Nossum reported a very simple program (a modified
version attached) that can make a normal user to request a pretty large
amount of kernel memory, well within the its maximum number of fds. To
solve such problem, default limits are now imposed, and /proc based
configuration has been introduced. A new directory has been created,
named /proc/sys/fs/epoll/ and inside there, there are two configuration
points:
max_user_instances = Maximum number of devices - per user
max_user_watches = Maximum number of "watched" fds - per user
The current default for "max_user_watches" limits the memory used by epoll
to store "watches", to 1/32 of the amount of the low RAM. As example, a
256MB 32bit machine, will have "max_user_watches" set to roughly 90000.
That should be enough to not break existing heavy epoll users. The
default value for "max_user_instances" is set to 128, that should be
enough too.
This also changes the userspace, because a new error code can now come out
from EPOLL_CTL_ADD (-ENOSPC). The EMFILE from epoll_create() was already
listed, so that should be ok.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: use get_current_user()]
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegardno@ifi.uio.no>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-12-01 21:13:55 +00:00
|
|
|
return -ENOSPC;
|
2021-09-08 03:00:00 +00:00
|
|
|
percpu_counter_inc(&ep->user->epoll_watches);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!(epi = kmem_cache_zalloc(epi_cache, GFP_KERNEL))) {
|
|
|
|
percpu_counter_dec(&ep->user->epoll_watches);
|
epoll: introduce resource usage limits
It has been thought that the per-user file descriptors limit would also
limit the resources that a normal user can request via the epoll
interface. Vegard Nossum reported a very simple program (a modified
version attached) that can make a normal user to request a pretty large
amount of kernel memory, well within the its maximum number of fds. To
solve such problem, default limits are now imposed, and /proc based
configuration has been introduced. A new directory has been created,
named /proc/sys/fs/epoll/ and inside there, there are two configuration
points:
max_user_instances = Maximum number of devices - per user
max_user_watches = Maximum number of "watched" fds - per user
The current default for "max_user_watches" limits the memory used by epoll
to store "watches", to 1/32 of the amount of the low RAM. As example, a
256MB 32bit machine, will have "max_user_watches" set to roughly 90000.
That should be enough to not break existing heavy epoll users. The
default value for "max_user_instances" is set to 128, that should be
enough too.
This also changes the userspace, because a new error code can now come out
from EPOLL_CTL_ADD (-ENOSPC). The EMFILE from epoll_create() was already
listed, so that should be ok.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: use get_current_user()]
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegardno@ifi.uio.no>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-12-01 21:13:55 +00:00
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
2021-09-08 03:00:00 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Item initialization follow here ... */
|
|
|
|
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&epi->rdllink);
|
|
|
|
epi->ep = ep;
|
2005-06-23 07:10:03 +00:00
|
|
|
ep_set_ffd(&epi->ffd, tfile, fd);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
epi->event = *event;
|
2007-05-15 08:40:41 +00:00
|
|
|
epi->next = EP_UNACTIVE_PTR;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-09-26 22:15:26 +00:00
|
|
|
if (tep)
|
|
|
|
mutex_lock_nested(&tep->mtx, 1);
|
2020-09-10 02:25:06 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Add the current item to the list of active epoll hook for this file */
|
epoll: take epitem list out of struct file
Move the head of epitem list out of struct file; for epoll ones it's
moved into struct eventpoll (->refs there), for non-epoll - into
the new object (struct epitem_head). In place of ->f_ep_links we
leave a pointer to the list head (->f_ep).
->f_ep is protected by ->f_lock and it's zeroed as soon as the list
of epitems becomes empty (that can happen only in ep_remove() by
now).
The list of files for reverse path check is *not* going through
struct file now - it's a single-linked list going through epitem_head
instances. It's terminated by ERR_PTR(-1) (== EP_UNACTIVE_POINTER),
so the elements of list can be distinguished by head->next != NULL.
epitem_head instances are allocated at ep_insert() time (by
attach_epitem()) and freed either by ep_remove() (if it empties
the set of epitems *and* epitem_head does not belong to the
reverse path check list) or by clear_tfile_check_list() when
the list is emptied (if the set of epitems is empty by that
point). Allocations are done from a separate slab - minimal kmalloc()
size is too large on some architectures.
As the result, we trim struct file _and_ get rid of the games with
temporary file references.
Locking and barriers are interesting (aren't they always); see unlist_file()
and ep_remove() for details. The non-obvious part is that ep_remove() needs
to decide if it will be the one to free the damn thing *before* actually
storing NULL to head->epitems.first - that's what smp_load_acquire is for
in there. unlist_file() lockless path is safe, since we hit it only if
we observe NULL in head->epitems.first and whoever had done that store is
guaranteed to have observed non-NULL in head->next. IOW, their last access
had been the store of NULL into ->epitems.first and we can safely free
the sucker. OTOH, we are under rcu_read_lock() and both epitem and
epitem->file have their freeing RCU-delayed. So if we see non-NULL
->epitems.first, we can grab ->f_lock (all epitems in there share the
same struct file) and safely recheck the emptiness of ->epitems; again,
->next is still non-NULL, so ep_remove() couldn't have freed head yet.
->f_lock serializes us wrt ep_remove(); the rest is trivial.
Note that once head->epitems becomes NULL, nothing can get inserted into
it - the only remaining reference to head after that point is from the
reverse path check list.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-10-02 00:45:51 +00:00
|
|
|
if (unlikely(attach_epitem(tfile, epi) < 0)) {
|
|
|
|
if (tep)
|
|
|
|
mutex_unlock(&tep->mtx);
|
2021-09-08 03:00:00 +00:00
|
|
|
kmem_cache_free(epi_cache, epi);
|
|
|
|
percpu_counter_dec(&ep->user->epoll_watches);
|
epoll: take epitem list out of struct file
Move the head of epitem list out of struct file; for epoll ones it's
moved into struct eventpoll (->refs there), for non-epoll - into
the new object (struct epitem_head). In place of ->f_ep_links we
leave a pointer to the list head (->f_ep).
->f_ep is protected by ->f_lock and it's zeroed as soon as the list
of epitems becomes empty (that can happen only in ep_remove() by
now).
The list of files for reverse path check is *not* going through
struct file now - it's a single-linked list going through epitem_head
instances. It's terminated by ERR_PTR(-1) (== EP_UNACTIVE_POINTER),
so the elements of list can be distinguished by head->next != NULL.
epitem_head instances are allocated at ep_insert() time (by
attach_epitem()) and freed either by ep_remove() (if it empties
the set of epitems *and* epitem_head does not belong to the
reverse path check list) or by clear_tfile_check_list() when
the list is emptied (if the set of epitems is empty by that
point). Allocations are done from a separate slab - minimal kmalloc()
size is too large on some architectures.
As the result, we trim struct file _and_ get rid of the games with
temporary file references.
Locking and barriers are interesting (aren't they always); see unlist_file()
and ep_remove() for details. The non-obvious part is that ep_remove() needs
to decide if it will be the one to free the damn thing *before* actually
storing NULL to head->epitems.first - that's what smp_load_acquire is for
in there. unlist_file() lockless path is safe, since we hit it only if
we observe NULL in head->epitems.first and whoever had done that store is
guaranteed to have observed non-NULL in head->next. IOW, their last access
had been the store of NULL into ->epitems.first and we can safely free
the sucker. OTOH, we are under rcu_read_lock() and both epitem and
epitem->file have their freeing RCU-delayed. So if we see non-NULL
->epitems.first, we can grab ->f_lock (all epitems in there share the
same struct file) and safely recheck the emptiness of ->epitems; again,
->next is still non-NULL, so ep_remove() couldn't have freed head yet.
->f_lock serializes us wrt ep_remove(); the rest is trivial.
Note that once head->epitems becomes NULL, nothing can get inserted into
it - the only remaining reference to head after that point is from the
reverse path check list.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-10-02 00:45:51 +00:00
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
2020-10-01 20:10:11 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2020-09-10 02:25:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
epoll: take epitem list out of struct file
Move the head of epitem list out of struct file; for epoll ones it's
moved into struct eventpoll (->refs there), for non-epoll - into
the new object (struct epitem_head). In place of ->f_ep_links we
leave a pointer to the list head (->f_ep).
->f_ep is protected by ->f_lock and it's zeroed as soon as the list
of epitems becomes empty (that can happen only in ep_remove() by
now).
The list of files for reverse path check is *not* going through
struct file now - it's a single-linked list going through epitem_head
instances. It's terminated by ERR_PTR(-1) (== EP_UNACTIVE_POINTER),
so the elements of list can be distinguished by head->next != NULL.
epitem_head instances are allocated at ep_insert() time (by
attach_epitem()) and freed either by ep_remove() (if it empties
the set of epitems *and* epitem_head does not belong to the
reverse path check list) or by clear_tfile_check_list() when
the list is emptied (if the set of epitems is empty by that
point). Allocations are done from a separate slab - minimal kmalloc()
size is too large on some architectures.
As the result, we trim struct file _and_ get rid of the games with
temporary file references.
Locking and barriers are interesting (aren't they always); see unlist_file()
and ep_remove() for details. The non-obvious part is that ep_remove() needs
to decide if it will be the one to free the damn thing *before* actually
storing NULL to head->epitems.first - that's what smp_load_acquire is for
in there. unlist_file() lockless path is safe, since we hit it only if
we observe NULL in head->epitems.first and whoever had done that store is
guaranteed to have observed non-NULL in head->next. IOW, their last access
had been the store of NULL into ->epitems.first and we can safely free
the sucker. OTOH, we are under rcu_read_lock() and both epitem and
epitem->file have their freeing RCU-delayed. So if we see non-NULL
->epitems.first, we can grab ->f_lock (all epitems in there share the
same struct file) and safely recheck the emptiness of ->epitems; again,
->next is still non-NULL, so ep_remove() couldn't have freed head yet.
->f_lock serializes us wrt ep_remove(); the rest is trivial.
Note that once head->epitems becomes NULL, nothing can get inserted into
it - the only remaining reference to head after that point is from the
reverse path check list.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-10-02 00:45:51 +00:00
|
|
|
if (full_check && !tep)
|
|
|
|
list_file(tfile);
|
|
|
|
|
2020-09-10 02:25:06 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Add the current item to the RB tree. All RB tree operations are
|
|
|
|
* protected by "mtx", and ep_insert() is called with "mtx" held.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
ep_rbtree_insert(ep, epi);
|
2020-09-26 22:15:26 +00:00
|
|
|
if (tep)
|
|
|
|
mutex_unlock(&tep->mtx);
|
2020-09-10 02:25:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
epoll: use refcount to reduce ep_mutex contention
We are observing huge contention on the epmutex during an http
connection/rate test:
83.17% 0.25% nginx [kernel.kallsyms] [k] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
[...]
|--66.96%--__fput
|--60.04%--eventpoll_release_file
|--58.41%--__mutex_lock.isra.6
|--56.56%--osq_lock
The application is multi-threaded, creates a new epoll entry for
each incoming connection, and does not delete it before the
connection shutdown - that is, before the connection's fd close().
Many different threads compete frequently for the epmutex lock,
affecting the overall performance.
To reduce the contention this patch introduces explicit reference counting
for the eventpoll struct. Each registered event acquires a reference,
and references are released at ep_remove() time.
The eventpoll struct is released by whoever - among EP file close() and
and the monitored file close() drops its last reference.
Additionally, this introduces a new 'dying' flag to prevent races between
the EP file close() and the monitored file close().
ep_eventpoll_release() marks, under f_lock spinlock, each epitem as dying
before removing it, while EP file close() does not touch dying epitems.
The above is needed as both close operations could run concurrently and
drop the EP reference acquired via the epitem entry. Without the above
flag, the monitored file close() could reach the EP struct via the epitem
list while the epitem is still listed and then try to put it after its
disposal.
An alternative could be avoiding touching the references acquired via
the epitems at EP file close() time, but that could leave the EP struct
alive for potentially unlimited time after EP file close(), with nasty
side effects.
With all the above in place, we can drop the epmutex usage at disposal time.
Overall this produces a significant performance improvement in the
mentioned connection/rate scenario: the mutex operations disappear from
the topmost offenders in the perf report, and the measured connections/rate
grows by ~60%.
To make the change more readable this additionally renames ep_free() to
ep_clear_and_put(), and moves the actual memory cleanup in a separate
ep_free() helper.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/4a57788dcaf28f5eb4f8dfddcc3a8b172a7357bb.1679504153.git.pabeni@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Tested-by: Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhiat.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-03-22 16:57:02 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* ep_remove_safe() calls in the later error paths can't lead to
|
|
|
|
* ep_free() as the ep file itself still holds an ep reference.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
ep_get(ep);
|
|
|
|
|
2020-09-10 02:25:06 +00:00
|
|
|
/* now check if we've created too many backpaths */
|
2020-09-26 22:09:29 +00:00
|
|
|
if (unlikely(full_check && reverse_path_check())) {
|
epoll: use refcount to reduce ep_mutex contention
We are observing huge contention on the epmutex during an http
connection/rate test:
83.17% 0.25% nginx [kernel.kallsyms] [k] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
[...]
|--66.96%--__fput
|--60.04%--eventpoll_release_file
|--58.41%--__mutex_lock.isra.6
|--56.56%--osq_lock
The application is multi-threaded, creates a new epoll entry for
each incoming connection, and does not delete it before the
connection shutdown - that is, before the connection's fd close().
Many different threads compete frequently for the epmutex lock,
affecting the overall performance.
To reduce the contention this patch introduces explicit reference counting
for the eventpoll struct. Each registered event acquires a reference,
and references are released at ep_remove() time.
The eventpoll struct is released by whoever - among EP file close() and
and the monitored file close() drops its last reference.
Additionally, this introduces a new 'dying' flag to prevent races between
the EP file close() and the monitored file close().
ep_eventpoll_release() marks, under f_lock spinlock, each epitem as dying
before removing it, while EP file close() does not touch dying epitems.
The above is needed as both close operations could run concurrently and
drop the EP reference acquired via the epitem entry. Without the above
flag, the monitored file close() could reach the EP struct via the epitem
list while the epitem is still listed and then try to put it after its
disposal.
An alternative could be avoiding touching the references acquired via
the epitems at EP file close() time, but that could leave the EP struct
alive for potentially unlimited time after EP file close(), with nasty
side effects.
With all the above in place, we can drop the epmutex usage at disposal time.
Overall this produces a significant performance improvement in the
mentioned connection/rate scenario: the mutex operations disappear from
the topmost offenders in the perf report, and the measured connections/rate
grows by ~60%.
To make the change more readable this additionally renames ep_free() to
ep_clear_and_put(), and moves the actual memory cleanup in a separate
ep_free() helper.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/4a57788dcaf28f5eb4f8dfddcc3a8b172a7357bb.1679504153.git.pabeni@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Tested-by: Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhiat.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-03-22 16:57:02 +00:00
|
|
|
ep_remove_safe(ep, epi);
|
2020-09-26 22:09:29 +00:00
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2020-09-10 02:25:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-09-27 15:03:32 +00:00
|
|
|
if (epi->event.events & EPOLLWAKEUP) {
|
|
|
|
error = ep_create_wakeup_source(epi);
|
|
|
|
if (error) {
|
epoll: use refcount to reduce ep_mutex contention
We are observing huge contention on the epmutex during an http
connection/rate test:
83.17% 0.25% nginx [kernel.kallsyms] [k] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
[...]
|--66.96%--__fput
|--60.04%--eventpoll_release_file
|--58.41%--__mutex_lock.isra.6
|--56.56%--osq_lock
The application is multi-threaded, creates a new epoll entry for
each incoming connection, and does not delete it before the
connection shutdown - that is, before the connection's fd close().
Many different threads compete frequently for the epmutex lock,
affecting the overall performance.
To reduce the contention this patch introduces explicit reference counting
for the eventpoll struct. Each registered event acquires a reference,
and references are released at ep_remove() time.
The eventpoll struct is released by whoever - among EP file close() and
and the monitored file close() drops its last reference.
Additionally, this introduces a new 'dying' flag to prevent races between
the EP file close() and the monitored file close().
ep_eventpoll_release() marks, under f_lock spinlock, each epitem as dying
before removing it, while EP file close() does not touch dying epitems.
The above is needed as both close operations could run concurrently and
drop the EP reference acquired via the epitem entry. Without the above
flag, the monitored file close() could reach the EP struct via the epitem
list while the epitem is still listed and then try to put it after its
disposal.
An alternative could be avoiding touching the references acquired via
the epitems at EP file close() time, but that could leave the EP struct
alive for potentially unlimited time after EP file close(), with nasty
side effects.
With all the above in place, we can drop the epmutex usage at disposal time.
Overall this produces a significant performance improvement in the
mentioned connection/rate scenario: the mutex operations disappear from
the topmost offenders in the perf report, and the measured connections/rate
grows by ~60%.
To make the change more readable this additionally renames ep_free() to
ep_clear_and_put(), and moves the actual memory cleanup in a separate
ep_free() helper.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/4a57788dcaf28f5eb4f8dfddcc3a8b172a7357bb.1679504153.git.pabeni@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Tested-by: Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhiat.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-03-22 16:57:02 +00:00
|
|
|
ep_remove_safe(ep, epi);
|
2020-09-27 15:03:32 +00:00
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2020-09-10 02:25:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Initialize the poll table using the queue callback */
|
|
|
|
epq.epi = epi;
|
|
|
|
init_poll_funcptr(&epq.pt, ep_ptable_queue_proc);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Attach the item to the poll hooks and get current event bits.
|
|
|
|
* We can safely use the file* here because its usage count has
|
2007-05-15 08:40:47 +00:00
|
|
|
* been increased by the caller of this function. Note that after
|
|
|
|
* this operation completes, the poll callback can start hitting
|
|
|
|
* the new item.
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
epoll: remove ep_call_nested() from ep_eventpoll_poll()
The use of ep_call_nested() in ep_eventpoll_poll(), which is the .poll
routine for an epoll fd, is used to prevent excessively deep epoll
nesting, and to prevent circular paths.
However, we are already preventing these conditions during
EPOLL_CTL_ADD. In terms of too deep epoll chains, we do in fact allow
deep nesting of the epoll fds themselves (deeper than EP_MAX_NESTS),
however we don't allow more than EP_MAX_NESTS when an epoll file
descriptor is actually connected to a wakeup source. Thus, we do not
require the use of ep_call_nested(), since ep_eventpoll_poll(), which is
called via ep_scan_ready_list() only continues nesting if there are
events available.
Since ep_call_nested() is implemented using a global lock, applications
that make use of nested epoll can see large performance improvements
with this change.
Davidlohr said:
: Improvements are quite obscene actually, such as for the following
: epoll_wait() benchmark with 2 level nesting on a 80 core IvyBridge:
:
: ncpus vanilla dirty delta
: 1 2447092 3028315 +23.75%
: 4 231265 2986954 +1191.57%
: 8 121631 2898796 +2283.27%
: 16 59749 2902056 +4757.07%
: 32 26837 2326314 +8568.30%
: 64 12926 1341281 +10276.61%
:
: (http://linux-scalability.org/epoll/epoll-test.c)
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509430214-5599-1-git-send-email-jbaron@akamai.com
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Salman Qazi <sqazi@google.com>
Cc: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-11-17 23:29:06 +00:00
|
|
|
revents = ep_item_poll(epi, &epq.pt, 1);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We have to check if something went wrong during the poll wait queue
|
|
|
|
* install process. Namely an allocation for a wait queue failed due
|
|
|
|
* high memory pressure.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2020-09-26 22:09:29 +00:00
|
|
|
if (unlikely(!epq.epi)) {
|
epoll: use refcount to reduce ep_mutex contention
We are observing huge contention on the epmutex during an http
connection/rate test:
83.17% 0.25% nginx [kernel.kallsyms] [k] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
[...]
|--66.96%--__fput
|--60.04%--eventpoll_release_file
|--58.41%--__mutex_lock.isra.6
|--56.56%--osq_lock
The application is multi-threaded, creates a new epoll entry for
each incoming connection, and does not delete it before the
connection shutdown - that is, before the connection's fd close().
Many different threads compete frequently for the epmutex lock,
affecting the overall performance.
To reduce the contention this patch introduces explicit reference counting
for the eventpoll struct. Each registered event acquires a reference,
and references are released at ep_remove() time.
The eventpoll struct is released by whoever - among EP file close() and
and the monitored file close() drops its last reference.
Additionally, this introduces a new 'dying' flag to prevent races between
the EP file close() and the monitored file close().
ep_eventpoll_release() marks, under f_lock spinlock, each epitem as dying
before removing it, while EP file close() does not touch dying epitems.
The above is needed as both close operations could run concurrently and
drop the EP reference acquired via the epitem entry. Without the above
flag, the monitored file close() could reach the EP struct via the epitem
list while the epitem is still listed and then try to put it after its
disposal.
An alternative could be avoiding touching the references acquired via
the epitems at EP file close() time, but that could leave the EP struct
alive for potentially unlimited time after EP file close(), with nasty
side effects.
With all the above in place, we can drop the epmutex usage at disposal time.
Overall this produces a significant performance improvement in the
mentioned connection/rate scenario: the mutex operations disappear from
the topmost offenders in the perf report, and the measured connections/rate
grows by ~60%.
To make the change more readable this additionally renames ep_free() to
ep_clear_and_put(), and moves the actual memory cleanup in a separate
ep_free() helper.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/4a57788dcaf28f5eb4f8dfddcc3a8b172a7357bb.1679504153.git.pabeni@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Tested-by: Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhiat.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-03-22 16:57:02 +00:00
|
|
|
ep_remove_safe(ep, epi);
|
2020-09-26 22:09:29 +00:00
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2007-05-15 08:40:47 +00:00
|
|
|
/* We have to drop the new item inside our item list to keep track of it */
|
2019-03-08 00:28:53 +00:00
|
|
|
write_lock_irq(&ep->lock);
|
2007-05-15 08:40:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-03-24 17:08:30 +00:00
|
|
|
/* record NAPI ID of new item if present */
|
|
|
|
ep_set_busy_poll_napi_id(epi);
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
/* If the file is already "ready" we drop it inside the ready list */
|
2018-08-22 04:58:26 +00:00
|
|
|
if (revents && !ep_is_linked(epi)) {
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
list_add_tail(&epi->rdllink, &ep->rdllist);
|
2013-04-30 22:27:39 +00:00
|
|
|
ep_pm_stay_awake(epi);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Notify waiting tasks that events are available */
|
|
|
|
if (waitqueue_active(&ep->wq))
|
2019-03-08 00:28:53 +00:00
|
|
|
wake_up(&ep->wq);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (waitqueue_active(&ep->poll_wait))
|
|
|
|
pwake++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-03-08 00:28:53 +00:00
|
|
|
write_unlock_irq(&ep->lock);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* We have to call this outside the lock */
|
|
|
|
if (pwake)
|
2022-11-20 17:10:53 +00:00
|
|
|
ep_poll_safewake(ep, NULL, 0);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Modify the interest event mask by dropping an event if the new mask
|
2007-05-15 08:40:47 +00:00
|
|
|
* has a match in the current file status. Must be called with "mtx" held.
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-11-29 00:43:33 +00:00
|
|
|
static int ep_modify(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epitem *epi,
|
|
|
|
const struct epoll_event *event)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int pwake = 0;
|
poll: add poll_requested_events() and poll_does_not_wait() functions
In some cases the poll() implementation in a driver has to do different
things depending on the events the caller wants to poll for. An example
is when a driver needs to start a DMA engine if the caller polls for
POLLIN, but doesn't want to do that if POLLIN is not requested but instead
only POLLOUT or POLLPRI is requested. This is something that can happen
in the video4linux subsystem among others.
Unfortunately, the current epoll/poll/select implementation doesn't
provide that information reliably. The poll_table_struct does have it: it
has a key field with the event mask. But once a poll() call matches one
or more bits of that mask any following poll() calls are passed a NULL
poll_table pointer.
Also, the eventpoll implementation always left the key field at ~0 instead
of using the requested events mask.
This was changed in eventpoll.c so the key field now contains the actual
events that should be polled for as set by the caller.
The solution to the NULL poll_table pointer is to set the qproc field to
NULL in poll_table once poll() matches the events, not the poll_table
pointer itself. That way drivers can obtain the mask through a new
poll_requested_events inline.
The poll_table_struct can still be NULL since some kernel code calls it
internally (netfs_state_poll() in ./drivers/staging/pohmelfs/netfs.h). In
that case poll_requested_events() returns ~0 (i.e. all events).
Very rarely drivers might want to know whether poll_wait will actually
wait. If another earlier file descriptor in the set already matched the
events the caller wanted to wait for, then the kernel will return from the
select() call without waiting. This might be useful information in order
to avoid doing expensive work.
A new helper function poll_does_not_wait() is added that drivers can use
to detect this situation. This is now used in sock_poll_wait() in
include/net/sock.h. This was the only place in the kernel that needed
this information.
Drivers should no longer access any of the poll_table internals, but use
the poll_requested_events() and poll_does_not_wait() access functions
instead. In order to enforce that the poll_table fields are now prepended
with an underscore and a comment was added warning against using them
directly.
This required a change in unix_dgram_poll() in unix/af_unix.c which used
the key field to get the requested events. It's been replaced by a call
to poll_requested_events().
For qproc it was especially important to change its name since the
behavior of that field changes with this patch since this function pointer
can now be NULL when that wasn't possible in the past.
Any driver accessing the qproc or key fields directly will now fail to compile.
Some notes regarding the correctness of this patch: the driver's poll()
function is called with a 'struct poll_table_struct *wait' argument. This
pointer may or may not be NULL, drivers can never rely on it being one or
the other as that depends on whether or not an earlier file descriptor in
the select()'s fdset matched the requested events.
There are only three things a driver can do with the wait argument:
1) obtain the key field:
events = wait ? wait->key : ~0;
This will still work although it should be replaced with the new
poll_requested_events() function (which does exactly the same).
This will now even work better, since wait is no longer set to NULL
unnecessarily.
2) use the qproc callback. This could be deadly since qproc can now be
NULL. Renaming qproc should prevent this from happening. There are no
kernel drivers that actually access this callback directly, BTW.
3) test whether wait == NULL to determine whether poll would return without
waiting. This is no longer sufficient as the correct test is now
wait == NULL || wait->_qproc == NULL.
However, the worst that can happen here is a slight performance hit in
the case where wait != NULL and wait->_qproc == NULL. In that case the
driver will assume that poll_wait() will actually add the fd to the set
of waiting file descriptors. Of course, poll_wait() will not do that
since it tests for wait->_qproc. This will not break anything, though.
There is only one place in the whole kernel where this happens
(sock_poll_wait() in include/net/sock.h) and that code will be replaced
by a call to poll_does_not_wait() in the next patch.
Note that even if wait->_qproc != NULL drivers cannot rely on poll_wait()
actually waiting. The next file descriptor from the set might match the
event mask and thus any possible waits will never happen.
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hans.verkuil@cisco.com>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Reviewed-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@infradead.org>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-03-23 22:02:27 +00:00
|
|
|
poll_table pt;
|
|
|
|
|
2018-08-22 04:56:45 +00:00
|
|
|
lockdep_assert_irqs_enabled();
|
|
|
|
|
poll: add poll_requested_events() and poll_does_not_wait() functions
In some cases the poll() implementation in a driver has to do different
things depending on the events the caller wants to poll for. An example
is when a driver needs to start a DMA engine if the caller polls for
POLLIN, but doesn't want to do that if POLLIN is not requested but instead
only POLLOUT or POLLPRI is requested. This is something that can happen
in the video4linux subsystem among others.
Unfortunately, the current epoll/poll/select implementation doesn't
provide that information reliably. The poll_table_struct does have it: it
has a key field with the event mask. But once a poll() call matches one
or more bits of that mask any following poll() calls are passed a NULL
poll_table pointer.
Also, the eventpoll implementation always left the key field at ~0 instead
of using the requested events mask.
This was changed in eventpoll.c so the key field now contains the actual
events that should be polled for as set by the caller.
The solution to the NULL poll_table pointer is to set the qproc field to
NULL in poll_table once poll() matches the events, not the poll_table
pointer itself. That way drivers can obtain the mask through a new
poll_requested_events inline.
The poll_table_struct can still be NULL since some kernel code calls it
internally (netfs_state_poll() in ./drivers/staging/pohmelfs/netfs.h). In
that case poll_requested_events() returns ~0 (i.e. all events).
Very rarely drivers might want to know whether poll_wait will actually
wait. If another earlier file descriptor in the set already matched the
events the caller wanted to wait for, then the kernel will return from the
select() call without waiting. This might be useful information in order
to avoid doing expensive work.
A new helper function poll_does_not_wait() is added that drivers can use
to detect this situation. This is now used in sock_poll_wait() in
include/net/sock.h. This was the only place in the kernel that needed
this information.
Drivers should no longer access any of the poll_table internals, but use
the poll_requested_events() and poll_does_not_wait() access functions
instead. In order to enforce that the poll_table fields are now prepended
with an underscore and a comment was added warning against using them
directly.
This required a change in unix_dgram_poll() in unix/af_unix.c which used
the key field to get the requested events. It's been replaced by a call
to poll_requested_events().
For qproc it was especially important to change its name since the
behavior of that field changes with this patch since this function pointer
can now be NULL when that wasn't possible in the past.
Any driver accessing the qproc or key fields directly will now fail to compile.
Some notes regarding the correctness of this patch: the driver's poll()
function is called with a 'struct poll_table_struct *wait' argument. This
pointer may or may not be NULL, drivers can never rely on it being one or
the other as that depends on whether or not an earlier file descriptor in
the select()'s fdset matched the requested events.
There are only three things a driver can do with the wait argument:
1) obtain the key field:
events = wait ? wait->key : ~0;
This will still work although it should be replaced with the new
poll_requested_events() function (which does exactly the same).
This will now even work better, since wait is no longer set to NULL
unnecessarily.
2) use the qproc callback. This could be deadly since qproc can now be
NULL. Renaming qproc should prevent this from happening. There are no
kernel drivers that actually access this callback directly, BTW.
3) test whether wait == NULL to determine whether poll would return without
waiting. This is no longer sufficient as the correct test is now
wait == NULL || wait->_qproc == NULL.
However, the worst that can happen here is a slight performance hit in
the case where wait != NULL and wait->_qproc == NULL. In that case the
driver will assume that poll_wait() will actually add the fd to the set
of waiting file descriptors. Of course, poll_wait() will not do that
since it tests for wait->_qproc. This will not break anything, though.
There is only one place in the whole kernel where this happens
(sock_poll_wait() in include/net/sock.h) and that code will be replaced
by a call to poll_does_not_wait() in the next patch.
Note that even if wait->_qproc != NULL drivers cannot rely on poll_wait()
actually waiting. The next file descriptor from the set might match the
event mask and thus any possible waits will never happen.
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hans.verkuil@cisco.com>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Reviewed-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@infradead.org>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-03-23 22:02:27 +00:00
|
|
|
init_poll_funcptr(&pt, NULL);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2009-03-31 22:24:15 +00:00
|
|
|
* Set the new event interest mask before calling f_op->poll();
|
|
|
|
* otherwise we might miss an event that happens between the
|
|
|
|
* f_op->poll() call and the new event set registering.
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2013-01-01 21:20:27 +00:00
|
|
|
epi->event.events = event->events; /* need barrier below */
|
2009-03-31 22:24:15 +00:00
|
|
|
epi->event.data = event->data; /* protected by mtx */
|
2012-05-01 19:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
if (epi->event.events & EPOLLWAKEUP) {
|
2013-04-30 22:27:39 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!ep_has_wakeup_source(epi))
|
2012-05-01 19:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
ep_create_wakeup_source(epi);
|
2013-04-30 22:27:39 +00:00
|
|
|
} else if (ep_has_wakeup_source(epi)) {
|
2012-05-01 19:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
ep_destroy_wakeup_source(epi);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2013-01-01 21:20:27 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The following barrier has two effects:
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* 1) Flush epi changes above to other CPUs. This ensures
|
|
|
|
* we do not miss events from ep_poll_callback if an
|
|
|
|
* event occurs immediately after we call f_op->poll().
|
2019-03-08 00:28:53 +00:00
|
|
|
* We need this because we did not take ep->lock while
|
2013-01-01 21:20:27 +00:00
|
|
|
* changing epi above (but ep_poll_callback does take
|
2019-03-08 00:28:53 +00:00
|
|
|
* ep->lock).
|
2013-01-01 21:20:27 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* 2) We also need to ensure we do not miss _past_ events
|
|
|
|
* when calling f_op->poll(). This barrier also
|
|
|
|
* pairs with the barrier in wq_has_sleeper (see
|
|
|
|
* comments for wq_has_sleeper).
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This barrier will now guarantee ep_poll_callback or f_op->poll
|
|
|
|
* (or both) will notice the readiness of an item.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
smp_mb();
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Get current event bits. We can safely use the file* here because
|
|
|
|
* its usage count has been increased by the caller of this function.
|
2007-05-15 08:40:47 +00:00
|
|
|
* If the item is "hot" and it is not registered inside the ready
|
2007-05-15 08:40:52 +00:00
|
|
|
* list, push it inside.
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-11-29 00:56:15 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ep_item_poll(epi, &pt, 1)) {
|
2019-03-08 00:28:53 +00:00
|
|
|
write_lock_irq(&ep->lock);
|
2018-08-22 04:58:26 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!ep_is_linked(epi)) {
|
2007-05-15 08:40:47 +00:00
|
|
|
list_add_tail(&epi->rdllink, &ep->rdllist);
|
2013-04-30 22:27:39 +00:00
|
|
|
ep_pm_stay_awake(epi);
|
2007-05-15 08:40:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Notify waiting tasks that events are available */
|
|
|
|
if (waitqueue_active(&ep->wq))
|
2019-03-08 00:28:53 +00:00
|
|
|
wake_up(&ep->wq);
|
2007-05-15 08:40:47 +00:00
|
|
|
if (waitqueue_active(&ep->poll_wait))
|
|
|
|
pwake++;
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2019-03-08 00:28:53 +00:00
|
|
|
write_unlock_irq(&ep->lock);
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
/* We have to call this outside the lock */
|
|
|
|
if (pwake)
|
2022-11-20 17:10:53 +00:00
|
|
|
ep_poll_safewake(ep, NULL, 0);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-08-31 17:39:52 +00:00
|
|
|
static int ep_send_events(struct eventpoll *ep,
|
|
|
|
struct epoll_event __user *events, int maxevents)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2019-01-03 23:27:05 +00:00
|
|
|
struct epitem *epi, *tmp;
|
2020-08-31 17:39:52 +00:00
|
|
|
LIST_HEAD(txlist);
|
poll: add poll_requested_events() and poll_does_not_wait() functions
In some cases the poll() implementation in a driver has to do different
things depending on the events the caller wants to poll for. An example
is when a driver needs to start a DMA engine if the caller polls for
POLLIN, but doesn't want to do that if POLLIN is not requested but instead
only POLLOUT or POLLPRI is requested. This is something that can happen
in the video4linux subsystem among others.
Unfortunately, the current epoll/poll/select implementation doesn't
provide that information reliably. The poll_table_struct does have it: it
has a key field with the event mask. But once a poll() call matches one
or more bits of that mask any following poll() calls are passed a NULL
poll_table pointer.
Also, the eventpoll implementation always left the key field at ~0 instead
of using the requested events mask.
This was changed in eventpoll.c so the key field now contains the actual
events that should be polled for as set by the caller.
The solution to the NULL poll_table pointer is to set the qproc field to
NULL in poll_table once poll() matches the events, not the poll_table
pointer itself. That way drivers can obtain the mask through a new
poll_requested_events inline.
The poll_table_struct can still be NULL since some kernel code calls it
internally (netfs_state_poll() in ./drivers/staging/pohmelfs/netfs.h). In
that case poll_requested_events() returns ~0 (i.e. all events).
Very rarely drivers might want to know whether poll_wait will actually
wait. If another earlier file descriptor in the set already matched the
events the caller wanted to wait for, then the kernel will return from the
select() call without waiting. This might be useful information in order
to avoid doing expensive work.
A new helper function poll_does_not_wait() is added that drivers can use
to detect this situation. This is now used in sock_poll_wait() in
include/net/sock.h. This was the only place in the kernel that needed
this information.
Drivers should no longer access any of the poll_table internals, but use
the poll_requested_events() and poll_does_not_wait() access functions
instead. In order to enforce that the poll_table fields are now prepended
with an underscore and a comment was added warning against using them
directly.
This required a change in unix_dgram_poll() in unix/af_unix.c which used
the key field to get the requested events. It's been replaced by a call
to poll_requested_events().
For qproc it was especially important to change its name since the
behavior of that field changes with this patch since this function pointer
can now be NULL when that wasn't possible in the past.
Any driver accessing the qproc or key fields directly will now fail to compile.
Some notes regarding the correctness of this patch: the driver's poll()
function is called with a 'struct poll_table_struct *wait' argument. This
pointer may or may not be NULL, drivers can never rely on it being one or
the other as that depends on whether or not an earlier file descriptor in
the select()'s fdset matched the requested events.
There are only three things a driver can do with the wait argument:
1) obtain the key field:
events = wait ? wait->key : ~0;
This will still work although it should be replaced with the new
poll_requested_events() function (which does exactly the same).
This will now even work better, since wait is no longer set to NULL
unnecessarily.
2) use the qproc callback. This could be deadly since qproc can now be
NULL. Renaming qproc should prevent this from happening. There are no
kernel drivers that actually access this callback directly, BTW.
3) test whether wait == NULL to determine whether poll would return without
waiting. This is no longer sufficient as the correct test is now
wait == NULL || wait->_qproc == NULL.
However, the worst that can happen here is a slight performance hit in
the case where wait != NULL and wait->_qproc == NULL. In that case the
driver will assume that poll_wait() will actually add the fd to the set
of waiting file descriptors. Of course, poll_wait() will not do that
since it tests for wait->_qproc. This will not break anything, though.
There is only one place in the whole kernel where this happens
(sock_poll_wait() in include/net/sock.h) and that code will be replaced
by a call to poll_does_not_wait() in the next patch.
Note that even if wait->_qproc != NULL drivers cannot rely on poll_wait()
actually waiting. The next file descriptor from the set might match the
event mask and thus any possible waits will never happen.
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hans.verkuil@cisco.com>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Reviewed-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@infradead.org>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-03-23 22:02:27 +00:00
|
|
|
poll_table pt;
|
2020-08-31 17:39:52 +00:00
|
|
|
int res = 0;
|
poll: add poll_requested_events() and poll_does_not_wait() functions
In some cases the poll() implementation in a driver has to do different
things depending on the events the caller wants to poll for. An example
is when a driver needs to start a DMA engine if the caller polls for
POLLIN, but doesn't want to do that if POLLIN is not requested but instead
only POLLOUT or POLLPRI is requested. This is something that can happen
in the video4linux subsystem among others.
Unfortunately, the current epoll/poll/select implementation doesn't
provide that information reliably. The poll_table_struct does have it: it
has a key field with the event mask. But once a poll() call matches one
or more bits of that mask any following poll() calls are passed a NULL
poll_table pointer.
Also, the eventpoll implementation always left the key field at ~0 instead
of using the requested events mask.
This was changed in eventpoll.c so the key field now contains the actual
events that should be polled for as set by the caller.
The solution to the NULL poll_table pointer is to set the qproc field to
NULL in poll_table once poll() matches the events, not the poll_table
pointer itself. That way drivers can obtain the mask through a new
poll_requested_events inline.
The poll_table_struct can still be NULL since some kernel code calls it
internally (netfs_state_poll() in ./drivers/staging/pohmelfs/netfs.h). In
that case poll_requested_events() returns ~0 (i.e. all events).
Very rarely drivers might want to know whether poll_wait will actually
wait. If another earlier file descriptor in the set already matched the
events the caller wanted to wait for, then the kernel will return from the
select() call without waiting. This might be useful information in order
to avoid doing expensive work.
A new helper function poll_does_not_wait() is added that drivers can use
to detect this situation. This is now used in sock_poll_wait() in
include/net/sock.h. This was the only place in the kernel that needed
this information.
Drivers should no longer access any of the poll_table internals, but use
the poll_requested_events() and poll_does_not_wait() access functions
instead. In order to enforce that the poll_table fields are now prepended
with an underscore and a comment was added warning against using them
directly.
This required a change in unix_dgram_poll() in unix/af_unix.c which used
the key field to get the requested events. It's been replaced by a call
to poll_requested_events().
For qproc it was especially important to change its name since the
behavior of that field changes with this patch since this function pointer
can now be NULL when that wasn't possible in the past.
Any driver accessing the qproc or key fields directly will now fail to compile.
Some notes regarding the correctness of this patch: the driver's poll()
function is called with a 'struct poll_table_struct *wait' argument. This
pointer may or may not be NULL, drivers can never rely on it being one or
the other as that depends on whether or not an earlier file descriptor in
the select()'s fdset matched the requested events.
There are only three things a driver can do with the wait argument:
1) obtain the key field:
events = wait ? wait->key : ~0;
This will still work although it should be replaced with the new
poll_requested_events() function (which does exactly the same).
This will now even work better, since wait is no longer set to NULL
unnecessarily.
2) use the qproc callback. This could be deadly since qproc can now be
NULL. Renaming qproc should prevent this from happening. There are no
kernel drivers that actually access this callback directly, BTW.
3) test whether wait == NULL to determine whether poll would return without
waiting. This is no longer sufficient as the correct test is now
wait == NULL || wait->_qproc == NULL.
However, the worst that can happen here is a slight performance hit in
the case where wait != NULL and wait->_qproc == NULL. In that case the
driver will assume that poll_wait() will actually add the fd to the set
of waiting file descriptors. Of course, poll_wait() will not do that
since it tests for wait->_qproc. This will not break anything, though.
There is only one place in the whole kernel where this happens
(sock_poll_wait() in include/net/sock.h) and that code will be replaced
by a call to poll_does_not_wait() in the next patch.
Note that even if wait->_qproc != NULL drivers cannot rely on poll_wait()
actually waiting. The next file descriptor from the set might match the
event mask and thus any possible waits will never happen.
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hans.verkuil@cisco.com>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Reviewed-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@infradead.org>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-03-23 22:02:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-12-18 22:01:51 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Always short-circuit for fatal signals to allow threads to make a
|
|
|
|
* timely exit without the chance of finding more events available and
|
|
|
|
* fetching repeatedly.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (fatal_signal_pending(current))
|
|
|
|
return -EINTR;
|
|
|
|
|
poll: add poll_requested_events() and poll_does_not_wait() functions
In some cases the poll() implementation in a driver has to do different
things depending on the events the caller wants to poll for. An example
is when a driver needs to start a DMA engine if the caller polls for
POLLIN, but doesn't want to do that if POLLIN is not requested but instead
only POLLOUT or POLLPRI is requested. This is something that can happen
in the video4linux subsystem among others.
Unfortunately, the current epoll/poll/select implementation doesn't
provide that information reliably. The poll_table_struct does have it: it
has a key field with the event mask. But once a poll() call matches one
or more bits of that mask any following poll() calls are passed a NULL
poll_table pointer.
Also, the eventpoll implementation always left the key field at ~0 instead
of using the requested events mask.
This was changed in eventpoll.c so the key field now contains the actual
events that should be polled for as set by the caller.
The solution to the NULL poll_table pointer is to set the qproc field to
NULL in poll_table once poll() matches the events, not the poll_table
pointer itself. That way drivers can obtain the mask through a new
poll_requested_events inline.
The poll_table_struct can still be NULL since some kernel code calls it
internally (netfs_state_poll() in ./drivers/staging/pohmelfs/netfs.h). In
that case poll_requested_events() returns ~0 (i.e. all events).
Very rarely drivers might want to know whether poll_wait will actually
wait. If another earlier file descriptor in the set already matched the
events the caller wanted to wait for, then the kernel will return from the
select() call without waiting. This might be useful information in order
to avoid doing expensive work.
A new helper function poll_does_not_wait() is added that drivers can use
to detect this situation. This is now used in sock_poll_wait() in
include/net/sock.h. This was the only place in the kernel that needed
this information.
Drivers should no longer access any of the poll_table internals, but use
the poll_requested_events() and poll_does_not_wait() access functions
instead. In order to enforce that the poll_table fields are now prepended
with an underscore and a comment was added warning against using them
directly.
This required a change in unix_dgram_poll() in unix/af_unix.c which used
the key field to get the requested events. It's been replaced by a call
to poll_requested_events().
For qproc it was especially important to change its name since the
behavior of that field changes with this patch since this function pointer
can now be NULL when that wasn't possible in the past.
Any driver accessing the qproc or key fields directly will now fail to compile.
Some notes regarding the correctness of this patch: the driver's poll()
function is called with a 'struct poll_table_struct *wait' argument. This
pointer may or may not be NULL, drivers can never rely on it being one or
the other as that depends on whether or not an earlier file descriptor in
the select()'s fdset matched the requested events.
There are only three things a driver can do with the wait argument:
1) obtain the key field:
events = wait ? wait->key : ~0;
This will still work although it should be replaced with the new
poll_requested_events() function (which does exactly the same).
This will now even work better, since wait is no longer set to NULL
unnecessarily.
2) use the qproc callback. This could be deadly since qproc can now be
NULL. Renaming qproc should prevent this from happening. There are no
kernel drivers that actually access this callback directly, BTW.
3) test whether wait == NULL to determine whether poll would return without
waiting. This is no longer sufficient as the correct test is now
wait == NULL || wait->_qproc == NULL.
However, the worst that can happen here is a slight performance hit in
the case where wait != NULL and wait->_qproc == NULL. In that case the
driver will assume that poll_wait() will actually add the fd to the set
of waiting file descriptors. Of course, poll_wait() will not do that
since it tests for wait->_qproc. This will not break anything, though.
There is only one place in the whole kernel where this happens
(sock_poll_wait() in include/net/sock.h) and that code will be replaced
by a call to poll_does_not_wait() in the next patch.
Note that even if wait->_qproc != NULL drivers cannot rely on poll_wait()
actually waiting. The next file descriptor from the set might match the
event mask and thus any possible waits will never happen.
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hans.verkuil@cisco.com>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Reviewed-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@infradead.org>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-03-23 22:02:27 +00:00
|
|
|
init_poll_funcptr(&pt, NULL);
|
2020-08-31 17:39:52 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-08-31 17:41:30 +00:00
|
|
|
mutex_lock(&ep->mtx);
|
|
|
|
ep_start_scan(ep, &txlist);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2009-03-31 22:24:11 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
epoll: fix epoll's own poll
Fix a bug inside the epoll's f_op->poll() code, that returns POLLIN even
though there are no actual ready monitored fds. The bug shows up if you
add an epoll fd inside another fd container (poll, select, epoll).
The problem is that callback-based wake ups used by epoll does not carry
(patches will follow, to fix this) any information about the events that
actually happened. So the callback code, since it can't call the file*
->poll() inside the callback, chains the file* into a ready-list.
So, suppose you added an fd with EPOLLOUT only, and some data shows up on
the fd, the file* mapped by the fd will be added into the ready-list (via
wakeup callback). During normal epoll_wait() use, this condition is
sorted out at the time we're actually able to call the file*'s
f_op->poll().
Inside the old epoll's f_op->poll() though, only a quick check
!list_empty(ready-list) was performed, and this could have led to
reporting POLLIN even though no ready fds would show up at a following
epoll_wait(). In order to correctly report the ready status for an epoll
fd, the ready-list must be checked to see if any really available fd+event
would be ready in a following epoll_wait().
Operation (calling f_op->poll() from inside f_op->poll()) that, like wake
ups, must be handled with care because of the fact that epoll fds can be
added to other epoll fds.
Test code:
/*
* epoll_test by Davide Libenzi (Simple code to test epoll internals)
* Copyright (C) 2008 Davide Libenzi
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
*
* Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
*
*/
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <poll.h>
#include <sys/epoll.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#define EPWAIT_TIMEO (1 * 1000)
#ifndef POLLRDHUP
#define POLLRDHUP 0x2000
#endif
#define EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN 100L
#define EPOLL_TF_LOOP (1 << 0)
struct epoll_test_cfg {
long size;
long flags;
};
static int xepoll_create(int n) {
int epfd;
if ((epfd = epoll_create(n)) == -1) {
perror("epoll_create");
exit(2);
}
return epfd;
}
static void xepoll_ctl(int epfd, int cmd, int fd, struct epoll_event *evt) {
if (epoll_ctl(epfd, cmd, fd, evt) < 0) {
perror("epoll_ctl");
exit(3);
}
}
static void xpipe(int *fds) {
if (pipe(fds)) {
perror("pipe");
exit(4);
}
}
static pid_t xfork(void) {
pid_t pid;
if ((pid = fork()) == (pid_t) -1) {
perror("pipe");
exit(5);
}
return pid;
}
static int run_forked_proc(int (*proc)(void *), void *data) {
int status;
pid_t pid;
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0)
exit((*proc)(data));
if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status): -2;
}
static int check_events(int fd, int timeo) {
struct pollfd pfd;
fprintf(stdout, "Checking events for fd %d\n", fd);
memset(&pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd));
pfd.fd = fd;
pfd.events = POLLIN | POLLOUT;
if (poll(&pfd, 1, timeo) < 0) {
perror("poll()");
return 0;
}
if (pfd.revents & POLLIN)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLIN\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLOUT)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLOUT\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLERR)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLERR\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLHUP)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLHUP\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLRDHUP)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLRDHUP\n");
return pfd.revents;
}
static int epoll_test_tty(void *data) {
int epfd, ifd = fileno(stdin), res;
struct epoll_event evt;
if (check_events(ifd, 0) != POLLOUT) {
fprintf(stderr, "Something is cooking on STDIN (%d)\n", ifd);
return 1;
}
epfd = xepoll_create(1);
fprintf(stdout, "Created epoll fd (%d)\n", epfd);
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
xepoll_ctl(epfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, ifd, &evt);
if (check_events(epfd, 0) & POLLIN) {
res = epoll_wait(epfd, &evt, 1, 0);
if (res == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Epoll fd (%d) is ready when it shouldn't!\n",
epfd);
return 2;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int epoll_wakeup_chain(void *data) {
struct epoll_test_cfg *tcfg = data;
int i, res, epfd, bfd, nfd, pfds[2];
pid_t pid;
struct epoll_event evt;
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
epfd = bfd = xepoll_create(1);
for (i = 0; i < tcfg->size; i++) {
nfd = xepoll_create(1);
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, nfd, &evt);
bfd = nfd;
}
xpipe(pfds);
if (tcfg->flags & EPOLL_TF_LOOP)
{
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, epfd, &evt);
/*
* If we're testing for loop, we want that the wakeup
* triggered by the write to the pipe done in the child
* process, triggers a fake event. So we add the pipe
* read size with EPOLLOUT events. This will trigger
* an addition to the ready-list, but no real events
* will be there. The the epoll kernel code will proceed
* in calling f_op->poll() of the epfd, triggering the
* loop we want to test.
*/
evt.events = EPOLLOUT;
}
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, pfds[0], &evt);
/*
* The pipe write must come after the poll(2) call inside
* check_events(). This tests the nested wakeup code in
* fs/eventpoll.c:ep_poll_safewake()
* By having the check_events() (hence poll(2)) happens first,
* we have poll wait queue filled up, and the write(2) in the
* child will trigger the wakeup chain.
*/
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0) {
sleep(1);
write(pfds[1], "w", 1);
exit(0);
}
res = check_events(epfd, 2000) & POLLIN;
if (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return res;
}
static int epoll_poll_chain(void *data) {
struct epoll_test_cfg *tcfg = data;
int i, res, epfd, bfd, nfd, pfds[2];
pid_t pid;
struct epoll_event evt;
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
epfd = bfd = xepoll_create(1);
for (i = 0; i < tcfg->size; i++) {
nfd = xepoll_create(1);
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, nfd, &evt);
bfd = nfd;
}
xpipe(pfds);
if (tcfg->flags & EPOLL_TF_LOOP)
{
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, epfd, &evt);
/*
* If we're testing for loop, we want that the wakeup
* triggered by the write to the pipe done in the child
* process, triggers a fake event. So we add the pipe
* read size with EPOLLOUT events. This will trigger
* an addition to the ready-list, but no real events
* will be there. The the epoll kernel code will proceed
* in calling f_op->poll() of the epfd, triggering the
* loop we want to test.
*/
evt.events = EPOLLOUT;
}
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, pfds[0], &evt);
/*
* The pipe write mush come before the poll(2) call inside
* check_events(). This tests the nested f_op->poll calls code in
* fs/eventpoll.c:ep_eventpoll_poll()
* By having the pipe write(2) happen first, we make the kernel
* epoll code to load the ready lists, and the following poll(2)
* done inside check_events() will test nested poll code in
* ep_eventpoll_poll().
*/
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0) {
write(pfds[1], "w", 1);
exit(0);
}
sleep(1);
res = check_events(epfd, 1000) & POLLIN;
if (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return res;
}
int main(int ac, char **av) {
int error;
struct epoll_test_cfg tcfg;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing TTY events\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_test_tty, NULL);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing short wakeup chain\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == POLLIN ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing long wakeup chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing short poll chain\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == POLLIN ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing long poll chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = EPOLL_TF_LOOP;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing loopy wakeup chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = EPOLL_TF_LOOP;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing loopy poll chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Pavel Pisa <pisa@cmp.felk.cvut.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-03-31 22:24:10 +00:00
|
|
|
* We can loop without lock because we are passed a task private list.
|
2020-08-31 17:41:30 +00:00
|
|
|
* Items cannot vanish during the loop we are holding ep->mtx.
|
2009-03-31 22:24:11 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2020-08-31 17:39:52 +00:00
|
|
|
list_for_each_entry_safe(epi, tmp, &txlist, rdllink) {
|
|
|
|
struct wakeup_source *ws;
|
|
|
|
__poll_t revents;
|
2019-01-03 23:27:12 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-08-31 17:39:52 +00:00
|
|
|
if (res >= maxevents)
|
2019-01-03 23:27:05 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
2007-05-15 08:40:41 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2012-05-01 19:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Activate ep->ws before deactivating epi->ws to prevent
|
|
|
|
* triggering auto-suspend here (in case we reactive epi->ws
|
|
|
|
* below).
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This could be rearranged to delay the deactivation of epi->ws
|
|
|
|
* instead, but then epi->ws would temporarily be out of sync
|
|
|
|
* with ep_is_linked().
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2013-04-30 22:27:39 +00:00
|
|
|
ws = ep_wakeup_source(epi);
|
|
|
|
if (ws) {
|
|
|
|
if (ws->active)
|
|
|
|
__pm_stay_awake(ep->ws);
|
|
|
|
__pm_relax(ws);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-05-15 08:40:41 +00:00
|
|
|
list_del_init(&epi->rdllink);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2009-03-31 22:24:11 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
epoll: fix epoll's own poll
Fix a bug inside the epoll's f_op->poll() code, that returns POLLIN even
though there are no actual ready monitored fds. The bug shows up if you
add an epoll fd inside another fd container (poll, select, epoll).
The problem is that callback-based wake ups used by epoll does not carry
(patches will follow, to fix this) any information about the events that
actually happened. So the callback code, since it can't call the file*
->poll() inside the callback, chains the file* into a ready-list.
So, suppose you added an fd with EPOLLOUT only, and some data shows up on
the fd, the file* mapped by the fd will be added into the ready-list (via
wakeup callback). During normal epoll_wait() use, this condition is
sorted out at the time we're actually able to call the file*'s
f_op->poll().
Inside the old epoll's f_op->poll() though, only a quick check
!list_empty(ready-list) was performed, and this could have led to
reporting POLLIN even though no ready fds would show up at a following
epoll_wait(). In order to correctly report the ready status for an epoll
fd, the ready-list must be checked to see if any really available fd+event
would be ready in a following epoll_wait().
Operation (calling f_op->poll() from inside f_op->poll()) that, like wake
ups, must be handled with care because of the fact that epoll fds can be
added to other epoll fds.
Test code:
/*
* epoll_test by Davide Libenzi (Simple code to test epoll internals)
* Copyright (C) 2008 Davide Libenzi
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
*
* Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
*
*/
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <poll.h>
#include <sys/epoll.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#define EPWAIT_TIMEO (1 * 1000)
#ifndef POLLRDHUP
#define POLLRDHUP 0x2000
#endif
#define EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN 100L
#define EPOLL_TF_LOOP (1 << 0)
struct epoll_test_cfg {
long size;
long flags;
};
static int xepoll_create(int n) {
int epfd;
if ((epfd = epoll_create(n)) == -1) {
perror("epoll_create");
exit(2);
}
return epfd;
}
static void xepoll_ctl(int epfd, int cmd, int fd, struct epoll_event *evt) {
if (epoll_ctl(epfd, cmd, fd, evt) < 0) {
perror("epoll_ctl");
exit(3);
}
}
static void xpipe(int *fds) {
if (pipe(fds)) {
perror("pipe");
exit(4);
}
}
static pid_t xfork(void) {
pid_t pid;
if ((pid = fork()) == (pid_t) -1) {
perror("pipe");
exit(5);
}
return pid;
}
static int run_forked_proc(int (*proc)(void *), void *data) {
int status;
pid_t pid;
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0)
exit((*proc)(data));
if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status): -2;
}
static int check_events(int fd, int timeo) {
struct pollfd pfd;
fprintf(stdout, "Checking events for fd %d\n", fd);
memset(&pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd));
pfd.fd = fd;
pfd.events = POLLIN | POLLOUT;
if (poll(&pfd, 1, timeo) < 0) {
perror("poll()");
return 0;
}
if (pfd.revents & POLLIN)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLIN\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLOUT)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLOUT\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLERR)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLERR\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLHUP)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLHUP\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLRDHUP)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLRDHUP\n");
return pfd.revents;
}
static int epoll_test_tty(void *data) {
int epfd, ifd = fileno(stdin), res;
struct epoll_event evt;
if (check_events(ifd, 0) != POLLOUT) {
fprintf(stderr, "Something is cooking on STDIN (%d)\n", ifd);
return 1;
}
epfd = xepoll_create(1);
fprintf(stdout, "Created epoll fd (%d)\n", epfd);
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
xepoll_ctl(epfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, ifd, &evt);
if (check_events(epfd, 0) & POLLIN) {
res = epoll_wait(epfd, &evt, 1, 0);
if (res == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Epoll fd (%d) is ready when it shouldn't!\n",
epfd);
return 2;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int epoll_wakeup_chain(void *data) {
struct epoll_test_cfg *tcfg = data;
int i, res, epfd, bfd, nfd, pfds[2];
pid_t pid;
struct epoll_event evt;
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
epfd = bfd = xepoll_create(1);
for (i = 0; i < tcfg->size; i++) {
nfd = xepoll_create(1);
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, nfd, &evt);
bfd = nfd;
}
xpipe(pfds);
if (tcfg->flags & EPOLL_TF_LOOP)
{
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, epfd, &evt);
/*
* If we're testing for loop, we want that the wakeup
* triggered by the write to the pipe done in the child
* process, triggers a fake event. So we add the pipe
* read size with EPOLLOUT events. This will trigger
* an addition to the ready-list, but no real events
* will be there. The the epoll kernel code will proceed
* in calling f_op->poll() of the epfd, triggering the
* loop we want to test.
*/
evt.events = EPOLLOUT;
}
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, pfds[0], &evt);
/*
* The pipe write must come after the poll(2) call inside
* check_events(). This tests the nested wakeup code in
* fs/eventpoll.c:ep_poll_safewake()
* By having the check_events() (hence poll(2)) happens first,
* we have poll wait queue filled up, and the write(2) in the
* child will trigger the wakeup chain.
*/
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0) {
sleep(1);
write(pfds[1], "w", 1);
exit(0);
}
res = check_events(epfd, 2000) & POLLIN;
if (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return res;
}
static int epoll_poll_chain(void *data) {
struct epoll_test_cfg *tcfg = data;
int i, res, epfd, bfd, nfd, pfds[2];
pid_t pid;
struct epoll_event evt;
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
epfd = bfd = xepoll_create(1);
for (i = 0; i < tcfg->size; i++) {
nfd = xepoll_create(1);
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, nfd, &evt);
bfd = nfd;
}
xpipe(pfds);
if (tcfg->flags & EPOLL_TF_LOOP)
{
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, epfd, &evt);
/*
* If we're testing for loop, we want that the wakeup
* triggered by the write to the pipe done in the child
* process, triggers a fake event. So we add the pipe
* read size with EPOLLOUT events. This will trigger
* an addition to the ready-list, but no real events
* will be there. The the epoll kernel code will proceed
* in calling f_op->poll() of the epfd, triggering the
* loop we want to test.
*/
evt.events = EPOLLOUT;
}
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, pfds[0], &evt);
/*
* The pipe write mush come before the poll(2) call inside
* check_events(). This tests the nested f_op->poll calls code in
* fs/eventpoll.c:ep_eventpoll_poll()
* By having the pipe write(2) happen first, we make the kernel
* epoll code to load the ready lists, and the following poll(2)
* done inside check_events() will test nested poll code in
* ep_eventpoll_poll().
*/
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0) {
write(pfds[1], "w", 1);
exit(0);
}
sleep(1);
res = check_events(epfd, 1000) & POLLIN;
if (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return res;
}
int main(int ac, char **av) {
int error;
struct epoll_test_cfg tcfg;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing TTY events\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_test_tty, NULL);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing short wakeup chain\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == POLLIN ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing long wakeup chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing short poll chain\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == POLLIN ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing long poll chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = EPOLL_TF_LOOP;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing loopy wakeup chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = EPOLL_TF_LOOP;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing loopy poll chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Pavel Pisa <pisa@cmp.felk.cvut.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-03-31 22:24:10 +00:00
|
|
|
* If the event mask intersect the caller-requested one,
|
2020-08-31 17:41:30 +00:00
|
|
|
* deliver the event to userspace. Again, we are holding ep->mtx,
|
|
|
|
* so no operations coming from userspace can change the item.
|
2009-03-31 22:24:11 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2019-01-03 23:27:05 +00:00
|
|
|
revents = ep_item_poll(epi, &pt, 1);
|
|
|
|
if (!revents)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
2021-08-11 07:30:22 +00:00
|
|
|
events = epoll_put_uevent(revents, epi->event.data, events);
|
|
|
|
if (!events) {
|
2020-08-31 17:39:52 +00:00
|
|
|
list_add(&epi->rdllink, &txlist);
|
2019-01-03 23:27:05 +00:00
|
|
|
ep_pm_stay_awake(epi);
|
2020-08-31 17:39:52 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!res)
|
|
|
|
res = -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2019-01-03 23:27:05 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2020-08-31 17:39:52 +00:00
|
|
|
res++;
|
2019-01-03 23:27:05 +00:00
|
|
|
if (epi->event.events & EPOLLONESHOT)
|
|
|
|
epi->event.events &= EP_PRIVATE_BITS;
|
|
|
|
else if (!(epi->event.events & EPOLLET)) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If this file has been added with Level
|
|
|
|
* Trigger mode, we need to insert back inside
|
|
|
|
* the ready list, so that the next call to
|
|
|
|
* epoll_wait() will check again the events
|
|
|
|
* availability. At this point, no one can insert
|
|
|
|
* into ep->rdllist besides us. The epoll_ctl()
|
|
|
|
* callers are locked out by
|
|
|
|
* ep_scan_ready_list() holding "mtx" and the
|
|
|
|
* poll callback will queue them in ep->ovflist.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
list_add_tail(&epi->rdllink, &ep->rdllist);
|
|
|
|
ep_pm_stay_awake(epi);
|
2009-03-31 22:24:11 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2020-08-31 17:41:30 +00:00
|
|
|
ep_done_scan(ep, &txlist);
|
|
|
|
mutex_unlock(&ep->mtx);
|
epoll: fix epoll's own poll
Fix a bug inside the epoll's f_op->poll() code, that returns POLLIN even
though there are no actual ready monitored fds. The bug shows up if you
add an epoll fd inside another fd container (poll, select, epoll).
The problem is that callback-based wake ups used by epoll does not carry
(patches will follow, to fix this) any information about the events that
actually happened. So the callback code, since it can't call the file*
->poll() inside the callback, chains the file* into a ready-list.
So, suppose you added an fd with EPOLLOUT only, and some data shows up on
the fd, the file* mapped by the fd will be added into the ready-list (via
wakeup callback). During normal epoll_wait() use, this condition is
sorted out at the time we're actually able to call the file*'s
f_op->poll().
Inside the old epoll's f_op->poll() though, only a quick check
!list_empty(ready-list) was performed, and this could have led to
reporting POLLIN even though no ready fds would show up at a following
epoll_wait(). In order to correctly report the ready status for an epoll
fd, the ready-list must be checked to see if any really available fd+event
would be ready in a following epoll_wait().
Operation (calling f_op->poll() from inside f_op->poll()) that, like wake
ups, must be handled with care because of the fact that epoll fds can be
added to other epoll fds.
Test code:
/*
* epoll_test by Davide Libenzi (Simple code to test epoll internals)
* Copyright (C) 2008 Davide Libenzi
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
*
* Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
*
*/
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <poll.h>
#include <sys/epoll.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#define EPWAIT_TIMEO (1 * 1000)
#ifndef POLLRDHUP
#define POLLRDHUP 0x2000
#endif
#define EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN 100L
#define EPOLL_TF_LOOP (1 << 0)
struct epoll_test_cfg {
long size;
long flags;
};
static int xepoll_create(int n) {
int epfd;
if ((epfd = epoll_create(n)) == -1) {
perror("epoll_create");
exit(2);
}
return epfd;
}
static void xepoll_ctl(int epfd, int cmd, int fd, struct epoll_event *evt) {
if (epoll_ctl(epfd, cmd, fd, evt) < 0) {
perror("epoll_ctl");
exit(3);
}
}
static void xpipe(int *fds) {
if (pipe(fds)) {
perror("pipe");
exit(4);
}
}
static pid_t xfork(void) {
pid_t pid;
if ((pid = fork()) == (pid_t) -1) {
perror("pipe");
exit(5);
}
return pid;
}
static int run_forked_proc(int (*proc)(void *), void *data) {
int status;
pid_t pid;
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0)
exit((*proc)(data));
if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status): -2;
}
static int check_events(int fd, int timeo) {
struct pollfd pfd;
fprintf(stdout, "Checking events for fd %d\n", fd);
memset(&pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd));
pfd.fd = fd;
pfd.events = POLLIN | POLLOUT;
if (poll(&pfd, 1, timeo) < 0) {
perror("poll()");
return 0;
}
if (pfd.revents & POLLIN)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLIN\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLOUT)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLOUT\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLERR)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLERR\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLHUP)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLHUP\n");
if (pfd.revents & POLLRDHUP)
fprintf(stdout, "\tPOLLRDHUP\n");
return pfd.revents;
}
static int epoll_test_tty(void *data) {
int epfd, ifd = fileno(stdin), res;
struct epoll_event evt;
if (check_events(ifd, 0) != POLLOUT) {
fprintf(stderr, "Something is cooking on STDIN (%d)\n", ifd);
return 1;
}
epfd = xepoll_create(1);
fprintf(stdout, "Created epoll fd (%d)\n", epfd);
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
xepoll_ctl(epfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, ifd, &evt);
if (check_events(epfd, 0) & POLLIN) {
res = epoll_wait(epfd, &evt, 1, 0);
if (res == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Epoll fd (%d) is ready when it shouldn't!\n",
epfd);
return 2;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int epoll_wakeup_chain(void *data) {
struct epoll_test_cfg *tcfg = data;
int i, res, epfd, bfd, nfd, pfds[2];
pid_t pid;
struct epoll_event evt;
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
epfd = bfd = xepoll_create(1);
for (i = 0; i < tcfg->size; i++) {
nfd = xepoll_create(1);
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, nfd, &evt);
bfd = nfd;
}
xpipe(pfds);
if (tcfg->flags & EPOLL_TF_LOOP)
{
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, epfd, &evt);
/*
* If we're testing for loop, we want that the wakeup
* triggered by the write to the pipe done in the child
* process, triggers a fake event. So we add the pipe
* read size with EPOLLOUT events. This will trigger
* an addition to the ready-list, but no real events
* will be there. The the epoll kernel code will proceed
* in calling f_op->poll() of the epfd, triggering the
* loop we want to test.
*/
evt.events = EPOLLOUT;
}
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, pfds[0], &evt);
/*
* The pipe write must come after the poll(2) call inside
* check_events(). This tests the nested wakeup code in
* fs/eventpoll.c:ep_poll_safewake()
* By having the check_events() (hence poll(2)) happens first,
* we have poll wait queue filled up, and the write(2) in the
* child will trigger the wakeup chain.
*/
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0) {
sleep(1);
write(pfds[1], "w", 1);
exit(0);
}
res = check_events(epfd, 2000) & POLLIN;
if (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return res;
}
static int epoll_poll_chain(void *data) {
struct epoll_test_cfg *tcfg = data;
int i, res, epfd, bfd, nfd, pfds[2];
pid_t pid;
struct epoll_event evt;
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(evt));
evt.events = EPOLLIN;
epfd = bfd = xepoll_create(1);
for (i = 0; i < tcfg->size; i++) {
nfd = xepoll_create(1);
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, nfd, &evt);
bfd = nfd;
}
xpipe(pfds);
if (tcfg->flags & EPOLL_TF_LOOP)
{
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, epfd, &evt);
/*
* If we're testing for loop, we want that the wakeup
* triggered by the write to the pipe done in the child
* process, triggers a fake event. So we add the pipe
* read size with EPOLLOUT events. This will trigger
* an addition to the ready-list, but no real events
* will be there. The the epoll kernel code will proceed
* in calling f_op->poll() of the epfd, triggering the
* loop we want to test.
*/
evt.events = EPOLLOUT;
}
xepoll_ctl(bfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, pfds[0], &evt);
/*
* The pipe write mush come before the poll(2) call inside
* check_events(). This tests the nested f_op->poll calls code in
* fs/eventpoll.c:ep_eventpoll_poll()
* By having the pipe write(2) happen first, we make the kernel
* epoll code to load the ready lists, and the following poll(2)
* done inside check_events() will test nested poll code in
* ep_eventpoll_poll().
*/
if ((pid = xfork()) == 0) {
write(pfds[1], "w", 1);
exit(0);
}
sleep(1);
res = check_events(epfd, 1000) & POLLIN;
if (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
return -1;
}
return res;
}
int main(int ac, char **av) {
int error;
struct epoll_test_cfg tcfg;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing TTY events\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_test_tty, NULL);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing short wakeup chain\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == POLLIN ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing long wakeup chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing short poll chain\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == POLLIN ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = EPOLL_MAX_CHAIN;
tcfg.flags = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing long poll chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = EPOLL_TF_LOOP;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing loopy wakeup chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_wakeup_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
tcfg.size = 3;
tcfg.flags = EPOLL_TF_LOOP;
fprintf(stdout, "\n********** Testing loopy poll chain (HOLD ON)\n");
error = run_forked_proc(epoll_poll_chain, &tcfg);
fprintf(stdout, error == 0 ?
"********** OK\n": "********** FAIL (%d)\n", error);
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Pavel Pisa <pisa@cmp.felk.cvut.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-03-31 22:24:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-08-31 17:39:52 +00:00
|
|
|
return res;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-12-18 22:05:35 +00:00
|
|
|
static struct timespec64 *ep_timeout_to_timespec(struct timespec64 *to, long ms)
|
2011-02-01 23:52:35 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2020-12-18 22:05:35 +00:00
|
|
|
struct timespec64 now;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ms < 0)
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!ms) {
|
|
|
|
to->tv_sec = 0;
|
|
|
|
to->tv_nsec = 0;
|
|
|
|
return to;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
to->tv_sec = ms / MSEC_PER_SEC;
|
|
|
|
to->tv_nsec = NSEC_PER_MSEC * (ms % MSEC_PER_SEC);
|
2011-02-01 23:52:35 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-05-20 00:09:05 +00:00
|
|
|
ktime_get_ts64(&now);
|
2020-12-18 22:05:35 +00:00
|
|
|
*to = timespec64_add_safe(now, *to);
|
|
|
|
return to;
|
2011-02-01 23:52:35 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2022-06-15 21:24:23 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* autoremove_wake_function, but remove even on failure to wake up, because we
|
|
|
|
* know that default_wake_function/ttwu will only fail if the thread is already
|
|
|
|
* woken, and in that case the ep_poll loop will remove the entry anyways, not
|
|
|
|
* try to reuse it.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int ep_autoremove_wake_function(struct wait_queue_entry *wq_entry,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int mode, int sync, void *key)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ret = default_wake_function(wq_entry, mode, sync, key);
|
|
|
|
|
2023-05-30 18:32:28 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Pairs with list_empty_careful in ep_poll, and ensures future loop
|
|
|
|
* iterations see the cause of this wakeup.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
list_del_init_careful(&wq_entry->entry);
|
2022-06-15 21:24:23 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-03-22 23:34:47 +00:00
|
|
|
/**
|
2021-03-01 22:25:51 +00:00
|
|
|
* ep_poll - Retrieves ready events, and delivers them to the caller-supplied
|
2011-03-22 23:34:47 +00:00
|
|
|
* event buffer.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* @ep: Pointer to the eventpoll context.
|
|
|
|
* @events: Pointer to the userspace buffer where the ready events should be
|
|
|
|
* stored.
|
|
|
|
* @maxevents: Size (in terms of number of events) of the caller event buffer.
|
|
|
|
* @timeout: Maximum timeout for the ready events fetch operation, in
|
2020-12-18 22:05:35 +00:00
|
|
|
* timespec. If the timeout is zero, the function will not block,
|
|
|
|
* while if the @timeout ptr is NULL, the function will block
|
2011-03-22 23:34:47 +00:00
|
|
|
* until at least one event has been retrieved (or an error
|
|
|
|
* occurred).
|
|
|
|
*
|
2021-03-01 22:25:51 +00:00
|
|
|
* Return: the number of ready events which have been fetched, or an
|
2011-03-22 23:34:47 +00:00
|
|
|
* error code, in case of error.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
static int ep_poll(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epoll_event __user *events,
|
2020-12-18 22:05:35 +00:00
|
|
|
int maxevents, struct timespec64 *timeout)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2020-12-18 22:02:06 +00:00
|
|
|
int res, eavail, timed_out = 0;
|
timer: convert timer_slack_ns from unsigned long to u64
This patchset introduces a /proc/<pid>/timerslack_ns interface which
would allow controlling processes to be able to set the timerslack value
on other processes in order to save power by avoiding wakeups (Something
Android currently does via out-of-tree patches).
The first patch tries to fix the internal timer_slack_ns usage which was
defined as a long, which limits the slack range to ~4 seconds on 32bit
systems. It converts it to a u64, which provides the same basically
unlimited slack (500 years) on both 32bit and 64bit machines.
The second patch introduces the /proc/<pid>/timerslack_ns interface
which allows the full 64bit slack range for a task to be read or set on
both 32bit and 64bit machines.
With these two patches, on a 32bit machine, after setting the slack on
bash to 10 seconds:
$ time sleep 1
real 0m10.747s
user 0m0.001s
sys 0m0.005s
The first patch is a little ugly, since I had to chase the slack delta
arguments through a number of functions converting them to u64s. Let me
know if it makes sense to break that up more or not.
Other than that things are fairly straightforward.
This patch (of 2):
The timer_slack_ns value in the task struct is currently a unsigned
long. This means that on 32bit applications, the maximum slack is just
over 4 seconds. However, on 64bit machines, its much much larger (~500
years).
This disparity could make application development a little (as well as
the default_slack) to a u64. This means both 32bit and 64bit systems
have the same effective internal slack range.
Now the existing ABI via PR_GET_TIMERSLACK and PR_SET_TIMERSLACK specify
the interface as a unsigned long, so we preserve that limitation on
32bit systems, where SET_TIMERSLACK can only set the slack to a unsigned
long value, and GET_TIMERSLACK will return ULONG_MAX if the slack is
actually larger then what can be stored by an unsigned long.
This patch also modifies hrtimer functions which specified the slack
delta as a unsigned long.
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Oren Laadan <orenl@cellrox.com>
Cc: Ruchi Kandoi <kandoiruchi@google.com>
Cc: Rom Lemarchand <romlem@android.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Android Kernel Team <kernel-team@android.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-17 21:20:51 +00:00
|
|
|
u64 slack = 0;
|
2017-06-20 10:06:13 +00:00
|
|
|
wait_queue_entry_t wait;
|
2010-10-27 22:34:54 +00:00
|
|
|
ktime_t expires, *to = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
2018-08-22 04:58:23 +00:00
|
|
|
lockdep_assert_irqs_enabled();
|
|
|
|
|
2020-12-18 22:05:35 +00:00
|
|
|
if (timeout && (timeout->tv_sec | timeout->tv_nsec)) {
|
|
|
|
slack = select_estimate_accuracy(timeout);
|
2010-10-27 22:34:54 +00:00
|
|
|
to = &expires;
|
2020-12-18 22:05:35 +00:00
|
|
|
*to = timespec64_to_ktime(*timeout);
|
|
|
|
} else if (timeout) {
|
2011-03-22 23:34:47 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Avoid the unnecessary trip to the wait queue loop, if the
|
2020-12-18 22:02:06 +00:00
|
|
|
* caller specified a non blocking operation.
|
2011-03-22 23:34:47 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2010-10-27 22:34:54 +00:00
|
|
|
timed_out = 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-12-18 22:02:06 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* This call is racy: We may or may not see events that are being added
|
2021-03-01 22:25:51 +00:00
|
|
|
* to the ready list under the lock (e.g., in IRQ callbacks). For cases
|
2020-12-18 22:02:06 +00:00
|
|
|
* with a non-zero timeout, this thread will check the ready list under
|
2021-03-01 22:25:51 +00:00
|
|
|
* lock and will add to the wait queue. For cases with a zero
|
2020-12-18 22:02:06 +00:00
|
|
|
* timeout, the user by definition should not care and will have to
|
|
|
|
* recheck again.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
eavail = ep_events_available(ep);
|
|
|
|
|
2020-12-18 22:02:03 +00:00
|
|
|
while (1) {
|
|
|
|
if (eavail) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Try to transfer events to user space. In case we get
|
|
|
|
* 0 events and there's still timeout left over, we go
|
|
|
|
* trying again in search of more luck.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
res = ep_send_events(ep, events, maxevents);
|
|
|
|
if (res)
|
|
|
|
return res;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (timed_out)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
eavail = ep_busy_loop(ep, timed_out);
|
2020-12-18 22:02:00 +00:00
|
|
|
if (eavail)
|
2020-12-18 22:02:03 +00:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-12-18 22:01:48 +00:00
|
|
|
if (signal_pending(current))
|
|
|
|
return -EINTR;
|
|
|
|
|
epoll: atomically remove wait entry on wake up
This patch does two things:
- fixes a lost wakeup introduced by commit 339ddb53d373 ("fs/epoll:
remove unnecessary wakeups of nested epoll")
- improves performance for events delivery.
The description of the problem is the following: if N (>1) threads are
waiting on ep->wq for new events and M (>1) events come, it is quite
likely that >1 wakeups hit the same wait queue entry, because there is
quite a big window between __add_wait_queue_exclusive() and the
following __remove_wait_queue() calls in ep_poll() function.
This can lead to lost wakeups, because thread, which was woken up, can
handle not all the events in ->rdllist. (in better words the problem is
described here: https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/10/7/905)
The idea of the current patch is to use init_wait() instead of
init_waitqueue_entry().
Internally init_wait() sets autoremove_wake_function as a callback,
which removes the wait entry atomically (under the wq locks) from the
list, thus the next coming wakeup hits the next wait entry in the wait
queue, thus preventing lost wakeups.
Problem is very well reproduced by the epoll60 test case [1].
Wait entry removal on wakeup has also performance benefits, because
there is no need to take a ep->lock and remove wait entry from the queue
after the successful wakeup. Here is the timing output of the epoll60
test case:
With explicit wakeup from ep_scan_ready_list() (the state of the
code prior 339ddb53d373):
real 0m6.970s
user 0m49.786s
sys 0m0.113s
After this patch:
real 0m5.220s
user 0m36.879s
sys 0m0.019s
The other testcase is the stress-epoll [2], where one thread consumes
all the events and other threads produce many events:
With explicit wakeup from ep_scan_ready_list() (the state of the
code prior 339ddb53d373):
threads events/ms run-time ms
8 5427 1474
16 6163 2596
32 6824 4689
64 7060 9064
128 6991 18309
After this patch:
threads events/ms run-time ms
8 5598 1429
16 7073 2262
32 7502 4265
64 7640 8376
128 7634 16767
(number of "events/ms" represents event bandwidth, thus higher is
better; number of "run-time ms" represents overall time spent
doing the benchmark, thus lower is better)
[1] tools/testing/selftests/filesystems/epoll/epoll_wakeup_test.c
[2] https://github.com/rouming/test-tools/blob/master/stress-epoll.c
Signed-off-by: Roman Penyaev <rpenyaev@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Cc: Khazhismel Kumykov <khazhy@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Heiher <r@hev.cc>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200430130326.1368509-2-rpenyaev@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-05-08 01:36:16 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Internally init_wait() uses autoremove_wake_function(),
|
|
|
|
* thus wait entry is removed from the wait queue on each
|
|
|
|
* wakeup. Why it is important? In case of several waiters
|
|
|
|
* each new wakeup will hit the next waiter, giving it the
|
|
|
|
* chance to harvest new event. Otherwise wakeup can be
|
|
|
|
* lost. This is also good performance-wise, because on
|
|
|
|
* normal wakeup path no need to call __remove_wait_queue()
|
|
|
|
* explicitly, thus ep->lock is not taken, which halts the
|
|
|
|
* event delivery.
|
2022-06-15 21:24:23 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* In fact, we now use an even more aggressive function that
|
|
|
|
* unconditionally removes, because we don't reuse the wait
|
|
|
|
* entry between loop iterations. This lets us also avoid the
|
|
|
|
* performance issue if a process is killed, causing all of its
|
|
|
|
* threads to wake up without being removed normally.
|
epoll: atomically remove wait entry on wake up
This patch does two things:
- fixes a lost wakeup introduced by commit 339ddb53d373 ("fs/epoll:
remove unnecessary wakeups of nested epoll")
- improves performance for events delivery.
The description of the problem is the following: if N (>1) threads are
waiting on ep->wq for new events and M (>1) events come, it is quite
likely that >1 wakeups hit the same wait queue entry, because there is
quite a big window between __add_wait_queue_exclusive() and the
following __remove_wait_queue() calls in ep_poll() function.
This can lead to lost wakeups, because thread, which was woken up, can
handle not all the events in ->rdllist. (in better words the problem is
described here: https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/10/7/905)
The idea of the current patch is to use init_wait() instead of
init_waitqueue_entry().
Internally init_wait() sets autoremove_wake_function as a callback,
which removes the wait entry atomically (under the wq locks) from the
list, thus the next coming wakeup hits the next wait entry in the wait
queue, thus preventing lost wakeups.
Problem is very well reproduced by the epoll60 test case [1].
Wait entry removal on wakeup has also performance benefits, because
there is no need to take a ep->lock and remove wait entry from the queue
after the successful wakeup. Here is the timing output of the epoll60
test case:
With explicit wakeup from ep_scan_ready_list() (the state of the
code prior 339ddb53d373):
real 0m6.970s
user 0m49.786s
sys 0m0.113s
After this patch:
real 0m5.220s
user 0m36.879s
sys 0m0.019s
The other testcase is the stress-epoll [2], where one thread consumes
all the events and other threads produce many events:
With explicit wakeup from ep_scan_ready_list() (the state of the
code prior 339ddb53d373):
threads events/ms run-time ms
8 5427 1474
16 6163 2596
32 6824 4689
64 7060 9064
128 6991 18309
After this patch:
threads events/ms run-time ms
8 5598 1429
16 7073 2262
32 7502 4265
64 7640 8376
128 7634 16767
(number of "events/ms" represents event bandwidth, thus higher is
better; number of "run-time ms" represents overall time spent
doing the benchmark, thus lower is better)
[1] tools/testing/selftests/filesystems/epoll/epoll_wakeup_test.c
[2] https://github.com/rouming/test-tools/blob/master/stress-epoll.c
Signed-off-by: Roman Penyaev <rpenyaev@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Cc: Khazhismel Kumykov <khazhy@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Heiher <r@hev.cc>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200430130326.1368509-2-rpenyaev@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-05-08 01:36:16 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
init_wait(&wait);
|
2022-06-15 21:24:23 +00:00
|
|
|
wait.func = ep_autoremove_wake_function;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-05-14 00:50:38 +00:00
|
|
|
write_lock_irq(&ep->lock);
|
2017-03-24 17:08:30 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2020-05-14 00:50:38 +00:00
|
|
|
* Barrierless variant, waitqueue_active() is called under
|
|
|
|
* the same lock on wakeup ep_poll_callback() side, so it
|
|
|
|
* is safe to avoid an explicit barrier.
|
2017-03-24 17:08:30 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2020-05-14 00:50:38 +00:00
|
|
|
__set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2020-05-14 00:50:38 +00:00
|
|
|
* Do the final check under the lock. ep_scan_ready_list()
|
|
|
|
* plays with two lists (->rdllist and ->ovflist) and there
|
|
|
|
* is always a race when both lists are empty for short
|
|
|
|
* period of time although events are pending, so lock is
|
|
|
|
* important.
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2020-05-14 00:50:38 +00:00
|
|
|
eavail = ep_events_available(ep);
|
2020-12-18 22:01:48 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!eavail)
|
|
|
|
__add_wait_queue_exclusive(&ep->wq, &wait);
|
|
|
|
|
2020-05-14 00:50:38 +00:00
|
|
|
write_unlock_irq(&ep->lock);
|
2010-10-27 22:34:54 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-12-18 22:01:48 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!eavail)
|
epoll: check for events when removing a timed out thread from the wait queue
Patch series "simplify ep_poll".
This patch series is a followup based on the suggestions and feedback by
Linus:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAHk-=wizk=OxUyQPbO8MS41w2Pag1kniUV5WdD5qWL-gq1kjDA@mail.gmail.com
The first patch in the series is a fix for the epoll race in presence of
timeouts, so that it can be cleanly backported to all affected stable
kernels.
The rest of the patch series simplify the ep_poll() implementation. Some
of these simplifications result in minor performance enhancements as well.
We have kept these changes under self tests and internal benchmarks for a
few days, and there are minor (1-2%) performance enhancements as a result.
This patch (of 8):
After abc610e01c66 ("fs/epoll: avoid barrier after an epoll_wait(2)
timeout"), we break out of the ep_poll loop upon timeout, without checking
whether there is any new events available. Prior to that patch-series we
always called ep_events_available() after exiting the loop.
This can cause races and missed wakeups. For example, consider the
following scenario reported by Guantao Liu:
Suppose we have an eventfd added using EPOLLET to an epollfd.
Thread 1: Sleeps for just below 5ms and then writes to an eventfd.
Thread 2: Calls epoll_wait with a timeout of 5 ms. If it sees an
event of the eventfd, it will write back on that fd.
Thread 3: Calls epoll_wait with a negative timeout.
Prior to abc610e01c66, it is guaranteed that Thread 3 will wake up either
by Thread 1 or Thread 2. After abc610e01c66, Thread 3 can be blocked
indefinitely if Thread 2 sees a timeout right before the write to the
eventfd by Thread 1. Thread 2 will be woken up from
schedule_hrtimeout_range and, with evail 0, it will not call
ep_send_events().
To fix this issue:
1) Simplify the timed_out case as suggested by Linus.
2) while holding the lock, recheck whether the thread was woken up
after its time out has reached.
Note that (2) is different from Linus' original suggestion: It do not set
"eavail = ep_events_available(ep)" to avoid unnecessary contention (when
there are too many timed-out threads and a small number of events), as
well as races mentioned in the discussion thread.
This is the first patch in the series so that the backport to stable
releases is straightforward.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201106231635.3528496-1-soheil.kdev@gmail.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAHk-=wizk=OxUyQPbO8MS41w2Pag1kniUV5WdD5qWL-gq1kjDA@mail.gmail.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201106231635.3528496-2-soheil.kdev@gmail.com
Fixes: abc610e01c66 ("fs/epoll: avoid barrier after an epoll_wait(2) timeout")
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Tested-by: Guantao Liu <guantaol@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Reported-by: Guantao Liu <guantaol@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Khazhismel Kumykov <khazhy@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-18 22:01:44 +00:00
|
|
|
timed_out = !schedule_hrtimeout_range(to, slack,
|
|
|
|
HRTIMER_MODE_ABS);
|
2020-12-18 22:01:54 +00:00
|
|
|
__set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
epoll: check for events when removing a timed out thread from the wait queue
Patch series "simplify ep_poll".
This patch series is a followup based on the suggestions and feedback by
Linus:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAHk-=wizk=OxUyQPbO8MS41w2Pag1kniUV5WdD5qWL-gq1kjDA@mail.gmail.com
The first patch in the series is a fix for the epoll race in presence of
timeouts, so that it can be cleanly backported to all affected stable
kernels.
The rest of the patch series simplify the ep_poll() implementation. Some
of these simplifications result in minor performance enhancements as well.
We have kept these changes under self tests and internal benchmarks for a
few days, and there are minor (1-2%) performance enhancements as a result.
This patch (of 8):
After abc610e01c66 ("fs/epoll: avoid barrier after an epoll_wait(2)
timeout"), we break out of the ep_poll loop upon timeout, without checking
whether there is any new events available. Prior to that patch-series we
always called ep_events_available() after exiting the loop.
This can cause races and missed wakeups. For example, consider the
following scenario reported by Guantao Liu:
Suppose we have an eventfd added using EPOLLET to an epollfd.
Thread 1: Sleeps for just below 5ms and then writes to an eventfd.
Thread 2: Calls epoll_wait with a timeout of 5 ms. If it sees an
event of the eventfd, it will write back on that fd.
Thread 3: Calls epoll_wait with a negative timeout.
Prior to abc610e01c66, it is guaranteed that Thread 3 will wake up either
by Thread 1 or Thread 2. After abc610e01c66, Thread 3 can be blocked
indefinitely if Thread 2 sees a timeout right before the write to the
eventfd by Thread 1. Thread 2 will be woken up from
schedule_hrtimeout_range and, with evail 0, it will not call
ep_send_events().
To fix this issue:
1) Simplify the timed_out case as suggested by Linus.
2) while holding the lock, recheck whether the thread was woken up
after its time out has reached.
Note that (2) is different from Linus' original suggestion: It do not set
"eavail = ep_events_available(ep)" to avoid unnecessary contention (when
there are too many timed-out threads and a small number of events), as
well as races mentioned in the discussion thread.
This is the first patch in the series so that the backport to stable
releases is straightforward.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201106231635.3528496-1-soheil.kdev@gmail.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAHk-=wizk=OxUyQPbO8MS41w2Pag1kniUV5WdD5qWL-gq1kjDA@mail.gmail.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201106231635.3528496-2-soheil.kdev@gmail.com
Fixes: abc610e01c66 ("fs/epoll: avoid barrier after an epoll_wait(2) timeout")
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Tested-by: Guantao Liu <guantaol@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Reported-by: Guantao Liu <guantaol@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Khazhismel Kumykov <khazhy@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-18 22:01:44 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We were woken up, thus go and try to harvest some events.
|
|
|
|
* If timed out and still on the wait queue, recheck eavail
|
|
|
|
* carefully under lock, below.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
epoll: atomically remove wait entry on wake up
This patch does two things:
- fixes a lost wakeup introduced by commit 339ddb53d373 ("fs/epoll:
remove unnecessary wakeups of nested epoll")
- improves performance for events delivery.
The description of the problem is the following: if N (>1) threads are
waiting on ep->wq for new events and M (>1) events come, it is quite
likely that >1 wakeups hit the same wait queue entry, because there is
quite a big window between __add_wait_queue_exclusive() and the
following __remove_wait_queue() calls in ep_poll() function.
This can lead to lost wakeups, because thread, which was woken up, can
handle not all the events in ->rdllist. (in better words the problem is
described here: https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/10/7/905)
The idea of the current patch is to use init_wait() instead of
init_waitqueue_entry().
Internally init_wait() sets autoremove_wake_function as a callback,
which removes the wait entry atomically (under the wq locks) from the
list, thus the next coming wakeup hits the next wait entry in the wait
queue, thus preventing lost wakeups.
Problem is very well reproduced by the epoll60 test case [1].
Wait entry removal on wakeup has also performance benefits, because
there is no need to take a ep->lock and remove wait entry from the queue
after the successful wakeup. Here is the timing output of the epoll60
test case:
With explicit wakeup from ep_scan_ready_list() (the state of the
code prior 339ddb53d373):
real 0m6.970s
user 0m49.786s
sys 0m0.113s
After this patch:
real 0m5.220s
user 0m36.879s
sys 0m0.019s
The other testcase is the stress-epoll [2], where one thread consumes
all the events and other threads produce many events:
With explicit wakeup from ep_scan_ready_list() (the state of the
code prior 339ddb53d373):
threads events/ms run-time ms
8 5427 1474
16 6163 2596
32 6824 4689
64 7060 9064
128 6991 18309
After this patch:
threads events/ms run-time ms
8 5598 1429
16 7073 2262
32 7502 4265
64 7640 8376
128 7634 16767
(number of "events/ms" represents event bandwidth, thus higher is
better; number of "run-time ms" represents overall time spent
doing the benchmark, thus lower is better)
[1] tools/testing/selftests/filesystems/epoll/epoll_wakeup_test.c
[2] https://github.com/rouming/test-tools/blob/master/stress-epoll.c
Signed-off-by: Roman Penyaev <rpenyaev@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Cc: Khazhismel Kumykov <khazhy@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Heiher <r@hev.cc>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200430130326.1368509-2-rpenyaev@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-05-08 01:36:16 +00:00
|
|
|
eavail = 1;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-12-18 22:02:00 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!list_empty_careful(&wait.entry)) {
|
|
|
|
write_lock_irq(&ep->lock);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If the thread timed out and is not on the wait queue,
|
|
|
|
* it means that the thread was woken up after its
|
|
|
|
* timeout expired before it could reacquire the lock.
|
|
|
|
* Thus, when wait.entry is empty, it needs to harvest
|
|
|
|
* events.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (timed_out)
|
|
|
|
eavail = list_empty(&wait.entry);
|
|
|
|
__remove_wait_queue(&ep->wq, &wait);
|
|
|
|
write_unlock_irq(&ep->lock);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2020-12-18 22:02:03 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
epoll: prevent creating circular epoll structures
In several places, an epoll fd can call another file's ->f_op->poll()
method with ep->mtx held. This is in general unsafe, because that other
file could itself be an epoll fd that contains the original epoll fd.
The code defends against this possibility in its own ->poll() method using
ep_call_nested, but there are several other unsafe calls to ->poll
elsewhere that can be made to deadlock. For example, the following simple
program causes the call in ep_insert recursively call the original fd's
->poll, leading to deadlock:
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/epoll.h>
int main(void) {
int e1, e2, p[2];
struct epoll_event evt = {
.events = EPOLLIN
};
e1 = epoll_create(1);
e2 = epoll_create(2);
pipe(p);
epoll_ctl(e2, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, e1, &evt);
epoll_ctl(e1, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, p[0], &evt);
write(p[1], p, sizeof p);
epoll_ctl(e1, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, e2, &evt);
return 0;
}
On insertion, check whether the inserted file is itself a struct epoll,
and if so, do a recursive walk to detect whether inserting this file would
create a loop of epoll structures, which could lead to deadlock.
[nelhage@ksplice.com: Use epmutex to serialize concurrent inserts]
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Reported-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Tested-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.34+, possibly earlier]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-02-25 22:44:12 +00:00
|
|
|
/**
|
2020-08-23 03:13:27 +00:00
|
|
|
* ep_loop_check_proc - verify that adding an epoll file inside another
|
2021-03-01 22:25:51 +00:00
|
|
|
* epoll structure does not violate the constraints, in
|
epoll: prevent creating circular epoll structures
In several places, an epoll fd can call another file's ->f_op->poll()
method with ep->mtx held. This is in general unsafe, because that other
file could itself be an epoll fd that contains the original epoll fd.
The code defends against this possibility in its own ->poll() method using
ep_call_nested, but there are several other unsafe calls to ->poll
elsewhere that can be made to deadlock. For example, the following simple
program causes the call in ep_insert recursively call the original fd's
->poll, leading to deadlock:
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/epoll.h>
int main(void) {
int e1, e2, p[2];
struct epoll_event evt = {
.events = EPOLLIN
};
e1 = epoll_create(1);
e2 = epoll_create(2);
pipe(p);
epoll_ctl(e2, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, e1, &evt);
epoll_ctl(e1, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, p[0], &evt);
write(p[1], p, sizeof p);
epoll_ctl(e1, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, e2, &evt);
return 0;
}
On insertion, check whether the inserted file is itself a struct epoll,
and if so, do a recursive walk to detect whether inserting this file would
create a loop of epoll structures, which could lead to deadlock.
[nelhage@ksplice.com: Use epmutex to serialize concurrent inserts]
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Reported-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Tested-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.34+, possibly earlier]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-02-25 22:44:12 +00:00
|
|
|
* terms of closed loops, or too deep chains (which can
|
|
|
|
* result in excessive stack usage).
|
|
|
|
*
|
2021-03-01 22:25:51 +00:00
|
|
|
* @ep: the &struct eventpoll to be currently checked.
|
2020-09-26 20:50:57 +00:00
|
|
|
* @depth: Current depth of the path being checked.
|
epoll: prevent creating circular epoll structures
In several places, an epoll fd can call another file's ->f_op->poll()
method with ep->mtx held. This is in general unsafe, because that other
file could itself be an epoll fd that contains the original epoll fd.
The code defends against this possibility in its own ->poll() method using
ep_call_nested, but there are several other unsafe calls to ->poll
elsewhere that can be made to deadlock. For example, the following simple
program causes the call in ep_insert recursively call the original fd's
->poll, leading to deadlock:
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/epoll.h>
int main(void) {
int e1, e2, p[2];
struct epoll_event evt = {
.events = EPOLLIN
};
e1 = epoll_create(1);
e2 = epoll_create(2);
pipe(p);
epoll_ctl(e2, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, e1, &evt);
epoll_ctl(e1, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, p[0], &evt);
write(p[1], p, sizeof p);
epoll_ctl(e1, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, e2, &evt);
return 0;
}
On insertion, check whether the inserted file is itself a struct epoll,
and if so, do a recursive walk to detect whether inserting this file would
create a loop of epoll structures, which could lead to deadlock.
[nelhage@ksplice.com: Use epmutex to serialize concurrent inserts]
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Reported-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Tested-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.34+, possibly earlier]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-02-25 22:44:12 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
2021-03-01 22:25:51 +00:00
|
|
|
* Return: %zero if adding the epoll @file inside current epoll
|
|
|
|
* structure @ep does not violate the constraints, or %-1 otherwise.
|
epoll: prevent creating circular epoll structures
In several places, an epoll fd can call another file's ->f_op->poll()
method with ep->mtx held. This is in general unsafe, because that other
file could itself be an epoll fd that contains the original epoll fd.
The code defends against this possibility in its own ->poll() method using
ep_call_nested, but there are several other unsafe calls to ->poll
elsewhere that can be made to deadlock. For example, the following simple
program causes the call in ep_insert recursively call the original fd's
->poll, leading to deadlock:
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/epoll.h>
int main(void) {
int e1, e2, p[2];
struct epoll_event evt = {
.events = EPOLLIN
};
e1 = epoll_create(1);
e2 = epoll_create(2);
pipe(p);
epoll_ctl(e2, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, e1, &evt);
epoll_ctl(e1, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, p[0], &evt);
write(p[1], p, sizeof p);
epoll_ctl(e1, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, e2, &evt);
return 0;
}
On insertion, check whether the inserted file is itself a struct epoll,
and if so, do a recursive walk to detect whether inserting this file would
create a loop of epoll structures, which could lead to deadlock.
[nelhage@ksplice.com: Use epmutex to serialize concurrent inserts]
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Reported-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Tested-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.34+, possibly earlier]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-02-25 22:44:12 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2020-09-26 20:50:57 +00:00
|
|
|
static int ep_loop_check_proc(struct eventpoll *ep, int depth)
|
epoll: prevent creating circular epoll structures
In several places, an epoll fd can call another file's ->f_op->poll()
method with ep->mtx held. This is in general unsafe, because that other
file could itself be an epoll fd that contains the original epoll fd.
The code defends against this possibility in its own ->poll() method using
ep_call_nested, but there are several other unsafe calls to ->poll
elsewhere that can be made to deadlock. For example, the following simple
program causes the call in ep_insert recursively call the original fd's
->poll, leading to deadlock:
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/epoll.h>
int main(void) {
int e1, e2, p[2];
struct epoll_event evt = {
.events = EPOLLIN
};
e1 = epoll_create(1);
e2 = epoll_create(2);
pipe(p);
epoll_ctl(e2, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, e1, &evt);
epoll_ctl(e1, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, p[0], &evt);
write(p[1], p, sizeof p);
epoll_ctl(e1, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, e2, &evt);
return 0;
}
On insertion, check whether the inserted file is itself a struct epoll,
and if so, do a recursive walk to detect whether inserting this file would
create a loop of epoll structures, which could lead to deadlock.
[nelhage@ksplice.com: Use epmutex to serialize concurrent inserts]
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Reported-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Tested-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.34+, possibly earlier]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-02-25 22:44:12 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int error = 0;
|
|
|
|
struct rb_node *rbp;
|
|
|
|
struct epitem *epi;
|
|
|
|
|
2020-08-23 03:13:27 +00:00
|
|
|
mutex_lock_nested(&ep->mtx, depth + 1);
|
2020-09-10 12:30:05 +00:00
|
|
|
ep->gen = loop_check_gen;
|
2017-09-08 23:15:18 +00:00
|
|
|
for (rbp = rb_first_cached(&ep->rbr); rbp; rbp = rb_next(rbp)) {
|
epoll: prevent creating circular epoll structures
In several places, an epoll fd can call another file's ->f_op->poll()
method with ep->mtx held. This is in general unsafe, because that other
file could itself be an epoll fd that contains the original epoll fd.
The code defends against this possibility in its own ->poll() method using
ep_call_nested, but there are several other unsafe calls to ->poll
elsewhere that can be made to deadlock. For example, the following simple
program causes the call in ep_insert recursively call the original fd's
->poll, leading to deadlock:
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/epoll.h>
int main(void) {
int e1, e2, p[2];
struct epoll_event evt = {
.events = EPOLLIN
};
e1 = epoll_create(1);
e2 = epoll_create(2);
pipe(p);
epoll_ctl(e2, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, e1, &evt);
epoll_ctl(e1, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, p[0], &evt);
write(p[1], p, sizeof p);
epoll_ctl(e1, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, e2, &evt);
return 0;
}
On insertion, check whether the inserted file is itself a struct epoll,
and if so, do a recursive walk to detect whether inserting this file would
create a loop of epoll structures, which could lead to deadlock.
[nelhage@ksplice.com: Use epmutex to serialize concurrent inserts]
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Reported-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Tested-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.34+, possibly earlier]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-02-25 22:44:12 +00:00
|
|
|
epi = rb_entry(rbp, struct epitem, rbn);
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(is_file_epoll(epi->ffd.file))) {
|
2020-09-26 20:50:57 +00:00
|
|
|
struct eventpoll *ep_tovisit;
|
epoll: limit paths
The current epoll code can be tickled to run basically indefinitely in
both loop detection path check (on ep_insert()), and in the wakeup paths.
The programs that tickle this behavior set up deeply linked networks of
epoll file descriptors that cause the epoll algorithms to traverse them
indefinitely. A couple of these sample programs have been previously
posted in this thread: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/25/297.
To fix the loop detection path check algorithms, I simply keep track of
the epoll nodes that have been already visited. Thus, the loop detection
becomes proportional to the number of epoll file descriptor and links.
This dramatically decreases the run-time of the loop check algorithm. In
one diabolical case I tried it reduced the run-time from 15 mintues (all
in kernel time) to .3 seconds.
Fixing the wakeup paths could be done at wakeup time in a similar manner
by keeping track of nodes that have already been visited, but the
complexity is harder, since there can be multiple wakeups on different
cpus...Thus, I've opted to limit the number of possible wakeup paths when
the paths are created.
This is accomplished, by noting that the end file descriptor points that
are found during the loop detection pass (from the newly added link), are
actually the sources for wakeup events. I keep a list of these file
descriptors and limit the number and length of these paths that emanate
from these 'source file descriptors'. In the current implemetation I
allow 1000 paths of length 1, 500 of length 2, 100 of length 3, 50 of
length 4 and 10 of length 5. Note that it is sufficient to check the
'source file descriptors' reachable from the newly added link, since no
other 'source file descriptors' will have newly added links. This allows
us to check only the wakeup paths that may have gotten too long, and not
re-check all possible wakeup paths on the system.
In terms of the path limit selection, I think its first worth noting that
the most common case for epoll, is probably the model where you have 1
epoll file descriptor that is monitoring n number of 'source file
descriptors'. In this case, each 'source file descriptor' has a 1 path of
length 1. Thus, I believe that the limits I'm proposing are quite
reasonable and in fact may be too generous. Thus, I'm hoping that the
proposed limits will not prevent any workloads that currently work to
fail.
In terms of locking, I have extended the use of the 'epmutex' to all
epoll_ctl add and remove operations. Currently its only used in a subset
of the add paths. I need to hold the epmutex, so that we can correctly
traverse a coherent graph, to check the number of paths. I believe that
this additional locking is probably ok, since its in the setup/teardown
paths, and doesn't affect the running paths, but it certainly is going to
add some extra overhead. Also, worth noting is that the epmuex was
recently added to the ep_ctl add operations in the initial path loop
detection code using the argument that it was not on a critical path.
Another thing to note here, is the length of epoll chains that is allowed.
Currently, eventpoll.c defines:
/* Maximum number of nesting allowed inside epoll sets */
#define EP_MAX_NESTS 4
This basically means that I am limited to a graph depth of 5 (EP_MAX_NESTS
+ 1). However, this limit is currently only enforced during the loop
check detection code, and only when the epoll file descriptors are added
in a certain order. Thus, this limit is currently easily bypassed. The
newly added check for wakeup paths, stricly limits the wakeup paths to a
length of 5, regardless of the order in which ep's are linked together.
Thus, a side-effect of the new code is a more consistent enforcement of
the graph depth.
Thus far, I've tested this, using the sample programs previously
mentioned, which now either return quickly or return -EINVAL. I've also
testing using the piptest.c epoll tester, which showed no difference in
performance. I've also created a number of different epoll networks and
tested that they behave as expectded.
I believe this solves the original diabolical test cases, while still
preserving the sane epoll nesting.
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Cc: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-01-13 01:17:43 +00:00
|
|
|
ep_tovisit = epi->ffd.file->private_data;
|
2020-09-10 12:30:05 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ep_tovisit->gen == loop_check_gen)
|
epoll: limit paths
The current epoll code can be tickled to run basically indefinitely in
both loop detection path check (on ep_insert()), and in the wakeup paths.
The programs that tickle this behavior set up deeply linked networks of
epoll file descriptors that cause the epoll algorithms to traverse them
indefinitely. A couple of these sample programs have been previously
posted in this thread: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/25/297.
To fix the loop detection path check algorithms, I simply keep track of
the epoll nodes that have been already visited. Thus, the loop detection
becomes proportional to the number of epoll file descriptor and links.
This dramatically decreases the run-time of the loop check algorithm. In
one diabolical case I tried it reduced the run-time from 15 mintues (all
in kernel time) to .3 seconds.
Fixing the wakeup paths could be done at wakeup time in a similar manner
by keeping track of nodes that have already been visited, but the
complexity is harder, since there can be multiple wakeups on different
cpus...Thus, I've opted to limit the number of possible wakeup paths when
the paths are created.
This is accomplished, by noting that the end file descriptor points that
are found during the loop detection pass (from the newly added link), are
actually the sources for wakeup events. I keep a list of these file
descriptors and limit the number and length of these paths that emanate
from these 'source file descriptors'. In the current implemetation I
allow 1000 paths of length 1, 500 of length 2, 100 of length 3, 50 of
length 4 and 10 of length 5. Note that it is sufficient to check the
'source file descriptors' reachable from the newly added link, since no
other 'source file descriptors' will have newly added links. This allows
us to check only the wakeup paths that may have gotten too long, and not
re-check all possible wakeup paths on the system.
In terms of the path limit selection, I think its first worth noting that
the most common case for epoll, is probably the model where you have 1
epoll file descriptor that is monitoring n number of 'source file
descriptors'. In this case, each 'source file descriptor' has a 1 path of
length 1. Thus, I believe that the limits I'm proposing are quite
reasonable and in fact may be too generous. Thus, I'm hoping that the
proposed limits will not prevent any workloads that currently work to
fail.
In terms of locking, I have extended the use of the 'epmutex' to all
epoll_ctl add and remove operations. Currently its only used in a subset
of the add paths. I need to hold the epmutex, so that we can correctly
traverse a coherent graph, to check the number of paths. I believe that
this additional locking is probably ok, since its in the setup/teardown
paths, and doesn't affect the running paths, but it certainly is going to
add some extra overhead. Also, worth noting is that the epmuex was
recently added to the ep_ctl add operations in the initial path loop
detection code using the argument that it was not on a critical path.
Another thing to note here, is the length of epoll chains that is allowed.
Currently, eventpoll.c defines:
/* Maximum number of nesting allowed inside epoll sets */
#define EP_MAX_NESTS 4
This basically means that I am limited to a graph depth of 5 (EP_MAX_NESTS
+ 1). However, this limit is currently only enforced during the loop
check detection code, and only when the epoll file descriptors are added
in a certain order. Thus, this limit is currently easily bypassed. The
newly added check for wakeup paths, stricly limits the wakeup paths to a
length of 5, regardless of the order in which ep's are linked together.
Thus, a side-effect of the new code is a more consistent enforcement of
the graph depth.
Thus far, I've tested this, using the sample programs previously
mentioned, which now either return quickly or return -EINVAL. I've also
testing using the piptest.c epoll tester, which showed no difference in
performance. I've also created a number of different epoll networks and
tested that they behave as expectded.
I believe this solves the original diabolical test cases, while still
preserving the sane epoll nesting.
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Cc: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-01-13 01:17:43 +00:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
2020-09-26 20:50:57 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ep_tovisit == inserting_into || depth > EP_MAX_NESTS)
|
2020-09-26 20:38:44 +00:00
|
|
|
error = -1;
|
2020-09-26 20:50:57 +00:00
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
error = ep_loop_check_proc(ep_tovisit, depth + 1);
|
epoll: prevent creating circular epoll structures
In several places, an epoll fd can call another file's ->f_op->poll()
method with ep->mtx held. This is in general unsafe, because that other
file could itself be an epoll fd that contains the original epoll fd.
The code defends against this possibility in its own ->poll() method using
ep_call_nested, but there are several other unsafe calls to ->poll
elsewhere that can be made to deadlock. For example, the following simple
program causes the call in ep_insert recursively call the original fd's
->poll, leading to deadlock:
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/epoll.h>
int main(void) {
int e1, e2, p[2];
struct epoll_event evt = {
.events = EPOLLIN
};
e1 = epoll_create(1);
e2 = epoll_create(2);
pipe(p);
epoll_ctl(e2, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, e1, &evt);
epoll_ctl(e1, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, p[0], &evt);
write(p[1], p, sizeof p);
epoll_ctl(e1, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, e2, &evt);
return 0;
}
On insertion, check whether the inserted file is itself a struct epoll,
and if so, do a recursive walk to detect whether inserting this file would
create a loop of epoll structures, which could lead to deadlock.
[nelhage@ksplice.com: Use epmutex to serialize concurrent inserts]
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Reported-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Tested-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.34+, possibly earlier]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-02-25 22:44:12 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
epoll: limit paths
The current epoll code can be tickled to run basically indefinitely in
both loop detection path check (on ep_insert()), and in the wakeup paths.
The programs that tickle this behavior set up deeply linked networks of
epoll file descriptors that cause the epoll algorithms to traverse them
indefinitely. A couple of these sample programs have been previously
posted in this thread: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/25/297.
To fix the loop detection path check algorithms, I simply keep track of
the epoll nodes that have been already visited. Thus, the loop detection
becomes proportional to the number of epoll file descriptor and links.
This dramatically decreases the run-time of the loop check algorithm. In
one diabolical case I tried it reduced the run-time from 15 mintues (all
in kernel time) to .3 seconds.
Fixing the wakeup paths could be done at wakeup time in a similar manner
by keeping track of nodes that have already been visited, but the
complexity is harder, since there can be multiple wakeups on different
cpus...Thus, I've opted to limit the number of possible wakeup paths when
the paths are created.
This is accomplished, by noting that the end file descriptor points that
are found during the loop detection pass (from the newly added link), are
actually the sources for wakeup events. I keep a list of these file
descriptors and limit the number and length of these paths that emanate
from these 'source file descriptors'. In the current implemetation I
allow 1000 paths of length 1, 500 of length 2, 100 of length 3, 50 of
length 4 and 10 of length 5. Note that it is sufficient to check the
'source file descriptors' reachable from the newly added link, since no
other 'source file descriptors' will have newly added links. This allows
us to check only the wakeup paths that may have gotten too long, and not
re-check all possible wakeup paths on the system.
In terms of the path limit selection, I think its first worth noting that
the most common case for epoll, is probably the model where you have 1
epoll file descriptor that is monitoring n number of 'source file
descriptors'. In this case, each 'source file descriptor' has a 1 path of
length 1. Thus, I believe that the limits I'm proposing are quite
reasonable and in fact may be too generous. Thus, I'm hoping that the
proposed limits will not prevent any workloads that currently work to
fail.
In terms of locking, I have extended the use of the 'epmutex' to all
epoll_ctl add and remove operations. Currently its only used in a subset
of the add paths. I need to hold the epmutex, so that we can correctly
traverse a coherent graph, to check the number of paths. I believe that
this additional locking is probably ok, since its in the setup/teardown
paths, and doesn't affect the running paths, but it certainly is going to
add some extra overhead. Also, worth noting is that the epmuex was
recently added to the ep_ctl add operations in the initial path loop
detection code using the argument that it was not on a critical path.
Another thing to note here, is the length of epoll chains that is allowed.
Currently, eventpoll.c defines:
/* Maximum number of nesting allowed inside epoll sets */
#define EP_MAX_NESTS 4
This basically means that I am limited to a graph depth of 5 (EP_MAX_NESTS
+ 1). However, this limit is currently only enforced during the loop
check detection code, and only when the epoll file descriptors are added
in a certain order. Thus, this limit is currently easily bypassed. The
newly added check for wakeup paths, stricly limits the wakeup paths to a
length of 5, regardless of the order in which ep's are linked together.
Thus, a side-effect of the new code is a more consistent enforcement of
the graph depth.
Thus far, I've tested this, using the sample programs previously
mentioned, which now either return quickly or return -EINVAL. I've also
testing using the piptest.c epoll tester, which showed no difference in
performance. I've also created a number of different epoll networks and
tested that they behave as expectded.
I believe this solves the original diabolical test cases, while still
preserving the sane epoll nesting.
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Cc: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-01-13 01:17:43 +00:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If we've reached a file that is not associated with
|
|
|
|
* an ep, then we need to check if the newly added
|
|
|
|
* links are going to add too many wakeup paths. We do
|
|
|
|
* this by adding it to the tfile_check_list, if it's
|
|
|
|
* not already there, and calling reverse_path_check()
|
|
|
|
* during ep_insert().
|
|
|
|
*/
|
epoll: take epitem list out of struct file
Move the head of epitem list out of struct file; for epoll ones it's
moved into struct eventpoll (->refs there), for non-epoll - into
the new object (struct epitem_head). In place of ->f_ep_links we
leave a pointer to the list head (->f_ep).
->f_ep is protected by ->f_lock and it's zeroed as soon as the list
of epitems becomes empty (that can happen only in ep_remove() by
now).
The list of files for reverse path check is *not* going through
struct file now - it's a single-linked list going through epitem_head
instances. It's terminated by ERR_PTR(-1) (== EP_UNACTIVE_POINTER),
so the elements of list can be distinguished by head->next != NULL.
epitem_head instances are allocated at ep_insert() time (by
attach_epitem()) and freed either by ep_remove() (if it empties
the set of epitems *and* epitem_head does not belong to the
reverse path check list) or by clear_tfile_check_list() when
the list is emptied (if the set of epitems is empty by that
point). Allocations are done from a separate slab - minimal kmalloc()
size is too large on some architectures.
As the result, we trim struct file _and_ get rid of the games with
temporary file references.
Locking and barriers are interesting (aren't they always); see unlist_file()
and ep_remove() for details. The non-obvious part is that ep_remove() needs
to decide if it will be the one to free the damn thing *before* actually
storing NULL to head->epitems.first - that's what smp_load_acquire is for
in there. unlist_file() lockless path is safe, since we hit it only if
we observe NULL in head->epitems.first and whoever had done that store is
guaranteed to have observed non-NULL in head->next. IOW, their last access
had been the store of NULL into ->epitems.first and we can safely free
the sucker. OTOH, we are under rcu_read_lock() and both epitem and
epitem->file have their freeing RCU-delayed. So if we see non-NULL
->epitems.first, we can grab ->f_lock (all epitems in there share the
same struct file) and safely recheck the emptiness of ->epitems; again,
->next is still non-NULL, so ep_remove() couldn't have freed head yet.
->f_lock serializes us wrt ep_remove(); the rest is trivial.
Note that once head->epitems becomes NULL, nothing can get inserted into
it - the only remaining reference to head after that point is from the
reverse path check list.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-10-02 00:45:51 +00:00
|
|
|
list_file(epi->ffd.file);
|
epoll: prevent creating circular epoll structures
In several places, an epoll fd can call another file's ->f_op->poll()
method with ep->mtx held. This is in general unsafe, because that other
file could itself be an epoll fd that contains the original epoll fd.
The code defends against this possibility in its own ->poll() method using
ep_call_nested, but there are several other unsafe calls to ->poll
elsewhere that can be made to deadlock. For example, the following simple
program causes the call in ep_insert recursively call the original fd's
->poll, leading to deadlock:
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/epoll.h>
int main(void) {
int e1, e2, p[2];
struct epoll_event evt = {
.events = EPOLLIN
};
e1 = epoll_create(1);
e2 = epoll_create(2);
pipe(p);
epoll_ctl(e2, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, e1, &evt);
epoll_ctl(e1, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, p[0], &evt);
write(p[1], p, sizeof p);
epoll_ctl(e1, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, e2, &evt);
return 0;
}
On insertion, check whether the inserted file is itself a struct epoll,
and if so, do a recursive walk to detect whether inserting this file would
create a loop of epoll structures, which could lead to deadlock.
[nelhage@ksplice.com: Use epmutex to serialize concurrent inserts]
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Reported-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Tested-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.34+, possibly earlier]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-02-25 22:44:12 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mutex_unlock(&ep->mtx);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
2020-09-26 20:50:57 +00:00
|
|
|
* ep_loop_check - Performs a check to verify that adding an epoll file (@to)
|
2021-03-01 22:25:51 +00:00
|
|
|
* into another epoll file (represented by @ep) does not create
|
epoll: prevent creating circular epoll structures
In several places, an epoll fd can call another file's ->f_op->poll()
method with ep->mtx held. This is in general unsafe, because that other
file could itself be an epoll fd that contains the original epoll fd.
The code defends against this possibility in its own ->poll() method using
ep_call_nested, but there are several other unsafe calls to ->poll
elsewhere that can be made to deadlock. For example, the following simple
program causes the call in ep_insert recursively call the original fd's
->poll, leading to deadlock:
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/epoll.h>
int main(void) {
int e1, e2, p[2];
struct epoll_event evt = {
.events = EPOLLIN
};
e1 = epoll_create(1);
e2 = epoll_create(2);
pipe(p);
epoll_ctl(e2, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, e1, &evt);
epoll_ctl(e1, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, p[0], &evt);
write(p[1], p, sizeof p);
epoll_ctl(e1, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, e2, &evt);
return 0;
}
On insertion, check whether the inserted file is itself a struct epoll,
and if so, do a recursive walk to detect whether inserting this file would
create a loop of epoll structures, which could lead to deadlock.
[nelhage@ksplice.com: Use epmutex to serialize concurrent inserts]
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Reported-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Tested-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.34+, possibly earlier]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-02-25 22:44:12 +00:00
|
|
|
* closed loops or too deep chains.
|
|
|
|
*
|
2021-03-01 22:25:51 +00:00
|
|
|
* @ep: Pointer to the epoll we are inserting into.
|
2020-09-26 20:50:57 +00:00
|
|
|
* @to: Pointer to the epoll to be inserted.
|
epoll: prevent creating circular epoll structures
In several places, an epoll fd can call another file's ->f_op->poll()
method with ep->mtx held. This is in general unsafe, because that other
file could itself be an epoll fd that contains the original epoll fd.
The code defends against this possibility in its own ->poll() method using
ep_call_nested, but there are several other unsafe calls to ->poll
elsewhere that can be made to deadlock. For example, the following simple
program causes the call in ep_insert recursively call the original fd's
->poll, leading to deadlock:
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/epoll.h>
int main(void) {
int e1, e2, p[2];
struct epoll_event evt = {
.events = EPOLLIN
};
e1 = epoll_create(1);
e2 = epoll_create(2);
pipe(p);
epoll_ctl(e2, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, e1, &evt);
epoll_ctl(e1, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, p[0], &evt);
write(p[1], p, sizeof p);
epoll_ctl(e1, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, e2, &evt);
return 0;
}
On insertion, check whether the inserted file is itself a struct epoll,
and if so, do a recursive walk to detect whether inserting this file would
create a loop of epoll structures, which could lead to deadlock.
[nelhage@ksplice.com: Use epmutex to serialize concurrent inserts]
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Reported-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Tested-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.34+, possibly earlier]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-02-25 22:44:12 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
2021-03-01 22:25:51 +00:00
|
|
|
* Return: %zero if adding the epoll @to inside the epoll @from
|
|
|
|
* does not violate the constraints, or %-1 otherwise.
|
epoll: prevent creating circular epoll structures
In several places, an epoll fd can call another file's ->f_op->poll()
method with ep->mtx held. This is in general unsafe, because that other
file could itself be an epoll fd that contains the original epoll fd.
The code defends against this possibility in its own ->poll() method using
ep_call_nested, but there are several other unsafe calls to ->poll
elsewhere that can be made to deadlock. For example, the following simple
program causes the call in ep_insert recursively call the original fd's
->poll, leading to deadlock:
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/epoll.h>
int main(void) {
int e1, e2, p[2];
struct epoll_event evt = {
.events = EPOLLIN
};
e1 = epoll_create(1);
e2 = epoll_create(2);
pipe(p);
epoll_ctl(e2, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, e1, &evt);
epoll_ctl(e1, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, p[0], &evt);
write(p[1], p, sizeof p);
epoll_ctl(e1, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, e2, &evt);
return 0;
}
On insertion, check whether the inserted file is itself a struct epoll,
and if so, do a recursive walk to detect whether inserting this file would
create a loop of epoll structures, which could lead to deadlock.
[nelhage@ksplice.com: Use epmutex to serialize concurrent inserts]
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Reported-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Tested-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.34+, possibly earlier]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-02-25 22:44:12 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2020-09-26 20:50:57 +00:00
|
|
|
static int ep_loop_check(struct eventpoll *ep, struct eventpoll *to)
|
epoll: prevent creating circular epoll structures
In several places, an epoll fd can call another file's ->f_op->poll()
method with ep->mtx held. This is in general unsafe, because that other
file could itself be an epoll fd that contains the original epoll fd.
The code defends against this possibility in its own ->poll() method using
ep_call_nested, but there are several other unsafe calls to ->poll
elsewhere that can be made to deadlock. For example, the following simple
program causes the call in ep_insert recursively call the original fd's
->poll, leading to deadlock:
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/epoll.h>
int main(void) {
int e1, e2, p[2];
struct epoll_event evt = {
.events = EPOLLIN
};
e1 = epoll_create(1);
e2 = epoll_create(2);
pipe(p);
epoll_ctl(e2, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, e1, &evt);
epoll_ctl(e1, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, p[0], &evt);
write(p[1], p, sizeof p);
epoll_ctl(e1, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, e2, &evt);
return 0;
}
On insertion, check whether the inserted file is itself a struct epoll,
and if so, do a recursive walk to detect whether inserting this file would
create a loop of epoll structures, which could lead to deadlock.
[nelhage@ksplice.com: Use epmutex to serialize concurrent inserts]
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Reported-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Tested-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.34+, possibly earlier]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-02-25 22:44:12 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2020-09-26 20:29:02 +00:00
|
|
|
inserting_into = ep;
|
2020-09-26 20:50:57 +00:00
|
|
|
return ep_loop_check_proc(to, 0);
|
epoll: limit paths
The current epoll code can be tickled to run basically indefinitely in
both loop detection path check (on ep_insert()), and in the wakeup paths.
The programs that tickle this behavior set up deeply linked networks of
epoll file descriptors that cause the epoll algorithms to traverse them
indefinitely. A couple of these sample programs have been previously
posted in this thread: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/25/297.
To fix the loop detection path check algorithms, I simply keep track of
the epoll nodes that have been already visited. Thus, the loop detection
becomes proportional to the number of epoll file descriptor and links.
This dramatically decreases the run-time of the loop check algorithm. In
one diabolical case I tried it reduced the run-time from 15 mintues (all
in kernel time) to .3 seconds.
Fixing the wakeup paths could be done at wakeup time in a similar manner
by keeping track of nodes that have already been visited, but the
complexity is harder, since there can be multiple wakeups on different
cpus...Thus, I've opted to limit the number of possible wakeup paths when
the paths are created.
This is accomplished, by noting that the end file descriptor points that
are found during the loop detection pass (from the newly added link), are
actually the sources for wakeup events. I keep a list of these file
descriptors and limit the number and length of these paths that emanate
from these 'source file descriptors'. In the current implemetation I
allow 1000 paths of length 1, 500 of length 2, 100 of length 3, 50 of
length 4 and 10 of length 5. Note that it is sufficient to check the
'source file descriptors' reachable from the newly added link, since no
other 'source file descriptors' will have newly added links. This allows
us to check only the wakeup paths that may have gotten too long, and not
re-check all possible wakeup paths on the system.
In terms of the path limit selection, I think its first worth noting that
the most common case for epoll, is probably the model where you have 1
epoll file descriptor that is monitoring n number of 'source file
descriptors'. In this case, each 'source file descriptor' has a 1 path of
length 1. Thus, I believe that the limits I'm proposing are quite
reasonable and in fact may be too generous. Thus, I'm hoping that the
proposed limits will not prevent any workloads that currently work to
fail.
In terms of locking, I have extended the use of the 'epmutex' to all
epoll_ctl add and remove operations. Currently its only used in a subset
of the add paths. I need to hold the epmutex, so that we can correctly
traverse a coherent graph, to check the number of paths. I believe that
this additional locking is probably ok, since its in the setup/teardown
paths, and doesn't affect the running paths, but it certainly is going to
add some extra overhead. Also, worth noting is that the epmuex was
recently added to the ep_ctl add operations in the initial path loop
detection code using the argument that it was not on a critical path.
Another thing to note here, is the length of epoll chains that is allowed.
Currently, eventpoll.c defines:
/* Maximum number of nesting allowed inside epoll sets */
#define EP_MAX_NESTS 4
This basically means that I am limited to a graph depth of 5 (EP_MAX_NESTS
+ 1). However, this limit is currently only enforced during the loop
check detection code, and only when the epoll file descriptors are added
in a certain order. Thus, this limit is currently easily bypassed. The
newly added check for wakeup paths, stricly limits the wakeup paths to a
length of 5, regardless of the order in which ep's are linked together.
Thus, a side-effect of the new code is a more consistent enforcement of
the graph depth.
Thus far, I've tested this, using the sample programs previously
mentioned, which now either return quickly or return -EINVAL. I've also
testing using the piptest.c epoll tester, which showed no difference in
performance. I've also created a number of different epoll networks and
tested that they behave as expectded.
I believe this solves the original diabolical test cases, while still
preserving the sane epoll nesting.
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Cc: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-01-13 01:17:43 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void clear_tfile_check_list(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
epoll: take epitem list out of struct file
Move the head of epitem list out of struct file; for epoll ones it's
moved into struct eventpoll (->refs there), for non-epoll - into
the new object (struct epitem_head). In place of ->f_ep_links we
leave a pointer to the list head (->f_ep).
->f_ep is protected by ->f_lock and it's zeroed as soon as the list
of epitems becomes empty (that can happen only in ep_remove() by
now).
The list of files for reverse path check is *not* going through
struct file now - it's a single-linked list going through epitem_head
instances. It's terminated by ERR_PTR(-1) (== EP_UNACTIVE_POINTER),
so the elements of list can be distinguished by head->next != NULL.
epitem_head instances are allocated at ep_insert() time (by
attach_epitem()) and freed either by ep_remove() (if it empties
the set of epitems *and* epitem_head does not belong to the
reverse path check list) or by clear_tfile_check_list() when
the list is emptied (if the set of epitems is empty by that
point). Allocations are done from a separate slab - minimal kmalloc()
size is too large on some architectures.
As the result, we trim struct file _and_ get rid of the games with
temporary file references.
Locking and barriers are interesting (aren't they always); see unlist_file()
and ep_remove() for details. The non-obvious part is that ep_remove() needs
to decide if it will be the one to free the damn thing *before* actually
storing NULL to head->epitems.first - that's what smp_load_acquire is for
in there. unlist_file() lockless path is safe, since we hit it only if
we observe NULL in head->epitems.first and whoever had done that store is
guaranteed to have observed non-NULL in head->next. IOW, their last access
had been the store of NULL into ->epitems.first and we can safely free
the sucker. OTOH, we are under rcu_read_lock() and both epitem and
epitem->file have their freeing RCU-delayed. So if we see non-NULL
->epitems.first, we can grab ->f_lock (all epitems in there share the
same struct file) and safely recheck the emptiness of ->epitems; again,
->next is still non-NULL, so ep_remove() couldn't have freed head yet.
->f_lock serializes us wrt ep_remove(); the rest is trivial.
Note that once head->epitems becomes NULL, nothing can get inserted into
it - the only remaining reference to head after that point is from the
reverse path check list.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-10-02 00:45:51 +00:00
|
|
|
rcu_read_lock();
|
|
|
|
while (tfile_check_list != EP_UNACTIVE_PTR) {
|
|
|
|
struct epitems_head *head = tfile_check_list;
|
|
|
|
tfile_check_list = head->next;
|
|
|
|
unlist_file(head);
|
epoll: limit paths
The current epoll code can be tickled to run basically indefinitely in
both loop detection path check (on ep_insert()), and in the wakeup paths.
The programs that tickle this behavior set up deeply linked networks of
epoll file descriptors that cause the epoll algorithms to traverse them
indefinitely. A couple of these sample programs have been previously
posted in this thread: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/25/297.
To fix the loop detection path check algorithms, I simply keep track of
the epoll nodes that have been already visited. Thus, the loop detection
becomes proportional to the number of epoll file descriptor and links.
This dramatically decreases the run-time of the loop check algorithm. In
one diabolical case I tried it reduced the run-time from 15 mintues (all
in kernel time) to .3 seconds.
Fixing the wakeup paths could be done at wakeup time in a similar manner
by keeping track of nodes that have already been visited, but the
complexity is harder, since there can be multiple wakeups on different
cpus...Thus, I've opted to limit the number of possible wakeup paths when
the paths are created.
This is accomplished, by noting that the end file descriptor points that
are found during the loop detection pass (from the newly added link), are
actually the sources for wakeup events. I keep a list of these file
descriptors and limit the number and length of these paths that emanate
from these 'source file descriptors'. In the current implemetation I
allow 1000 paths of length 1, 500 of length 2, 100 of length 3, 50 of
length 4 and 10 of length 5. Note that it is sufficient to check the
'source file descriptors' reachable from the newly added link, since no
other 'source file descriptors' will have newly added links. This allows
us to check only the wakeup paths that may have gotten too long, and not
re-check all possible wakeup paths on the system.
In terms of the path limit selection, I think its first worth noting that
the most common case for epoll, is probably the model where you have 1
epoll file descriptor that is monitoring n number of 'source file
descriptors'. In this case, each 'source file descriptor' has a 1 path of
length 1. Thus, I believe that the limits I'm proposing are quite
reasonable and in fact may be too generous. Thus, I'm hoping that the
proposed limits will not prevent any workloads that currently work to
fail.
In terms of locking, I have extended the use of the 'epmutex' to all
epoll_ctl add and remove operations. Currently its only used in a subset
of the add paths. I need to hold the epmutex, so that we can correctly
traverse a coherent graph, to check the number of paths. I believe that
this additional locking is probably ok, since its in the setup/teardown
paths, and doesn't affect the running paths, but it certainly is going to
add some extra overhead. Also, worth noting is that the epmuex was
recently added to the ep_ctl add operations in the initial path loop
detection code using the argument that it was not on a critical path.
Another thing to note here, is the length of epoll chains that is allowed.
Currently, eventpoll.c defines:
/* Maximum number of nesting allowed inside epoll sets */
#define EP_MAX_NESTS 4
This basically means that I am limited to a graph depth of 5 (EP_MAX_NESTS
+ 1). However, this limit is currently only enforced during the loop
check detection code, and only when the epoll file descriptors are added
in a certain order. Thus, this limit is currently easily bypassed. The
newly added check for wakeup paths, stricly limits the wakeup paths to a
length of 5, regardless of the order in which ep's are linked together.
Thus, a side-effect of the new code is a more consistent enforcement of
the graph depth.
Thus far, I've tested this, using the sample programs previously
mentioned, which now either return quickly or return -EINVAL. I've also
testing using the piptest.c epoll tester, which showed no difference in
performance. I've also created a number of different epoll networks and
tested that they behave as expectded.
I believe this solves the original diabolical test cases, while still
preserving the sane epoll nesting.
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Cc: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-01-13 01:17:43 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
epoll: take epitem list out of struct file
Move the head of epitem list out of struct file; for epoll ones it's
moved into struct eventpoll (->refs there), for non-epoll - into
the new object (struct epitem_head). In place of ->f_ep_links we
leave a pointer to the list head (->f_ep).
->f_ep is protected by ->f_lock and it's zeroed as soon as the list
of epitems becomes empty (that can happen only in ep_remove() by
now).
The list of files for reverse path check is *not* going through
struct file now - it's a single-linked list going through epitem_head
instances. It's terminated by ERR_PTR(-1) (== EP_UNACTIVE_POINTER),
so the elements of list can be distinguished by head->next != NULL.
epitem_head instances are allocated at ep_insert() time (by
attach_epitem()) and freed either by ep_remove() (if it empties
the set of epitems *and* epitem_head does not belong to the
reverse path check list) or by clear_tfile_check_list() when
the list is emptied (if the set of epitems is empty by that
point). Allocations are done from a separate slab - minimal kmalloc()
size is too large on some architectures.
As the result, we trim struct file _and_ get rid of the games with
temporary file references.
Locking and barriers are interesting (aren't they always); see unlist_file()
and ep_remove() for details. The non-obvious part is that ep_remove() needs
to decide if it will be the one to free the damn thing *before* actually
storing NULL to head->epitems.first - that's what smp_load_acquire is for
in there. unlist_file() lockless path is safe, since we hit it only if
we observe NULL in head->epitems.first and whoever had done that store is
guaranteed to have observed non-NULL in head->next. IOW, their last access
had been the store of NULL into ->epitems.first and we can safely free
the sucker. OTOH, we are under rcu_read_lock() and both epitem and
epitem->file have their freeing RCU-delayed. So if we see non-NULL
->epitems.first, we can grab ->f_lock (all epitems in there share the
same struct file) and safely recheck the emptiness of ->epitems; again,
->next is still non-NULL, so ep_remove() couldn't have freed head yet.
->f_lock serializes us wrt ep_remove(); the rest is trivial.
Note that once head->epitems becomes NULL, nothing can get inserted into
it - the only remaining reference to head after that point is from the
reverse path check list.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-10-02 00:45:51 +00:00
|
|
|
rcu_read_unlock();
|
epoll: prevent creating circular epoll structures
In several places, an epoll fd can call another file's ->f_op->poll()
method with ep->mtx held. This is in general unsafe, because that other
file could itself be an epoll fd that contains the original epoll fd.
The code defends against this possibility in its own ->poll() method using
ep_call_nested, but there are several other unsafe calls to ->poll
elsewhere that can be made to deadlock. For example, the following simple
program causes the call in ep_insert recursively call the original fd's
->poll, leading to deadlock:
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/epoll.h>
int main(void) {
int e1, e2, p[2];
struct epoll_event evt = {
.events = EPOLLIN
};
e1 = epoll_create(1);
e2 = epoll_create(2);
pipe(p);
epoll_ctl(e2, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, e1, &evt);
epoll_ctl(e1, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, p[0], &evt);
write(p[1], p, sizeof p);
epoll_ctl(e1, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, e2, &evt);
return 0;
}
On insertion, check whether the inserted file is itself a struct epoll,
and if so, do a recursive walk to detect whether inserting this file would
create a loop of epoll structures, which could lead to deadlock.
[nelhage@ksplice.com: Use epmutex to serialize concurrent inserts]
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Reported-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Tested-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.34+, possibly earlier]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-02-25 22:44:12 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2008-08-12 22:09:01 +00:00
|
|
|
* Open an eventpoll file descriptor.
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2018-03-11 10:34:30 +00:00
|
|
|
static int do_epoll_create(int flags)
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
epoll: limit paths
The current epoll code can be tickled to run basically indefinitely in
both loop detection path check (on ep_insert()), and in the wakeup paths.
The programs that tickle this behavior set up deeply linked networks of
epoll file descriptors that cause the epoll algorithms to traverse them
indefinitely. A couple of these sample programs have been previously
posted in this thread: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/25/297.
To fix the loop detection path check algorithms, I simply keep track of
the epoll nodes that have been already visited. Thus, the loop detection
becomes proportional to the number of epoll file descriptor and links.
This dramatically decreases the run-time of the loop check algorithm. In
one diabolical case I tried it reduced the run-time from 15 mintues (all
in kernel time) to .3 seconds.
Fixing the wakeup paths could be done at wakeup time in a similar manner
by keeping track of nodes that have already been visited, but the
complexity is harder, since there can be multiple wakeups on different
cpus...Thus, I've opted to limit the number of possible wakeup paths when
the paths are created.
This is accomplished, by noting that the end file descriptor points that
are found during the loop detection pass (from the newly added link), are
actually the sources for wakeup events. I keep a list of these file
descriptors and limit the number and length of these paths that emanate
from these 'source file descriptors'. In the current implemetation I
allow 1000 paths of length 1, 500 of length 2, 100 of length 3, 50 of
length 4 and 10 of length 5. Note that it is sufficient to check the
'source file descriptors' reachable from the newly added link, since no
other 'source file descriptors' will have newly added links. This allows
us to check only the wakeup paths that may have gotten too long, and not
re-check all possible wakeup paths on the system.
In terms of the path limit selection, I think its first worth noting that
the most common case for epoll, is probably the model where you have 1
epoll file descriptor that is monitoring n number of 'source file
descriptors'. In this case, each 'source file descriptor' has a 1 path of
length 1. Thus, I believe that the limits I'm proposing are quite
reasonable and in fact may be too generous. Thus, I'm hoping that the
proposed limits will not prevent any workloads that currently work to
fail.
In terms of locking, I have extended the use of the 'epmutex' to all
epoll_ctl add and remove operations. Currently its only used in a subset
of the add paths. I need to hold the epmutex, so that we can correctly
traverse a coherent graph, to check the number of paths. I believe that
this additional locking is probably ok, since its in the setup/teardown
paths, and doesn't affect the running paths, but it certainly is going to
add some extra overhead. Also, worth noting is that the epmuex was
recently added to the ep_ctl add operations in the initial path loop
detection code using the argument that it was not on a critical path.
Another thing to note here, is the length of epoll chains that is allowed.
Currently, eventpoll.c defines:
/* Maximum number of nesting allowed inside epoll sets */
#define EP_MAX_NESTS 4
This basically means that I am limited to a graph depth of 5 (EP_MAX_NESTS
+ 1). However, this limit is currently only enforced during the loop
check detection code, and only when the epoll file descriptors are added
in a certain order. Thus, this limit is currently easily bypassed. The
newly added check for wakeup paths, stricly limits the wakeup paths to a
length of 5, regardless of the order in which ep's are linked together.
Thus, a side-effect of the new code is a more consistent enforcement of
the graph depth.
Thus far, I've tested this, using the sample programs previously
mentioned, which now either return quickly or return -EINVAL. I've also
testing using the piptest.c epoll tester, which showed no difference in
performance. I've also created a number of different epoll networks and
tested that they behave as expectded.
I believe this solves the original diabolical test cases, while still
preserving the sane epoll nesting.
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Cc: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-01-13 01:17:43 +00:00
|
|
|
int error, fd;
|
2009-03-31 22:24:12 +00:00
|
|
|
struct eventpoll *ep = NULL;
|
epoll: limit paths
The current epoll code can be tickled to run basically indefinitely in
both loop detection path check (on ep_insert()), and in the wakeup paths.
The programs that tickle this behavior set up deeply linked networks of
epoll file descriptors that cause the epoll algorithms to traverse them
indefinitely. A couple of these sample programs have been previously
posted in this thread: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/25/297.
To fix the loop detection path check algorithms, I simply keep track of
the epoll nodes that have been already visited. Thus, the loop detection
becomes proportional to the number of epoll file descriptor and links.
This dramatically decreases the run-time of the loop check algorithm. In
one diabolical case I tried it reduced the run-time from 15 mintues (all
in kernel time) to .3 seconds.
Fixing the wakeup paths could be done at wakeup time in a similar manner
by keeping track of nodes that have already been visited, but the
complexity is harder, since there can be multiple wakeups on different
cpus...Thus, I've opted to limit the number of possible wakeup paths when
the paths are created.
This is accomplished, by noting that the end file descriptor points that
are found during the loop detection pass (from the newly added link), are
actually the sources for wakeup events. I keep a list of these file
descriptors and limit the number and length of these paths that emanate
from these 'source file descriptors'. In the current implemetation I
allow 1000 paths of length 1, 500 of length 2, 100 of length 3, 50 of
length 4 and 10 of length 5. Note that it is sufficient to check the
'source file descriptors' reachable from the newly added link, since no
other 'source file descriptors' will have newly added links. This allows
us to check only the wakeup paths that may have gotten too long, and not
re-check all possible wakeup paths on the system.
In terms of the path limit selection, I think its first worth noting that
the most common case for epoll, is probably the model where you have 1
epoll file descriptor that is monitoring n number of 'source file
descriptors'. In this case, each 'source file descriptor' has a 1 path of
length 1. Thus, I believe that the limits I'm proposing are quite
reasonable and in fact may be too generous. Thus, I'm hoping that the
proposed limits will not prevent any workloads that currently work to
fail.
In terms of locking, I have extended the use of the 'epmutex' to all
epoll_ctl add and remove operations. Currently its only used in a subset
of the add paths. I need to hold the epmutex, so that we can correctly
traverse a coherent graph, to check the number of paths. I believe that
this additional locking is probably ok, since its in the setup/teardown
paths, and doesn't affect the running paths, but it certainly is going to
add some extra overhead. Also, worth noting is that the epmuex was
recently added to the ep_ctl add operations in the initial path loop
detection code using the argument that it was not on a critical path.
Another thing to note here, is the length of epoll chains that is allowed.
Currently, eventpoll.c defines:
/* Maximum number of nesting allowed inside epoll sets */
#define EP_MAX_NESTS 4
This basically means that I am limited to a graph depth of 5 (EP_MAX_NESTS
+ 1). However, this limit is currently only enforced during the loop
check detection code, and only when the epoll file descriptors are added
in a certain order. Thus, this limit is currently easily bypassed. The
newly added check for wakeup paths, stricly limits the wakeup paths to a
length of 5, regardless of the order in which ep's are linked together.
Thus, a side-effect of the new code is a more consistent enforcement of
the graph depth.
Thus far, I've tested this, using the sample programs previously
mentioned, which now either return quickly or return -EINVAL. I've also
testing using the piptest.c epoll tester, which showed no difference in
performance. I've also created a number of different epoll networks and
tested that they behave as expectded.
I believe this solves the original diabolical test cases, while still
preserving the sane epoll nesting.
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Cc: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-01-13 01:17:43 +00:00
|
|
|
struct file *file;
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-07-24 04:29:42 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Check the EPOLL_* constant for consistency. */
|
|
|
|
BUILD_BUG_ON(EPOLL_CLOEXEC != O_CLOEXEC);
|
|
|
|
|
2009-03-31 22:24:11 +00:00
|
|
|
if (flags & ~EPOLL_CLOEXEC)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2009-03-31 22:24:12 +00:00
|
|
|
* Create the internal data structure ("struct eventpoll").
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2008-07-24 04:29:43 +00:00
|
|
|
error = ep_alloc(&ep);
|
2009-03-31 22:24:12 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error < 0)
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Creates all the items needed to setup an eventpoll file. That is,
|
2008-02-23 11:46:49 +00:00
|
|
|
* a file structure and a free file descriptor.
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
epoll: limit paths
The current epoll code can be tickled to run basically indefinitely in
both loop detection path check (on ep_insert()), and in the wakeup paths.
The programs that tickle this behavior set up deeply linked networks of
epoll file descriptors that cause the epoll algorithms to traverse them
indefinitely. A couple of these sample programs have been previously
posted in this thread: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/25/297.
To fix the loop detection path check algorithms, I simply keep track of
the epoll nodes that have been already visited. Thus, the loop detection
becomes proportional to the number of epoll file descriptor and links.
This dramatically decreases the run-time of the loop check algorithm. In
one diabolical case I tried it reduced the run-time from 15 mintues (all
in kernel time) to .3 seconds.
Fixing the wakeup paths could be done at wakeup time in a similar manner
by keeping track of nodes that have already been visited, but the
complexity is harder, since there can be multiple wakeups on different
cpus...Thus, I've opted to limit the number of possible wakeup paths when
the paths are created.
This is accomplished, by noting that the end file descriptor points that
are found during the loop detection pass (from the newly added link), are
actually the sources for wakeup events. I keep a list of these file
descriptors and limit the number and length of these paths that emanate
from these 'source file descriptors'. In the current implemetation I
allow 1000 paths of length 1, 500 of length 2, 100 of length 3, 50 of
length 4 and 10 of length 5. Note that it is sufficient to check the
'source file descriptors' reachable from the newly added link, since no
other 'source file descriptors' will have newly added links. This allows
us to check only the wakeup paths that may have gotten too long, and not
re-check all possible wakeup paths on the system.
In terms of the path limit selection, I think its first worth noting that
the most common case for epoll, is probably the model where you have 1
epoll file descriptor that is monitoring n number of 'source file
descriptors'. In this case, each 'source file descriptor' has a 1 path of
length 1. Thus, I believe that the limits I'm proposing are quite
reasonable and in fact may be too generous. Thus, I'm hoping that the
proposed limits will not prevent any workloads that currently work to
fail.
In terms of locking, I have extended the use of the 'epmutex' to all
epoll_ctl add and remove operations. Currently its only used in a subset
of the add paths. I need to hold the epmutex, so that we can correctly
traverse a coherent graph, to check the number of paths. I believe that
this additional locking is probably ok, since its in the setup/teardown
paths, and doesn't affect the running paths, but it certainly is going to
add some extra overhead. Also, worth noting is that the epmuex was
recently added to the ep_ctl add operations in the initial path loop
detection code using the argument that it was not on a critical path.
Another thing to note here, is the length of epoll chains that is allowed.
Currently, eventpoll.c defines:
/* Maximum number of nesting allowed inside epoll sets */
#define EP_MAX_NESTS 4
This basically means that I am limited to a graph depth of 5 (EP_MAX_NESTS
+ 1). However, this limit is currently only enforced during the loop
check detection code, and only when the epoll file descriptors are added
in a certain order. Thus, this limit is currently easily bypassed. The
newly added check for wakeup paths, stricly limits the wakeup paths to a
length of 5, regardless of the order in which ep's are linked together.
Thus, a side-effect of the new code is a more consistent enforcement of
the graph depth.
Thus far, I've tested this, using the sample programs previously
mentioned, which now either return quickly or return -EINVAL. I've also
testing using the piptest.c epoll tester, which showed no difference in
performance. I've also created a number of different epoll networks and
tested that they behave as expectded.
I believe this solves the original diabolical test cases, while still
preserving the sane epoll nesting.
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Cc: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-01-13 01:17:43 +00:00
|
|
|
fd = get_unused_fd_flags(O_RDWR | (flags & O_CLOEXEC));
|
|
|
|
if (fd < 0) {
|
|
|
|
error = fd;
|
|
|
|
goto out_free_ep;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
file = anon_inode_getfile("[eventpoll]", &eventpoll_fops, ep,
|
2009-12-18 17:41:24 +00:00
|
|
|
O_RDWR | (flags & O_CLOEXEC));
|
epoll: limit paths
The current epoll code can be tickled to run basically indefinitely in
both loop detection path check (on ep_insert()), and in the wakeup paths.
The programs that tickle this behavior set up deeply linked networks of
epoll file descriptors that cause the epoll algorithms to traverse them
indefinitely. A couple of these sample programs have been previously
posted in this thread: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/25/297.
To fix the loop detection path check algorithms, I simply keep track of
the epoll nodes that have been already visited. Thus, the loop detection
becomes proportional to the number of epoll file descriptor and links.
This dramatically decreases the run-time of the loop check algorithm. In
one diabolical case I tried it reduced the run-time from 15 mintues (all
in kernel time) to .3 seconds.
Fixing the wakeup paths could be done at wakeup time in a similar manner
by keeping track of nodes that have already been visited, but the
complexity is harder, since there can be multiple wakeups on different
cpus...Thus, I've opted to limit the number of possible wakeup paths when
the paths are created.
This is accomplished, by noting that the end file descriptor points that
are found during the loop detection pass (from the newly added link), are
actually the sources for wakeup events. I keep a list of these file
descriptors and limit the number and length of these paths that emanate
from these 'source file descriptors'. In the current implemetation I
allow 1000 paths of length 1, 500 of length 2, 100 of length 3, 50 of
length 4 and 10 of length 5. Note that it is sufficient to check the
'source file descriptors' reachable from the newly added link, since no
other 'source file descriptors' will have newly added links. This allows
us to check only the wakeup paths that may have gotten too long, and not
re-check all possible wakeup paths on the system.
In terms of the path limit selection, I think its first worth noting that
the most common case for epoll, is probably the model where you have 1
epoll file descriptor that is monitoring n number of 'source file
descriptors'. In this case, each 'source file descriptor' has a 1 path of
length 1. Thus, I believe that the limits I'm proposing are quite
reasonable and in fact may be too generous. Thus, I'm hoping that the
proposed limits will not prevent any workloads that currently work to
fail.
In terms of locking, I have extended the use of the 'epmutex' to all
epoll_ctl add and remove operations. Currently its only used in a subset
of the add paths. I need to hold the epmutex, so that we can correctly
traverse a coherent graph, to check the number of paths. I believe that
this additional locking is probably ok, since its in the setup/teardown
paths, and doesn't affect the running paths, but it certainly is going to
add some extra overhead. Also, worth noting is that the epmuex was
recently added to the ep_ctl add operations in the initial path loop
detection code using the argument that it was not on a critical path.
Another thing to note here, is the length of epoll chains that is allowed.
Currently, eventpoll.c defines:
/* Maximum number of nesting allowed inside epoll sets */
#define EP_MAX_NESTS 4
This basically means that I am limited to a graph depth of 5 (EP_MAX_NESTS
+ 1). However, this limit is currently only enforced during the loop
check detection code, and only when the epoll file descriptors are added
in a certain order. Thus, this limit is currently easily bypassed. The
newly added check for wakeup paths, stricly limits the wakeup paths to a
length of 5, regardless of the order in which ep's are linked together.
Thus, a side-effect of the new code is a more consistent enforcement of
the graph depth.
Thus far, I've tested this, using the sample programs previously
mentioned, which now either return quickly or return -EINVAL. I've also
testing using the piptest.c epoll tester, which showed no difference in
performance. I've also created a number of different epoll networks and
tested that they behave as expectded.
I believe this solves the original diabolical test cases, while still
preserving the sane epoll nesting.
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Cc: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-01-13 01:17:43 +00:00
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(file)) {
|
|
|
|
error = PTR_ERR(file);
|
|
|
|
goto out_free_fd;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ep->file = file;
|
2012-08-18 02:42:36 +00:00
|
|
|
fd_install(fd, file);
|
epoll: limit paths
The current epoll code can be tickled to run basically indefinitely in
both loop detection path check (on ep_insert()), and in the wakeup paths.
The programs that tickle this behavior set up deeply linked networks of
epoll file descriptors that cause the epoll algorithms to traverse them
indefinitely. A couple of these sample programs have been previously
posted in this thread: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/25/297.
To fix the loop detection path check algorithms, I simply keep track of
the epoll nodes that have been already visited. Thus, the loop detection
becomes proportional to the number of epoll file descriptor and links.
This dramatically decreases the run-time of the loop check algorithm. In
one diabolical case I tried it reduced the run-time from 15 mintues (all
in kernel time) to .3 seconds.
Fixing the wakeup paths could be done at wakeup time in a similar manner
by keeping track of nodes that have already been visited, but the
complexity is harder, since there can be multiple wakeups on different
cpus...Thus, I've opted to limit the number of possible wakeup paths when
the paths are created.
This is accomplished, by noting that the end file descriptor points that
are found during the loop detection pass (from the newly added link), are
actually the sources for wakeup events. I keep a list of these file
descriptors and limit the number and length of these paths that emanate
from these 'source file descriptors'. In the current implemetation I
allow 1000 paths of length 1, 500 of length 2, 100 of length 3, 50 of
length 4 and 10 of length 5. Note that it is sufficient to check the
'source file descriptors' reachable from the newly added link, since no
other 'source file descriptors' will have newly added links. This allows
us to check only the wakeup paths that may have gotten too long, and not
re-check all possible wakeup paths on the system.
In terms of the path limit selection, I think its first worth noting that
the most common case for epoll, is probably the model where you have 1
epoll file descriptor that is monitoring n number of 'source file
descriptors'. In this case, each 'source file descriptor' has a 1 path of
length 1. Thus, I believe that the limits I'm proposing are quite
reasonable and in fact may be too generous. Thus, I'm hoping that the
proposed limits will not prevent any workloads that currently work to
fail.
In terms of locking, I have extended the use of the 'epmutex' to all
epoll_ctl add and remove operations. Currently its only used in a subset
of the add paths. I need to hold the epmutex, so that we can correctly
traverse a coherent graph, to check the number of paths. I believe that
this additional locking is probably ok, since its in the setup/teardown
paths, and doesn't affect the running paths, but it certainly is going to
add some extra overhead. Also, worth noting is that the epmuex was
recently added to the ep_ctl add operations in the initial path loop
detection code using the argument that it was not on a critical path.
Another thing to note here, is the length of epoll chains that is allowed.
Currently, eventpoll.c defines:
/* Maximum number of nesting allowed inside epoll sets */
#define EP_MAX_NESTS 4
This basically means that I am limited to a graph depth of 5 (EP_MAX_NESTS
+ 1). However, this limit is currently only enforced during the loop
check detection code, and only when the epoll file descriptors are added
in a certain order. Thus, this limit is currently easily bypassed. The
newly added check for wakeup paths, stricly limits the wakeup paths to a
length of 5, regardless of the order in which ep's are linked together.
Thus, a side-effect of the new code is a more consistent enforcement of
the graph depth.
Thus far, I've tested this, using the sample programs previously
mentioned, which now either return quickly or return -EINVAL. I've also
testing using the piptest.c epoll tester, which showed no difference in
performance. I've also created a number of different epoll networks and
tested that they behave as expectded.
I believe this solves the original diabolical test cases, while still
preserving the sane epoll nesting.
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Cc: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-01-13 01:17:43 +00:00
|
|
|
return fd;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
out_free_fd:
|
|
|
|
put_unused_fd(fd);
|
|
|
|
out_free_ep:
|
epoll: use refcount to reduce ep_mutex contention
We are observing huge contention on the epmutex during an http
connection/rate test:
83.17% 0.25% nginx [kernel.kallsyms] [k] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
[...]
|--66.96%--__fput
|--60.04%--eventpoll_release_file
|--58.41%--__mutex_lock.isra.6
|--56.56%--osq_lock
The application is multi-threaded, creates a new epoll entry for
each incoming connection, and does not delete it before the
connection shutdown - that is, before the connection's fd close().
Many different threads compete frequently for the epmutex lock,
affecting the overall performance.
To reduce the contention this patch introduces explicit reference counting
for the eventpoll struct. Each registered event acquires a reference,
and references are released at ep_remove() time.
The eventpoll struct is released by whoever - among EP file close() and
and the monitored file close() drops its last reference.
Additionally, this introduces a new 'dying' flag to prevent races between
the EP file close() and the monitored file close().
ep_eventpoll_release() marks, under f_lock spinlock, each epitem as dying
before removing it, while EP file close() does not touch dying epitems.
The above is needed as both close operations could run concurrently and
drop the EP reference acquired via the epitem entry. Without the above
flag, the monitored file close() could reach the EP struct via the epitem
list while the epitem is still listed and then try to put it after its
disposal.
An alternative could be avoiding touching the references acquired via
the epitems at EP file close() time, but that could leave the EP struct
alive for potentially unlimited time after EP file close(), with nasty
side effects.
With all the above in place, we can drop the epmutex usage at disposal time.
Overall this produces a significant performance improvement in the
mentioned connection/rate scenario: the mutex operations disappear from
the topmost offenders in the perf report, and the measured connections/rate
grows by ~60%.
To make the change more readable this additionally renames ep_free() to
ep_clear_and_put(), and moves the actual memory cleanup in a separate
ep_free() helper.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/4a57788dcaf28f5eb4f8dfddcc3a8b172a7357bb.1679504153.git.pabeni@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Tested-by: Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhiat.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-03-22 16:57:02 +00:00
|
|
|
ep_clear_and_put(ep);
|
2009-03-31 22:24:12 +00:00
|
|
|
return error;
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-03-11 10:34:30 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(epoll_create1, int, flags)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return do_epoll_create(flags);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-01-14 13:14:25 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(epoll_create, int, size)
|
2008-07-24 04:29:27 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2009-05-12 20:19:44 +00:00
|
|
|
if (size <= 0)
|
2008-07-24 04:29:43 +00:00
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
2018-03-11 10:34:30 +00:00
|
|
|
return do_epoll_create(0);
|
2008-07-24 04:29:27 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2023-03-10 16:07:54 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_PM_SLEEP
|
|
|
|
static inline void ep_take_care_of_epollwakeup(struct epoll_event *epev)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if ((epev->events & EPOLLWAKEUP) && !capable(CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND))
|
|
|
|
epev->events &= ~EPOLLWAKEUP;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
static inline void ep_take_care_of_epollwakeup(struct epoll_event *epev)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
epev->events &= ~EPOLLWAKEUP;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2020-01-08 22:05:37 +00:00
|
|
|
static inline int epoll_mutex_lock(struct mutex *mutex, int depth,
|
|
|
|
bool nonblock)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (!nonblock) {
|
|
|
|
mutex_lock_nested(mutex, depth);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (mutex_trylock(mutex))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
return -EAGAIN;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int do_epoll_ctl(int epfd, int op, int fd, struct epoll_event *epds,
|
|
|
|
bool nonblock)
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int error;
|
2013-11-12 23:10:18 +00:00
|
|
|
int full_check = 0;
|
2013-08-30 16:47:21 +00:00
|
|
|
struct fd f, tf;
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
struct eventpoll *ep;
|
|
|
|
struct epitem *epi;
|
2013-11-12 23:10:18 +00:00
|
|
|
struct eventpoll *tep = NULL;
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
error = -EBADF;
|
2013-08-30 16:47:21 +00:00
|
|
|
f = fdget(epfd);
|
|
|
|
if (!f.file)
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
goto error_return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Get the "struct file *" for the target file */
|
2013-08-30 16:47:21 +00:00
|
|
|
tf = fdget(fd);
|
|
|
|
if (!tf.file)
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
goto error_fput;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* The target file descriptor must support poll */
|
|
|
|
error = -EPERM;
|
2018-03-05 15:26:05 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!file_can_poll(tf.file))
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
goto error_tgt_fput;
|
|
|
|
|
2012-05-01 19:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Check if EPOLLWAKEUP is allowed */
|
2014-09-09 21:50:51 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ep_op_has_event(op))
|
2020-01-08 21:35:13 +00:00
|
|
|
ep_take_care_of_epollwakeup(epds);
|
2012-05-01 19:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We have to check that the file structure underneath the file descriptor
|
|
|
|
* the user passed to us _is_ an eventpoll file. And also we do not permit
|
|
|
|
* adding an epoll file descriptor inside itself.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
error = -EINVAL;
|
2013-08-30 16:47:21 +00:00
|
|
|
if (f.file == tf.file || !is_file_epoll(f.file))
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
goto error_tgt_fput;
|
|
|
|
|
2016-01-20 22:59:24 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* epoll adds to the wakeup queue at EPOLL_CTL_ADD time only,
|
|
|
|
* so EPOLLEXCLUSIVE is not allowed for a EPOLL_CTL_MOD operation.
|
|
|
|
* Also, we do not currently supported nested exclusive wakeups.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2020-01-08 21:35:13 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ep_op_has_event(op) && (epds->events & EPOLLEXCLUSIVE)) {
|
epoll: restrict EPOLLEXCLUSIVE to POLLIN and POLLOUT
In the current implementation of the EPOLLEXCLUSIVE flag (added for
4.5-rc1), if epoll waiters create different POLL* sets and register them
as exclusive against the same target fd, the current implementation will
stop waking any further waiters once it finds the first idle waiter.
This means that waiters could miss wakeups in certain cases.
For example, when we wake up a pipe for reading we do:
wake_up_interruptible_sync_poll(&pipe->wait, POLLIN | POLLRDNORM); So if
one epoll set or epfd is added to pipe p with POLLIN and a second set
epfd2 is added to pipe p with POLLRDNORM, only epfd may receive the
wakeup since the current implementation will stop after it finds any
intersection of events with a waiter that is blocked in epoll_wait().
We could potentially address this by requiring all epoll waiters that
are added to p be required to pass the same set of POLL* events. IE the
first EPOLL_CTL_ADD that passes EPOLLEXCLUSIVE establishes the set POLL*
flags to be used by any other epfds that are added as EPOLLEXCLUSIVE.
However, I think it might be somewhat confusing interface as we would
have to reference count the number of users for that set, and so
userspace would have to keep track of that count, or we would need a
more involved interface. It also adds some shared state that we'd have
store somewhere. I don't think anybody will want to bloat
__wait_queue_head for this.
I think what we could do instead, is to simply restrict EPOLLEXCLUSIVE
such that it can only be specified with EPOLLIN and/or EPOLLOUT. So
that way if the wakeup includes 'POLLIN' and not 'POLLOUT', we can stop
once we hit the first idle waiter that specifies the EPOLLIN bit, since
any remaining waiters that only have 'POLLOUT' set wouldn't need to be
woken. Likewise, we can do the same thing if 'POLLOUT' is in the wakeup
bit set and not 'POLLIN'. If both 'POLLOUT' and 'POLLIN' are set in the
wake bit set (there is at least one example of this I saw in fs/pipe.c),
then we just wake the entire exclusive list. Having both 'POLLOUT' and
'POLLIN' both set should not be on any performance critical path, so I
think that's ok (in fs/pipe.c its in pipe_release()). We also continue
to include EPOLLERR and EPOLLHUP by default in any exclusive set. Thus,
the user can specify EPOLLERR and/or EPOLLHUP but is not required to do
so.
Since epoll waiters may be interested in other events as well besides
EPOLLIN, EPOLLOUT, EPOLLERR and EPOLLHUP, these can still be added by
doing a 'dup' call on the target fd and adding that as one normally
would with EPOLL_CTL_ADD. Since I think that the POLLIN and POLLOUT
events are what we are interest in balancing, I think that the 'dup'
thing could perhaps be added to only one of the waiter threads.
However, I think that EPOLLIN, EPOLLOUT, EPOLLERR and EPOLLHUP should be
sufficient for the majority of use-cases.
Since EPOLLEXCLUSIVE is intended to be used with a target fd shared
among multiple epfds, where between 1 and n of the epfds may receive an
event, it does not satisfy the semantics of EPOLLONESHOT where only 1
epfd would get an event. Thus, it is not allowed to be specified in
conjunction with EPOLLEXCLUSIVE.
EPOLL_CTL_MOD is also not allowed if the fd was previously added as
EPOLLEXCLUSIVE. It seems with the limited number of flags to not be as
interesting, but this could be relaxed at some further point.
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Tested-by: Madars Vitolins <m@silodev.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ftp.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric Wong <normalperson@yhbt.net>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-02-05 23:37:04 +00:00
|
|
|
if (op == EPOLL_CTL_MOD)
|
|
|
|
goto error_tgt_fput;
|
|
|
|
if (op == EPOLL_CTL_ADD && (is_file_epoll(tf.file) ||
|
2020-01-08 21:35:13 +00:00
|
|
|
(epds->events & ~EPOLLEXCLUSIVE_OK_BITS)))
|
epoll: restrict EPOLLEXCLUSIVE to POLLIN and POLLOUT
In the current implementation of the EPOLLEXCLUSIVE flag (added for
4.5-rc1), if epoll waiters create different POLL* sets and register them
as exclusive against the same target fd, the current implementation will
stop waking any further waiters once it finds the first idle waiter.
This means that waiters could miss wakeups in certain cases.
For example, when we wake up a pipe for reading we do:
wake_up_interruptible_sync_poll(&pipe->wait, POLLIN | POLLRDNORM); So if
one epoll set or epfd is added to pipe p with POLLIN and a second set
epfd2 is added to pipe p with POLLRDNORM, only epfd may receive the
wakeup since the current implementation will stop after it finds any
intersection of events with a waiter that is blocked in epoll_wait().
We could potentially address this by requiring all epoll waiters that
are added to p be required to pass the same set of POLL* events. IE the
first EPOLL_CTL_ADD that passes EPOLLEXCLUSIVE establishes the set POLL*
flags to be used by any other epfds that are added as EPOLLEXCLUSIVE.
However, I think it might be somewhat confusing interface as we would
have to reference count the number of users for that set, and so
userspace would have to keep track of that count, or we would need a
more involved interface. It also adds some shared state that we'd have
store somewhere. I don't think anybody will want to bloat
__wait_queue_head for this.
I think what we could do instead, is to simply restrict EPOLLEXCLUSIVE
such that it can only be specified with EPOLLIN and/or EPOLLOUT. So
that way if the wakeup includes 'POLLIN' and not 'POLLOUT', we can stop
once we hit the first idle waiter that specifies the EPOLLIN bit, since
any remaining waiters that only have 'POLLOUT' set wouldn't need to be
woken. Likewise, we can do the same thing if 'POLLOUT' is in the wakeup
bit set and not 'POLLIN'. If both 'POLLOUT' and 'POLLIN' are set in the
wake bit set (there is at least one example of this I saw in fs/pipe.c),
then we just wake the entire exclusive list. Having both 'POLLOUT' and
'POLLIN' both set should not be on any performance critical path, so I
think that's ok (in fs/pipe.c its in pipe_release()). We also continue
to include EPOLLERR and EPOLLHUP by default in any exclusive set. Thus,
the user can specify EPOLLERR and/or EPOLLHUP but is not required to do
so.
Since epoll waiters may be interested in other events as well besides
EPOLLIN, EPOLLOUT, EPOLLERR and EPOLLHUP, these can still be added by
doing a 'dup' call on the target fd and adding that as one normally
would with EPOLL_CTL_ADD. Since I think that the POLLIN and POLLOUT
events are what we are interest in balancing, I think that the 'dup'
thing could perhaps be added to only one of the waiter threads.
However, I think that EPOLLIN, EPOLLOUT, EPOLLERR and EPOLLHUP should be
sufficient for the majority of use-cases.
Since EPOLLEXCLUSIVE is intended to be used with a target fd shared
among multiple epfds, where between 1 and n of the epfds may receive an
event, it does not satisfy the semantics of EPOLLONESHOT where only 1
epfd would get an event. Thus, it is not allowed to be specified in
conjunction with EPOLLEXCLUSIVE.
EPOLL_CTL_MOD is also not allowed if the fd was previously added as
EPOLLEXCLUSIVE. It seems with the limited number of flags to not be as
interesting, but this could be relaxed at some further point.
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Tested-by: Madars Vitolins <m@silodev.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ftp.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric Wong <normalperson@yhbt.net>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-02-05 23:37:04 +00:00
|
|
|
goto error_tgt_fput;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-01-20 22:59:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* At this point it is safe to assume that the "private_data" contains
|
|
|
|
* our own data structure.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2013-08-30 16:47:21 +00:00
|
|
|
ep = f.file->private_data;
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
epoll: prevent creating circular epoll structures
In several places, an epoll fd can call another file's ->f_op->poll()
method with ep->mtx held. This is in general unsafe, because that other
file could itself be an epoll fd that contains the original epoll fd.
The code defends against this possibility in its own ->poll() method using
ep_call_nested, but there are several other unsafe calls to ->poll
elsewhere that can be made to deadlock. For example, the following simple
program causes the call in ep_insert recursively call the original fd's
->poll, leading to deadlock:
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/epoll.h>
int main(void) {
int e1, e2, p[2];
struct epoll_event evt = {
.events = EPOLLIN
};
e1 = epoll_create(1);
e2 = epoll_create(2);
pipe(p);
epoll_ctl(e2, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, e1, &evt);
epoll_ctl(e1, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, p[0], &evt);
write(p[1], p, sizeof p);
epoll_ctl(e1, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, e2, &evt);
return 0;
}
On insertion, check whether the inserted file is itself a struct epoll,
and if so, do a recursive walk to detect whether inserting this file would
create a loop of epoll structures, which could lead to deadlock.
[nelhage@ksplice.com: Use epmutex to serialize concurrent inserts]
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Reported-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Tested-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.34+, possibly earlier]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-02-25 22:44:12 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2021-03-01 22:25:51 +00:00
|
|
|
* When we insert an epoll file descriptor inside another epoll file
|
|
|
|
* descriptor, there is the chance of creating closed loops, which are
|
epoll: limit paths
The current epoll code can be tickled to run basically indefinitely in
both loop detection path check (on ep_insert()), and in the wakeup paths.
The programs that tickle this behavior set up deeply linked networks of
epoll file descriptors that cause the epoll algorithms to traverse them
indefinitely. A couple of these sample programs have been previously
posted in this thread: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/25/297.
To fix the loop detection path check algorithms, I simply keep track of
the epoll nodes that have been already visited. Thus, the loop detection
becomes proportional to the number of epoll file descriptor and links.
This dramatically decreases the run-time of the loop check algorithm. In
one diabolical case I tried it reduced the run-time from 15 mintues (all
in kernel time) to .3 seconds.
Fixing the wakeup paths could be done at wakeup time in a similar manner
by keeping track of nodes that have already been visited, but the
complexity is harder, since there can be multiple wakeups on different
cpus...Thus, I've opted to limit the number of possible wakeup paths when
the paths are created.
This is accomplished, by noting that the end file descriptor points that
are found during the loop detection pass (from the newly added link), are
actually the sources for wakeup events. I keep a list of these file
descriptors and limit the number and length of these paths that emanate
from these 'source file descriptors'. In the current implemetation I
allow 1000 paths of length 1, 500 of length 2, 100 of length 3, 50 of
length 4 and 10 of length 5. Note that it is sufficient to check the
'source file descriptors' reachable from the newly added link, since no
other 'source file descriptors' will have newly added links. This allows
us to check only the wakeup paths that may have gotten too long, and not
re-check all possible wakeup paths on the system.
In terms of the path limit selection, I think its first worth noting that
the most common case for epoll, is probably the model where you have 1
epoll file descriptor that is monitoring n number of 'source file
descriptors'. In this case, each 'source file descriptor' has a 1 path of
length 1. Thus, I believe that the limits I'm proposing are quite
reasonable and in fact may be too generous. Thus, I'm hoping that the
proposed limits will not prevent any workloads that currently work to
fail.
In terms of locking, I have extended the use of the 'epmutex' to all
epoll_ctl add and remove operations. Currently its only used in a subset
of the add paths. I need to hold the epmutex, so that we can correctly
traverse a coherent graph, to check the number of paths. I believe that
this additional locking is probably ok, since its in the setup/teardown
paths, and doesn't affect the running paths, but it certainly is going to
add some extra overhead. Also, worth noting is that the epmuex was
recently added to the ep_ctl add operations in the initial path loop
detection code using the argument that it was not on a critical path.
Another thing to note here, is the length of epoll chains that is allowed.
Currently, eventpoll.c defines:
/* Maximum number of nesting allowed inside epoll sets */
#define EP_MAX_NESTS 4
This basically means that I am limited to a graph depth of 5 (EP_MAX_NESTS
+ 1). However, this limit is currently only enforced during the loop
check detection code, and only when the epoll file descriptors are added
in a certain order. Thus, this limit is currently easily bypassed. The
newly added check for wakeup paths, stricly limits the wakeup paths to a
length of 5, regardless of the order in which ep's are linked together.
Thus, a side-effect of the new code is a more consistent enforcement of
the graph depth.
Thus far, I've tested this, using the sample programs previously
mentioned, which now either return quickly or return -EINVAL. I've also
testing using the piptest.c epoll tester, which showed no difference in
performance. I've also created a number of different epoll networks and
tested that they behave as expectded.
I believe this solves the original diabolical test cases, while still
preserving the sane epoll nesting.
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Cc: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-01-13 01:17:43 +00:00
|
|
|
* better be handled here, than in more critical paths. While we are
|
|
|
|
* checking for loops we also determine the list of files reachable
|
|
|
|
* and hang them on the tfile_check_list, so we can check that we
|
|
|
|
* haven't created too many possible wakeup paths.
|
epoll: prevent creating circular epoll structures
In several places, an epoll fd can call another file's ->f_op->poll()
method with ep->mtx held. This is in general unsafe, because that other
file could itself be an epoll fd that contains the original epoll fd.
The code defends against this possibility in its own ->poll() method using
ep_call_nested, but there are several other unsafe calls to ->poll
elsewhere that can be made to deadlock. For example, the following simple
program causes the call in ep_insert recursively call the original fd's
->poll, leading to deadlock:
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/epoll.h>
int main(void) {
int e1, e2, p[2];
struct epoll_event evt = {
.events = EPOLLIN
};
e1 = epoll_create(1);
e2 = epoll_create(2);
pipe(p);
epoll_ctl(e2, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, e1, &evt);
epoll_ctl(e1, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, p[0], &evt);
write(p[1], p, sizeof p);
epoll_ctl(e1, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, e2, &evt);
return 0;
}
On insertion, check whether the inserted file is itself a struct epoll,
and if so, do a recursive walk to detect whether inserting this file would
create a loop of epoll structures, which could lead to deadlock.
[nelhage@ksplice.com: Use epmutex to serialize concurrent inserts]
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Reported-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Tested-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.34+, possibly earlier]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-02-25 22:44:12 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
2013-11-12 23:10:18 +00:00
|
|
|
* We do not need to take the global 'epumutex' on EPOLL_CTL_ADD when
|
|
|
|
* the epoll file descriptor is attaching directly to a wakeup source,
|
|
|
|
* unless the epoll file descriptor is nested. The purpose of taking the
|
2023-04-11 23:41:59 +00:00
|
|
|
* 'epnested_mutex' on add is to prevent complex toplogies such as loops and
|
2013-11-12 23:10:18 +00:00
|
|
|
* deep wakeup paths from forming in parallel through multiple
|
|
|
|
* EPOLL_CTL_ADD operations.
|
epoll: prevent creating circular epoll structures
In several places, an epoll fd can call another file's ->f_op->poll()
method with ep->mtx held. This is in general unsafe, because that other
file could itself be an epoll fd that contains the original epoll fd.
The code defends against this possibility in its own ->poll() method using
ep_call_nested, but there are several other unsafe calls to ->poll
elsewhere that can be made to deadlock. For example, the following simple
program causes the call in ep_insert recursively call the original fd's
->poll, leading to deadlock:
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/epoll.h>
int main(void) {
int e1, e2, p[2];
struct epoll_event evt = {
.events = EPOLLIN
};
e1 = epoll_create(1);
e2 = epoll_create(2);
pipe(p);
epoll_ctl(e2, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, e1, &evt);
epoll_ctl(e1, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, p[0], &evt);
write(p[1], p, sizeof p);
epoll_ctl(e1, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, e2, &evt);
return 0;
}
On insertion, check whether the inserted file is itself a struct epoll,
and if so, do a recursive walk to detect whether inserting this file would
create a loop of epoll structures, which could lead to deadlock.
[nelhage@ksplice.com: Use epmutex to serialize concurrent inserts]
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Reported-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Tested-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.34+, possibly earlier]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-02-25 22:44:12 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2020-01-08 22:05:37 +00:00
|
|
|
error = epoll_mutex_lock(&ep->mtx, 0, nonblock);
|
|
|
|
if (error)
|
|
|
|
goto error_tgt_fput;
|
epoll: limit paths
The current epoll code can be tickled to run basically indefinitely in
both loop detection path check (on ep_insert()), and in the wakeup paths.
The programs that tickle this behavior set up deeply linked networks of
epoll file descriptors that cause the epoll algorithms to traverse them
indefinitely. A couple of these sample programs have been previously
posted in this thread: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/25/297.
To fix the loop detection path check algorithms, I simply keep track of
the epoll nodes that have been already visited. Thus, the loop detection
becomes proportional to the number of epoll file descriptor and links.
This dramatically decreases the run-time of the loop check algorithm. In
one diabolical case I tried it reduced the run-time from 15 mintues (all
in kernel time) to .3 seconds.
Fixing the wakeup paths could be done at wakeup time in a similar manner
by keeping track of nodes that have already been visited, but the
complexity is harder, since there can be multiple wakeups on different
cpus...Thus, I've opted to limit the number of possible wakeup paths when
the paths are created.
This is accomplished, by noting that the end file descriptor points that
are found during the loop detection pass (from the newly added link), are
actually the sources for wakeup events. I keep a list of these file
descriptors and limit the number and length of these paths that emanate
from these 'source file descriptors'. In the current implemetation I
allow 1000 paths of length 1, 500 of length 2, 100 of length 3, 50 of
length 4 and 10 of length 5. Note that it is sufficient to check the
'source file descriptors' reachable from the newly added link, since no
other 'source file descriptors' will have newly added links. This allows
us to check only the wakeup paths that may have gotten too long, and not
re-check all possible wakeup paths on the system.
In terms of the path limit selection, I think its first worth noting that
the most common case for epoll, is probably the model where you have 1
epoll file descriptor that is monitoring n number of 'source file
descriptors'. In this case, each 'source file descriptor' has a 1 path of
length 1. Thus, I believe that the limits I'm proposing are quite
reasonable and in fact may be too generous. Thus, I'm hoping that the
proposed limits will not prevent any workloads that currently work to
fail.
In terms of locking, I have extended the use of the 'epmutex' to all
epoll_ctl add and remove operations. Currently its only used in a subset
of the add paths. I need to hold the epmutex, so that we can correctly
traverse a coherent graph, to check the number of paths. I believe that
this additional locking is probably ok, since its in the setup/teardown
paths, and doesn't affect the running paths, but it certainly is going to
add some extra overhead. Also, worth noting is that the epmuex was
recently added to the ep_ctl add operations in the initial path loop
detection code using the argument that it was not on a critical path.
Another thing to note here, is the length of epoll chains that is allowed.
Currently, eventpoll.c defines:
/* Maximum number of nesting allowed inside epoll sets */
#define EP_MAX_NESTS 4
This basically means that I am limited to a graph depth of 5 (EP_MAX_NESTS
+ 1). However, this limit is currently only enforced during the loop
check detection code, and only when the epoll file descriptors are added
in a certain order. Thus, this limit is currently easily bypassed. The
newly added check for wakeup paths, stricly limits the wakeup paths to a
length of 5, regardless of the order in which ep's are linked together.
Thus, a side-effect of the new code is a more consistent enforcement of
the graph depth.
Thus far, I've tested this, using the sample programs previously
mentioned, which now either return quickly or return -EINVAL. I've also
testing using the piptest.c epoll tester, which showed no difference in
performance. I've also created a number of different epoll networks and
tested that they behave as expectded.
I believe this solves the original diabolical test cases, while still
preserving the sane epoll nesting.
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Cc: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-01-13 01:17:43 +00:00
|
|
|
if (op == EPOLL_CTL_ADD) {
|
epoll: take epitem list out of struct file
Move the head of epitem list out of struct file; for epoll ones it's
moved into struct eventpoll (->refs there), for non-epoll - into
the new object (struct epitem_head). In place of ->f_ep_links we
leave a pointer to the list head (->f_ep).
->f_ep is protected by ->f_lock and it's zeroed as soon as the list
of epitems becomes empty (that can happen only in ep_remove() by
now).
The list of files for reverse path check is *not* going through
struct file now - it's a single-linked list going through epitem_head
instances. It's terminated by ERR_PTR(-1) (== EP_UNACTIVE_POINTER),
so the elements of list can be distinguished by head->next != NULL.
epitem_head instances are allocated at ep_insert() time (by
attach_epitem()) and freed either by ep_remove() (if it empties
the set of epitems *and* epitem_head does not belong to the
reverse path check list) or by clear_tfile_check_list() when
the list is emptied (if the set of epitems is empty by that
point). Allocations are done from a separate slab - minimal kmalloc()
size is too large on some architectures.
As the result, we trim struct file _and_ get rid of the games with
temporary file references.
Locking and barriers are interesting (aren't they always); see unlist_file()
and ep_remove() for details. The non-obvious part is that ep_remove() needs
to decide if it will be the one to free the damn thing *before* actually
storing NULL to head->epitems.first - that's what smp_load_acquire is for
in there. unlist_file() lockless path is safe, since we hit it only if
we observe NULL in head->epitems.first and whoever had done that store is
guaranteed to have observed non-NULL in head->next. IOW, their last access
had been the store of NULL into ->epitems.first and we can safely free
the sucker. OTOH, we are under rcu_read_lock() and both epitem and
epitem->file have their freeing RCU-delayed. So if we see non-NULL
->epitems.first, we can grab ->f_lock (all epitems in there share the
same struct file) and safely recheck the emptiness of ->epitems; again,
->next is still non-NULL, so ep_remove() couldn't have freed head yet.
->f_lock serializes us wrt ep_remove(); the rest is trivial.
Note that once head->epitems becomes NULL, nothing can get inserted into
it - the only remaining reference to head after that point is from the
reverse path check list.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-10-02 00:45:51 +00:00
|
|
|
if (READ_ONCE(f.file->f_ep) || ep->gen == loop_check_gen ||
|
|
|
|
is_file_epoll(tf.file)) {
|
2013-11-12 23:10:18 +00:00
|
|
|
mutex_unlock(&ep->mtx);
|
2023-04-11 23:41:59 +00:00
|
|
|
error = epoll_mutex_lock(&epnested_mutex, 0, nonblock);
|
2020-01-08 22:05:37 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error)
|
|
|
|
goto error_tgt_fput;
|
2020-09-10 12:30:05 +00:00
|
|
|
loop_check_gen++;
|
2020-01-08 22:05:37 +00:00
|
|
|
full_check = 1;
|
2013-11-12 23:10:18 +00:00
|
|
|
if (is_file_epoll(tf.file)) {
|
2020-09-26 20:50:57 +00:00
|
|
|
tep = tf.file->private_data;
|
2013-11-12 23:10:18 +00:00
|
|
|
error = -ELOOP;
|
2020-09-26 20:50:57 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ep_loop_check(ep, tep) != 0)
|
2013-11-12 23:10:18 +00:00
|
|
|
goto error_tgt_fput;
|
2020-08-19 16:12:17 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2020-01-08 22:05:37 +00:00
|
|
|
error = epoll_mutex_lock(&ep->mtx, 0, nonblock);
|
2020-08-22 22:25:52 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error)
|
2020-01-08 22:05:37 +00:00
|
|
|
goto error_tgt_fput;
|
2013-11-12 23:10:18 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2007-05-15 08:40:52 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2021-03-01 22:25:51 +00:00
|
|
|
* Try to lookup the file inside our RB tree. Since we grabbed "mtx"
|
2007-05-15 08:40:52 +00:00
|
|
|
* above, we can be sure to be able to use the item looked up by
|
|
|
|
* ep_find() till we release the mutex.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2013-08-30 16:47:21 +00:00
|
|
|
epi = ep_find(ep, tf.file, fd);
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
error = -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
switch (op) {
|
|
|
|
case EPOLL_CTL_ADD:
|
|
|
|
if (!epi) {
|
2020-01-08 21:35:13 +00:00
|
|
|
epds->events |= EPOLLERR | EPOLLHUP;
|
|
|
|
error = ep_insert(ep, epds, tf.file, fd, full_check);
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
error = -EEXIST;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case EPOLL_CTL_DEL:
|
epoll: use refcount to reduce ep_mutex contention
We are observing huge contention on the epmutex during an http
connection/rate test:
83.17% 0.25% nginx [kernel.kallsyms] [k] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
[...]
|--66.96%--__fput
|--60.04%--eventpoll_release_file
|--58.41%--__mutex_lock.isra.6
|--56.56%--osq_lock
The application is multi-threaded, creates a new epoll entry for
each incoming connection, and does not delete it before the
connection shutdown - that is, before the connection's fd close().
Many different threads compete frequently for the epmutex lock,
affecting the overall performance.
To reduce the contention this patch introduces explicit reference counting
for the eventpoll struct. Each registered event acquires a reference,
and references are released at ep_remove() time.
The eventpoll struct is released by whoever - among EP file close() and
and the monitored file close() drops its last reference.
Additionally, this introduces a new 'dying' flag to prevent races between
the EP file close() and the monitored file close().
ep_eventpoll_release() marks, under f_lock spinlock, each epitem as dying
before removing it, while EP file close() does not touch dying epitems.
The above is needed as both close operations could run concurrently and
drop the EP reference acquired via the epitem entry. Without the above
flag, the monitored file close() could reach the EP struct via the epitem
list while the epitem is still listed and then try to put it after its
disposal.
An alternative could be avoiding touching the references acquired via
the epitems at EP file close() time, but that could leave the EP struct
alive for potentially unlimited time after EP file close(), with nasty
side effects.
With all the above in place, we can drop the epmutex usage at disposal time.
Overall this produces a significant performance improvement in the
mentioned connection/rate scenario: the mutex operations disappear from
the topmost offenders in the perf report, and the measured connections/rate
grows by ~60%.
To make the change more readable this additionally renames ep_free() to
ep_clear_and_put(), and moves the actual memory cleanup in a separate
ep_free() helper.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/4a57788dcaf28f5eb4f8dfddcc3a8b172a7357bb.1679504153.git.pabeni@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Tested-by: Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhiat.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-03-22 16:57:02 +00:00
|
|
|
if (epi) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The eventpoll itself is still alive: the refcount
|
|
|
|
* can't go to zero here.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
ep_remove_safe(ep, epi);
|
|
|
|
error = 0;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
error = -ENOENT;
|
epoll: use refcount to reduce ep_mutex contention
We are observing huge contention on the epmutex during an http
connection/rate test:
83.17% 0.25% nginx [kernel.kallsyms] [k] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
[...]
|--66.96%--__fput
|--60.04%--eventpoll_release_file
|--58.41%--__mutex_lock.isra.6
|--56.56%--osq_lock
The application is multi-threaded, creates a new epoll entry for
each incoming connection, and does not delete it before the
connection shutdown - that is, before the connection's fd close().
Many different threads compete frequently for the epmutex lock,
affecting the overall performance.
To reduce the contention this patch introduces explicit reference counting
for the eventpoll struct. Each registered event acquires a reference,
and references are released at ep_remove() time.
The eventpoll struct is released by whoever - among EP file close() and
and the monitored file close() drops its last reference.
Additionally, this introduces a new 'dying' flag to prevent races between
the EP file close() and the monitored file close().
ep_eventpoll_release() marks, under f_lock spinlock, each epitem as dying
before removing it, while EP file close() does not touch dying epitems.
The above is needed as both close operations could run concurrently and
drop the EP reference acquired via the epitem entry. Without the above
flag, the monitored file close() could reach the EP struct via the epitem
list while the epitem is still listed and then try to put it after its
disposal.
An alternative could be avoiding touching the references acquired via
the epitems at EP file close() time, but that could leave the EP struct
alive for potentially unlimited time after EP file close(), with nasty
side effects.
With all the above in place, we can drop the epmutex usage at disposal time.
Overall this produces a significant performance improvement in the
mentioned connection/rate scenario: the mutex operations disappear from
the topmost offenders in the perf report, and the measured connections/rate
grows by ~60%.
To make the change more readable this additionally renames ep_free() to
ep_clear_and_put(), and moves the actual memory cleanup in a separate
ep_free() helper.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/4a57788dcaf28f5eb4f8dfddcc3a8b172a7357bb.1679504153.git.pabeni@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Tested-by: Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhiat.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-03-22 16:57:02 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case EPOLL_CTL_MOD:
|
|
|
|
if (epi) {
|
epoll: restrict EPOLLEXCLUSIVE to POLLIN and POLLOUT
In the current implementation of the EPOLLEXCLUSIVE flag (added for
4.5-rc1), if epoll waiters create different POLL* sets and register them
as exclusive against the same target fd, the current implementation will
stop waking any further waiters once it finds the first idle waiter.
This means that waiters could miss wakeups in certain cases.
For example, when we wake up a pipe for reading we do:
wake_up_interruptible_sync_poll(&pipe->wait, POLLIN | POLLRDNORM); So if
one epoll set or epfd is added to pipe p with POLLIN and a second set
epfd2 is added to pipe p with POLLRDNORM, only epfd may receive the
wakeup since the current implementation will stop after it finds any
intersection of events with a waiter that is blocked in epoll_wait().
We could potentially address this by requiring all epoll waiters that
are added to p be required to pass the same set of POLL* events. IE the
first EPOLL_CTL_ADD that passes EPOLLEXCLUSIVE establishes the set POLL*
flags to be used by any other epfds that are added as EPOLLEXCLUSIVE.
However, I think it might be somewhat confusing interface as we would
have to reference count the number of users for that set, and so
userspace would have to keep track of that count, or we would need a
more involved interface. It also adds some shared state that we'd have
store somewhere. I don't think anybody will want to bloat
__wait_queue_head for this.
I think what we could do instead, is to simply restrict EPOLLEXCLUSIVE
such that it can only be specified with EPOLLIN and/or EPOLLOUT. So
that way if the wakeup includes 'POLLIN' and not 'POLLOUT', we can stop
once we hit the first idle waiter that specifies the EPOLLIN bit, since
any remaining waiters that only have 'POLLOUT' set wouldn't need to be
woken. Likewise, we can do the same thing if 'POLLOUT' is in the wakeup
bit set and not 'POLLIN'. If both 'POLLOUT' and 'POLLIN' are set in the
wake bit set (there is at least one example of this I saw in fs/pipe.c),
then we just wake the entire exclusive list. Having both 'POLLOUT' and
'POLLIN' both set should not be on any performance critical path, so I
think that's ok (in fs/pipe.c its in pipe_release()). We also continue
to include EPOLLERR and EPOLLHUP by default in any exclusive set. Thus,
the user can specify EPOLLERR and/or EPOLLHUP but is not required to do
so.
Since epoll waiters may be interested in other events as well besides
EPOLLIN, EPOLLOUT, EPOLLERR and EPOLLHUP, these can still be added by
doing a 'dup' call on the target fd and adding that as one normally
would with EPOLL_CTL_ADD. Since I think that the POLLIN and POLLOUT
events are what we are interest in balancing, I think that the 'dup'
thing could perhaps be added to only one of the waiter threads.
However, I think that EPOLLIN, EPOLLOUT, EPOLLERR and EPOLLHUP should be
sufficient for the majority of use-cases.
Since EPOLLEXCLUSIVE is intended to be used with a target fd shared
among multiple epfds, where between 1 and n of the epfds may receive an
event, it does not satisfy the semantics of EPOLLONESHOT where only 1
epfd would get an event. Thus, it is not allowed to be specified in
conjunction with EPOLLEXCLUSIVE.
EPOLL_CTL_MOD is also not allowed if the fd was previously added as
EPOLLEXCLUSIVE. It seems with the limited number of flags to not be as
interesting, but this could be relaxed at some further point.
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Tested-by: Madars Vitolins <m@silodev.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ftp.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric Wong <normalperson@yhbt.net>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-02-05 23:37:04 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!(epi->event.events & EPOLLEXCLUSIVE)) {
|
2020-01-08 21:35:13 +00:00
|
|
|
epds->events |= EPOLLERR | EPOLLHUP;
|
|
|
|
error = ep_modify(ep, epi, epds);
|
epoll: restrict EPOLLEXCLUSIVE to POLLIN and POLLOUT
In the current implementation of the EPOLLEXCLUSIVE flag (added for
4.5-rc1), if epoll waiters create different POLL* sets and register them
as exclusive against the same target fd, the current implementation will
stop waking any further waiters once it finds the first idle waiter.
This means that waiters could miss wakeups in certain cases.
For example, when we wake up a pipe for reading we do:
wake_up_interruptible_sync_poll(&pipe->wait, POLLIN | POLLRDNORM); So if
one epoll set or epfd is added to pipe p with POLLIN and a second set
epfd2 is added to pipe p with POLLRDNORM, only epfd may receive the
wakeup since the current implementation will stop after it finds any
intersection of events with a waiter that is blocked in epoll_wait().
We could potentially address this by requiring all epoll waiters that
are added to p be required to pass the same set of POLL* events. IE the
first EPOLL_CTL_ADD that passes EPOLLEXCLUSIVE establishes the set POLL*
flags to be used by any other epfds that are added as EPOLLEXCLUSIVE.
However, I think it might be somewhat confusing interface as we would
have to reference count the number of users for that set, and so
userspace would have to keep track of that count, or we would need a
more involved interface. It also adds some shared state that we'd have
store somewhere. I don't think anybody will want to bloat
__wait_queue_head for this.
I think what we could do instead, is to simply restrict EPOLLEXCLUSIVE
such that it can only be specified with EPOLLIN and/or EPOLLOUT. So
that way if the wakeup includes 'POLLIN' and not 'POLLOUT', we can stop
once we hit the first idle waiter that specifies the EPOLLIN bit, since
any remaining waiters that only have 'POLLOUT' set wouldn't need to be
woken. Likewise, we can do the same thing if 'POLLOUT' is in the wakeup
bit set and not 'POLLIN'. If both 'POLLOUT' and 'POLLIN' are set in the
wake bit set (there is at least one example of this I saw in fs/pipe.c),
then we just wake the entire exclusive list. Having both 'POLLOUT' and
'POLLIN' both set should not be on any performance critical path, so I
think that's ok (in fs/pipe.c its in pipe_release()). We also continue
to include EPOLLERR and EPOLLHUP by default in any exclusive set. Thus,
the user can specify EPOLLERR and/or EPOLLHUP but is not required to do
so.
Since epoll waiters may be interested in other events as well besides
EPOLLIN, EPOLLOUT, EPOLLERR and EPOLLHUP, these can still be added by
doing a 'dup' call on the target fd and adding that as one normally
would with EPOLL_CTL_ADD. Since I think that the POLLIN and POLLOUT
events are what we are interest in balancing, I think that the 'dup'
thing could perhaps be added to only one of the waiter threads.
However, I think that EPOLLIN, EPOLLOUT, EPOLLERR and EPOLLHUP should be
sufficient for the majority of use-cases.
Since EPOLLEXCLUSIVE is intended to be used with a target fd shared
among multiple epfds, where between 1 and n of the epfds may receive an
event, it does not satisfy the semantics of EPOLLONESHOT where only 1
epfd would get an event. Thus, it is not allowed to be specified in
conjunction with EPOLLEXCLUSIVE.
EPOLL_CTL_MOD is also not allowed if the fd was previously added as
EPOLLEXCLUSIVE. It seems with the limited number of flags to not be as
interesting, but this could be relaxed at some further point.
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Tested-by: Madars Vitolins <m@silodev.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ftp.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric Wong <normalperson@yhbt.net>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-02-05 23:37:04 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
error = -ENOENT;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2007-05-15 08:40:41 +00:00
|
|
|
mutex_unlock(&ep->mtx);
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
error_tgt_fput:
|
2020-08-22 22:25:52 +00:00
|
|
|
if (full_check) {
|
|
|
|
clear_tfile_check_list();
|
2020-09-10 12:30:05 +00:00
|
|
|
loop_check_gen++;
|
2023-04-11 23:41:59 +00:00
|
|
|
mutex_unlock(&epnested_mutex);
|
2020-08-22 22:25:52 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
epoll: prevent creating circular epoll structures
In several places, an epoll fd can call another file's ->f_op->poll()
method with ep->mtx held. This is in general unsafe, because that other
file could itself be an epoll fd that contains the original epoll fd.
The code defends against this possibility in its own ->poll() method using
ep_call_nested, but there are several other unsafe calls to ->poll
elsewhere that can be made to deadlock. For example, the following simple
program causes the call in ep_insert recursively call the original fd's
->poll, leading to deadlock:
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/epoll.h>
int main(void) {
int e1, e2, p[2];
struct epoll_event evt = {
.events = EPOLLIN
};
e1 = epoll_create(1);
e2 = epoll_create(2);
pipe(p);
epoll_ctl(e2, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, e1, &evt);
epoll_ctl(e1, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, p[0], &evt);
write(p[1], p, sizeof p);
epoll_ctl(e1, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, e2, &evt);
return 0;
}
On insertion, check whether the inserted file is itself a struct epoll,
and if so, do a recursive walk to detect whether inserting this file would
create a loop of epoll structures, which could lead to deadlock.
[nelhage@ksplice.com: Use epmutex to serialize concurrent inserts]
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Reported-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Tested-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.34+, possibly earlier]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-02-25 22:44:12 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2013-08-30 16:47:21 +00:00
|
|
|
fdput(tf);
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
error_fput:
|
2013-08-30 16:47:21 +00:00
|
|
|
fdput(f);
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
error_return:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-01-08 21:35:13 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The following function implements the controller interface for
|
|
|
|
* the eventpoll file that enables the insertion/removal/change of
|
|
|
|
* file descriptors inside the interest set.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE4(epoll_ctl, int, epfd, int, op, int, fd,
|
|
|
|
struct epoll_event __user *, event)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct epoll_event epds;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ep_op_has_event(op) &&
|
|
|
|
copy_from_user(&epds, event, sizeof(struct epoll_event)))
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
|
2020-01-08 22:05:37 +00:00
|
|
|
return do_epoll_ctl(epfd, op, fd, &epds, false);
|
2020-01-08 21:35:13 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Implement the event wait interface for the eventpoll file. It is the kernel
|
|
|
|
* part of the user space epoll_wait(2).
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2018-03-11 10:34:30 +00:00
|
|
|
static int do_epoll_wait(int epfd, struct epoll_event __user *events,
|
2020-12-18 22:05:35 +00:00
|
|
|
int maxevents, struct timespec64 *to)
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2012-08-28 16:52:22 +00:00
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
struct fd f;
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
struct eventpoll *ep;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* The maximum number of event must be greater than zero */
|
|
|
|
if (maxevents <= 0 || maxevents > EP_MAX_EVENTS)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Verify that the area passed by the user is writeable */
|
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 02:57:57 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!access_ok(events, maxevents * sizeof(struct epoll_event)))
|
2012-08-28 16:52:22 +00:00
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Get the "struct file *" for the eventpoll file */
|
2012-08-28 16:52:22 +00:00
|
|
|
f = fdget(epfd);
|
|
|
|
if (!f.file)
|
|
|
|
return -EBADF;
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We have to check that the file structure underneath the fd
|
|
|
|
* the user passed to us _is_ an eventpoll file.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
error = -EINVAL;
|
2012-08-28 16:52:22 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!is_file_epoll(f.file))
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
goto error_fput;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* At this point it is safe to assume that the "private_data" contains
|
|
|
|
* our own data structure.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2012-08-28 16:52:22 +00:00
|
|
|
ep = f.file->private_data;
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Time to fish for events ... */
|
2020-12-18 22:05:35 +00:00
|
|
|
error = ep_poll(ep, events, maxevents, to);
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
error_fput:
|
2012-08-28 16:52:22 +00:00
|
|
|
fdput(f);
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-03-11 10:34:30 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE4(epoll_wait, int, epfd, struct epoll_event __user *, events,
|
|
|
|
int, maxevents, int, timeout)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2020-12-18 22:05:35 +00:00
|
|
|
struct timespec64 to;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return do_epoll_wait(epfd, events, maxevents,
|
|
|
|
ep_timeout_to_timespec(&to, timeout));
|
2018-03-11 10:34:30 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Implement the event wait interface for the eventpoll file. It is the kernel
|
|
|
|
* part of the user space epoll_pwait(2).
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2020-12-18 22:05:38 +00:00
|
|
|
static int do_epoll_pwait(int epfd, struct epoll_event __user *events,
|
|
|
|
int maxevents, struct timespec64 *to,
|
|
|
|
const sigset_t __user *sigmask, size_t sigsetsize)
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If the caller wants a certain signal mask to be set during the wait,
|
|
|
|
* we apply it here.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2019-07-16 23:29:53 +00:00
|
|
|
error = set_user_sigmask(sigmask, sigsetsize);
|
2018-09-20 04:41:04 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error)
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-12-18 22:05:38 +00:00
|
|
|
error = do_epoll_wait(epfd, events, maxevents, to);
|
2020-12-18 22:05:35 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-07-16 23:29:53 +00:00
|
|
|
restore_saved_sigmask_unless(error == -EINTR);
|
2007-05-11 05:23:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-12-18 22:05:38 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE6(epoll_pwait, int, epfd, struct epoll_event __user *, events,
|
|
|
|
int, maxevents, int, timeout, const sigset_t __user *, sigmask,
|
|
|
|
size_t, sigsetsize)
|
2013-02-24 19:52:17 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2020-12-18 22:05:35 +00:00
|
|
|
struct timespec64 to;
|
2020-12-18 22:05:38 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return do_epoll_pwait(epfd, events, maxevents,
|
|
|
|
ep_timeout_to_timespec(&to, timeout),
|
|
|
|
sigmask, sigsetsize);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE6(epoll_pwait2, int, epfd, struct epoll_event __user *, events,
|
|
|
|
int, maxevents, const struct __kernel_timespec __user *, timeout,
|
|
|
|
const sigset_t __user *, sigmask, size_t, sigsetsize)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct timespec64 ts, *to = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (timeout) {
|
|
|
|
if (get_timespec64(&ts, timeout))
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
to = &ts;
|
|
|
|
if (poll_select_set_timeout(to, ts.tv_sec, ts.tv_nsec))
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return do_epoll_pwait(epfd, events, maxevents, to,
|
|
|
|
sigmask, sigsetsize);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
|
|
|
|
static int do_compat_epoll_pwait(int epfd, struct epoll_event __user *events,
|
|
|
|
int maxevents, struct timespec64 *timeout,
|
|
|
|
const compat_sigset_t __user *sigmask,
|
|
|
|
compat_size_t sigsetsize)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2013-02-24 19:52:17 +00:00
|
|
|
long err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If the caller wants a certain signal mask to be set during the wait,
|
|
|
|
* we apply it here.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2019-07-16 23:29:53 +00:00
|
|
|
err = set_compat_user_sigmask(sigmask, sigsetsize);
|
2018-09-20 04:41:04 +00:00
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
2013-02-24 19:52:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-12-18 22:05:38 +00:00
|
|
|
err = do_epoll_wait(epfd, events, maxevents, timeout);
|
2020-12-18 22:05:35 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-07-16 23:29:53 +00:00
|
|
|
restore_saved_sigmask_unless(err == -EINTR);
|
2013-02-24 19:52:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2020-12-18 22:05:38 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE6(epoll_pwait, int, epfd,
|
|
|
|
struct epoll_event __user *, events,
|
|
|
|
int, maxevents, int, timeout,
|
|
|
|
const compat_sigset_t __user *, sigmask,
|
|
|
|
compat_size_t, sigsetsize)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct timespec64 to;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return do_compat_epoll_pwait(epfd, events, maxevents,
|
|
|
|
ep_timeout_to_timespec(&to, timeout),
|
|
|
|
sigmask, sigsetsize);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE6(epoll_pwait2, int, epfd,
|
|
|
|
struct epoll_event __user *, events,
|
|
|
|
int, maxevents,
|
|
|
|
const struct __kernel_timespec __user *, timeout,
|
|
|
|
const compat_sigset_t __user *, sigmask,
|
|
|
|
compat_size_t, sigsetsize)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct timespec64 ts, *to = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (timeout) {
|
|
|
|
if (get_timespec64(&ts, timeout))
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
to = &ts;
|
|
|
|
if (poll_select_set_timeout(to, ts.tv_sec, ts.tv_nsec))
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return do_compat_epoll_pwait(epfd, events, maxevents, to,
|
|
|
|
sigmask, sigsetsize);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-02-24 19:52:17 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
static int __init eventpoll_init(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
epoll: introduce resource usage limits
It has been thought that the per-user file descriptors limit would also
limit the resources that a normal user can request via the epoll
interface. Vegard Nossum reported a very simple program (a modified
version attached) that can make a normal user to request a pretty large
amount of kernel memory, well within the its maximum number of fds. To
solve such problem, default limits are now imposed, and /proc based
configuration has been introduced. A new directory has been created,
named /proc/sys/fs/epoll/ and inside there, there are two configuration
points:
max_user_instances = Maximum number of devices - per user
max_user_watches = Maximum number of "watched" fds - per user
The current default for "max_user_watches" limits the memory used by epoll
to store "watches", to 1/32 of the amount of the low RAM. As example, a
256MB 32bit machine, will have "max_user_watches" set to roughly 90000.
That should be enough to not break existing heavy epoll users. The
default value for "max_user_instances" is set to 128, that should be
enough too.
This also changes the userspace, because a new error code can now come out
from EPOLL_CTL_ADD (-ENOSPC). The EMFILE from epoll_create() was already
listed, so that should be ok.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: use get_current_user()]
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegardno@ifi.uio.no>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-12-01 21:13:55 +00:00
|
|
|
struct sysinfo si;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
si_meminfo(&si);
|
2009-01-29 22:25:26 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Allows top 4% of lomem to be allocated for epoll watches (per user).
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
max_user_watches = (((si.totalram - si.totalhigh) / 25) << PAGE_SHIFT) /
|
epoll: introduce resource usage limits
It has been thought that the per-user file descriptors limit would also
limit the resources that a normal user can request via the epoll
interface. Vegard Nossum reported a very simple program (a modified
version attached) that can make a normal user to request a pretty large
amount of kernel memory, well within the its maximum number of fds. To
solve such problem, default limits are now imposed, and /proc based
configuration has been introduced. A new directory has been created,
named /proc/sys/fs/epoll/ and inside there, there are two configuration
points:
max_user_instances = Maximum number of devices - per user
max_user_watches = Maximum number of "watched" fds - per user
The current default for "max_user_watches" limits the memory used by epoll
to store "watches", to 1/32 of the amount of the low RAM. As example, a
256MB 32bit machine, will have "max_user_watches" set to roughly 90000.
That should be enough to not break existing heavy epoll users. The
default value for "max_user_instances" is set to 128, that should be
enough too.
This also changes the userspace, because a new error code can now come out
from EPOLL_CTL_ADD (-ENOSPC). The EMFILE from epoll_create() was already
listed, so that should be ok.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: use get_current_user()]
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegardno@ifi.uio.no>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-12-01 21:13:55 +00:00
|
|
|
EP_ITEM_COST;
|
2011-01-13 01:00:01 +00:00
|
|
|
BUG_ON(max_user_watches < 0);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2013-04-30 22:27:38 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We can have many thousands of epitems, so prevent this from
|
|
|
|
* using an extra cache line on 64-bit (and smaller) CPUs
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
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BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(void *) <= 8 && sizeof(struct epitem) > 128);
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|
|
|
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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|
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/* Allocates slab cache used to allocate "struct epitem" items */
|
|
|
|
epi_cache = kmem_cache_create("eventpoll_epi", sizeof(struct epitem),
|
2017-11-17 23:28:59 +00:00
|
|
|
0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT, NULL);
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
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/* Allocates slab cache used to allocate "struct eppoll_entry" */
|
|
|
|
pwq_cache = kmem_cache_create("eventpoll_pwq",
|
2017-11-17 23:28:59 +00:00
|
|
|
sizeof(struct eppoll_entry), 0, SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT, NULL);
|
2022-01-22 06:12:09 +00:00
|
|
|
epoll_sysctls_init();
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
epoll: take epitem list out of struct file
Move the head of epitem list out of struct file; for epoll ones it's
moved into struct eventpoll (->refs there), for non-epoll - into
the new object (struct epitem_head). In place of ->f_ep_links we
leave a pointer to the list head (->f_ep).
->f_ep is protected by ->f_lock and it's zeroed as soon as the list
of epitems becomes empty (that can happen only in ep_remove() by
now).
The list of files for reverse path check is *not* going through
struct file now - it's a single-linked list going through epitem_head
instances. It's terminated by ERR_PTR(-1) (== EP_UNACTIVE_POINTER),
so the elements of list can be distinguished by head->next != NULL.
epitem_head instances are allocated at ep_insert() time (by
attach_epitem()) and freed either by ep_remove() (if it empties
the set of epitems *and* epitem_head does not belong to the
reverse path check list) or by clear_tfile_check_list() when
the list is emptied (if the set of epitems is empty by that
point). Allocations are done from a separate slab - minimal kmalloc()
size is too large on some architectures.
As the result, we trim struct file _and_ get rid of the games with
temporary file references.
Locking and barriers are interesting (aren't they always); see unlist_file()
and ep_remove() for details. The non-obvious part is that ep_remove() needs
to decide if it will be the one to free the damn thing *before* actually
storing NULL to head->epitems.first - that's what smp_load_acquire is for
in there. unlist_file() lockless path is safe, since we hit it only if
we observe NULL in head->epitems.first and whoever had done that store is
guaranteed to have observed non-NULL in head->next. IOW, their last access
had been the store of NULL into ->epitems.first and we can safely free
the sucker. OTOH, we are under rcu_read_lock() and both epitem and
epitem->file have their freeing RCU-delayed. So if we see non-NULL
->epitems.first, we can grab ->f_lock (all epitems in there share the
same struct file) and safely recheck the emptiness of ->epitems; again,
->next is still non-NULL, so ep_remove() couldn't have freed head yet.
->f_lock serializes us wrt ep_remove(); the rest is trivial.
Note that once head->epitems becomes NULL, nothing can get inserted into
it - the only remaining reference to head after that point is from the
reverse path check list.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-10-02 00:45:51 +00:00
|
|
|
ephead_cache = kmem_cache_create("ep_head",
|
|
|
|
sizeof(struct epitems_head), 0, SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT, NULL);
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2007-05-11 05:23:22 +00:00
|
|
|
fs_initcall(eventpoll_init);
|