linux-stable/arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* Based on arch/arm/kernel/setup.c
*
* Copyright (C) 1995-2001 Russell King
* Copyright (C) 2012 ARM Ltd.
*/
ARM64 / ACPI: Get RSDP and ACPI boot-time tables As we want to get ACPI tables to parse and then use the information for system initialization, we should get the RSDP (Root System Description Pointer) first, it then locates Extended Root Description Table (XSDT) which contains all the 64-bit physical address that pointer to other boot-time tables. Introduce acpi.c and its related head file in this patch to provide fundamental needs of extern variables and functions for ACPI core, and then get boot-time tables as needed. - asm/acenv.h for arch specific ACPICA environments and implementation, It is needed unconditionally by ACPI core; - asm/acpi.h for arch specific variables and functions needed by ACPI driver core; - acpi.c for ARM64 related ACPI implementation for ACPI driver core; acpi_boot_table_init() is introduced to get RSDP and boot-time tables, it will be called in setup_arch() before paging_init(), so we should use eary_memremap() mechanism here to get the RSDP and all the table pointers. FADT Major.Minor version was introduced in ACPI 5.1, it is the same as ACPI version. In ACPI 5.1, some major gaps are fixed for ARM, such as updates in MADT table for GIC and SMP init, without those updates, we can not get the MPIDR for SMP init, and GICv2/3 related init information, so we can't boot arm64 ACPI properly with table versions predating 5.1. If firmware provides ACPI tables with ACPI version less than 5.1, OS has no way to retrieve the configuration data that is necessary to init SMP boot protocol and the GIC properly, so disable ACPI if we get an FADT table with version less that 5.1 when acpi_boot_table_init() called. CC: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> CC: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> CC: Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com> Tested-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <Suravee.Suthikulpanit@amd.com> Tested-by: Yijing Wang <wangyijing@huawei.com> Tested-by: Mark Langsdorf <mlangsdo@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Tested-by: Timur Tabi <timur@codeaurora.org> Tested-by: Robert Richter <rrichter@cavium.com> Acked-by: Robert Richter <rrichter@cavium.com> Acked-by: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net> Acked-by: Grant Likely <grant.likely@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Al Stone <al.stone@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Graeme Gregory <graeme.gregory@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Tomasz Nowicki <tomasz.nowicki@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Hanjun Guo <hanjun.guo@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2015-03-24 14:02:37 +00:00
#include <linux/acpi.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/stddef.h>
#include <linux/ioport.h>
#include <linux/delay.h>
#include <linux/initrd.h>
#include <linux/console.h>
#include <linux/cache.h>
#include <linux/screen_info.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/kexec.h>
#include <linux/root_dev.h>
#include <linux/cpu.h>
#include <linux/interrupt.h>
#include <linux/smp.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
kernel.h: split out panic and oops helpers kernel.h is being used as a dump for all kinds of stuff for a long time. Here is the attempt to start cleaning it up by splitting out panic and oops helpers. There are several purposes of doing this: - dropping dependency in bug.h - dropping a loop by moving out panic_notifier.h - unload kernel.h from something which has its own domain At the same time convert users tree-wide to use new headers, although for the time being include new header back to kernel.h to avoid twisted indirected includes for existing users. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: thread_info.h needs limits.h] [andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com: ia64 fix] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210520130557.55277-1-andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210511074137.33666-1-andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org> Co-developed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org> Acked-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: Sebastian Reichel <sre@kernel.org> Acked-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Acked-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org> Acked-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de> Acked-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> # parisc Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-07-01 01:54:59 +00:00
#include <linux/panic_notifier.h>
#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
#include <linux/memblock.h>
#include <linux/of_fdt.h>
#include <linux/efi.h>
#include <linux/psci.h>
#include <linux/sched/task.h>
#include <linux/scs.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
ARM64 / ACPI: Get RSDP and ACPI boot-time tables As we want to get ACPI tables to parse and then use the information for system initialization, we should get the RSDP (Root System Description Pointer) first, it then locates Extended Root Description Table (XSDT) which contains all the 64-bit physical address that pointer to other boot-time tables. Introduce acpi.c and its related head file in this patch to provide fundamental needs of extern variables and functions for ACPI core, and then get boot-time tables as needed. - asm/acenv.h for arch specific ACPICA environments and implementation, It is needed unconditionally by ACPI core; - asm/acpi.h for arch specific variables and functions needed by ACPI driver core; - acpi.c for ARM64 related ACPI implementation for ACPI driver core; acpi_boot_table_init() is introduced to get RSDP and boot-time tables, it will be called in setup_arch() before paging_init(), so we should use eary_memremap() mechanism here to get the RSDP and all the table pointers. FADT Major.Minor version was introduced in ACPI 5.1, it is the same as ACPI version. In ACPI 5.1, some major gaps are fixed for ARM, such as updates in MADT table for GIC and SMP init, without those updates, we can not get the MPIDR for SMP init, and GICv2/3 related init information, so we can't boot arm64 ACPI properly with table versions predating 5.1. If firmware provides ACPI tables with ACPI version less than 5.1, OS has no way to retrieve the configuration data that is necessary to init SMP boot protocol and the GIC properly, so disable ACPI if we get an FADT table with version less that 5.1 when acpi_boot_table_init() called. CC: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> CC: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> CC: Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com> Tested-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <Suravee.Suthikulpanit@amd.com> Tested-by: Yijing Wang <wangyijing@huawei.com> Tested-by: Mark Langsdorf <mlangsdo@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Tested-by: Timur Tabi <timur@codeaurora.org> Tested-by: Robert Richter <rrichter@cavium.com> Acked-by: Robert Richter <rrichter@cavium.com> Acked-by: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net> Acked-by: Grant Likely <grant.likely@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Al Stone <al.stone@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Graeme Gregory <graeme.gregory@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Tomasz Nowicki <tomasz.nowicki@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Hanjun Guo <hanjun.guo@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2015-03-24 14:02:37 +00:00
#include <asm/acpi.h>
#include <asm/fixmap.h>
#include <asm/cpu.h>
#include <asm/cputype.h>
#include <asm/daifflags.h>
#include <asm/elf.h>
#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
#include <asm/cpu_ops.h>
2015-10-12 15:52:58 +00:00
#include <asm/kasan.h>
#include <asm/numa.h>
#include <asm/scs.h>
#include <asm/sections.h>
#include <asm/setup.h>
#include <asm/smp_plat.h>
#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
#include <asm/traps.h>
#include <asm/efi.h>
#include <asm/xen/hypervisor.h>
#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
arm64: Fix /proc/iomem for reserved but not memory regions We describe ranges of 'reserved' memory to userspace via /proc/iomem. Commit 50d7ba36b916 ("arm64: export memblock_reserve()d regions via /proc/iomem") updated the logic to export regions that were reserved because their contents should be preserved. This allowed kexec-tools to tell the difference between 'reserved' memory that must be preserved and not overwritten, (e.g. the ACPI tables), and 'nomap' memory that must not be touched without knowing the memory-attributes (e.g. RAS CPER regions). The above commit wrongly assumed that memblock_reserve() would not be used to reserve regions that aren't memory. It turns out this is exactly what early_init_dt_reserve_memory_arch() will do if it finds a DT reserved-memory that was also carved out of the memory node, which results in a WARN_ON_ONCE() and the region being reserved instead of ignored. The ramoops description on hikey and dragonboard-410c both do this, so we can't simply write this configuration off as "buggy firmware". Avoid this issue by rewriting reserve_memblock_reserved_regions() so that only the portions of reserved regions which overlap with mapped memory are actually reserved. Fixes: 50d7ba36b916 ("arm64: export memblock_reserve()d regions via /proc/iomem") Reported-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Reported-by: Paolo Pisati <p.pisati@gmail.com> CC: Akashi Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> CC: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2018-10-11 10:29:14 +00:00
static int num_standard_resources;
static struct resource *standard_resources;
phys_addr_t __fdt_pointer __initdata;
u64 mmu_enabled_at_boot __initdata;
/*
* Standard memory resources
*/
static struct resource mem_res[] = {
{
.name = "Kernel code",
.start = 0,
.end = 0,
.flags = IORESOURCE_SYSTEM_RAM
},
{
.name = "Kernel data",
.start = 0,
.end = 0,
.flags = IORESOURCE_SYSTEM_RAM
}
};
#define kernel_code mem_res[0]
#define kernel_data mem_res[1]
/*
* The recorded values of x0 .. x3 upon kernel entry.
*/
u64 __cacheline_aligned boot_args[4];
void __init smp_setup_processor_id(void)
{
u64 mpidr = read_cpuid_mpidr() & MPIDR_HWID_BITMASK;
set_cpu_logical_map(0, mpidr);
pr_info("Booting Linux on physical CPU 0x%010lx [0x%08x]\n",
(unsigned long)mpidr, read_cpuid_id());
}
bool arch_match_cpu_phys_id(int cpu, u64 phys_id)
{
return phys_id == cpu_logical_map(cpu);
}
arm64: kernel: build MPIDR_EL1 hash function data structure On ARM64 SMP systems, cores are identified by their MPIDR_EL1 register. The MPIDR_EL1 guidelines in the ARM ARM do not provide strict enforcement of MPIDR_EL1 layout, only recommendations that, if followed, split the MPIDR_EL1 on ARM 64 bit platforms in four affinity levels. In multi-cluster systems like big.LITTLE, if the affinity guidelines are followed, the MPIDR_EL1 can not be considered a linear index. This means that the association between logical CPU in the kernel and the HW CPU identifier becomes somewhat more complicated requiring methods like hashing to associate a given MPIDR_EL1 to a CPU logical index, in order for the look-up to be carried out in an efficient and scalable way. This patch provides a function in the kernel that starting from the cpu_logical_map, implement collision-free hashing of MPIDR_EL1 values by checking all significative bits of MPIDR_EL1 affinity level bitfields. The hashing can then be carried out through bits shifting and ORing; the resulting hash algorithm is a collision-free though not minimal hash that can be executed with few assembly instructions. The mpidr_el1 is filtered through a mpidr mask that is built by checking all bits that toggle in the set of MPIDR_EL1s corresponding to possible CPUs. Bits that do not toggle do not carry information so they do not contribute to the resulting hash. Pseudo code: /* check all bits that toggle, so they are required */ for (i = 1, mpidr_el1_mask = 0; i < num_possible_cpus(); i++) mpidr_el1_mask |= (cpu_logical_map(i) ^ cpu_logical_map(0)); /* * Build shifts to be applied to aff0, aff1, aff2, aff3 values to hash the * mpidr_el1 * fls() returns the last bit set in a word, 0 if none * ffs() returns the first bit set in a word, 0 if none */ fs0 = mpidr_el1_mask[7:0] ? ffs(mpidr_el1_mask[7:0]) - 1 : 0; fs1 = mpidr_el1_mask[15:8] ? ffs(mpidr_el1_mask[15:8]) - 1 : 0; fs2 = mpidr_el1_mask[23:16] ? ffs(mpidr_el1_mask[23:16]) - 1 : 0; fs3 = mpidr_el1_mask[39:32] ? ffs(mpidr_el1_mask[39:32]) - 1 : 0; ls0 = fls(mpidr_el1_mask[7:0]); ls1 = fls(mpidr_el1_mask[15:8]); ls2 = fls(mpidr_el1_mask[23:16]); ls3 = fls(mpidr_el1_mask[39:32]); bits0 = ls0 - fs0; bits1 = ls1 - fs1; bits2 = ls2 - fs2; bits3 = ls3 - fs3; aff0_shift = fs0; aff1_shift = 8 + fs1 - bits0; aff2_shift = 16 + fs2 - (bits0 + bits1); aff3_shift = 32 + fs3 - (bits0 + bits1 + bits2); u32 hash(u64 mpidr_el1) { u32 l[4]; u64 mpidr_el1_masked = mpidr_el1 & mpidr_el1_mask; l[0] = mpidr_el1_masked & 0xff; l[1] = mpidr_el1_masked & 0xff00; l[2] = mpidr_el1_masked & 0xff0000; l[3] = mpidr_el1_masked & 0xff00000000; return (l[0] >> aff0_shift | l[1] >> aff1_shift | l[2] >> aff2_shift | l[3] >> aff3_shift); } The hashing algorithm relies on the inherent properties set in the ARM ARM recommendations for the MPIDR_EL1. Exotic configurations, where for instance the MPIDR_EL1 values at a given affinity level have large holes, can end up requiring big hash tables since the compression of values that can be achieved through shifting is somewhat crippled when holes are present. Kernel warns if the number of buckets of the resulting hash table exceeds the number of possible CPUs by a factor of 4, which is a symptom of a very sparse HW MPIDR_EL1 configuration. The hash algorithm is quite simple and can easily be implemented in assembly code, to be used in code paths where the kernel virtual address space is not set-up (ie cpu_resume) and instruction and data fetches are strongly ordered so code must be compact and must carry out few data accesses. Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com>
2013-05-16 09:32:09 +00:00
struct mpidr_hash mpidr_hash;
/**
* smp_build_mpidr_hash - Pre-compute shifts required at each affinity
* level in order to build a linear index from an
* MPIDR value. Resulting algorithm is a collision
* free hash carried out through shifting and ORing
*/
static void __init smp_build_mpidr_hash(void)
{
u32 i, affinity, fs[4], bits[4], ls;
u64 mask = 0;
/*
* Pre-scan the list of MPIDRS and filter out bits that do
* not contribute to affinity levels, ie they never toggle.
*/
for_each_possible_cpu(i)
mask |= (cpu_logical_map(i) ^ cpu_logical_map(0));
pr_debug("mask of set bits %#llx\n", mask);
/*
* Find and stash the last and first bit set at all affinity levels to
* check how many bits are required to represent them.
*/
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
affinity = MPIDR_AFFINITY_LEVEL(mask, i);
/*
* Find the MSB bit and LSB bits position
* to determine how many bits are required
* to express the affinity level.
*/
ls = fls(affinity);
fs[i] = affinity ? ffs(affinity) - 1 : 0;
bits[i] = ls - fs[i];
}
/*
* An index can be created from the MPIDR_EL1 by isolating the
* significant bits at each affinity level and by shifting
* them in order to compress the 32 bits values space to a
* compressed set of values. This is equivalent to hashing
* the MPIDR_EL1 through shifting and ORing. It is a collision free
* hash though not minimal since some levels might contain a number
* of CPUs that is not an exact power of 2 and their bit
* representation might contain holes, eg MPIDR_EL1[7:0] = {0x2, 0x80}.
*/
mpidr_hash.shift_aff[0] = MPIDR_LEVEL_SHIFT(0) + fs[0];
mpidr_hash.shift_aff[1] = MPIDR_LEVEL_SHIFT(1) + fs[1] - bits[0];
mpidr_hash.shift_aff[2] = MPIDR_LEVEL_SHIFT(2) + fs[2] -
(bits[1] + bits[0]);
mpidr_hash.shift_aff[3] = MPIDR_LEVEL_SHIFT(3) +
fs[3] - (bits[2] + bits[1] + bits[0]);
mpidr_hash.mask = mask;
mpidr_hash.bits = bits[3] + bits[2] + bits[1] + bits[0];
pr_debug("MPIDR hash: aff0[%u] aff1[%u] aff2[%u] aff3[%u] mask[%#llx] bits[%u]\n",
mpidr_hash.shift_aff[0],
mpidr_hash.shift_aff[1],
mpidr_hash.shift_aff[2],
mpidr_hash.shift_aff[3],
mpidr_hash.mask,
mpidr_hash.bits);
/*
* 4x is an arbitrary value used to warn on a hash table much bigger
* than expected on most systems.
*/
if (mpidr_hash_size() > 4 * num_possible_cpus())
pr_warn("Large number of MPIDR hash buckets detected\n");
}
static void __init setup_machine_fdt(phys_addr_t dt_phys)
{
int size;
void *dt_virt = fixmap_remap_fdt(dt_phys, &size, PAGE_KERNEL);
const char *name;
if (dt_virt)
memblock_reserve(dt_phys, size);
if (!dt_virt || !early_init_dt_scan(dt_virt)) {
pr_crit("\n"
"Error: invalid device tree blob at physical address %pa (virtual address 0x%px)\n"
"The dtb must be 8-byte aligned and must not exceed 2 MB in size\n"
"\nPlease check your bootloader.",
&dt_phys, dt_virt);
/*
* Note that in this _really_ early stage we cannot even BUG()
* or oops, so the least terrible thing to do is cpu_relax(),
* or else we could end-up printing non-initialized data, etc.
*/
while (true)
cpu_relax();
}
/* Early fixups are done, map the FDT as read-only now */
fixmap_remap_fdt(dt_phys, &size, PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
name = of_flat_dt_get_machine_name();
if (!name)
return;
pr_info("Machine model: %s\n", name);
dump_stack_set_arch_desc("%s (DT)", name);
}
static void __init request_standard_resources(void)
{
struct memblock_region *region;
struct resource *res;
arm64: Fix /proc/iomem for reserved but not memory regions We describe ranges of 'reserved' memory to userspace via /proc/iomem. Commit 50d7ba36b916 ("arm64: export memblock_reserve()d regions via /proc/iomem") updated the logic to export regions that were reserved because their contents should be preserved. This allowed kexec-tools to tell the difference between 'reserved' memory that must be preserved and not overwritten, (e.g. the ACPI tables), and 'nomap' memory that must not be touched without knowing the memory-attributes (e.g. RAS CPER regions). The above commit wrongly assumed that memblock_reserve() would not be used to reserve regions that aren't memory. It turns out this is exactly what early_init_dt_reserve_memory_arch() will do if it finds a DT reserved-memory that was also carved out of the memory node, which results in a WARN_ON_ONCE() and the region being reserved instead of ignored. The ramoops description on hikey and dragonboard-410c both do this, so we can't simply write this configuration off as "buggy firmware". Avoid this issue by rewriting reserve_memblock_reserved_regions() so that only the portions of reserved regions which overlap with mapped memory are actually reserved. Fixes: 50d7ba36b916 ("arm64: export memblock_reserve()d regions via /proc/iomem") Reported-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Reported-by: Paolo Pisati <p.pisati@gmail.com> CC: Akashi Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> CC: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2018-10-11 10:29:14 +00:00
unsigned long i = 0;
treewide: add checks for the return value of memblock_alloc*() Add check for the return value of memblock_alloc*() functions and call panic() in case of error. The panic message repeats the one used by panicing memblock allocators with adjustment of parameters to include only relevant ones. The replacement was mostly automated with semantic patches like the one below with manual massaging of format strings. @@ expression ptr, size, align; @@ ptr = memblock_alloc(size, align); + if (!ptr) + panic("%s: Failed to allocate %lu bytes align=0x%lx\n", __func__, size, align); [anders.roxell@linaro.org: use '%pa' with 'phys_addr_t' type] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190131161046.21886-1-anders.roxell@linaro.org [rppt@linux.ibm.com: fix format strings for panics after memblock_alloc] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1548950940-15145-1-git-send-email-rppt@linux.ibm.com [rppt@linux.ibm.com: don't panic if the allocation in sparse_buffer_init fails] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190131074018.GD28876@rapoport-lnx [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix xtensa printk warning] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1548057848-15136-20-git-send-email-rppt@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Guo Ren <ren_guo@c-sky.com> [c-sky] Acked-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com> [MIPS] Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> [s390] Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> [Xen] Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> [m68k] Acked-by: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com> [xtensa] Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Dennis Zhou <dennis@kernel.org> Cc: Greentime Hu <green.hu@gmail.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@pku.edu.cn> Cc: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com> Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org> Cc: Rob Herring <robh+dt@kernel.org> Cc: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-03-12 06:30:31 +00:00
size_t res_size;
kernel_code.start = __pa_symbol(_stext);
kernel_code.end = __pa_symbol(__init_begin - 1);
kernel_data.start = __pa_symbol(_sdata);
kernel_data.end = __pa_symbol(_end - 1);
insert_resource(&iomem_resource, &kernel_code);
insert_resource(&iomem_resource, &kernel_data);
arm64: Fix /proc/iomem for reserved but not memory regions We describe ranges of 'reserved' memory to userspace via /proc/iomem. Commit 50d7ba36b916 ("arm64: export memblock_reserve()d regions via /proc/iomem") updated the logic to export regions that were reserved because their contents should be preserved. This allowed kexec-tools to tell the difference between 'reserved' memory that must be preserved and not overwritten, (e.g. the ACPI tables), and 'nomap' memory that must not be touched without knowing the memory-attributes (e.g. RAS CPER regions). The above commit wrongly assumed that memblock_reserve() would not be used to reserve regions that aren't memory. It turns out this is exactly what early_init_dt_reserve_memory_arch() will do if it finds a DT reserved-memory that was also carved out of the memory node, which results in a WARN_ON_ONCE() and the region being reserved instead of ignored. The ramoops description on hikey and dragonboard-410c both do this, so we can't simply write this configuration off as "buggy firmware". Avoid this issue by rewriting reserve_memblock_reserved_regions() so that only the portions of reserved regions which overlap with mapped memory are actually reserved. Fixes: 50d7ba36b916 ("arm64: export memblock_reserve()d regions via /proc/iomem") Reported-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Reported-by: Paolo Pisati <p.pisati@gmail.com> CC: Akashi Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> CC: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2018-10-11 10:29:14 +00:00
num_standard_resources = memblock.memory.cnt;
treewide: add checks for the return value of memblock_alloc*() Add check for the return value of memblock_alloc*() functions and call panic() in case of error. The panic message repeats the one used by panicing memblock allocators with adjustment of parameters to include only relevant ones. The replacement was mostly automated with semantic patches like the one below with manual massaging of format strings. @@ expression ptr, size, align; @@ ptr = memblock_alloc(size, align); + if (!ptr) + panic("%s: Failed to allocate %lu bytes align=0x%lx\n", __func__, size, align); [anders.roxell@linaro.org: use '%pa' with 'phys_addr_t' type] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190131161046.21886-1-anders.roxell@linaro.org [rppt@linux.ibm.com: fix format strings for panics after memblock_alloc] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1548950940-15145-1-git-send-email-rppt@linux.ibm.com [rppt@linux.ibm.com: don't panic if the allocation in sparse_buffer_init fails] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190131074018.GD28876@rapoport-lnx [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix xtensa printk warning] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1548057848-15136-20-git-send-email-rppt@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Guo Ren <ren_guo@c-sky.com> [c-sky] Acked-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com> [MIPS] Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> [s390] Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> [Xen] Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> [m68k] Acked-by: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com> [xtensa] Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Dennis Zhou <dennis@kernel.org> Cc: Greentime Hu <green.hu@gmail.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@pku.edu.cn> Cc: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com> Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org> Cc: Rob Herring <robh+dt@kernel.org> Cc: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-03-12 06:30:31 +00:00
res_size = num_standard_resources * sizeof(*standard_resources);
arm64: replace memblock_alloc_low with memblock_alloc If we use "crashkernel=Y[@X]" and the start address is above 4G, the arm64 kdump capture kernel may call memblock_alloc_low() failure in request_standard_resources(). Replacing memblock_alloc_low() with memblock_alloc(). [ 0.000000] MEMBLOCK configuration: [ 0.000000] memory size = 0x0000000040650000 reserved size = 0x0000000004db7f39 [ 0.000000] memory.cnt = 0x6 [ 0.000000] memory[0x0] [0x00000000395f0000-0x000000003968ffff], 0x00000000000a0000 bytes on node 0 flags: 0x4 [ 0.000000] memory[0x1] [0x0000000039730000-0x000000003973ffff], 0x0000000000010000 bytes on node 0 flags: 0x4 [ 0.000000] memory[0x2] [0x0000000039780000-0x000000003986ffff], 0x00000000000f0000 bytes on node 0 flags: 0x4 [ 0.000000] memory[0x3] [0x0000000039890000-0x0000000039d0ffff], 0x0000000000480000 bytes on node 0 flags: 0x4 [ 0.000000] memory[0x4] [0x000000003ed00000-0x000000003ed2ffff], 0x0000000000030000 bytes on node 0 flags: 0x4 [ 0.000000] memory[0x5] [0x0000002040000000-0x000000207fffffff], 0x0000000040000000 bytes on node 0 flags: 0x0 [ 0.000000] reserved.cnt = 0x7 [ 0.000000] reserved[0x0] [0x0000002040080000-0x0000002041c4dfff], 0x0000000001bce000 bytes flags: 0x0 [ 0.000000] reserved[0x1] [0x0000002041c53000-0x0000002042c203f8], 0x0000000000fcd3f9 bytes flags: 0x0 [ 0.000000] reserved[0x2] [0x000000207da00000-0x000000207dbfffff], 0x0000000000200000 bytes flags: 0x0 [ 0.000000] reserved[0x3] [0x000000207ddef000-0x000000207fbfffff], 0x0000000001e11000 bytes flags: 0x0 [ 0.000000] reserved[0x4] [0x000000207fdf2b00-0x000000207fdfc03f], 0x0000000000009540 bytes flags: 0x0 [ 0.000000] reserved[0x5] [0x000000207fdfd000-0x000000207ffff3ff], 0x0000000000202400 bytes flags: 0x0 [ 0.000000] reserved[0x6] [0x000000207ffffe00-0x000000207fffffff], 0x0000000000000200 bytes flags: 0x0 [ 0.000000] Kernel panic - not syncing: request_standard_resources: Failed to allocate 384 bytes [ 0.000000] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.1.0-next-20190321+ #4 [ 0.000000] Call trace: [ 0.000000] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x188 [ 0.000000] show_stack+0x24/0x30 [ 0.000000] dump_stack+0xa8/0xcc [ 0.000000] panic+0x14c/0x31c [ 0.000000] setup_arch+0x2b0/0x5e0 [ 0.000000] start_kernel+0x90/0x52c [ 0.000000] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: request_standard_resources: Failed to allocate 384 bytes ]--- Link: https://www.spinics.net/lists/arm-kernel/msg715293.html Signed-off-by: Chen Zhou <chenzhou10@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2019-03-27 13:51:16 +00:00
standard_resources = memblock_alloc(res_size, SMP_CACHE_BYTES);
treewide: add checks for the return value of memblock_alloc*() Add check for the return value of memblock_alloc*() functions and call panic() in case of error. The panic message repeats the one used by panicing memblock allocators with adjustment of parameters to include only relevant ones. The replacement was mostly automated with semantic patches like the one below with manual massaging of format strings. @@ expression ptr, size, align; @@ ptr = memblock_alloc(size, align); + if (!ptr) + panic("%s: Failed to allocate %lu bytes align=0x%lx\n", __func__, size, align); [anders.roxell@linaro.org: use '%pa' with 'phys_addr_t' type] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190131161046.21886-1-anders.roxell@linaro.org [rppt@linux.ibm.com: fix format strings for panics after memblock_alloc] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1548950940-15145-1-git-send-email-rppt@linux.ibm.com [rppt@linux.ibm.com: don't panic if the allocation in sparse_buffer_init fails] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190131074018.GD28876@rapoport-lnx [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix xtensa printk warning] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1548057848-15136-20-git-send-email-rppt@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Guo Ren <ren_guo@c-sky.com> [c-sky] Acked-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com> [MIPS] Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> [s390] Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> [Xen] Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> [m68k] Acked-by: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com> [xtensa] Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Dennis Zhou <dennis@kernel.org> Cc: Greentime Hu <green.hu@gmail.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@pku.edu.cn> Cc: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com> Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org> Cc: Rob Herring <robh+dt@kernel.org> Cc: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-03-12 06:30:31 +00:00
if (!standard_resources)
panic("%s: Failed to allocate %zu bytes\n", __func__, res_size);
arm64: Fix /proc/iomem for reserved but not memory regions We describe ranges of 'reserved' memory to userspace via /proc/iomem. Commit 50d7ba36b916 ("arm64: export memblock_reserve()d regions via /proc/iomem") updated the logic to export regions that were reserved because their contents should be preserved. This allowed kexec-tools to tell the difference between 'reserved' memory that must be preserved and not overwritten, (e.g. the ACPI tables), and 'nomap' memory that must not be touched without knowing the memory-attributes (e.g. RAS CPER regions). The above commit wrongly assumed that memblock_reserve() would not be used to reserve regions that aren't memory. It turns out this is exactly what early_init_dt_reserve_memory_arch() will do if it finds a DT reserved-memory that was also carved out of the memory node, which results in a WARN_ON_ONCE() and the region being reserved instead of ignored. The ramoops description on hikey and dragonboard-410c both do this, so we can't simply write this configuration off as "buggy firmware". Avoid this issue by rewriting reserve_memblock_reserved_regions() so that only the portions of reserved regions which overlap with mapped memory are actually reserved. Fixes: 50d7ba36b916 ("arm64: export memblock_reserve()d regions via /proc/iomem") Reported-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Reported-by: Paolo Pisati <p.pisati@gmail.com> CC: Akashi Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> CC: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2018-10-11 10:29:14 +00:00
memblock: use separate iterators for memory and reserved regions for_each_memblock() is used to iterate over memblock.memory in a few places that use data from memblock_region rather than the memory ranges. Introduce separate for_each_mem_region() and for_each_reserved_mem_region() to improve encapsulation of memblock internals from its users. Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> [x86] Acked-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de> [MIPS] Acked-by: Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com> [.clang-format] Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Emil Renner Berthing <kernel@esmil.dk> Cc: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> Cc: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com> Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200818151634.14343-18-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-10-13 23:58:30 +00:00
for_each_mem_region(region) {
arm64: Fix /proc/iomem for reserved but not memory regions We describe ranges of 'reserved' memory to userspace via /proc/iomem. Commit 50d7ba36b916 ("arm64: export memblock_reserve()d regions via /proc/iomem") updated the logic to export regions that were reserved because their contents should be preserved. This allowed kexec-tools to tell the difference between 'reserved' memory that must be preserved and not overwritten, (e.g. the ACPI tables), and 'nomap' memory that must not be touched without knowing the memory-attributes (e.g. RAS CPER regions). The above commit wrongly assumed that memblock_reserve() would not be used to reserve regions that aren't memory. It turns out this is exactly what early_init_dt_reserve_memory_arch() will do if it finds a DT reserved-memory that was also carved out of the memory node, which results in a WARN_ON_ONCE() and the region being reserved instead of ignored. The ramoops description on hikey and dragonboard-410c both do this, so we can't simply write this configuration off as "buggy firmware". Avoid this issue by rewriting reserve_memblock_reserved_regions() so that only the portions of reserved regions which overlap with mapped memory are actually reserved. Fixes: 50d7ba36b916 ("arm64: export memblock_reserve()d regions via /proc/iomem") Reported-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Reported-by: Paolo Pisati <p.pisati@gmail.com> CC: Akashi Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> CC: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2018-10-11 10:29:14 +00:00
res = &standard_resources[i++];
if (memblock_is_nomap(region)) {
res->name = "reserved";
res->flags = IORESOURCE_MEM;
res->start = __pfn_to_phys(memblock_region_reserved_base_pfn(region));
res->end = __pfn_to_phys(memblock_region_reserved_end_pfn(region)) - 1;
} else {
res->name = "System RAM";
res->flags = IORESOURCE_SYSTEM_RAM | IORESOURCE_BUSY;
res->start = __pfn_to_phys(memblock_region_memory_base_pfn(region));
res->end = __pfn_to_phys(memblock_region_memory_end_pfn(region)) - 1;
}
insert_resource(&iomem_resource, res);
}
}
arm64: export memblock_reserve()d regions via /proc/iomem There has been some confusion around what is necessary to prevent kexec overwriting important memory regions. memblock: reserve, or nomap? Only memblock nomap regions are reported via /proc/iomem, kexec's user-space doesn't know about memblock_reserve()d regions. Until commit f56ab9a5b73ca ("efi/arm: Don't mark ACPI reclaim memory as MEMBLOCK_NOMAP") the ACPI tables were nomap, now they are reserved and thus possible for kexec to overwrite with the new kernel or initrd. But this was always broken, as the UEFI memory map is also reserved and not marked as nomap. Exporting both nomap and reserved memblock types is a nuisance as they live in different memblock structures which we can't walk at the same time. Take a second walk over memblock.reserved and add new 'reserved' subnodes for the memblock_reserved() regions that aren't already described by the existing code. (e.g. Kernel Code) We use reserve_region_with_split() to find the gaps in existing named regions. This handles the gap between 'kernel code' and 'kernel data' which is memblock_reserve()d, but already partially described by request_standard_resources(). e.g.: | 80000000-dfffffff : System RAM | 80080000-80ffffff : Kernel code | 81000000-8158ffff : reserved | 81590000-8237efff : Kernel data | a0000000-dfffffff : Crash kernel | e00f0000-f949ffff : System RAM reserve_region_with_split needs kzalloc() which isn't available when request_standard_resources() is called, use an initcall. Reported-by: Bhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@redhat.com> Reported-by: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@codeaurora.org> Suggested-by: Akashi Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Fixes: d28f6df1305a ("arm64/kexec: Add core kexec support") Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> CC: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2018-07-23 01:57:28 +00:00
static int __init reserve_memblock_reserved_regions(void)
{
arm64: Fix /proc/iomem for reserved but not memory regions We describe ranges of 'reserved' memory to userspace via /proc/iomem. Commit 50d7ba36b916 ("arm64: export memblock_reserve()d regions via /proc/iomem") updated the logic to export regions that were reserved because their contents should be preserved. This allowed kexec-tools to tell the difference between 'reserved' memory that must be preserved and not overwritten, (e.g. the ACPI tables), and 'nomap' memory that must not be touched without knowing the memory-attributes (e.g. RAS CPER regions). The above commit wrongly assumed that memblock_reserve() would not be used to reserve regions that aren't memory. It turns out this is exactly what early_init_dt_reserve_memory_arch() will do if it finds a DT reserved-memory that was also carved out of the memory node, which results in a WARN_ON_ONCE() and the region being reserved instead of ignored. The ramoops description on hikey and dragonboard-410c both do this, so we can't simply write this configuration off as "buggy firmware". Avoid this issue by rewriting reserve_memblock_reserved_regions() so that only the portions of reserved regions which overlap with mapped memory are actually reserved. Fixes: 50d7ba36b916 ("arm64: export memblock_reserve()d regions via /proc/iomem") Reported-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Reported-by: Paolo Pisati <p.pisati@gmail.com> CC: Akashi Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> CC: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2018-10-11 10:29:14 +00:00
u64 i, j;
for (i = 0; i < num_standard_resources; ++i) {
struct resource *mem = &standard_resources[i];
phys_addr_t r_start, r_end, mem_size = resource_size(mem);
if (!memblock_is_region_reserved(mem->start, mem_size))
arm64: export memblock_reserve()d regions via /proc/iomem There has been some confusion around what is necessary to prevent kexec overwriting important memory regions. memblock: reserve, or nomap? Only memblock nomap regions are reported via /proc/iomem, kexec's user-space doesn't know about memblock_reserve()d regions. Until commit f56ab9a5b73ca ("efi/arm: Don't mark ACPI reclaim memory as MEMBLOCK_NOMAP") the ACPI tables were nomap, now they are reserved and thus possible for kexec to overwrite with the new kernel or initrd. But this was always broken, as the UEFI memory map is also reserved and not marked as nomap. Exporting both nomap and reserved memblock types is a nuisance as they live in different memblock structures which we can't walk at the same time. Take a second walk over memblock.reserved and add new 'reserved' subnodes for the memblock_reserved() regions that aren't already described by the existing code. (e.g. Kernel Code) We use reserve_region_with_split() to find the gaps in existing named regions. This handles the gap between 'kernel code' and 'kernel data' which is memblock_reserve()d, but already partially described by request_standard_resources(). e.g.: | 80000000-dfffffff : System RAM | 80080000-80ffffff : Kernel code | 81000000-8158ffff : reserved | 81590000-8237efff : Kernel data | a0000000-dfffffff : Crash kernel | e00f0000-f949ffff : System RAM reserve_region_with_split needs kzalloc() which isn't available when request_standard_resources() is called, use an initcall. Reported-by: Bhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@redhat.com> Reported-by: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@codeaurora.org> Suggested-by: Akashi Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Fixes: d28f6df1305a ("arm64/kexec: Add core kexec support") Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> CC: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2018-07-23 01:57:28 +00:00
continue;
memblock: implement for_each_reserved_mem_region() using __next_mem_region() Iteration over memblock.reserved with for_each_reserved_mem_region() used __next_reserved_mem_region() that implemented a subset of __next_mem_region(). Use __for_each_mem_range() and, essentially, __next_mem_region() with appropriate parameters to reduce code duplication. While on it, rename for_each_reserved_mem_region() to for_each_reserved_mem_range() for consistency. Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com> [.clang-format] Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Emil Renner Berthing <kernel@esmil.dk> Cc: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> Cc: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com> Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200818151634.14343-17-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-10-13 23:58:25 +00:00
for_each_reserved_mem_range(j, &r_start, &r_end) {
arm64: Fix /proc/iomem for reserved but not memory regions We describe ranges of 'reserved' memory to userspace via /proc/iomem. Commit 50d7ba36b916 ("arm64: export memblock_reserve()d regions via /proc/iomem") updated the logic to export regions that were reserved because their contents should be preserved. This allowed kexec-tools to tell the difference between 'reserved' memory that must be preserved and not overwritten, (e.g. the ACPI tables), and 'nomap' memory that must not be touched without knowing the memory-attributes (e.g. RAS CPER regions). The above commit wrongly assumed that memblock_reserve() would not be used to reserve regions that aren't memory. It turns out this is exactly what early_init_dt_reserve_memory_arch() will do if it finds a DT reserved-memory that was also carved out of the memory node, which results in a WARN_ON_ONCE() and the region being reserved instead of ignored. The ramoops description on hikey and dragonboard-410c both do this, so we can't simply write this configuration off as "buggy firmware". Avoid this issue by rewriting reserve_memblock_reserved_regions() so that only the portions of reserved regions which overlap with mapped memory are actually reserved. Fixes: 50d7ba36b916 ("arm64: export memblock_reserve()d regions via /proc/iomem") Reported-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Reported-by: Paolo Pisati <p.pisati@gmail.com> CC: Akashi Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> CC: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2018-10-11 10:29:14 +00:00
resource_size_t start, end;
start = max(PFN_PHYS(PFN_DOWN(r_start)), mem->start);
end = min(PFN_PHYS(PFN_UP(r_end)) - 1, mem->end);
if (start > mem->end || end < mem->start)
continue;
reserve_region_with_split(mem, start, end, "reserved");
}
arm64: export memblock_reserve()d regions via /proc/iomem There has been some confusion around what is necessary to prevent kexec overwriting important memory regions. memblock: reserve, or nomap? Only memblock nomap regions are reported via /proc/iomem, kexec's user-space doesn't know about memblock_reserve()d regions. Until commit f56ab9a5b73ca ("efi/arm: Don't mark ACPI reclaim memory as MEMBLOCK_NOMAP") the ACPI tables were nomap, now they are reserved and thus possible for kexec to overwrite with the new kernel or initrd. But this was always broken, as the UEFI memory map is also reserved and not marked as nomap. Exporting both nomap and reserved memblock types is a nuisance as they live in different memblock structures which we can't walk at the same time. Take a second walk over memblock.reserved and add new 'reserved' subnodes for the memblock_reserved() regions that aren't already described by the existing code. (e.g. Kernel Code) We use reserve_region_with_split() to find the gaps in existing named regions. This handles the gap between 'kernel code' and 'kernel data' which is memblock_reserve()d, but already partially described by request_standard_resources(). e.g.: | 80000000-dfffffff : System RAM | 80080000-80ffffff : Kernel code | 81000000-8158ffff : reserved | 81590000-8237efff : Kernel data | a0000000-dfffffff : Crash kernel | e00f0000-f949ffff : System RAM reserve_region_with_split needs kzalloc() which isn't available when request_standard_resources() is called, use an initcall. Reported-by: Bhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@redhat.com> Reported-by: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@codeaurora.org> Suggested-by: Akashi Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Fixes: d28f6df1305a ("arm64/kexec: Add core kexec support") Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> CC: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2018-07-23 01:57:28 +00:00
}
return 0;
}
arch_initcall(reserve_memblock_reserved_regions);
u64 __cpu_logical_map[NR_CPUS] = { [0 ... NR_CPUS-1] = INVALID_HWID };
u64 cpu_logical_map(unsigned int cpu)
{
return __cpu_logical_map[cpu];
}
kasan, arm64: don't instrument functions that enable kasan This patch prepares Software Tag-Based KASAN for stack tagging support. With stack tagging enabled, KASAN tags stack variable in each function in its prologue. In start_kernel() stack variables get tagged before KASAN is enabled via setup_arch()->kasan_init(). As the result the tags for start_kernel()'s stack variables end up in the temporary shadow memory. Later when KASAN gets enabled, switched to normal shadow, and starts checking tags, this leads to false-positive reports, as proper tags are missing in normal shadow. Disable KASAN instrumentation for start_kernel(). Also disable it for arm64's setup_arch() as a precaution (it doesn't have any stack variables right now). [andreyknvl@google.com: reorder attributes for start_kernel()] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/26fb6165a17abcf61222eda5184c030fb6b133d1.1596544734.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> [arm64] Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Elena Petrova <lenaptr@google.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/55d432671a92e931ab8234b03dc36b14d4c21bfb.1596199677.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-08-07 06:25:05 +00:00
void __init __no_sanitize_address setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
{
setup_initial_init_mm(_stext, _etext, _edata, _end);
*cmdline_p = boot_command_line;
arm64: kaslr: split kaslr/module initialization Currently kaslr_init() handles a mixture of detecting/announcing whether KASLR is enabled, and randomizing the module region depending on whether KASLR is enabled. To make it easier to rework the module region initialization, split the KASLR initialization into two steps: * kaslr_init() determines whether KASLR should be enabled, and announces this choice, recording this to a new global boolean variable. This is called from setup_arch() just before the existing call to kaslr_requires_kpti() so that this will always provide the expected result. * kaslr_module_init() randomizes the module region when required. This is called as a subsys_initcall, where we previously called kaslr_init(). As a bonus, moving the KASLR reporting earlier makes it easier to spot and permits it to be logged via earlycon, making it easier to debug any issues that could be triggered by KASLR. Booting a v6.4-rc1 kernel with this patch applied, the log looks like: | EFI stub: Booting Linux Kernel... | EFI stub: Generating empty DTB | EFI stub: Exiting boot services... | [ 0.000000] Booting Linux on physical CPU 0x0000000000 [0x000f0510] | [ 0.000000] Linux version 6.4.0-rc1-00006-g4763a8f8aeb3 (mark@lakrids) (aarch64-linux-gcc (GCC) 12.1.0, GNU ld (GNU Binutils) 2.38) #2 SMP PREEMPT Tue May 9 11:03:37 BST 2023 | [ 0.000000] KASLR enabled | [ 0.000000] earlycon: pl11 at MMIO 0x0000000009000000 (options '') | [ 0.000000] printk: bootconsole [pl11] enabled Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Tested-by: Shanker Donthineni <sdonthineni@nvidia.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230530110328.2213762-4-mark.rutland@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2023-05-30 11:03:25 +00:00
kaslr_init();
early_fixmap_init();
early_ioremap_init();
setup_machine_fdt(__fdt_pointer);
arm64: move jump_label_init() before parse_early_param() While jump_label_init() was moved earlier in the boot process in efd9e03facd0 ("arm64: Use static keys for CPU features"), it wasn't early enough for early params to use it. The old state of things was as described here... init/main.c calls out to arch-specific things before general jump label and early param handling: asmlinkage __visible void __init start_kernel(void) { ... setup_arch(&command_line); ... smp_prepare_boot_cpu(); ... /* parameters may set static keys */ jump_label_init(); parse_early_param(); ... } x86 setup_arch() wants those earlier, so it handles jump label and early param: void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p) { ... jump_label_init(); ... parse_early_param(); ... } arm64 setup_arch() only had early param: void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p) { ... parse_early_param(); ... } with jump label later in smp_prepare_boot_cpu(): void __init smp_prepare_boot_cpu(void) { ... jump_label_init(); ... } This moves arm64 jump_label_init() from smp_prepare_boot_cpu() to setup_arch(), as done already on x86, in preparation from early param usage in the init_on_alloc/free() series: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1561572949.5154.81.camel@lca.pw Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/201906271003.005303B52@keescook Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-12 03:59:15 +00:00
/*
* Initialise the static keys early as they may be enabled by the
* cpufeature code and early parameters.
arm64: move jump_label_init() before parse_early_param() While jump_label_init() was moved earlier in the boot process in efd9e03facd0 ("arm64: Use static keys for CPU features"), it wasn't early enough for early params to use it. The old state of things was as described here... init/main.c calls out to arch-specific things before general jump label and early param handling: asmlinkage __visible void __init start_kernel(void) { ... setup_arch(&command_line); ... smp_prepare_boot_cpu(); ... /* parameters may set static keys */ jump_label_init(); parse_early_param(); ... } x86 setup_arch() wants those earlier, so it handles jump label and early param: void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p) { ... jump_label_init(); ... parse_early_param(); ... } arm64 setup_arch() only had early param: void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p) { ... parse_early_param(); ... } with jump label later in smp_prepare_boot_cpu(): void __init smp_prepare_boot_cpu(void) { ... jump_label_init(); ... } This moves arm64 jump_label_init() from smp_prepare_boot_cpu() to setup_arch(), as done already on x86, in preparation from early param usage in the init_on_alloc/free() series: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1561572949.5154.81.camel@lca.pw Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/201906271003.005303B52@keescook Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-12 03:59:15 +00:00
*/
jump_label_init();
parse_early_param();
dynamic_scs_init();
/*
* Unmask SError as soon as possible after initializing earlycon so
* that we can report any SErrors immediately.
*/
local_daif_restore(DAIF_PROCCTX_NOIRQ);
/*
* TTBR0 is only used for the identity mapping at this stage. Make it
* point to zero page to avoid speculatively fetching new entries.
*/
cpu_uninstall_idmap();
xen_early_init();
efi_init();
if (!efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) {
if ((u64)_text % MIN_KIMG_ALIGN)
pr_warn(FW_BUG "Kernel image misaligned at boot, please fix your bootloader!");
WARN_TAINT(mmu_enabled_at_boot, TAINT_FIRMWARE_WORKAROUND,
FW_BUG "Booted with MMU enabled!");
}
arm64_memblock_init();
paging_init();
acpi_table_upgrade();
ARM64 / ACPI: Get RSDP and ACPI boot-time tables As we want to get ACPI tables to parse and then use the information for system initialization, we should get the RSDP (Root System Description Pointer) first, it then locates Extended Root Description Table (XSDT) which contains all the 64-bit physical address that pointer to other boot-time tables. Introduce acpi.c and its related head file in this patch to provide fundamental needs of extern variables and functions for ACPI core, and then get boot-time tables as needed. - asm/acenv.h for arch specific ACPICA environments and implementation, It is needed unconditionally by ACPI core; - asm/acpi.h for arch specific variables and functions needed by ACPI driver core; - acpi.c for ARM64 related ACPI implementation for ACPI driver core; acpi_boot_table_init() is introduced to get RSDP and boot-time tables, it will be called in setup_arch() before paging_init(), so we should use eary_memremap() mechanism here to get the RSDP and all the table pointers. FADT Major.Minor version was introduced in ACPI 5.1, it is the same as ACPI version. In ACPI 5.1, some major gaps are fixed for ARM, such as updates in MADT table for GIC and SMP init, without those updates, we can not get the MPIDR for SMP init, and GICv2/3 related init information, so we can't boot arm64 ACPI properly with table versions predating 5.1. If firmware provides ACPI tables with ACPI version less than 5.1, OS has no way to retrieve the configuration data that is necessary to init SMP boot protocol and the GIC properly, so disable ACPI if we get an FADT table with version less that 5.1 when acpi_boot_table_init() called. CC: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> CC: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> CC: Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com> Tested-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <Suravee.Suthikulpanit@amd.com> Tested-by: Yijing Wang <wangyijing@huawei.com> Tested-by: Mark Langsdorf <mlangsdo@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Tested-by: Timur Tabi <timur@codeaurora.org> Tested-by: Robert Richter <rrichter@cavium.com> Acked-by: Robert Richter <rrichter@cavium.com> Acked-by: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net> Acked-by: Grant Likely <grant.likely@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Al Stone <al.stone@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Graeme Gregory <graeme.gregory@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Tomasz Nowicki <tomasz.nowicki@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Hanjun Guo <hanjun.guo@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2015-03-24 14:02:37 +00:00
/* Parse the ACPI tables for possible boot-time configuration */
acpi_boot_table_init();
if (acpi_disabled)
unflatten_device_tree();
bootmem_init();
2015-10-12 15:52:58 +00:00
kasan_init();
request_standard_resources();
early_ioremap_reset();
if (acpi_disabled)
psci_dt_init();
else
psci_acpi_init();
init_bootcpu_ops();
smp_init_cpus();
arm64: kernel: build MPIDR_EL1 hash function data structure On ARM64 SMP systems, cores are identified by their MPIDR_EL1 register. The MPIDR_EL1 guidelines in the ARM ARM do not provide strict enforcement of MPIDR_EL1 layout, only recommendations that, if followed, split the MPIDR_EL1 on ARM 64 bit platforms in four affinity levels. In multi-cluster systems like big.LITTLE, if the affinity guidelines are followed, the MPIDR_EL1 can not be considered a linear index. This means that the association between logical CPU in the kernel and the HW CPU identifier becomes somewhat more complicated requiring methods like hashing to associate a given MPIDR_EL1 to a CPU logical index, in order for the look-up to be carried out in an efficient and scalable way. This patch provides a function in the kernel that starting from the cpu_logical_map, implement collision-free hashing of MPIDR_EL1 values by checking all significative bits of MPIDR_EL1 affinity level bitfields. The hashing can then be carried out through bits shifting and ORing; the resulting hash algorithm is a collision-free though not minimal hash that can be executed with few assembly instructions. The mpidr_el1 is filtered through a mpidr mask that is built by checking all bits that toggle in the set of MPIDR_EL1s corresponding to possible CPUs. Bits that do not toggle do not carry information so they do not contribute to the resulting hash. Pseudo code: /* check all bits that toggle, so they are required */ for (i = 1, mpidr_el1_mask = 0; i < num_possible_cpus(); i++) mpidr_el1_mask |= (cpu_logical_map(i) ^ cpu_logical_map(0)); /* * Build shifts to be applied to aff0, aff1, aff2, aff3 values to hash the * mpidr_el1 * fls() returns the last bit set in a word, 0 if none * ffs() returns the first bit set in a word, 0 if none */ fs0 = mpidr_el1_mask[7:0] ? ffs(mpidr_el1_mask[7:0]) - 1 : 0; fs1 = mpidr_el1_mask[15:8] ? ffs(mpidr_el1_mask[15:8]) - 1 : 0; fs2 = mpidr_el1_mask[23:16] ? ffs(mpidr_el1_mask[23:16]) - 1 : 0; fs3 = mpidr_el1_mask[39:32] ? ffs(mpidr_el1_mask[39:32]) - 1 : 0; ls0 = fls(mpidr_el1_mask[7:0]); ls1 = fls(mpidr_el1_mask[15:8]); ls2 = fls(mpidr_el1_mask[23:16]); ls3 = fls(mpidr_el1_mask[39:32]); bits0 = ls0 - fs0; bits1 = ls1 - fs1; bits2 = ls2 - fs2; bits3 = ls3 - fs3; aff0_shift = fs0; aff1_shift = 8 + fs1 - bits0; aff2_shift = 16 + fs2 - (bits0 + bits1); aff3_shift = 32 + fs3 - (bits0 + bits1 + bits2); u32 hash(u64 mpidr_el1) { u32 l[4]; u64 mpidr_el1_masked = mpidr_el1 & mpidr_el1_mask; l[0] = mpidr_el1_masked & 0xff; l[1] = mpidr_el1_masked & 0xff00; l[2] = mpidr_el1_masked & 0xff0000; l[3] = mpidr_el1_masked & 0xff00000000; return (l[0] >> aff0_shift | l[1] >> aff1_shift | l[2] >> aff2_shift | l[3] >> aff3_shift); } The hashing algorithm relies on the inherent properties set in the ARM ARM recommendations for the MPIDR_EL1. Exotic configurations, where for instance the MPIDR_EL1 values at a given affinity level have large holes, can end up requiring big hash tables since the compression of values that can be achieved through shifting is somewhat crippled when holes are present. Kernel warns if the number of buckets of the resulting hash table exceeds the number of possible CPUs by a factor of 4, which is a symptom of a very sparse HW MPIDR_EL1 configuration. The hash algorithm is quite simple and can easily be implemented in assembly code, to be used in code paths where the kernel virtual address space is not set-up (ie cpu_resume) and instruction and data fetches are strongly ordered so code must be compact and must carry out few data accesses. Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com>
2013-05-16 09:32:09 +00:00
smp_build_mpidr_hash();
/* Init percpu seeds for random tags after cpus are set up. */
kasan_init_sw_tags();
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN
/*
* Make sure init_thread_info.ttbr0 always generates translation
* faults in case uaccess_enable() is inadvertently called by the init
* thread.
*/
init_task.thread_info.ttbr0 = phys_to_ttbr(__pa_symbol(reserved_pg_dir));
#endif
if (boot_args[1] || boot_args[2] || boot_args[3]) {
pr_err("WARNING: x1-x3 nonzero in violation of boot protocol:\n"
"\tx1: %016llx\n\tx2: %016llx\n\tx3: %016llx\n"
"This indicates a broken bootloader or old kernel\n",
boot_args[1], boot_args[2], boot_args[3]);
}
}
static inline bool cpu_can_disable(unsigned int cpu)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU
const struct cpu_operations *ops = get_cpu_ops(cpu);
if (ops && ops->cpu_can_disable)
return ops->cpu_can_disable(cpu);
#endif
return false;
}
bool arch_cpu_is_hotpluggable(int num)
{
return cpu_can_disable(num);
}
arm64: add support for kernel ASLR This adds support for KASLR is implemented, based on entropy provided by the bootloader in the /chosen/kaslr-seed DT property. Depending on the size of the address space (VA_BITS) and the page size, the entropy in the virtual displacement is up to 13 bits (16k/2 levels) and up to 25 bits (all 4 levels), with the sidenote that displacements that result in the kernel image straddling a 1GB/32MB/512MB alignment boundary (for 4KB/16KB/64KB granule kernels, respectively) are not allowed, and will be rounded up to an acceptable value. If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is enabled, the module region is randomized independently from the core kernel. This makes it less likely that the location of core kernel data structures can be determined by an adversary, but causes all function calls from modules into the core kernel to be resolved via entries in the module PLTs. If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is not enabled, the module region is randomized by choosing a page aligned 128 MB region inside the interval [_etext - 128 MB, _stext + 128 MB). This gives between 10 and 14 bits of entropy (depending on page size), independently of the kernel randomization, but still guarantees that modules are within the range of relative branch and jump instructions (with the caveat that, since the module region is shared with other uses of the vmalloc area, modules may need to be loaded further away if the module region is exhausted) Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-01-26 13:12:01 +00:00
static void dump_kernel_offset(void)
arm64: add support for kernel ASLR This adds support for KASLR is implemented, based on entropy provided by the bootloader in the /chosen/kaslr-seed DT property. Depending on the size of the address space (VA_BITS) and the page size, the entropy in the virtual displacement is up to 13 bits (16k/2 levels) and up to 25 bits (all 4 levels), with the sidenote that displacements that result in the kernel image straddling a 1GB/32MB/512MB alignment boundary (for 4KB/16KB/64KB granule kernels, respectively) are not allowed, and will be rounded up to an acceptable value. If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is enabled, the module region is randomized independently from the core kernel. This makes it less likely that the location of core kernel data structures can be determined by an adversary, but causes all function calls from modules into the core kernel to be resolved via entries in the module PLTs. If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is not enabled, the module region is randomized by choosing a page aligned 128 MB region inside the interval [_etext - 128 MB, _stext + 128 MB). This gives between 10 and 14 bits of entropy (depending on page size), independently of the kernel randomization, but still guarantees that modules are within the range of relative branch and jump instructions (with the caveat that, since the module region is shared with other uses of the vmalloc area, modules may need to be loaded further away if the module region is exhausted) Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-01-26 13:12:01 +00:00
{
const unsigned long offset = kaslr_offset();
arm64: add support for kernel ASLR This adds support for KASLR is implemented, based on entropy provided by the bootloader in the /chosen/kaslr-seed DT property. Depending on the size of the address space (VA_BITS) and the page size, the entropy in the virtual displacement is up to 13 bits (16k/2 levels) and up to 25 bits (all 4 levels), with the sidenote that displacements that result in the kernel image straddling a 1GB/32MB/512MB alignment boundary (for 4KB/16KB/64KB granule kernels, respectively) are not allowed, and will be rounded up to an acceptable value. If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is enabled, the module region is randomized independently from the core kernel. This makes it less likely that the location of core kernel data structures can be determined by an adversary, but causes all function calls from modules into the core kernel to be resolved via entries in the module PLTs. If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is not enabled, the module region is randomized by choosing a page aligned 128 MB region inside the interval [_etext - 128 MB, _stext + 128 MB). This gives between 10 and 14 bits of entropy (depending on page size), independently of the kernel randomization, but still guarantees that modules are within the range of relative branch and jump instructions (with the caveat that, since the module region is shared with other uses of the vmalloc area, modules may need to be loaded further away if the module region is exhausted) Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-01-26 13:12:01 +00:00
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE) && offset > 0) {
pr_emerg("Kernel Offset: 0x%lx from 0x%lx\n",
offset, KIMAGE_VADDR);
pr_emerg("PHYS_OFFSET: 0x%llx\n", PHYS_OFFSET);
arm64: add support for kernel ASLR This adds support for KASLR is implemented, based on entropy provided by the bootloader in the /chosen/kaslr-seed DT property. Depending on the size of the address space (VA_BITS) and the page size, the entropy in the virtual displacement is up to 13 bits (16k/2 levels) and up to 25 bits (all 4 levels), with the sidenote that displacements that result in the kernel image straddling a 1GB/32MB/512MB alignment boundary (for 4KB/16KB/64KB granule kernels, respectively) are not allowed, and will be rounded up to an acceptable value. If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is enabled, the module region is randomized independently from the core kernel. This makes it less likely that the location of core kernel data structures can be determined by an adversary, but causes all function calls from modules into the core kernel to be resolved via entries in the module PLTs. If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is not enabled, the module region is randomized by choosing a page aligned 128 MB region inside the interval [_etext - 128 MB, _stext + 128 MB). This gives between 10 and 14 bits of entropy (depending on page size), independently of the kernel randomization, but still guarantees that modules are within the range of relative branch and jump instructions (with the caveat that, since the module region is shared with other uses of the vmalloc area, modules may need to be loaded further away if the module region is exhausted) Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-01-26 13:12:01 +00:00
} else {
pr_emerg("Kernel Offset: disabled\n");
}
}
static int arm64_panic_block_dump(struct notifier_block *self,
unsigned long v, void *p)
{
dump_kernel_offset();
dump_cpu_features();
dump_mem_limit();
arm64: add support for kernel ASLR This adds support for KASLR is implemented, based on entropy provided by the bootloader in the /chosen/kaslr-seed DT property. Depending on the size of the address space (VA_BITS) and the page size, the entropy in the virtual displacement is up to 13 bits (16k/2 levels) and up to 25 bits (all 4 levels), with the sidenote that displacements that result in the kernel image straddling a 1GB/32MB/512MB alignment boundary (for 4KB/16KB/64KB granule kernels, respectively) are not allowed, and will be rounded up to an acceptable value. If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is enabled, the module region is randomized independently from the core kernel. This makes it less likely that the location of core kernel data structures can be determined by an adversary, but causes all function calls from modules into the core kernel to be resolved via entries in the module PLTs. If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is not enabled, the module region is randomized by choosing a page aligned 128 MB region inside the interval [_etext - 128 MB, _stext + 128 MB). This gives between 10 and 14 bits of entropy (depending on page size), independently of the kernel randomization, but still guarantees that modules are within the range of relative branch and jump instructions (with the caveat that, since the module region is shared with other uses of the vmalloc area, modules may need to be loaded further away if the module region is exhausted) Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-01-26 13:12:01 +00:00
return 0;
}
static struct notifier_block arm64_panic_block = {
.notifier_call = arm64_panic_block_dump
arm64: add support for kernel ASLR This adds support for KASLR is implemented, based on entropy provided by the bootloader in the /chosen/kaslr-seed DT property. Depending on the size of the address space (VA_BITS) and the page size, the entropy in the virtual displacement is up to 13 bits (16k/2 levels) and up to 25 bits (all 4 levels), with the sidenote that displacements that result in the kernel image straddling a 1GB/32MB/512MB alignment boundary (for 4KB/16KB/64KB granule kernels, respectively) are not allowed, and will be rounded up to an acceptable value. If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is enabled, the module region is randomized independently from the core kernel. This makes it less likely that the location of core kernel data structures can be determined by an adversary, but causes all function calls from modules into the core kernel to be resolved via entries in the module PLTs. If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is not enabled, the module region is randomized by choosing a page aligned 128 MB region inside the interval [_etext - 128 MB, _stext + 128 MB). This gives between 10 and 14 bits of entropy (depending on page size), independently of the kernel randomization, but still guarantees that modules are within the range of relative branch and jump instructions (with the caveat that, since the module region is shared with other uses of the vmalloc area, modules may need to be loaded further away if the module region is exhausted) Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-01-26 13:12:01 +00:00
};
static int __init register_arm64_panic_block(void)
arm64: add support for kernel ASLR This adds support for KASLR is implemented, based on entropy provided by the bootloader in the /chosen/kaslr-seed DT property. Depending on the size of the address space (VA_BITS) and the page size, the entropy in the virtual displacement is up to 13 bits (16k/2 levels) and up to 25 bits (all 4 levels), with the sidenote that displacements that result in the kernel image straddling a 1GB/32MB/512MB alignment boundary (for 4KB/16KB/64KB granule kernels, respectively) are not allowed, and will be rounded up to an acceptable value. If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is enabled, the module region is randomized independently from the core kernel. This makes it less likely that the location of core kernel data structures can be determined by an adversary, but causes all function calls from modules into the core kernel to be resolved via entries in the module PLTs. If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is not enabled, the module region is randomized by choosing a page aligned 128 MB region inside the interval [_etext - 128 MB, _stext + 128 MB). This gives between 10 and 14 bits of entropy (depending on page size), independently of the kernel randomization, but still guarantees that modules are within the range of relative branch and jump instructions (with the caveat that, since the module region is shared with other uses of the vmalloc area, modules may need to be loaded further away if the module region is exhausted) Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-01-26 13:12:01 +00:00
{
atomic_notifier_chain_register(&panic_notifier_list,
&arm64_panic_block);
arm64: add support for kernel ASLR This adds support for KASLR is implemented, based on entropy provided by the bootloader in the /chosen/kaslr-seed DT property. Depending on the size of the address space (VA_BITS) and the page size, the entropy in the virtual displacement is up to 13 bits (16k/2 levels) and up to 25 bits (all 4 levels), with the sidenote that displacements that result in the kernel image straddling a 1GB/32MB/512MB alignment boundary (for 4KB/16KB/64KB granule kernels, respectively) are not allowed, and will be rounded up to an acceptable value. If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is enabled, the module region is randomized independently from the core kernel. This makes it less likely that the location of core kernel data structures can be determined by an adversary, but causes all function calls from modules into the core kernel to be resolved via entries in the module PLTs. If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is not enabled, the module region is randomized by choosing a page aligned 128 MB region inside the interval [_etext - 128 MB, _stext + 128 MB). This gives between 10 and 14 bits of entropy (depending on page size), independently of the kernel randomization, but still guarantees that modules are within the range of relative branch and jump instructions (with the caveat that, since the module region is shared with other uses of the vmalloc area, modules may need to be loaded further away if the module region is exhausted) Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-01-26 13:12:01 +00:00
return 0;
}
device_initcall(register_arm64_panic_block);
static int __init check_mmu_enabled_at_boot(void)
{
if (!efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT) && mmu_enabled_at_boot)
panic("Non-EFI boot detected with MMU and caches enabled");
return 0;
}
device_initcall_sync(check_mmu_enabled_at_boot);