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admin-guide/hw-vuln: Rephrase a section of core-scheduling.rst 

Rephrase the "For MDS" section in core-scheduling.rst for the purpose of
making it clearer what is meant by "kernel memory is still considered
untrusted".

Suggested-by: Vineeth Pillai <Vineeth.Pillai@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fabio M. De Francesco <fmdefrancesco@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joelaf@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210721190250.26095-1-fmdefrancesco@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
This commit is contained in:
Fabio M. De Francesco 2021-07-21 21:02:50 +02:00 committed by Jonathan Corbet
parent b426d9d78e
commit ce48ee81a1
1 changed files with 6 additions and 4 deletions
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10
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst
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@ -181,10 +181,12 @@ Open cross-HT issues that core scheduling does not solve
--------------------------------------------------------
1. For MDS
~~~~~~~~~~
Core scheduling cannot protect against MDS attacks between an HT running in
user mode and another running in kernel mode. Even though both HTs run tasks
which trust each other, kernel memory is still considered untrusted. Such
attacks are possible for any combination of sibling CPU modes (host or guest mode).
Core scheduling cannot protect against MDS attacks between the siblings
running in user mode and the others running in kernel mode. Even though all
siblings run tasks which trust each other, when the kernel is executing
code on behalf of a task, it cannot trust the code running in the
sibling. Such attacks are possible for any combination of sibling CPU modes
(host or guest mode).
2. For L1TF
~~~~~~~~~~~