The input parameter @fields is type of struct ima_template_field ***, so
when allocates array memory for @fields, the size of element should be
sizeof(**field) instead of sizeof(*field).
Actually the original code would not cause any runtime error, but it's
better to make it logically right.
Fixes: adf53a778a ("ima: new templates management mechanism")
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Key restriction is allocated in integrity_init_keyring(). However, if
keyring allocation failed, it is not freed, causing memory leaks.
Fixes: 2b6aa412ff ("KEYS: Use structure to capture key restriction function and data")
Signed-off-by: GUO Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The sidtab conversion code has support for multiple context
conversion routines through the use of function pointers and
indirect calls. However, the reality is that all current users rely
on the same conversion routine: convert_context(). This patch does
away with this extra complexity and replaces the indirect calls
with direct function calls; allowing us to remove a layer of
obfuscation and create cleaner, more maintainable code.
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Commit 4ff09db1b7 ("bpf: net: Change sk_getsockopt() to take the
sockptr_t argument") made it possible to call sk_getsockopt()
with both user and kernel address space buffers through the use of
the sockptr_t type. Unfortunately at the time of conversion the
security_socket_getpeersec_stream() LSM hook was written to only
accept userspace buffers, and in a desire to avoid having to change
the LSM hook the commit author simply passed the sockptr_t's
userspace buffer pointer. Since the only sk_getsockopt() callers
at the time of conversion which used kernel sockptr_t buffers did
not allow SO_PEERSEC, and hence the
security_socket_getpeersec_stream() hook, this was acceptable but
also very fragile as future changes presented the possibility of
silently passing kernel space pointers to the LSM hook.
There are several ways to protect against this, including careful
code review of future commits, but since relying on code review to
catch bugs is a recipe for disaster and the upstream eBPF maintainer
is "strongly against defensive programming", this patch updates the
LSM hook, and all of the implementations to support sockptr_t and
safely handle both user and kernel space buffers.
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Commit f3cc6b25dc ("ima: always measure and audit files in policy") lets
measurement or audit happen even if the file digest cannot be calculated.
As a result, iint->ima_hash could have been allocated despite
ima_collect_measurement() returning an error.
Since ima_hash belongs to a temporary inode metadata structure, declared
at the beginning of __ima_inode_hash(), just add a kfree() call if
ima_collect_measurement() returns an error different from -ENOMEM (in that
case, ima_hash should not have been allocated).
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 280fe8367b ("ima: Always return a file measurement in ima_file_hash()")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
IMA relies on the blocking LSM policy notifier callback to update the
LSM based IMA policy rules.
When SELinux update its policies, IMA would be notified and starts
updating all its lsm rules one-by-one. During this time, -ESTALE would
be returned by ima_filter_rule_match() if it is called with a LSM rule
that has not yet been updated. In ima_match_rules(), -ESTALE is not
handled, and the LSM rule is considered a match, causing extra files
to be measured by IMA.
Fix it by re-initializing a temporary rule if -ESTALE is returned by
ima_filter_rule_match(). The origin rule in the rule list would be
updated by the LSM policy notifier callback.
Fixes: b169424551 ("ima: use the lsm policy update notifier")
Signed-off-by: GUO Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Currently ima_lsm_copy_rule() set the arg_p field of the source rule to
NULL, so that the source rule could be freed afterward. It does not make
sense for this behavior to be inside a "copy" function. So move it
outside and let the caller handle this field.
ima_lsm_copy_rule() now produce a shallow copy of the original entry
including args_p field. Meaning only the lsm.rule and the rule itself
should be freed for the original rule. Thus, instead of calling
ima_lsm_free_rule() which frees lsm.rule as well as args_p field, free
the lsm.rule directly.
Signed-off-by: GUO Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
In restore_template_fmt, when kstrdup fails, a non-NULL value will still be
returned, which causes a NULL pointer access in template_desc_init_fields.
Fixes: c7d0936770 ("ima: support restoring multiple template formats")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Co-developed-by: Jiaming Li <lijiaming30@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiaming Li <lijiaming30@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Huaxin Lu <luhuaxin1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Make sure array_size is initialized in the kunit test to get rid of
compiler warnings. This will also make sure the following tests fail
consistently if the first test fails.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
The aa_setup_dfa_engine() and aa_teardown_dfa_engine() is only called in
apparmor_init(), so let us add __init annotation to them.
Fixes: 11c236b89d ("apparmor: add a default null dfa")
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
After changes in commit a1bd627b46 ("apparmor: share profile name on
replacement"), the hname member of struct aa_policy is not valid slab
object, but a subset of that, it can not be freed by kfree_sensitive(),
use aa_policy_destroy() to fix it.
Fixes: a1bd627b46 ("apparmor: share profile name on replacement")
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20221031' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm
Pull LSM fix from Paul Moore:
"A single patch to the capabilities code to fix a potential memory leak
in the xattr allocation error handling"
* tag 'lsm-pr-20221031' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm:
capabilities: fix potential memleak on error path from vfs_getxattr_alloc()
When evm_status is INTEGRITY_PASS then this function returns early and so
later codepaths that check for evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS can be removed
as they are dead code.
Fixes: e61b135f7b ("integrity: implement get and set acl hook")
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
In cap_inode_getsecurity(), we will use vfs_getxattr_alloc() to
complete the memory allocation of tmpbuf, if we have completed
the memory allocation of tmpbuf, but failed to call handler->get(...),
there will be a memleak in below logic:
|-- ret = (int)vfs_getxattr_alloc(mnt_userns, ...)
| /* ^^^ alloc for tmpbuf */
|-- value = krealloc(*xattr_value, error + 1, flags)
| /* ^^^ alloc memory */
|-- error = handler->get(handler, ...)
| /* error! */
|-- *xattr_value = value
| /* xattr_value is &tmpbuf (memory leak!) */
So we will try to free(tmpbuf) after vfs_getxattr_alloc() fails to fix it.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 8db6c34f1d ("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities")
Signed-off-by: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
[PM: subject line and backtrace tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The current code provokes some kernel-doc warnings:
security/lsm_audit.c:198: warning: Function parameter or member
'ab' not described in 'dump_common_audit_data'
Signed-off-by: Bo Liu <liubo03@inspur.com>
[PM: description line wrap]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
We already ported most parts and filesystems over for v6.0 to the new
vfs{g,u}id_t type and associated helpers for v6.0. Convert the remaining
places so we can remove all the old helpers.
This is a non-functional change.
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee (DigitalOcean) <sforshee@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
We already ported most parts and filesystems over for v6.0 to the new
vfs{g,u}id_t type and associated helpers for v6.0. Convert the remaining
places so we can remove all the old helpers.
This is a non-functional change.
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee (DigitalOcean) <sforshee@kernel.org>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
We already ported most parts and filesystems over for v6.0 to the new
vfs{g,u}id_t type and associated helpers for v6.0. Convert the remaining
places so we can remove all the old helpers.
This is a non-functional change.
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee (DigitalOcean) <sforshee@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Before aa_alloc_profile(), it has allocated string for @*ns_name if @tmpns
is not NULL, so directly return -ENOMEM if aa_alloc_profile() failed will
cause a memleak issue, and even if aa_alloc_profile() succeed, in the
@fail_profile tag of aa_unpack(), it need to free @ns_name as well, this
patch fixes them.
Fixes: 736ec752d9 ("AppArmor: policy routines for loading and unpacking policy")
Fixes: 04dc715e24 ("apparmor: audit policy ns specified in policy load")
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
According to the implementations of cred_label() and set_cred_label(),
we should use pointer to struct aa_label for lbs_cred instead of struct
aa_task_ctx, this patch fixes it.
Fixes: bbd3662a83 ("Infrastructure management of the cred security blob")
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Unfortunately it is possible for some userspace's to load children
profiles before the parent profile. This can even happen when the
child and the parent are in different load sets.
Fix this by creating a null place holder profile that grants no permissions
and can be replaced by the parent once it is loaded.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Bother unconfined and learning profiles use the null profile as their
base. Refactor so they are share a common base routine. This doesn't
save much atm but will be important when the feature set of the
parent is inherited.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Update the comments for aa_getprocattr() and audit_resource(), the
args of them have beed changed since commit 76a1d263ab ("apparmor:
switch getprocattr to using label_print fns()").
Signed-off-by: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Remove the following useless static inline functions:
1. label_is_visible() is a static function in
security/apparmor/label.c, and it's not used, aa_ns_visible()
can do the same things as it, so it's redundant.
2. is_deleted() is a static function in security/apparmor/file.c,
and it's not used since commit aebd873e8d ("apparmor: refactor
path name lookup and permission checks around labels"), so it's
redundant.
They are redundant, so remove them.
Signed-off-by: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
The security and integrity infrastructure has dedicated hooks now so
evm_xattr_acl_change() is dead code. Before this commit the callchain was:
evm_protect_xattr()
-> evm_xattr_change()
-> evm_xattr_acl_change()
where evm_protect_xattr() was hit from evm_inode_setxattr() and
evm_inode_removexattr(). But now we have evm_inode_set_acl() and
evm_inode_remove_acl() and have switched over the vfs to rely on the posix
acl api so the code isn't hit anymore.
Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
The current way of setting and getting posix acls through the generic
xattr interface is error prone and type unsafe. The vfs needs to
interpret and fixup posix acls before storing or reporting it to
userspace. Various hacks exist to make this work. The code is hard to
understand and difficult to maintain in it's current form. Instead of
making this work by hacking posix acls through xattr handlers we are
building a dedicated posix acl api around the get and set inode
operations. This removes a lot of hackiness and makes the codepaths
easier to maintain. A lot of background can be found in [1].
So far posix acls were passed as a void blob to the security and
integrity modules. Some of them like evm then proceed to interpret the
void pointer and convert it into the kernel internal struct posix acl
representation to perform their integrity checking magic. This is
obviously pretty problematic as that requires knowledge that only the
vfs is guaranteed to have and has lead to various bugs. Add a proper
security hook for setting posix acls and pass down the posix acls in
their appropriate vfs format instead of hacking it through a void
pointer stored in the uapi format.
I spent considerate time in the security module and integrity
infrastructure and audited all codepaths. EVM is the only part that
really has restrictions based on the actual posix acl values passed
through it (e.g., i_mode). Before this dedicated hook EVM used to translate
from the uapi posix acl format sent to it in the form of a void pointer
into the vfs format. This is not a good thing. Instead of hacking around in
the uapi struct give EVM the posix acls in the appropriate vfs format and
perform sane permissions checks that mirror what it used to to in the
generic xattr hook.
IMA doesn't have any restrictions on posix acls. When posix acls are
changed it just wants to update its appraisal status to trigger an EVM
revalidation.
The removal of posix acls is equivalent to passing NULL to the posix set
acl hooks. This is the same as before through the generic xattr api.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org [1]
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> (LSM)
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
The current way of setting and getting posix acls through the generic
xattr interface is error prone and type unsafe. The vfs needs to
interpret and fixup posix acls before storing or reporting it to
userspace. Various hacks exist to make this work. The code is hard to
understand and difficult to maintain in it's current form. Instead of
making this work by hacking posix acls through xattr handlers we are
building a dedicated posix acl api around the get and set inode
operations. This removes a lot of hackiness and makes the codepaths
easier to maintain. A lot of background can be found in [1].
So far posix acls were passed as a void blob to the security and
integrity modules. Some of them like evm then proceed to interpret the
void pointer and convert it into the kernel internal struct posix acl
representation to perform their integrity checking magic. This is
obviously pretty problematic as that requires knowledge that only the
vfs is guaranteed to have and has lead to various bugs. Add a proper
security hook for setting posix acls and pass down the posix acls in
their appropriate vfs format instead of hacking it through a void
pointer stored in the uapi format.
I spent considerate time in the security module infrastructure and
audited all codepaths. Smack has no restrictions based on the posix
acl values passed through it. The capability hook doesn't need to be
called either because it only has restrictions on security.* xattrs. So
these all becomes very simple hooks for smack.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org [1]
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
The current way of setting and getting posix acls through the generic
xattr interface is error prone and type unsafe. The vfs needs to
interpret and fixup posix acls before storing or reporting it to
userspace. Various hacks exist to make this work. The code is hard to
understand and difficult to maintain in it's current form. Instead of
making this work by hacking posix acls through xattr handlers we are
building a dedicated posix acl api around the get and set inode
operations. This removes a lot of hackiness and makes the codepaths
easier to maintain. A lot of background can be found in [1].
So far posix acls were passed as a void blob to the security and
integrity modules. Some of them like evm then proceed to interpret the
void pointer and convert it into the kernel internal struct posix acl
representation to perform their integrity checking magic. This is
obviously pretty problematic as that requires knowledge that only the
vfs is guaranteed to have and has lead to various bugs. Add a proper
security hook for setting posix acls and pass down the posix acls in
their appropriate vfs format instead of hacking it through a void
pointer stored in the uapi format.
I spent considerate time in the security module infrastructure and
audited all codepaths. SELinux has no restrictions based on the posix
acl values passed through it. The capability hook doesn't need to be
called either because it only has restrictions on security.* xattrs. So
these are all fairly simply hooks for SELinux.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org [1]
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
The current way of setting and getting posix acls through the generic
xattr interface is error prone and type unsafe. The vfs needs to
interpret and fixup posix acls before storing or reporting it to
userspace. Various hacks exist to make this work. The code is hard to
understand and difficult to maintain in it's current form. Instead of
making this work by hacking posix acls through xattr handlers we are
building a dedicated posix acl api around the get and set inode
operations. This removes a lot of hackiness and makes the codepaths
easier to maintain. A lot of background can be found in [1].
So far posix acls were passed as a void blob to the security and
integrity modules. Some of them like evm then proceed to interpret the
void pointer and convert it into the kernel internal struct posix acl
representation to perform their integrity checking magic. This is
obviously pretty problematic as that requires knowledge that only the
vfs is guaranteed to have and has lead to various bugs. Add a proper
security hook for setting posix acls and pass down the posix acls in
their appropriate vfs format instead of hacking it through a void
pointer stored in the uapi format.
In the next patches we implement the hooks for the few security modules
that do actually have restrictions on posix acls.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org [1]
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Commit cd3bc044af ("KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with
user-provided decrypted data") added key instantiation with user
provided decrypted data. The user data is hex-ascii-encoded but was
just memcpy'ed to the binary buffer. Fix this to use hex2bin instead.
Old keys created from user provided decrypted data saved with "keyctl
pipe" are still valid, however if the key is recreated from decrypted
data the old key must be converted to the correct format. This can be
done with a small shell script, e.g.:
BROKENKEY=abcdefABCDEF1234567890aaaaaaaaaa
NEWKEY=$(echo -ne $BROKENKEY | xxd -p -c32)
keyctl add user masterkey "$(cat masterkey.bin)" @u
keyctl add encrypted testkey "new user:masterkey 32 $NEWKEY" @u
However, NEWKEY is still broken: If for BROKENKEY 32 bytes were
specified, a brute force attacker knowing the key properties would only
need to try at most 2^(16*8) keys, as if the key was only 16 bytes long.
The security issue is a result of the combination of limiting the input
range to hex-ascii and using memcpy() instead of hex2bin(). It could
have been fixed either by allowing binary input or using hex2bin() (and
doubling the ascii input key length). This patch implements the latter.
The corresponding test for the Linux Test Project ltp has also been
fixed (see link below).
Fixes: cd3bc044af ("KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided decrypted data")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/ltp/20221006081709.92303897@mail.steuer-voss.de/
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nikolaus Voss <nikolaus.voss@haag-streit.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The following warning was triggered on a hardware environment:
SELinux: Converting 162 SID table entries...
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at
__might_sleep+0x60/0x74 0x0
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 128, non_block: 0, pid: 5943, name: tar
CPU: 7 PID: 5943 Comm: tar Tainted: P O 5.10.0 #1
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1c8
show_stack+0x18/0x28
dump_stack+0xe8/0x15c
___might_sleep+0x168/0x17c
__might_sleep+0x60/0x74
__kmalloc_track_caller+0xa0/0x7dc
kstrdup+0x54/0xac
convert_context+0x48/0x2e4
sidtab_context_to_sid+0x1c4/0x36c
security_context_to_sid_core+0x168/0x238
security_context_to_sid_default+0x14/0x24
inode_doinit_use_xattr+0x164/0x1e4
inode_doinit_with_dentry+0x1c0/0x488
selinux_d_instantiate+0x20/0x34
security_d_instantiate+0x70/0xbc
d_splice_alias+0x4c/0x3c0
ext4_lookup+0x1d8/0x200 [ext4]
__lookup_slow+0x12c/0x1e4
walk_component+0x100/0x200
path_lookupat+0x88/0x118
filename_lookup+0x98/0x130
user_path_at_empty+0x48/0x60
vfs_statx+0x84/0x140
vfs_fstatat+0x20/0x30
__se_sys_newfstatat+0x30/0x74
__arm64_sys_newfstatat+0x1c/0x2c
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x100/0x184
do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x2c
el0_svc+0x20/0x34
el0_sync_handler+0x80/0x17c
el0_sync+0x13c/0x140
SELinux: Context system_u:object_r:pssp_rsyslog_log_t:s0:c0 is
not valid (left unmapped).
It was found that within a critical section of spin_lock_irqsave in
sidtab_context_to_sid(), convert_context() (hooked by
sidtab_convert_params.func) might cause the process to sleep via
allocating memory with GFP_KERNEL, which is problematic.
As Ondrej pointed out [1], convert_context()/sidtab_convert_params.func
has another caller sidtab_convert_tree(), which is okay with GFP_KERNEL.
Therefore, fix this problem by adding a gfp_t argument for
convert_context()/sidtab_convert_params.func and pass GFP_KERNEL/_ATOMIC
properly in individual callers.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221018120111.1474581-1-gongruiqi1@huawei.com/ [1]
Reported-by: Tan Ninghao <tanninghao1@huawei.com>
Fixes: ee1a84fdfe ("selinux: overhaul sidtab to fix bug and improve performance")
Signed-off-by: GONG, Ruiqi <gongruiqi1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
[PM: wrap long BUG() output lines, tweak subject line]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Introduce the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE flag for file truncation.
This flag hooks into the path_truncate, file_truncate and
file_alloc_security LSM hooks and covers file truncation using
truncate(2), ftruncate(2), open(2) with O_TRUNC, as well as creat().
This change also increments the Landlock ABI version, updates
corresponding selftests, and updates code documentation to document
the flag.
In security/security.c, allocate security blobs at pointer-aligned
offsets. This fixes the problem where one LSM's security blob can
shift another LSM's security blob to an unaligned address (reported
by Nathan Chancellor).
The following operations are restricted:
open(2): requires the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE right if a file gets
implicitly truncated as part of the open() (e.g. using O_TRUNC).
Notable special cases:
* open(..., O_RDONLY|O_TRUNC) can truncate files as well in Linux
* open() with O_TRUNC does *not* need the TRUNCATE right when it
creates a new file.
truncate(2) (on a path): requires the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE
right.
ftruncate(2) (on a file): requires that the file had the TRUNCATE
right when it was previously opened. File descriptors acquired by
other means than open(2) (e.g. memfd_create(2)) continue to support
truncation with ftruncate(2).
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> (LSM)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221018182216.301684-5-gnoack3000@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Rename check_access_path_dual() to is_access_to_paths_allowed().
Make it return true iff the access is allowed.
Calculate the EXDEV/EACCES error code in the one place where it's needed.
Suggested-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221018182216.301684-3-gnoack3000@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Like path_truncate, the file_truncate hook also restricts file
truncation, but is called in the cases where truncation is attempted
on an already-opened file.
This is required in a subsequent commit to handle ftruncate()
operations differently to truncate() operations.
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221018182216.301684-2-gnoack3000@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Further the checkreqprot and runtime disable deprecation efforts by
increasing the sleep time from 5 to 15 seconds to help make this more
noticeable for any users who are still using these knobs.
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
linux-next for a couple of months without, to my knowledge, any negative
reports (or any positive ones, come to that).
- Also the Maple Tree from Liam R. Howlett. An overlapping range-based
tree for vmas. It it apparently slight more efficient in its own right,
but is mainly targeted at enabling work to reduce mmap_lock contention.
Liam has identified a number of other tree users in the kernel which
could be beneficially onverted to mapletrees.
Yu Zhao has identified a hard-to-hit but "easy to fix" lockdep splat
(https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAOUHufZabH85CeUN-MEMgL8gJGzJEWUrkiM58JkTbBhh-jew0Q@mail.gmail.com).
This has yet to be addressed due to Liam's unfortunately timed
vacation. He is now back and we'll get this fixed up.
- Dmitry Vyukov introduces KMSAN: the Kernel Memory Sanitizer. It uses
clang-generated instrumentation to detect used-unintialized bugs down to
the single bit level.
KMSAN keeps finding bugs. New ones, as well as the legacy ones.
- Yang Shi adds a userspace mechanism (madvise) to induce a collapse of
memory into THPs.
- Zach O'Keefe has expanded Yang Shi's madvise(MADV_COLLAPSE) to support
file/shmem-backed pages.
- userfaultfd updates from Axel Rasmussen
- zsmalloc cleanups from Alexey Romanov
- cleanups from Miaohe Lin: vmscan, hugetlb_cgroup, hugetlb and memory-failure
- Huang Ying adds enhancements to NUMA balancing memory tiering mode's
page promotion, with a new way of detecting hot pages.
- memcg updates from Shakeel Butt: charging optimizations and reduced
memory consumption.
- memcg cleanups from Kairui Song.
- memcg fixes and cleanups from Johannes Weiner.
- Vishal Moola provides more folio conversions
- Zhang Yi removed ll_rw_block() :(
- migration enhancements from Peter Xu
- migration error-path bugfixes from Huang Ying
- Aneesh Kumar added ability for a device driver to alter the memory
tiering promotion paths. For optimizations by PMEM drivers, DRM
drivers, etc.
- vma merging improvements from Jakub Matěn.
- NUMA hinting cleanups from David Hildenbrand.
- xu xin added aditional userspace visibility into KSM merging activity.
- THP & KSM code consolidation from Qi Zheng.
- more folio work from Matthew Wilcox.
- KASAN updates from Andrey Konovalov.
- DAMON cleanups from Kaixu Xia.
- DAMON work from SeongJae Park: fixes, cleanups.
- hugetlb sysfs cleanups from Muchun Song.
- Mike Kravetz fixes locking issues in hugetlbfs and in hugetlb core.
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Merge tag 'mm-stable-2022-10-08' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Pull MM updates from Andrew Morton:
- Yu Zhao's Multi-Gen LRU patches are here. They've been under test in
linux-next for a couple of months without, to my knowledge, any
negative reports (or any positive ones, come to that).
- Also the Maple Tree from Liam Howlett. An overlapping range-based
tree for vmas. It it apparently slightly more efficient in its own
right, but is mainly targeted at enabling work to reduce mmap_lock
contention.
Liam has identified a number of other tree users in the kernel which
could be beneficially onverted to mapletrees.
Yu Zhao has identified a hard-to-hit but "easy to fix" lockdep splat
at [1]. This has yet to be addressed due to Liam's unfortunately
timed vacation. He is now back and we'll get this fixed up.
- Dmitry Vyukov introduces KMSAN: the Kernel Memory Sanitizer. It uses
clang-generated instrumentation to detect used-unintialized bugs down
to the single bit level.
KMSAN keeps finding bugs. New ones, as well as the legacy ones.
- Yang Shi adds a userspace mechanism (madvise) to induce a collapse of
memory into THPs.
- Zach O'Keefe has expanded Yang Shi's madvise(MADV_COLLAPSE) to
support file/shmem-backed pages.
- userfaultfd updates from Axel Rasmussen
- zsmalloc cleanups from Alexey Romanov
- cleanups from Miaohe Lin: vmscan, hugetlb_cgroup, hugetlb and
memory-failure
- Huang Ying adds enhancements to NUMA balancing memory tiering mode's
page promotion, with a new way of detecting hot pages.
- memcg updates from Shakeel Butt: charging optimizations and reduced
memory consumption.
- memcg cleanups from Kairui Song.
- memcg fixes and cleanups from Johannes Weiner.
- Vishal Moola provides more folio conversions
- Zhang Yi removed ll_rw_block() :(
- migration enhancements from Peter Xu
- migration error-path bugfixes from Huang Ying
- Aneesh Kumar added ability for a device driver to alter the memory
tiering promotion paths. For optimizations by PMEM drivers, DRM
drivers, etc.
- vma merging improvements from Jakub Matěn.
- NUMA hinting cleanups from David Hildenbrand.
- xu xin added aditional userspace visibility into KSM merging
activity.
- THP & KSM code consolidation from Qi Zheng.
- more folio work from Matthew Wilcox.
- KASAN updates from Andrey Konovalov.
- DAMON cleanups from Kaixu Xia.
- DAMON work from SeongJae Park: fixes, cleanups.
- hugetlb sysfs cleanups from Muchun Song.
- Mike Kravetz fixes locking issues in hugetlbfs and in hugetlb core.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAOUHufZabH85CeUN-MEMgL8gJGzJEWUrkiM58JkTbBhh-jew0Q@mail.gmail.com [1]
* tag 'mm-stable-2022-10-08' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (555 commits)
hugetlb: allocate vma lock for all sharable vmas
hugetlb: take hugetlb vma_lock when clearing vma_lock->vma pointer
hugetlb: fix vma lock handling during split vma and range unmapping
mglru: mm/vmscan.c: fix imprecise comments
mm/mglru: don't sync disk for each aging cycle
mm: memcontrol: drop dead CONFIG_MEMCG_SWAP config symbol
mm: memcontrol: use do_memsw_account() in a few more places
mm: memcontrol: deprecate swapaccounting=0 mode
mm: memcontrol: don't allocate cgroup swap arrays when memcg is disabled
mm/secretmem: remove reduntant return value
mm/hugetlb: add available_huge_pages() func
mm: remove unused inline functions from include/linux/mm_inline.h
selftests/vm: add selftest for MADV_COLLAPSE of uffd-minor memory
selftests/vm: add file/shmem MADV_COLLAPSE selftest for cleared pmd
selftests/vm: add thp collapse shmem testing
selftests/vm: add thp collapse file and tmpfs testing
selftests/vm: modularize thp collapse memory operations
selftests/vm: dedup THP helpers
mm/khugepaged: add tracepoint to hpage_collapse_scan_file()
mm/madvise: add file and shmem support to MADV_COLLAPSE
...
unpack_profile() sets a default error on entry but this gets overridden
by error assignment by functions called in its body. If an error
check that was relying on the default value is triggered after one
of these error assignments then zero will be passed to ERR_PTR.
Fix this by setting up a default -EPROTO assignment in the error
path and while we are at it make sure the correct error is returned
in non-default cases.
Fixes: 217af7e2f4 ("apparmor: refactor profile rules and attachments")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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Merge tag 'tpmdd-next-v6.1-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd
Pull tpm updates from Jarkko Sakkinen:
"Just a few bug fixes this time"
* tag 'tpmdd-next-v6.1-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd:
selftest: tpm2: Add Client.__del__() to close /dev/tpm* handle
security/keys: Remove inconsistent __user annotation
char: move from strlcpy with unused retval to strscpy
The error path has one case where *table is uninitialized, initialize
it.
Fixes: a0792e2ced ("apparmor: make transition table unpack generic so it can be reused")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
- Remove our now never-true definitions for pgd_huge() and p4d_leaf().
- Add pte_needs_flush() and huge_pmd_needs_flush() for 64-bit.
- Add support for syscall wrappers.
- Add support for KFENCE on 64-bit.
- Update 64-bit HV KVM to use the new guest state entry/exit accounting API.
- Support execute-only memory when using the Radix MMU (P9 or later).
- Implement CONFIG_PARAVIRT_TIME_ACCOUNTING for pseries guests.
- Updates to our linker script to move more data into read-only sections.
- Allow the VDSO to be randomised on 32-bit.
- Many other small features and fixes.
Thanks to: Andrew Donnellan, Aneesh Kumar K.V, Arnd Bergmann, Athira Rajeev, Christophe
Leroy, David Hildenbrand, Disha Goel, Fabiano Rosas, Gaosheng Cui, Gustavo A. R. Silva,
Haren Myneni, Hari Bathini, Jilin Yuan, Joel Stanley, Kajol Jain, Kees Cook, Krzysztof
Kozlowski, Laurent Dufour, Liang He, Li Huafei, Lukas Bulwahn, Madhavan Srinivasan, Nathan
Chancellor, Nathan Lynch, Nicholas Miehlbradt, Nicholas Piggin, Pali Rohár, Rohan McLure,
Russell Currey, Sachin Sant, Segher Boessenkool, Shrikanth Hegde, Tyrel Datwyler, Wolfram
Sang, ye xingchen, Zheng Yongjun.
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Merge tag 'powerpc-6.1-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux
Pull powerpc updates from Michael Ellerman:
- Remove our now never-true definitions for pgd_huge() and p4d_leaf().
- Add pte_needs_flush() and huge_pmd_needs_flush() for 64-bit.
- Add support for syscall wrappers.
- Add support for KFENCE on 64-bit.
- Update 64-bit HV KVM to use the new guest state entry/exit accounting
API.
- Support execute-only memory when using the Radix MMU (P9 or later).
- Implement CONFIG_PARAVIRT_TIME_ACCOUNTING for pseries guests.
- Updates to our linker script to move more data into read-only
sections.
- Allow the VDSO to be randomised on 32-bit.
- Many other small features and fixes.
Thanks to Andrew Donnellan, Aneesh Kumar K.V, Arnd Bergmann, Athira
Rajeev, Christophe Leroy, David Hildenbrand, Disha Goel, Fabiano Rosas,
Gaosheng Cui, Gustavo A. R. Silva, Haren Myneni, Hari Bathini, Jilin
Yuan, Joel Stanley, Kajol Jain, Kees Cook, Krzysztof Kozlowski, Laurent
Dufour, Liang He, Li Huafei, Lukas Bulwahn, Madhavan Srinivasan, Nathan
Chancellor, Nathan Lynch, Nicholas Miehlbradt, Nicholas Piggin, Pali
Rohár, Rohan McLure, Russell Currey, Sachin Sant, Segher Boessenkool,
Shrikanth Hegde, Tyrel Datwyler, Wolfram Sang, ye xingchen, and Zheng
Yongjun.
* tag 'powerpc-6.1-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux: (214 commits)
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix stack frame regs marker
powerpc: Don't add __powerpc_ prefix to syscall entry points
powerpc/64s/interrupt: Fix stack frame regs marker
powerpc/64: Fix msr_check_and_set/clear MSR[EE] race
powerpc/64s/interrupt: Change must-hard-mask interrupt check from BUG to WARN
powerpc/pseries: Add firmware details to the hardware description
powerpc/powernv: Add opal details to the hardware description
powerpc: Add device-tree model to the hardware description
powerpc/64: Add logical PVR to the hardware description
powerpc: Add PVR & CPU name to hardware description
powerpc: Add hardware description string
powerpc/configs: Enable PPC_UV in powernv_defconfig
powerpc/configs: Update config files for removed/renamed symbols
powerpc/mm: Fix UBSAN warning reported on hugetlb
powerpc/mm: Always update max/min_low_pfn in mem_topology_setup()
powerpc/mm/book3s/hash: Rename flush_tlb_pmd_range
powerpc: Drops STABS_DEBUG from linker scripts
powerpc/64s: Remove lost/old comment
powerpc/64s: Remove old STAB comment
powerpc: remove orphan systbl_chk.sh
...
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Merge tag 'pull-tomoyo' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull misc tomoyo changes from Al Viro:
"A couple of assorted tomoyo patches"
* tag 'pull-tomoyo' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
tomoyo: struct path it might get from LSM callers won't have NULL dentry or mnt
tomoyo: use vsnprintf() properly
The declaration of keyring_read does not match the definition
(security/keys/keyring.c). In this case the definition is correct
because it matches what defined in "struct key_type::read"
(linux/key-type.h).
Fix the declaration removing the inconsistent __user annotation.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Core
----
- Introduce and use a single page frag cache for allocating small skb
heads, clawing back the 10-20% performance regression in UDP flood
test from previous fixes.
- Run packets which already went thru HW coalescing thru SW GRO.
This significantly improves TCP segment coalescing and simplifies
deployments as different workloads benefit from HW or SW GRO.
- Shrink the size of the base zero-copy send structure.
- Move TCP init under a new slow / sleepable version of DO_ONCE().
BPF
---
- Add BPF-specific, any-context-safe memory allocator.
- Add helpers/kfuncs for PKCS#7 signature verification from BPF
programs.
- Define a new map type and related helpers for user space -> kernel
communication over a ring buffer (BPF_MAP_TYPE_USER_RINGBUF).
- Allow targeting BPF iterators to loop through resources of one
task/thread.
- Add ability to call selected destructive functions.
Expose crash_kexec() to allow BPF to trigger a kernel dump.
Use CAP_SYS_BOOT check on the loading process to judge permissions.
- Enable BPF to collect custom hierarchical cgroup stats efficiently
by integrating with the rstat framework.
- Support struct arguments for trampoline based programs.
Only structs with size <= 16B and x86 are supported.
- Invoke cgroup/connect{4,6} programs for unprivileged ICMP ping
sockets (instead of just TCP and UDP sockets).
- Add a helper for accessing CLOCK_TAI for time sensitive network
related programs.
- Support accessing network tunnel metadata's flags.
- Make TCP SYN ACK RTO tunable by BPF programs with TCP Fast Open.
- Add support for writing to Netfilter's nf_conn:mark.
Protocols
---------
- WiFi: more Extremely High Throughput (EHT) and Multi-Link
Operation (MLO) work (802.11be, WiFi 7).
- vsock: improve support for SO_RCVLOWAT.
- SMC: support SO_REUSEPORT.
- Netlink: define and document how to use netlink in a "modern" way.
Support reporting missing attributes via extended ACK.
- IPSec: support collect metadata mode for xfrm interfaces.
- TCPv6: send consistent autoflowlabel in SYN_RECV state
and RST packets.
- TCP: introduce optional per-netns connection hash table to allow
better isolation between namespaces (opt-in, at the cost of memory
and cache pressure).
- MPTCP: support TCP_FASTOPEN_CONNECT.
- Add NEXT-C-SID support in Segment Routing (SRv6) End behavior.
- Adjust IP_UNICAST_IF sockopt behavior for connected UDP sockets.
- Open vSwitch:
- Allow specifying ifindex of new interfaces.
- Allow conntrack and metering in non-initial user namespace.
- TLS: support the Korean ARIA-GCM crypto algorithm.
- Remove DECnet support.
Driver API
----------
- Allow selecting the conduit interface used by each port
in DSA switches, at runtime.
- Ethernet Power Sourcing Equipment and Power Device support.
- Add tc-taprio support for queueMaxSDU parameter, i.e. setting
per traffic class max frame size for time-based packet schedules.
- Support PHY rate matching - adapting between differing host-side
and link-side speeds.
- Introduce QUSGMII PHY mode and 1000BASE-KX interface mode.
- Validate OF (device tree) nodes for DSA shared ports; make
phylink-related properties mandatory on DSA and CPU ports.
Enforcing more uniformity should allow transitioning to phylink.
- Require that flash component name used during update matches one
of the components for which version is reported by info_get().
- Remove "weight" argument from driver-facing NAPI API as much
as possible. It's one of those magic knobs which seemed like
a good idea at the time but is too indirect to use in practice.
- Support offload of TLS connections with 256 bit keys.
New hardware / drivers
----------------------
- Ethernet:
- Microchip KSZ9896 6-port Gigabit Ethernet Switch
- Renesas Ethernet AVB (EtherAVB-IF) Gen4 SoCs
- Analog Devices ADIN1110 and ADIN2111 industrial single pair
Ethernet (10BASE-T1L) MAC+PHY.
- Rockchip RV1126 Gigabit Ethernet (a version of stmmac IP).
- Ethernet SFPs / modules:
- RollBall / Hilink / Turris 10G copper SFPs
- HALNy GPON module
- WiFi:
- CYW43439 SDIO chipset (brcmfmac)
- CYW89459 PCIe chipset (brcmfmac)
- BCM4378 on Apple platforms (brcmfmac)
Drivers
-------
- CAN:
- gs_usb: HW timestamp support
- Ethernet PHYs:
- lan8814: cable diagnostics
- Ethernet NICs:
- Intel (100G):
- implement control of FCS/CRC stripping
- port splitting via devlink
- L2TPv3 filtering offload
- nVidia/Mellanox:
- tunnel offload for sub-functions
- MACSec offload, w/ Extended packet number and replay
window offload
- significantly restructure, and optimize the AF_XDP support,
align the behavior with other vendors
- Huawei:
- configuring DSCP map for traffic class selection
- querying standard FEC statistics
- querying SerDes lane number via ethtool
- Marvell/Cavium:
- egress priority flow control
- MACSec offload
- AMD/SolarFlare:
- PTP over IPv6 and raw Ethernet
- small / embedded:
- ax88772: convert to phylink (to support SFP cages)
- altera: tse: convert to phylink
- ftgmac100: support fixed link
- enetc: standard Ethtool counters
- macb: ZynqMP SGMII dynamic configuration support
- tsnep: support multi-queue and use page pool
- lan743x: Rx IP & TCP checksum offload
- igc: add xdp frags support to ndo_xdp_xmit
- Ethernet high-speed switches:
- Marvell (prestera):
- support SPAN port features (traffic mirroring)
- nexthop object offloading
- Microchip (sparx5):
- multicast forwarding offload
- QoS queuing offload (tc-mqprio, tc-tbf, tc-ets)
- Ethernet embedded switches:
- Marvell (mv88e6xxx):
- support RGMII cmode
- NXP (felix):
- standardized ethtool counters
- Microchip (lan966x):
- QoS queuing offload (tc-mqprio, tc-tbf, tc-cbs, tc-ets)
- traffic policing and mirroring
- link aggregation / bonding offload
- QUSGMII PHY mode support
- Qualcomm 802.11ax WiFi (ath11k):
- cold boot calibration support on WCN6750
- support to connect to a non-transmit MBSSID AP profile
- enable remain-on-channel support on WCN6750
- Wake-on-WLAN support for WCN6750
- support to provide transmit power from firmware via nl80211
- support to get power save duration for each client
- spectral scan support for 160 MHz
- MediaTek WiFi (mt76):
- WiFi-to-Ethernet bridging offload for MT7986 chips
- RealTek WiFi (rtw89):
- P2P support
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Merge tag 'net-next-6.1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next
Pull networking updates from Jakub Kicinski:
"Core:
- Introduce and use a single page frag cache for allocating small skb
heads, clawing back the 10-20% performance regression in UDP flood
test from previous fixes.
- Run packets which already went thru HW coalescing thru SW GRO. This
significantly improves TCP segment coalescing and simplifies
deployments as different workloads benefit from HW or SW GRO.
- Shrink the size of the base zero-copy send structure.
- Move TCP init under a new slow / sleepable version of DO_ONCE().
BPF:
- Add BPF-specific, any-context-safe memory allocator.
- Add helpers/kfuncs for PKCS#7 signature verification from BPF
programs.
- Define a new map type and related helpers for user space -> kernel
communication over a ring buffer (BPF_MAP_TYPE_USER_RINGBUF).
- Allow targeting BPF iterators to loop through resources of one
task/thread.
- Add ability to call selected destructive functions. Expose
crash_kexec() to allow BPF to trigger a kernel dump. Use
CAP_SYS_BOOT check on the loading process to judge permissions.
- Enable BPF to collect custom hierarchical cgroup stats efficiently
by integrating with the rstat framework.
- Support struct arguments for trampoline based programs. Only
structs with size <= 16B and x86 are supported.
- Invoke cgroup/connect{4,6} programs for unprivileged ICMP ping
sockets (instead of just TCP and UDP sockets).
- Add a helper for accessing CLOCK_TAI for time sensitive network
related programs.
- Support accessing network tunnel metadata's flags.
- Make TCP SYN ACK RTO tunable by BPF programs with TCP Fast Open.
- Add support for writing to Netfilter's nf_conn:mark.
Protocols:
- WiFi: more Extremely High Throughput (EHT) and Multi-Link Operation
(MLO) work (802.11be, WiFi 7).
- vsock: improve support for SO_RCVLOWAT.
- SMC: support SO_REUSEPORT.
- Netlink: define and document how to use netlink in a "modern" way.
Support reporting missing attributes via extended ACK.
- IPSec: support collect metadata mode for xfrm interfaces.
- TCPv6: send consistent autoflowlabel in SYN_RECV state and RST
packets.
- TCP: introduce optional per-netns connection hash table to allow
better isolation between namespaces (opt-in, at the cost of memory
and cache pressure).
- MPTCP: support TCP_FASTOPEN_CONNECT.
- Add NEXT-C-SID support in Segment Routing (SRv6) End behavior.
- Adjust IP_UNICAST_IF sockopt behavior for connected UDP sockets.
- Open vSwitch:
- Allow specifying ifindex of new interfaces.
- Allow conntrack and metering in non-initial user namespace.
- TLS: support the Korean ARIA-GCM crypto algorithm.
- Remove DECnet support.
Driver API:
- Allow selecting the conduit interface used by each port in DSA
switches, at runtime.
- Ethernet Power Sourcing Equipment and Power Device support.
- Add tc-taprio support for queueMaxSDU parameter, i.e. setting per
traffic class max frame size for time-based packet schedules.
- Support PHY rate matching - adapting between differing host-side
and link-side speeds.
- Introduce QUSGMII PHY mode and 1000BASE-KX interface mode.
- Validate OF (device tree) nodes for DSA shared ports; make
phylink-related properties mandatory on DSA and CPU ports.
Enforcing more uniformity should allow transitioning to phylink.
- Require that flash component name used during update matches one of
the components for which version is reported by info_get().
- Remove "weight" argument from driver-facing NAPI API as much as
possible. It's one of those magic knobs which seemed like a good
idea at the time but is too indirect to use in practice.
- Support offload of TLS connections with 256 bit keys.
New hardware / drivers:
- Ethernet:
- Microchip KSZ9896 6-port Gigabit Ethernet Switch
- Renesas Ethernet AVB (EtherAVB-IF) Gen4 SoCs
- Analog Devices ADIN1110 and ADIN2111 industrial single pair
Ethernet (10BASE-T1L) MAC+PHY.
- Rockchip RV1126 Gigabit Ethernet (a version of stmmac IP).
- Ethernet SFPs / modules:
- RollBall / Hilink / Turris 10G copper SFPs
- HALNy GPON module
- WiFi:
- CYW43439 SDIO chipset (brcmfmac)
- CYW89459 PCIe chipset (brcmfmac)
- BCM4378 on Apple platforms (brcmfmac)
Drivers:
- CAN:
- gs_usb: HW timestamp support
- Ethernet PHYs:
- lan8814: cable diagnostics
- Ethernet NICs:
- Intel (100G):
- implement control of FCS/CRC stripping
- port splitting via devlink
- L2TPv3 filtering offload
- nVidia/Mellanox:
- tunnel offload for sub-functions
- MACSec offload, w/ Extended packet number and replay window
offload
- significantly restructure, and optimize the AF_XDP support,
align the behavior with other vendors
- Huawei:
- configuring DSCP map for traffic class selection
- querying standard FEC statistics
- querying SerDes lane number via ethtool
- Marvell/Cavium:
- egress priority flow control
- MACSec offload
- AMD/SolarFlare:
- PTP over IPv6 and raw Ethernet
- small / embedded:
- ax88772: convert to phylink (to support SFP cages)
- altera: tse: convert to phylink
- ftgmac100: support fixed link
- enetc: standard Ethtool counters
- macb: ZynqMP SGMII dynamic configuration support
- tsnep: support multi-queue and use page pool
- lan743x: Rx IP & TCP checksum offload
- igc: add xdp frags support to ndo_xdp_xmit
- Ethernet high-speed switches:
- Marvell (prestera):
- support SPAN port features (traffic mirroring)
- nexthop object offloading
- Microchip (sparx5):
- multicast forwarding offload
- QoS queuing offload (tc-mqprio, tc-tbf, tc-ets)
- Ethernet embedded switches:
- Marvell (mv88e6xxx):
- support RGMII cmode
- NXP (felix):
- standardized ethtool counters
- Microchip (lan966x):
- QoS queuing offload (tc-mqprio, tc-tbf, tc-cbs, tc-ets)
- traffic policing and mirroring
- link aggregation / bonding offload
- QUSGMII PHY mode support
- Qualcomm 802.11ax WiFi (ath11k):
- cold boot calibration support on WCN6750
- support to connect to a non-transmit MBSSID AP profile
- enable remain-on-channel support on WCN6750
- Wake-on-WLAN support for WCN6750
- support to provide transmit power from firmware via nl80211
- support to get power save duration for each client
- spectral scan support for 160 MHz
- MediaTek WiFi (mt76):
- WiFi-to-Ethernet bridging offload for MT7986 chips
- RealTek WiFi (rtw89):
- P2P support"
* tag 'net-next-6.1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next: (1864 commits)
eth: pse: add missing static inlines
once: rename _SLOW to _SLEEPABLE
net: pse-pd: add regulator based PSE driver
dt-bindings: net: pse-dt: add bindings for regulator based PoDL PSE controller
ethtool: add interface to interact with Ethernet Power Equipment
net: mdiobus: search for PSE nodes by parsing PHY nodes.
net: mdiobus: fwnode_mdiobus_register_phy() rework error handling
net: add framework to support Ethernet PSE and PDs devices
dt-bindings: net: phy: add PoDL PSE property
net: marvell: prestera: Propagate nh state from hw to kernel
net: marvell: prestera: Add neighbour cache accounting
net: marvell: prestera: add stub handler neighbour events
net: marvell: prestera: Add heplers to interact with fib_notifier_info
net: marvell: prestera: Add length macros for prestera_ip_addr
net: marvell: prestera: add delayed wq and flush wq on deinit
net: marvell: prestera: Add strict cleanup of fib arbiter
net: marvell: prestera: Add cleanup of allocated fib_nodes
net: marvell: prestera: Add router nexthops ABI
eth: octeon: fix build after netif_napi_add() changes
net/mlx5: E-Switch, Return EBUSY if can't get mode lock
...
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Merge tag 'landlock-6.1-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux
Pull landlock updates from Mickaël Salaün:
"Improve user help for Landlock (documentation and sample)"
* tag 'landlock-6.1-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux:
landlock: Fix documentation style
landlock: Slightly improve documentation and fix spelling
samples/landlock: Print hints about ABI versions
The unpack_perms_table() can return error which is negative value. Store
the return value to a signed variable. policy->size is unsigned
variable. It shouldn't be used to store the return status.
Fixes: 2d6b2dea7f3c ("apparmor: add the ability for policy to specify a permission table")
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Usama Anjum <usama.anjum@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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Merge tag 'fs.acl.rework.prep.v6.1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/idmapping
Pull vfs acl updates from Christian Brauner:
"These are general fixes and preparatory changes related to the ongoing
posix acl rework. The actual rework where we build a type safe posix
acl api wasn't ready for this merge window but we're hopeful for the
next merge window.
General fixes:
- Some filesystems like 9p and cifs have to implement custom posix
acl handlers because they require access to the dentry in order to
set and get posix acls while the set and get inode operations
currently don't. But the ntfs3 filesystem has no such requirement
and thus implemented custom posix acl xattr handlers when it really
didn't have to. So this pr contains patch that just implements set
and get inode operations for ntfs3 and switches it to rely on the
generic posix acl xattr handlers. (We would've appreciated reviews
from the ntfs3 maintainers but we didn't get any. But hey, if we
really broke it we'll fix it. But fstests for ntfs3 said it's
fine.)
- The posix_acl_fix_xattr_common() helper has been adapted so it can
be used by a few more callers and avoiding open-coding the same
checks over and over.
Other than the two general fixes this series introduces a new helper
vfs_set_acl_prepare(). The reason for this helper is so that we can
mitigate one of the source that change {g,u}id values directly in the
uapi struct. With the vfs_set_acl_prepare() helper we can move the
idmapped mount fixup into the generic posix acl set handler.
The advantage of this is that it allows us to remove the
posix_acl_setxattr_idmapped_mnt() helper which so far we had to call
in vfs_setxattr() to account for idmapped mounts. While semantically
correct the problem with this approach was that we had to keep the
value parameter of the generic vfs_setxattr() call as non-const. This
is rectified in this series.
Ultimately, we will get rid of all the extreme kludges and type
unsafety once we have merged the posix api - hopefully during the next
merge window - built solely around get and set inode operations. Which
incidentally will also improve handling of posix acls in security and
especially in integrity modesl. While this will come with temporarily
having two inode operation for posix acls that is nothing compared to
the problems we have right now and so well worth it. We'll end up with
something that we can actually reason about instead of needing to
write novels to explain what's going on"
* tag 'fs.acl.rework.prep.v6.1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/idmapping:
xattr: always us is_posix_acl_xattr() helper
acl: fix the comments of posix_acl_xattr_set
xattr: constify value argument in vfs_setxattr()
ovl: use vfs_set_acl_prepare()
acl: move idmapping handling into posix_acl_xattr_set()
acl: add vfs_set_acl_prepare()
acl: return EOPNOTSUPP in posix_acl_fix_xattr_common()
ntfs3: rework xattr handlers and switch to POSIX ACL VFS helpers
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Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20221003' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm
Pull LSM updates from Paul Moore:
"Seven patches for the LSM layer and we've got a mix of trivial and
significant patches. Highlights below, starting with the smaller bits
first so they don't get lost in the discussion of the larger items:
- Remove some redundant NULL pointer checks in the common LSM audit
code.
- Ratelimit the lockdown LSM's access denial messages.
With this change there is a chance that the last visible lockdown
message on the console is outdated/old, but it does help preserve
the initial series of lockdown denials that started the denial
message flood and my gut feeling is that these might be the more
valuable messages.
- Open userfaultfds as readonly instead of read/write.
While this code obviously lives outside the LSM, it does have a
noticeable impact on the LSMs with Ondrej explaining the situation
in the commit description. It is worth noting that this patch
languished on the VFS list for over a year without any comments
(objections or otherwise) so I took the liberty of pulling it into
the LSM tree after giving fair notice. It has been in linux-next
since the end of August without any noticeable problems.
- Add a LSM hook for user namespace creation, with implementations
for both the BPF LSM and SELinux.
Even though the changes are fairly small, this is the bulk of the
diffstat as we are also including BPF LSM selftests for the new
hook.
It's also the most contentious of the changes in this pull request
with Eric Biederman NACK'ing the LSM hook multiple times during its
development and discussion upstream. While I've never taken NACK's
lightly, I'm sending these patches to you because it is my belief
that they are of good quality, satisfy a long-standing need of
users and distros, and are in keeping with the existing nature of
the LSM layer and the Linux Kernel as a whole.
The patches in implement a LSM hook for user namespace creation
that allows for a granular approach, configurable at runtime, which
enables both monitoring and control of user namespaces. The general
consensus has been that this is far preferable to the other
solutions that have been adopted downstream including outright
removal from the kernel, disabling via system wide sysctls, or
various other out-of-tree mechanisms that users have been forced to
adopt since we haven't been able to provide them an upstream
solution for their requests. Eric has been steadfast in his
objections to this LSM hook, explaining that any restrictions on
the user namespace could have significant impact on userspace.
While there is the possibility of impacting userspace, it is
important to note that this solution only impacts userspace when it
is requested based on the runtime configuration supplied by the
distro/admin/user. Frederick (the pathset author), the LSM/security
community, and myself have tried to work with Eric during
development of this patchset to find a mutually acceptable
solution, but Eric's approach and unwillingness to engage in a
meaningful way have made this impossible. I have CC'd Eric directly
on this pull request so he has a chance to provide his side of the
story; there have been no objections outside of Eric's"
* tag 'lsm-pr-20221003' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm:
lockdown: ratelimit denial messages
userfaultfd: open userfaultfds with O_RDONLY
selinux: Implement userns_create hook
selftests/bpf: Add tests verifying bpf lsm userns_create hook
bpf-lsm: Make bpf_lsm_userns_create() sleepable
security, lsm: Introduce security_create_user_ns()
lsm: clean up redundant NULL pointer check
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20221003' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull SELinux updates from Paul Moore:
"Six SELinux patches, all are simple and easily understood, but a list
of the highlights is below:
- Use 'grep -E' instead of 'egrep' in the SELinux policy install
script.
Fun fact, this seems to be GregKH's *second* dedicated SELinux
patch since we transitioned to git (ignoring merges, the SPDX
stuff, and a trivial fs reference removal when lustre was yanked);
the first was back in 2011 when selinuxfs was placed in
/sys/fs/selinux. Oh, the memories ...
- Convert the SELinux policy boolean values to use signed integer
types throughout the SELinux kernel code.
Prior to this we were using a mix of signed and unsigned integers
which was probably okay in this particular case, but it is
definitely not a good idea in general.
- Remove a reference to the SELinux runtime disable functionality in
/etc/selinux/config as we are in the process of deprecating that.
See [1] for more background on this if you missed the previous
notes on the deprecation.
- Minor cleanups: remove unneeded variables and function parameter
constification"
Link: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/wiki/DEPRECATE-runtime-disable [1]
* tag 'selinux-pr-20221003' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: remove runtime disable message in the install_policy.sh script
selinux: use "grep -E" instead of "egrep"
selinux: remove the unneeded result variable
selinux: declare read-only parameters const
selinux: use int arrays for boolean values
selinux: remove an unneeded variable in sel_make_class_dir_entries()
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Merge tag 'integrity-v6.1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
"Just two bug fixes"
* tag 'integrity-v6.1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
efi: Correct Macmini DMI match in uefi cert quirk
ima: fix blocking of security.ima xattrs of unsupported algorithms
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Merge tag 'Smack-for-6.1' of https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next
Pull smack updates from Casey Schaufler:
"Two minor code clean-ups: one removes constants left over from the old
mount API, while the other gets rid of an unneeded variable.
The other change fixes a flaw in handling IPv6 labeling"
* tag 'Smack-for-6.1' of https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next:
smack: cleanup obsolete mount option flags
smack: lsm: remove the unneeded result variable
SMACK: Add sk_clone_security LSM hook
Various fixes across several hardening areas:
- loadpin: Fix verity target enforcement (Matthias Kaehlcke).
- zero-call-used-regs: Add missing clobbers in paravirt (Bill Wendling).
- CFI: clean up sparc function pointer type mismatches (Bart Van Assche).
- Clang: Adjust compiler flag detection for various Clang changes (Sami
Tolvanen, Kees Cook).
- fortify: Fix warnings in arch-specific code in sh, ARM, and xen.
Improvements to existing features:
- testing: improve overflow KUnit test, introduce fortify KUnit test,
add more coverage to LKDTM tests (Bart Van Assche, Kees Cook).
- overflow: Relax overflow type checking for wider utility.
New features:
- string: Introduce strtomem() and strtomem_pad() to fill a gap in
strncpy() replacement needs.
- um: Enable FORTIFY_SOURCE support.
- fortify: Enable run-time struct member memcpy() overflow warning.
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Merge tag 'hardening-v6.1-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull kernel hardening updates from Kees Cook:
"Most of the collected changes here are fixes across the tree for
various hardening features (details noted below).
The most notable new feature here is the addition of the memcpy()
overflow warning (under CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE), which is the next step
on the path to killing the common class of "trivially detectable"
buffer overflow conditions (i.e. on arrays with sizes known at compile
time) that have resulted in many exploitable vulnerabilities over the
years (e.g. BleedingTooth).
This feature is expected to still have some undiscovered false
positives. It's been in -next for a full development cycle and all the
reported false positives have been fixed in their respective trees.
All the known-bad code patterns we could find with Coccinelle are also
either fixed in their respective trees or in flight.
The commit message in commit 54d9469bc5 ("fortify: Add run-time WARN
for cross-field memcpy()") for the feature has extensive details, but
I'll repeat here that this is a warning _only_, and is not intended to
actually block overflows (yet). The many patches fixing array sizes
and struct members have been landing for several years now, and we're
finally able to turn this on to find any remaining stragglers.
Summary:
Various fixes across several hardening areas:
- loadpin: Fix verity target enforcement (Matthias Kaehlcke).
- zero-call-used-regs: Add missing clobbers in paravirt (Bill
Wendling).
- CFI: clean up sparc function pointer type mismatches (Bart Van
Assche).
- Clang: Adjust compiler flag detection for various Clang changes
(Sami Tolvanen, Kees Cook).
- fortify: Fix warnings in arch-specific code in sh, ARM, and xen.
Improvements to existing features:
- testing: improve overflow KUnit test, introduce fortify KUnit test,
add more coverage to LKDTM tests (Bart Van Assche, Kees Cook).
- overflow: Relax overflow type checking for wider utility.
New features:
- string: Introduce strtomem() and strtomem_pad() to fill a gap in
strncpy() replacement needs.
- um: Enable FORTIFY_SOURCE support.
- fortify: Enable run-time struct member memcpy() overflow warning"
* tag 'hardening-v6.1-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: (27 commits)
Makefile.extrawarn: Move -Wcast-function-type-strict to W=1
hardening: Remove Clang's enable flag for -ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero
sparc: Unbreak the build
x86/paravirt: add extra clobbers with ZERO_CALL_USED_REGS enabled
x86/paravirt: clean up typos and grammaros
fortify: Convert to struct vs member helpers
fortify: Explicitly check bounds are compile-time constants
x86/entry: Work around Clang __bdos() bug
ARM: decompressor: Include .data.rel.ro.local
fortify: Adjust KUnit test for modular build
sh: machvec: Use char[] for section boundaries
kunit/memcpy: Avoid pathological compile-time string size
lib: Improve the is_signed_type() kunit test
LoadPin: Require file with verity root digests to have a header
dm: verity-loadpin: Only trust verity targets with enforcement
LoadPin: Fix Kconfig doc about format of file with verity digests
um: Enable FORTIFY_SOURCE
lkdtm: Update tests for memcpy() run-time warnings
fortify: Add run-time WARN for cross-field memcpy()
fortify: Use SIZE_MAX instead of (size_t)-1
...
The apparmor kunit tests are failing on the out of bounds array check
with the following failure
# policy_unpack_test_unpack_array_out_of_bounds: EXPECTATION FAILED at security/apparmor/policy_unpack_test.c:178
Expected unpack_array(puf->e, name, &array_size) == 1, but
unpack_array(puf->e, name, &array_size) == -1
# policy_unpack_test_unpack_array_out_of_bounds: EXPECTATION FAILED at security/apparmor/policy_unpack_test.c:180
Expected array_size == 0, but
array_size == 64192
not ok 5 - policy_unpack_test_unpack_array_out_of_bounds
This is because unpack_array changed to allow distinguishing between
the array not being present and an error. In the error case the array
size is not set and should not be tested.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <yujie.liu@intel.com>
Fixes: 995a5b64620e ("apparmor: make unpack_array return a trianary value")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
The rawdata readback has a few of problems. First if compression is
enabled when the data is read then the compressed data is read out
instead decompressing the data. Second if compression of the data
fails, the code does not handle holding onto the raw_data in
uncompressed form. Third if the compression is enabled/disabled after
the rawdata was loaded, the check against the global control of
whether to use compression does not reflect what was already done to
the data.
Fix these by always storing the compressed size, along with the
original data size even if compression fails or is not used. And use
this to detect whether the rawdata is actually compressed.
Fixes: 52ccc20c652b ("apparmor: use zstd compression for profile data")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Jon Tourville <jon.tourville@canonical.com>
Unfortunately the switch to using zstd compression did not properly
ifdef all the code that uses zstd_ symbols. So that if exporting of
binary policy is disabled in the config the compile will fail with the
following errors
security/apparmor/lsm.c:1545: undefined reference to `zstd_min_clevel'
aarch64-linux-ld: security/apparmor/lsm.c:1545: undefined reference to `zstd_max_clevel'
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Fixes: 52ccc20c652b ("apparmor: use zstd compression for profile data")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Jon Tourville <jon.tourville@canonical.com>
The decompress ctx was not properly initialized when reading raw
profile data back to userspace.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Fixes: 52ccc20c652b ("apparmor: use zstd compression for profile data")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
The index into the trans_table has a max size of 2^24 bits which the
code was testing but this is unnecessary as unpack_array can only
unpack a table of 2^16 bits in size so the table unpacked will never
be larger than what can be indexed, and any test here is redundant.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
When compute_fperms was moved to policy_compat and made static it
was renamed from aa_compute_fperms to just compute_fperms to help
indicate it is only available statically. Unfortunately the doc
comment did not also get updated to reflect the change.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Make __aa_path_perm() static as it's only used inside apparmor/file.c.
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
In aa_get_task_label(), aa_get_newest_cred_label(__task_cred(task))
can do the same things as aa_get_newest_label(__aa_task_raw_label(task)),
so we can replace it and remove __aa_task_raw_label() to simplify the code.
Signed-off-by: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
The unconfined label flag is not being computed correctly. It
should only be set if all the profiles in the vector are set, which
is different than what is required for the debug and stale flag
that are set if any on the profile flags are set.
Fixes: c1ed5da197 ("apparmor: allow label to carry debug flags")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Convert profile->rules to a list as the next step towards supporting
multiple rulesets in a profile. For this step only support a single
list entry item. The logic for iterating the list will come as a
separate step.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
In preparation for moving from a single set of rules and a single
attachment to multiple rulesets and attachments separate from the
profile refactor attachment information and ruleset info into their
own structures.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Add an additional verification that loaded permission sets don't
overlap in ways that are not intended. This will help ensure that
permission accumulation can't result in an invalid permission set.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Perm accumulation is going to be used much more frequently so let
the compiler figure out if it can be optimized when used.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
accumulate permission indexes on a first encountered basis. This
favors original rulesets so that new ones can not override without
profile replacement.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
While the dfa xindex's are verified, the indexes in the permission
table are not currently verified. Fix this.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Currently permissions are encoded in the dfa accept entries that are
then mapped to an internal permission structure. This limits the
permissions that userspace can specify, so allow userspace to directly
specify the permission table.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
currently unpack_array() does not return an error nor whether the
array is not present. The ability to detect an error or the array
not being present is needed so rework the unpack_array() to return
the needed information.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
There are currently three policydb rule groupings (xmatch, file,
policydb) that each do their own slightly different thing. Group them
into a single routine and unify.
This extends/unifies dfa features by
- all dfas are allowed having an optional start field
- all dfas are allowed having a string/transition table
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Currently the transition table is tied to the file dfa. Make it so
we can unpack a transition table against any dfa.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Allow the profile to contain a user mode prompt flag. This works similar
to complain mode but will try to send messages to a userspace daemon.
If the daemon is not present or timesout regular informent will occur.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Audit messages currently don't contain the mediation class which can
make them less clear than they should be in some circumstances. With
newer mediation classes coming this potential confusion will become
worse.
Fix this by adding the mediatin class to the messages.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
add indexes for label and tag entries. Rename the domain table to the
str_table as its a shared string table with label and tags.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
The details of mapping old policy into newer policy formats clutters
up the unpack code and makes it possible to accidentally use old
mappings in code, so isolate the mapping code into its own file.
This will become more important when the dfa remapping code lands,
as it will greatly expand the compat code base.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Now that the permission remapping macros aren't needed anywhere except
during profile unpack, move them.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
The policydb permission set has left the xbits unused. Make them
available for mediation.
Note: that this does not bring full auditing control of the
permissions as there are not enough bits. The quieting of denials is
provided as that is used more than forced auditing of allowed
permissions.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
the v8 and earlier policy does not encode the locking permission for
no-fs unix sockets. However the kernel is enforcing mediation.
Add the AA_MAY_LOCK perm to v8 and earlier computed perm mask which will
grant permission for all current abi profiles, but still allow specifying
auditing of the operation if needed.
Link: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1780227
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
The v8 abi is supported by the kernel but the userspace supported
version check does not allow for it. This was missed when v8 was added
due to a bug in the userspace compiler which was setting an older abi
version for v8 encoding (which is forward compatible except on the
network encoding). However it is possible to detect the network
encoding by checking the policydb network support which the code
does. The end result was that missing the abi flag worked until
userspace was fixed and began correctly checking for the v8 abi
version.
Fixes: 56974a6fcf ("apparmor: add base infastructure for socket mediation")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Convert from an unsigned int to a state_t for state position. This is
a step in prepping for the state position carrying some additional
flags, and a limited form of backtracking to support variables.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Remap polidydb dfa accept table from embedded perms to an index, and
then move the perm lookup to use the accept entry as an index into the
perm table. This is done so that the perm table can be separated from
the dfa, allowing dfa accept to index to share expanded permission
sets.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
The shared permissions struct has the stop field which is unneeded
and the "reserved" subtree field commented which is needed. Also
reorganize so that the entries are logically grouped.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Remap xmatch dfa accept table from embedded perms to an index and then
move xmatch lookup to use accept entry to index into the xmatch table.
This is step towards unifying permission lookup and reducing the
size of permissions tables.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Remap file dfa accept table from embedded perms to index and then move
fperm lookup to use the accept entry as an index into the fperm table.
This is a step toward unifying permission lookup.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
continue permission unification by converting xmatch to use the
policydb struct that is used by the other profile dfas.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
file_rules and policydb are almost the same and will need the same
features in the future so combine them.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Rather than computing policydb permissions for each access
permissions can be computed once on profile load and stored for lookup.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Convert xmatch from using perms encoded in the accept entry of the
dfa to the common external aa_perms in a table.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
shorten the name of some of the mapping functions which shortens line
lengths.
change the mapping so it returns the perm table instead of operating
directly on the file struct.
Handle potential memory allocation failure.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
fperm computation is only needed during policy_unpack so move the
code there to isolate it fromt the run time code.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Rather than computing xmatch permissions each time access is requested,
these permissions can be computed once on profile load and stored for
lookup.
Signed-off-by: Mike Salvatore <mike.salvatore@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Rather than computing file permissions for each file access, file
permissions can be computed once on profile load and stored for lookup.
Signed-off-by: Mike Salvatore <mike.salvatore@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Create two new files in apparmor's sysfs:
/sys/kernel/security/apparmor/raw_data_compression_level_min
/sys/kernel/security/apparmor/raw_data_compression_level_max
These correspond to the minimum and maximum zstd compression levels
that can be assigned to the apparmor module parameter
raw_data_compression_level.
Signed-off-by: Jon Tourville <jon.tourville@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Change the algorithm used by apparmor to compress profile data from
zlib to zstd, using the new zstd API introduced in 5.16.
Zstd provides a larger range of compression levels than zlib and
significantly better performance at the default level (for a relatively
small increase in compressed size).
The apparmor module parameter raw_data_compression_level is now clamped
to the minimum and maximum compression levels reported by the zstd
library. A compression level of 0 retains the previous behavior of
disabling policy compression instead of using zstd's behavior, which is
to use the default compression level.
Signed-off-by: Jon Tourville <jon.tourville@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reserve mediation classes that exist in out of tree development
branches or are used by userspace mediation helpers.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Fix the following lockdep warning
[ 1119.158984] ============================================
[ 1119.158988] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
[ 1119.158996] 6.0.0-rc1+ #257 Tainted: G E N
[ 1119.158999] --------------------------------------------
[ 1119.159001] bash/80100 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 1119.159007] ffff88803e79b4a0 (&ns->lock/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: destroy_ns.part.0+0x43/0x140
[ 1119.159028]
but task is already holding lock:
[ 1119.159030] ffff8881009764a0 (&ns->lock/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: aa_remove_profiles+0x3f0/0x640
[ 1119.159040]
other info that might help us debug this:
[ 1119.159042] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[ 1119.159043] CPU0
[ 1119.159045] ----
[ 1119.159047] lock(&ns->lock/1);
[ 1119.159051] lock(&ns->lock/1);
[ 1119.159055]
*** DEADLOCK ***
Which is caused by an incorrect lockdep nesting notation
Fixes: feb3c766a3 ("apparmor: fix possible recursive lock warning in __aa_create_ns")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
In multi_transaction_new(), the variable t is not freed or passed out
on the failure of copy_from_user(t->data, buf, size), which could lead
to a memleak.
Fix this bug by adding a put_multi_transaction(t) in the error path.
Fixes: 1dea3b41e8 ("apparmor: speed up transactional queries")
Signed-off-by: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Heap and stack initialization is great, but not when we are trying uses of
uninitialized memory. When the kernel is built with KMSAN, having kernel
memory initialization enabled may introduce false negatives.
We disable CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_PATTERN and CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO
under CONFIG_KMSAN, making it impossible to auto-initialize stack
variables in KMSAN builds. We also disable
CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON and CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON to
prevent accidental use of heap auto-initialization.
We however still let the users enable heap auto-initialization at
boot-time (by setting init_on_alloc=1 or init_on_free=1), in which case a
warning is printed.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220915150417.722975-31-glider@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Daniel Borkmann says:
====================
pull-request: bpf-next 2022-10-03
We've added 143 non-merge commits during the last 27 day(s) which contain
a total of 151 files changed, 8321 insertions(+), 1402 deletions(-).
The main changes are:
1) Add kfuncs for PKCS#7 signature verification from BPF programs, from Roberto Sassu.
2) Add support for struct-based arguments for trampoline based BPF programs,
from Yonghong Song.
3) Fix entry IP for kprobe-multi and trampoline probes under IBT enabled, from Jiri Olsa.
4) Batch of improvements to veristat selftest tool in particular to add CSV output,
a comparison mode for CSV outputs and filtering, from Andrii Nakryiko.
5) Add preparatory changes needed for the BPF core for upcoming BPF HID support,
from Benjamin Tissoires.
6) Support for direct writes to nf_conn's mark field from tc and XDP BPF program
types, from Daniel Xu.
7) Initial batch of documentation improvements for BPF insn set spec, from Dave Thaler.
8) Add a new BPF_MAP_TYPE_USER_RINGBUF map which provides single-user-space-producer /
single-kernel-consumer semantics for BPF ring buffer, from David Vernet.
9) Follow-up fixes to BPF allocator under RT to always use raw spinlock for the BPF
hashtab's bucket lock, from Hou Tao.
10) Allow creating an iterator that loops through only the resources of one
task/thread instead of all, from Kui-Feng Lee.
11) Add support for kptrs in the per-CPU arraymap, from Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi.
12) Add a new kfunc helper for nf to set src/dst NAT IP/port in a newly allocated CT
entry which is not yet inserted, from Lorenzo Bianconi.
13) Remove invalid recursion check for struct_ops for TCP congestion control BPF
programs, from Martin KaFai Lau.
14) Fix W^X issue with BPF trampoline and BPF dispatcher, from Song Liu.
15) Fix percpu_counter leakage in BPF hashtab allocation error path, from Tetsuo Handa.
16) Various cleanups in BPF selftests to use preferred ASSERT_* macros, from Wang Yufen.
17) Add invocation for cgroup/connect{4,6} BPF programs for ICMP pings, from YiFei Zhu.
18) Lift blinding decision under bpf_jit_harden = 1 to bpf_capable(), from Yauheni Kaliuta.
19) Various libbpf fixes and cleanups including a libbpf NULL pointer deref, from Xin Liu.
* https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next: (143 commits)
net: netfilter: move bpf_ct_set_nat_info kfunc in nf_nat_bpf.c
Documentation: bpf: Add implementation notes documentations to table of contents
bpf, docs: Delete misformatted table.
selftests/xsk: Fix double free
bpftool: Fix error message of strerror
libbpf: Fix overrun in netlink attribute iteration
selftests/bpf: Fix spelling mistake "unpriviledged" -> "unprivileged"
samples/bpf: Fix typo in xdp_router_ipv4 sample
bpftool: Remove unused struct event_ring_info
bpftool: Remove unused struct btf_attach_point
bpf, docs: Add TOC and fix formatting.
bpf, docs: Add Clang note about BPF_ALU
bpf, docs: Move Clang notes to a separate file
bpf, docs: Linux byteswap note
bpf, docs: Move legacy packet instructions to a separate file
selftests/bpf: Check -EBUSY for the recurred bpf_setsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION)
bpf: tcp: Stop bpf_setsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION) in init ops to recur itself
bpf: Refactor bpf_setsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION) handling into another function
bpf: Move the "cdg" tcp-cc check to the common sol_tcp_sockopt()
bpf: Add __bpf_prog_{enter,exit}_struct_ops for struct_ops trampoline
...
====================
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221003194915.11847-1-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
It turns out Apple doesn't capitalise the "mini" in "Macmini" in DMI, which
is inconsistent with other model line names.
Correct the capitalisation of Macmini in the quirk for skipping loading
platform certs on T2 Macs.
Currently users get:
------------[ cut here ]------------
[Firmware Bug]: Page fault caused by firmware at PA: 0xffffa30640054000
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 8 at arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c:735 efi_crash_gracefully_on_page_fault+0x55/0xe0
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 8 Comm: kworker/u12:0 Not tainted 5.18.14-arch1-2-t2 #1 4535eb3fc40fd08edab32a509fbf4c9bc52d111e
Hardware name: Apple Inc. Macmini8,1/Mac-7BA5B2DFE22DDD8C, BIOS 1731.120.10.0.0 (iBridge: 19.16.15071.0.0,0) 04/24/2022
Workqueue: efi_rts_wq efi_call_rts
...
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
efi: Froze efi_rts_wq and disabled EFI Runtime Services
integrity: Couldn't get size: 0x8000000000000015
integrity: MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list
efi: EFI Runtime Services are disabled!
integrity: Couldn't get size: 0x8000000000000015
integrity: Couldn't get UEFI dbx list
Fixes: 155ca952c7 ("efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@live.com>
Tested-by: Samuel Jiang <chyishian.jiang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Orlando Chamberlain <redecorating@protonmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Now that Clang's -enable-trivial-auto-var-init-zero-knowing-it-will-be-removed-from-clang
option is no longer required, remove it from the command line. Clang 16
and later will warn when it is used, which will cause Kconfig to think
it can't use -ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero at all. Check for whether it
is required and only use it when so.
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org
Cc: llvm@lists.linux.dev
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: f02003c860 ("hardening: Avoid harmless Clang option under CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
It seems that all code should use double backquotes, which is also used
to convert "%" defines. Let's use an homogeneous style and remove all
use of simple backquotes (which should only be used for emphasis).
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220923154207.3311629-4-mic@digikod.net
Now that we have more than one ABI version, make limitation explanation
more consistent by replacing "ABI 1" with "ABI < 2". This also
indicates which ABIs support such past limitation.
Improve documentation consistency by not using contractions.
Fix spelling in fs.c .
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220923154207.3311629-3-mic@digikod.net
The error injection facility on pseries VMs allows corruption of
arbitrary guest memory, potentially enabling a sufficiently privileged
user to disable lockdown or perform other modifications of the running
kernel via the rtas syscall.
Block the PAPR error injection facility from being opened or called
when locked down.
Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> (LSM)
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220926131643.146502-3-nathanl@linux.ibm.com
The /proc/powerpc/ofdt interface allows the root user to freely alter
the in-kernel device tree, enabling arbitrary physical address writes
via drivers that could bind to malicious device nodes, thus making it
possible to disable lockdown.
Historically this interface has been used on the pseries platform to
facilitate the runtime addition and removal of processor, memory, and
device resources (aka Dynamic Logical Partitioning or DLPAR). Years
ago, the processor and memory use cases were migrated to designs that
happen to be lockdown-friendly: device tree updates are communicated
directly to the kernel from firmware without passing through untrusted
user space. I/O device DLPAR via the "drmgr" command in powerpc-utils
remains the sole legitimate user of /proc/powerpc/ofdt, but it is
already broken in lockdown since it uses /dev/mem to allocate argument
buffers for the rtas syscall. So only illegitimate uses of the
interface should see a behavior change when running on a locked down
kernel.
Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> (LSM)
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220926131643.146502-2-nathanl@linux.ibm.com
These mount option flags are obsolete since commit 12085b14a4 ("smack:
switch to private smack_mnt_opts"), remove them.
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Return the value smk_ptrace_rule_check() directly instead of storing it
in another redundant variable.
Reported-by: Zeal Robot <zealci@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Xu Panda <xu.panda@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Using smk_of_current() during sk_alloc_security hook leads in
rare cases to a faulty initialization of the security context
of the created socket.
By adding the LSM hook sk_clone_security to SMACK this initialization
fault is corrected by copying the security context of the old socket
pointer to the newly cloned one.
Co-authored-by: Martin Ostertag: <martin.ostertag@elektrobit.com>
Signed-off-by: Lontke Michael <michael.lontke@elektrobit.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
In preparation for the patch that introduces the bpf_lookup_user_key() eBPF
kfunc, move KEY_LOOKUP_ definitions to include/linux/key.h, to be able to
validate the kfunc parameters. Add them to enum key_lookup_flag, so that
all the current ones and the ones defined in the future are automatically
exported through BTF and available to eBPF programs.
Also, add KEY_LOOKUP_ALL to the enum, with the logical OR of currently
defined flags as value, to facilitate checking whether a variable contains
only those flags.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220920075951.929132-7-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Return the value avc_has_perm() directly instead of storing it in
another redundant variable.
Reported-by: Zeal Robot <zealci@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Xu Panda <xu.panda@zte.com.cn>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
User space can flood the log with lockdown denial messages:
[ 662.555584] Lockdown: bash: debugfs access is restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7
[ 662.563237] Lockdown: bash: debugfs access is restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7
[ 662.571134] Lockdown: bash: debugfs access is restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7
[ 662.578668] Lockdown: bash: debugfs access is restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7
[ 662.586021] Lockdown: bash: debugfs access is restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7
[ 662.593398] Lockdown: bash: debugfs access is restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7
Ratelimiting these shouldn't meaningfully degrade the quality of the
information logged.
Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
LoadPin expects the file with trusted verity root digests to be
an ASCII file with one digest (hex value) per line. A pinned
root could contain files that meet these format requirements,
even though the hex values don't represent trusted root
digests.
Add a new requirement to the file format which consists in
the first line containing a fixed string. This prevents
attackers from feeding files with an otherwise valid format
to LoadPin.
Suggested-by: Sarthak Kukreti <sarthakkukreti@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220906181725.1.I3f51d1bb0014e5a5951be4ad3c5ad7c7ca1dfc32@changeid
The doc for CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN_VERITY says that the file with verity
digests must contain a comma separated list of digests. That was the case
at some stage of the development, but was changed during the review
process to one digest per line. Update the Kconfig doc accordingly.
Reported-by: Jae Hoon Kim <kimjae@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Fixes: 3f805f8cc2 ("LoadPin: Enable loading from trusted dm-verity devices")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220829174557.1.I5d202d1344212a3800d9828f936df6511eb2d0d1@changeid
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Merge tag 'landlock-6.0-rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux
Pull landlock fix from Mickaël Salaün:
"This fixes a mis-handling of the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER right when
multiple rulesets/domains are stacked.
The expected behaviour was that an additional ruleset can only
restrict the set of permitted operations, but in this particular case,
it was potentially possible to re-gain the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER
right"
* tag 'landlock-6.0-rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux:
landlock: Fix file reparenting without explicit LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER
This change fixes a mis-handling of the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER right
when multiple rulesets/domains are stacked. The expected behaviour was
that an additional ruleset can only restrict the set of permitted
operations, but in this particular case, it was potentially possible to
re-gain the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER right.
With the introduction of LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER, we added the first
globally denied-by-default access right. Indeed, this lifted an initial
Landlock limitation to rename and link files, which was initially always
denied when the source or the destination were different directories.
This led to an inconsistent backward compatibility behavior which was
only taken into account if no domain layer were using the new
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER right. However, when restricting a thread with
a new ruleset handling LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER, all inherited parent
rulesets/layers not explicitly handling LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER would
behave as if they were handling this access right and with all their
rules allowing it. This means that renaming and linking files could
became allowed by these parent layers, but all the other required
accesses must also be granted: all layers must allow file removal or
creation, and renaming and linking operations cannot lead to privilege
escalation according to the Landlock policy. See detailed explanation
in commit b91c3e4ea7 ("landlock: Add support for file reparenting with
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER").
To say it another way, this bug may lift the renaming and linking
limitations of the initial Landlock version, and a same ruleset can
enforce different restrictions depending on previous or next enforced
ruleset (i.e. inconsistent behavior). The LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER right
cannot give access to data not already allowed, but this doesn't follow
the contract of the first Landlock ABI. This fix puts back the
limitation for sandboxes that didn't opt-in for this additional right.
For instance, if a first ruleset allows LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG on
/dst and LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE on /src, renaming /src/file to
/dst/file is denied. However, without this fix, stacking a new ruleset
which allows LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER on / would now permit the
sandboxed thread to rename /src/file to /dst/file .
This change fixes the (absolute) rule access rights, which now always
forbid LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER except when it is explicitly allowed
when creating a rule.
Making all domain handle LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER was an initial
approach but there is two downsides:
* it makes the code more complex because we still want to check that a
rule allowing LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER is legitimate according to the
ruleset's handled access rights (i.e. ABI v1 != ABI v2);
* it would not allow to identify if the user created a ruleset
explicitly handling LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER or not, which will be an
issue to audit Landlock.
Instead, this change adds an ACCESS_INITIALLY_DENIED list of
denied-by-default rights, which (only) contains
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER. All domains are treated as if they are also
handling this list, but without modifying their fs_access_masks field.
A side effect is that the errno code returned by rename(2) or link(2)
*may* be changed from EXDEV to EACCES according to the enforced
restrictions. Indeed, we now have the mechanic to identify if an access
is denied because of a required right (e.g. LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG,
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE) or if it is denied because of missing
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER rights. This may result in different errno
codes than for the initial Landlock version, but this approach is more
consistent and better for rename/link compatibility reasons, and it
wasn't possible before (hence no backport to ABI v1). The
layout1.rename_file test reflects this change.
Add 4 layout1.refer_denied_by_default* test suites to check that the
behavior of a ruleset not handling LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER (ABI v1) is
unchanged even if another layer handles LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER (i.e.
ABI v1 precedence). Make sure rule's absolute access rights are correct
by testing with and without a matching path. Add test_rename() and
test_exchange() helpers.
Extend layout1.inval tests to check that a denied-by-default access
right is not necessarily part of a domain's handled access rights.
Test coverage for security/landlock is 95.3% of 599 lines according to
gcc/gcov-11.
Fixes: b91c3e4ea7 ("landlock: Add support for file reparenting with LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER")
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220831203840.1370732-1-mic@digikod.net
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
[mic: Constify and slightly simplify test helpers]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
cast of ->d_name.name to char * is completely wrong - nothing is
allowed to modify its contents.
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20220829' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm
Pull LSM support for IORING_OP_URING_CMD from Paul Moore:
"Add SELinux and Smack controls to the io_uring IORING_OP_URING_CMD.
These are necessary as without them the IORING_OP_URING_CMD remains
outside the purview of the LSMs (Luis' LSM patch, Casey's Smack patch,
and my SELinux patch). They have been discussed at length with the
io_uring folks, and Jens has given his thumbs-up on the relevant
patches (see the commit descriptions).
There is one patch that is not strictly necessary, but it makes
testing much easier and is very trivial: the /dev/null
IORING_OP_URING_CMD patch."
* tag 'lsm-pr-20220829' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm:
Smack: Provide read control for io_uring_cmd
/dev/null: add IORING_OP_URING_CMD support
selinux: implement the security_uring_cmd() LSM hook
lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks for the new uring_cmd file op
The uapi POSIX ACL struct passed through the value argument during
setxattr() contains {g,u}id values encoded via ACL_{GROUP,USER} entries
that should actually be stored in the form of k{g,u}id_t (See [1] for a
long explanation of the issue.).
In 0c5fd887d2 ("acl: move idmapped mount fixup into vfs_{g,s}etxattr()")
we took the mount's idmapping into account in order to let overlayfs
handle POSIX ACLs on idmapped layers correctly. The fixup is currently
performed directly in vfs_setxattr() which piles on top of the earlier
hackiness by handling the mount's idmapping and stuff the vfs{g,u}id_t
values into the uapi struct as well. While that is all correct and works
fine it's just ugly.
Now that we have introduced vfs_make_posix_acl() earlier move handling
idmapped mounts out of vfs_setxattr() and into the POSIX ACL handler
where it belongs.
Note that we also need to call vfs_make_posix_acl() for EVM which
interpretes POSIX ACLs during security_inode_setxattr(). Leave them a
longer comment for future reference.
All filesystems that support idmapped mounts via FS_ALLOW_IDMAP use the
standard POSIX ACL xattr handlers and are covered by this change. This
includes overlayfs which simply calls vfs_{g,s}etxattr().
The following filesystems use custom POSIX ACL xattr handlers: 9p, cifs,
ecryptfs, and ntfs3 (and overlayfs but we've covered that in the paragraph
above) and none of them support idmapped mounts yet.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org/ [1]
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee (DigitalOcean) <sforshee@kernel.org>
Declare ebitmap, mls_level and mls_context parameters const where they
are only read from. This allows callers to supply pointers to const
as arguments and increases readability.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Do not cast pointers of signed integers to pointers of unsigned integers
and vice versa.
It should currently not be an issue since they hold SELinux boolean
values which should only contain either 0's or 1's, which should have
the same representation.
Reported by sparse:
.../selinuxfs.c:1485:30: warning: incorrect type in assignment
(different signedness)
.../selinuxfs.c:1485:30: expected unsigned int *
.../selinuxfs.c:1485:30: got int *[addressable] values
.../selinuxfs.c:1402:48: warning: incorrect type in argument 3
(different signedness)
.../selinuxfs.c:1402:48: expected int *values
.../selinuxfs.c:1402:48: got unsigned int *bool_pending_values
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[PM: minor whitespace fixes, sparse output cleanup]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Return the value sel_make_perm_files() directly instead of storing it
in another redundant variable.
Reported-by: Zeal Robot <zealci@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: ye xingchen <ye.xingchen@zte.com.cn>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Limit io_uring "cmd" options to files for which the caller has
Smack read access. There may be cases where the cmd option may
be closer to a write access than a read, but there is no way
to make that determination.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ee692a21e9 ("fs,io_uring: add infrastructure for uring-cmd")
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Add a SELinux access control for the iouring IORING_OP_URING_CMD
command. This includes the addition of a new permission in the
existing "io_uring" object class: "cmd". The subject of the new
permission check is the domain of the process requesting access, the
object is the open file which points to the device/file that is the
target of the IORING_OP_URING_CMD operation. A sample policy rule
is shown below:
allow <domain> <file>:io_uring { cmd };
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ee692a21e9 ("fs,io_uring: add infrastructure for uring-cmd")
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
io-uring cmd support was added through ee692a21e9 ("fs,io_uring:
add infrastructure for uring-cmd"), this extended the struct
file_operations to allow a new command which each subsystem can use
to enable command passthrough. Add an LSM specific for the command
passthrough which enables LSMs to inspect the command details.
This was discussed long ago without no clear pointer for something
conclusive, so this enables LSMs to at least reject this new file
operation.
[0] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/8adf55db-7bab-f59d-d612-ed906b948d19@schaufler-ca.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ee692a21e9 ("fs,io_uring: add infrastructure for uring-cmd")
Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Limit validating the hash algorithm to just security.ima xattr, not
the security.evm xattr or any of the protected EVM security xattrs,
nor posix acls.
Fixes: 50f742dd91 ("IMA: block writes of the security.ima xattr with unsupported algorithms")
Reported-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Idiomatic way to find how much space sprintf output would take is
len = snprintf(NULL, 0, ...) + 1;
Once upon a time there'd been libc implementations that blew chunks
on that and somebody had come up with the following "cute" trick:
len = snprintf((char *) &len, 1, ...) + 1;
for doing the same. However, that's unidiomatic, harder to follow
*and* any such libc implementation would violate both C99 and POSIX
(since 2001).
IOW, this kludge is best buried along with such libc implementations,
nevermind getting cargo-culted into newer code. Our vsnprintf() does not
suffer that braindamage, TYVM.
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Unprivileged user namespace creation is an intended feature to enable
sandboxing, however this feature is often used to as an initial step to
perform a privilege escalation attack.
This patch implements a new user_namespace { create } access control
permission to restrict which domains allow or deny user namespace
creation. This is necessary for system administrators to quickly protect
their systems while waiting for vulnerability patches to be applied.
This permission can be used in the following way:
allow domA_t domA_t : user_namespace { create };
Signed-off-by: Frederick Lawler <fred@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
User namespaces are an effective tool to allow programs to run with
permission without requiring the need for a program to run as root. User
namespaces may also be used as a sandboxing technique. However, attackers
sometimes leverage user namespaces as an initial attack vector to perform
some exploit. [1,2,3]
While it is not the unprivileged user namespace functionality, which
causes the kernel to be exploitable, users/administrators might want to
more granularly limit or at least monitor how various processes use this
functionality, while vulnerable kernel subsystems are being patched.
Preventing user namespace already creation comes in a few of forms in
order of granularity:
1. /proc/sys/user/max_user_namespaces sysctl
2. Distro specific patch(es)
3. CONFIG_USER_NS
To block a task based on its attributes, the LSM hook cred_prepare is a
decent candidate for use because it provides more granular control, and
it is called before create_user_ns():
cred = prepare_creds()
security_prepare_creds()
call_int_hook(cred_prepare, ...
if (cred)
create_user_ns(cred)
Since security_prepare_creds() is meant for LSMs to copy and prepare
credentials, access control is an unintended use of the hook. [4]
Further, security_prepare_creds() will always return a ENOMEM if the
hook returns any non-zero error code.
This hook also does not handle the clone3 case which requires us to
access a user space pointer to know if we're in the CLONE_NEW_USER
call path which may be subject to a TOCTTOU attack.
Lastly, cred_prepare is called in many call paths, and a targeted hook
further limits the frequency of calls which is a beneficial outcome.
Therefore introduce a new function security_create_user_ns() with an
accompanying userns_create LSM hook.
With the new userns_create hook, users will have more control over the
observability and access control over user namespace creation. Users
should expect that normal operation of user namespaces will behave as
usual, and only be impacted when controls are implemented by users or
administrators.
This hook takes the prepared creds for LSM authors to write policy
against. On success, the new namespace is applied to credentials,
otherwise an error is returned.
Links:
1. https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-0492
2. https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-25636
3. https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-34918
4. https://lore.kernel.org/all/1c4b1c0d-12f6-6e9e-a6a3-cdce7418110c@schaufler-ca.com/
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Frederick Lawler <fred@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The copy_from_user() function returns the number of bytes remaining to
be copied on a failure. Such failures should return -EFAULT to high
levels.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Fixes: 3f805f8cc2 ("LoadPin: Enable loading from trusted dm-verity devices")
Cc: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
The implements of {ip,tcp,udp,dccp,sctp,ipv6}_hdr(skb) guarantee that
they will never return NULL, and elsewhere users don't do the check
as well, so remove the check here.
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
[PM: subject line tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
- Convert secid mapping to XArrays instead of IDR
- Add a kernel label to use on kernel objects
- Extend policydb permission set by making use of the xbits
- Make export of raw binary profile to userspace optional
- Enable tuning of policy paranoid load for embedded systems
- Don't create raw_sha1 symlink if sha1 hashing is disabled
- Allow labels to carry debug flags
+ Cleanups
- Update MAINTAINERS file
- Use struct_size() helper in kmalloc()
- Move ptrace mediation to more logical task.{h,c}
- Resolve uninitialized symbol warnings
- Remove redundant ret variable
- Mark alloc_unconfined() as static
- Update help description of policy hash for introspection
- Remove some casts which are no-longer required
+ Bug Fixes
- Fix aa_label_asxprint return check
- Fix reference count leak in aa_pivotroot()
- Fix memleak in aa_simple_write_to_buffer()
- Fix kernel doc comments
- Fix absroot causing audited secids to begin with =
- Fix quiet_denied for file rules
- Fix failed mount permission check error message
- Disable showing the mode as part of a secid to secctx
- Fix setting unconfined mode on a loaded profile
- Fix overlapping attachment computation
- Fix undefined reference to `zlib_deflate_workspacesize'
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Merge tag 'apparmor-pr-2022-08-08' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor
Pull AppArmor updates from John Johansen:
"This is mostly cleanups and bug fixes with the one bigger change being
Mathew Wilcox's patch to use XArrays instead of the IDR from the
thread around the locking weirdness.
Features:
- Convert secid mapping to XArrays instead of IDR
- Add a kernel label to use on kernel objects
- Extend policydb permission set by making use of the xbits
- Make export of raw binary profile to userspace optional
- Enable tuning of policy paranoid load for embedded systems
- Don't create raw_sha1 symlink if sha1 hashing is disabled
- Allow labels to carry debug flags
Cleanups:
- Update MAINTAINERS file
- Use struct_size() helper in kmalloc()
- Move ptrace mediation to more logical task.{h,c}
- Resolve uninitialized symbol warnings
- Remove redundant ret variable
- Mark alloc_unconfined() as static
- Update help description of policy hash for introspection
- Remove some casts which are no-longer required
Bug Fixes:
- Fix aa_label_asxprint return check
- Fix reference count leak in aa_pivotroot()
- Fix memleak in aa_simple_write_to_buffer()
- Fix kernel doc comments
- Fix absroot causing audited secids to begin with =
- Fix quiet_denied for file rules
- Fix failed mount permission check error message
- Disable showing the mode as part of a secid to secctx
- Fix setting unconfined mode on a loaded profile
- Fix overlapping attachment computation
- Fix undefined reference to `zlib_deflate_workspacesize'"
* tag 'apparmor-pr-2022-08-08' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor: (34 commits)
apparmor: Update MAINTAINERS file with new email address
apparmor: correct config reference to intended one
apparmor: move ptrace mediation to more logical task.{h,c}
apparmor: extend policydb permission set by making use of the xbits
apparmor: allow label to carry debug flags
apparmor: fix overlapping attachment computation
apparmor: fix setting unconfined mode on a loaded profile
apparmor: Fix some kernel-doc comments
apparmor: Mark alloc_unconfined() as static
apparmor: disable showing the mode as part of a secid to secctx
apparmor: Convert secid mapping to XArrays instead of IDR
apparmor: add a kernel label to use on kernel objects
apparmor: test: Remove some casts which are no-longer required
apparmor: Fix memleak in aa_simple_write_to_buffer()
apparmor: fix reference count leak in aa_pivotroot()
apparmor: Fix some kernel-doc comments
apparmor: Fix undefined reference to `zlib_deflate_workspacesize'
apparmor: fix aa_label_asxprint return check
apparmor: Fix some kernel-doc comments
apparmor: Fix some kernel-doc comments
...
This KUnit update for Linux 5.20-rc1 consists of several fixes and an
important feature to discourage running KUnit tests on production
systems. Running tests on a production system could leave the system
in a bad state. This new feature adds:
- adds a new taint type, TAINT_TEST to signal that a test has been run.
This should discourage people from running these tests on production
systems, and to make it easier to tell if tests have been run
accidentally (by loading the wrong configuration, etc.)
- several documentation and tool enhancements and fixes.
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Merge tag 'linux-kselftest-kunit-5.20-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/shuah/linux-kselftest
Pull KUnit updates from Shuah Khan:
"This consists of several fixes and an important feature to discourage
running KUnit tests on production systems. Running tests on a
production system could leave the system in a bad state.
Summary:
- Add a new taint type, TAINT_TEST to signal that a test has been
run.
This should discourage people from running these tests on
production systems, and to make it easier to tell if tests have
been run accidentally (by loading the wrong configuration, etc)
- Several documentation and tool enhancements and fixes"
* tag 'linux-kselftest-kunit-5.20-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/shuah/linux-kselftest: (29 commits)
Documentation: KUnit: Fix example with compilation error
Documentation: kunit: Add CLI args for kunit_tool
kcsan: test: Add a .kunitconfig to run KCSAN tests
kunit: executor: Fix a memory leak on failure in kunit_filter_tests
clk: explicitly disable CONFIG_UML_PCI_OVER_VIRTIO in .kunitconfig
mmc: sdhci-of-aspeed: test: Use kunit_test_suite() macro
nitro_enclaves: test: Use kunit_test_suite() macro
thunderbolt: test: Use kunit_test_suite() macro
kunit: flatten kunit_suite*** to kunit_suite** in .kunit_test_suites
kunit: unify module and builtin suite definitions
selftest: Taint kernel when test module loaded
module: panic: Taint the kernel when selftest modules load
Documentation: kunit: fix example run_kunit func to allow spaces in args
Documentation: kunit: Cleanup run_wrapper, fix x-ref
kunit: test.h: fix a kernel-doc markup
kunit: tool: Enable virtio/PCI by default on UML
kunit: tool: make --kunitconfig repeatable, blindly concat
kunit: add coverage_uml.config to enable GCOV on UML
kunit: tool: refactor internal kconfig handling, allow overriding
kunit: tool: introduce --qemu_args
...
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Merge tag 'integrity-v6.0' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
"Aside from the one EVM cleanup patch, all the other changes are kexec
related.
On different architectures different keyrings are used to verify the
kexec'ed kernel image signature. Here are a number of preparatory
cleanup patches and the patches themselves for making the keyrings -
builtin_trusted_keyring, .machine, .secondary_trusted_keyring, and
.platform - consistent across the different architectures"
* tag 'integrity-v6.0' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
kexec, KEYS, s390: Make use of built-in and secondary keyring for signature verification
arm64: kexec_file: use more system keyrings to verify kernel image signature
kexec, KEYS: make the code in bzImage64_verify_sig generic
kexec: clean up arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig
kexec: drop weak attribute from functions
kexec_file: drop weak attribute from functions
evm: Use IS_ENABLED to initialize .enabled
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Merge tag 'safesetid-6.0' of https://github.com/micah-morton/linux
Pull SafeSetID updates from Micah Morton:
"This contains one commit that touches common kernel code, one that
adds functionality internal to the SafeSetID LSM code, and a few other
commits that only modify the SafeSetID LSM selftest.
The commit that touches common kernel code simply adds an LSM hook in
the setgroups() syscall that mirrors what is done for the existing LSM
hooks in the setuid() and setgid() syscalls. This commit combined with
the SafeSetID-specific one allow the LSM to filter setgroups() calls
according to configured rule sets in the same way that is already done
for setuid() and setgid()"
* tag 'safesetid-6.0' of https://github.com/micah-morton/linux:
LSM: SafeSetID: add setgroups() testing to selftest
LSM: SafeSetID: Add setgroups() security policy handling
security: Add LSM hook to setgroups() syscall
LSM: SafeSetID: add GID testing to selftest
LSM: SafeSetID: selftest cleanup and prepare for GIDs
LSM: SafeSetID: fix userns bug in selftest
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Merge tag 'Smack-for-6.0' of https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next
Pull msack updates from Casey Schaufler:
"Two minor code clean-ups for Smack.
One removes a touch of dead code and the other replaces an instance of
kzalloc + strncpy with kstrndup"
* tag 'Smack-for-6.0' of https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next:
smack: Remove the redundant lsm_inode_alloc
smack: Replace kzalloc + strncpy with kstrndup
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20220801' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
"A relatively small set of patches for SELinux this time, eight patches
in total with really only one significant change.
The highlights are:
- Add support for proper labeling of memfd_secret anonymous inodes.
This will allow LSMs that implement the anonymous inode hooks to
apply security policy to memfd_secret() fds.
- Various small improvements to memory management: fixed leaks, freed
memory when needed, boundary checks.
- Hardened the selinux_audit_data struct with __randomize_layout.
- A minor documentation tweak to fix a formatting/style issue"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20220801' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: selinux_add_opt() callers free memory
selinux: Add boundary check in put_entry()
selinux: fix memleak in security_read_state_kernel()
docs: selinux: add '=' signs to kernel boot options
mm: create security context for memfd_secret inodes
selinux: fix typos in comments
selinux: drop unnecessary NULL check
selinux: add __randomize_layout to selinux_audit_data
- Fix Sparse warnings with randomizd kstack (GONG, Ruiqi)
- Replace uintptr_t with unsigned long in usercopy (Jason A. Donenfeld)
- Fix Clang -Wforward warning in LKDTM (Justin Stitt)
- Fix comment to correctly refer to STRICT_DEVMEM (Lukas Bulwahn)
- Introduce dm-verity binding logic to LoadPin LSM (Matthias Kaehlcke)
- Clean up warnings and overflow and KASAN tests (Kees Cook)
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Merge tag 'hardening-v5.20-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull hardening updates from Kees Cook:
- Fix Sparse warnings with randomizd kstack (GONG, Ruiqi)
- Replace uintptr_t with unsigned long in usercopy (Jason A. Donenfeld)
- Fix Clang -Wforward warning in LKDTM (Justin Stitt)
- Fix comment to correctly refer to STRICT_DEVMEM (Lukas Bulwahn)
- Introduce dm-verity binding logic to LoadPin LSM (Matthias Kaehlcke)
- Clean up warnings and overflow and KASAN tests (Kees Cook)
* tag 'hardening-v5.20-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
dm: verity-loadpin: Drop use of dm_table_get_num_targets()
kasan: test: Silence GCC 12 warnings
drivers: lkdtm: fix clang -Wformat warning
x86: mm: refer to the intended config STRICT_DEVMEM in a comment
dm: verity-loadpin: Use CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN_VERITY for conditional compilation
LoadPin: Enable loading from trusted dm-verity devices
dm: Add verity helpers for LoadPin
stack: Declare {randomize_,}kstack_offset to fix Sparse warnings
lib: overflow: Do not define 64-bit tests on 32-bit
MAINTAINERS: Add a general "kernel hardening" section
usercopy: use unsigned long instead of uintptr_t
It's not possible for inode->i_security to be NULL here because every
inode will call inode_init_always and then lsm_inode_alloc to alloc
memory for inode->security, this is what LSM infrastructure management
do, so remove this redundant code.
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Simplify the code by using kstrndup instead of kzalloc and strncpy in
smk_parse_smack(), which meanwhile remove strncpy as [1] suggests.
[1]: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/90
Signed-off-by: GONG, Ruiqi <gongruiqi1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
loader
- Add the ability to pass the IMA measurement of kernel and bootloader
to the kexec-ed kernel
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Merge tag 'x86_kdump_for_v6.0_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 kdump updates from Borislav Petkov:
- Add the ability to pass early an RNG seed to the kernel from the boot
loader
- Add the ability to pass the IMA measurement of kernel and bootloader
to the kexec-ed kernel
* tag 'x86_kdump_for_v6.0_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/setup: Use rng seeds from setup_data
x86/kexec: Carry forward IMA measurement log on kexec
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Merge tag 'fs.idmapped.vfsuid.v5.20' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux
Pull fs idmapping updates from Christian Brauner:
"This introduces the new vfs{g,u}id_t types we agreed on. Similar to
k{g,u}id_t the new types are just simple wrapper structs around
regular {g,u}id_t types.
They allow to establish a type safety boundary in the VFS for idmapped
mounts preventing confusion betwen {g,u}ids mapped into an idmapped
mount and {g,u}ids mapped into the caller's or the filesystem's
idmapping.
An initial set of helpers is introduced that allows to operate on
vfs{g,u}id_t types. We will remove all references to non-type safe
idmapped mounts helpers in the very near future. The patches do
already exist.
This converts the core attribute changing codepaths which become
significantly easier to reason about because of this change.
Just a few highlights here as the patches give detailed overviews of
what is happening in the commit messages:
- The kernel internal struct iattr contains type safe vfs{g,u}id_t
values clearly communicating that these values have to take a given
mount's idmapping into account.
- The ownership values placed in struct iattr to change ownership are
identical for idmapped and non-idmapped mounts going forward. This
also allows to simplify stacking filesystems such as overlayfs that
change attributes In other words, they always represent the values.
- Instead of open coding checks for whether ownership changes have
been requested and an actual update of the inode is required we now
have small static inline wrappers that abstract this logic away
removing a lot of code duplication from individual filesystems that
all open-coded the same checks"
* tag 'fs.idmapped.vfsuid.v5.20' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux:
mnt_idmapping: align kernel doc and parameter order
mnt_idmapping: use new helpers in mapped_fs{g,u}id()
fs: port HAS_UNMAPPED_ID() to vfs{g,u}id_t
mnt_idmapping: return false when comparing two invalid ids
attr: fix kernel doc
attr: port attribute changes to new types
security: pass down mount idmapping to setattr hook
quota: port quota helpers mount ids
fs: port to iattr ownership update helpers
fs: introduce tiny iattr ownership update helpers
fs: use mount types in iattr
fs: add two type safe mapping helpers
mnt_idmapping: add vfs{g,u}id_t
Commit 5bfcbd22ee ("apparmor: Enable tuning of policy paranoid load for
embedded systems") introduces the config SECURITY_APPARMOR_PARANOID_LOAD,
but then refers in the code to SECURITY_PARANOID_LOAD; note the missing
APPARMOR in the middle.
Correct this to the introduced and intended config option.
Fixes: 5bfcbd22ee ("apparmor: Enable tuning of policy paranoid load for embedded systems")
Signed-off-by: Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
The lockdown LSM is primarily used in conjunction with UEFI Secure Boot.
This LSM may also be used on machines without UEFI. It can also be
enabled when UEFI Secure Boot is disabled. One of lockdown's features
is to prevent kexec from loading untrusted kernels. Lockdown can be
enabled through a bootparam or after the kernel has booted through
securityfs.
If IMA appraisal is used with the "ima_appraise=log" boot param,
lockdown can be defeated with kexec on any machine when Secure Boot is
disabled or unavailable. IMA prevents setting "ima_appraise=log" from
the boot param when Secure Boot is enabled, but this does not cover
cases where lockdown is used without Secure Boot.
To defeat lockdown, boot without Secure Boot and add ima_appraise=log to
the kernel command line; then:
$ echo "integrity" > /sys/kernel/security/lockdown
$ echo "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig" > \
/sys/kernel/security/ima/policy
$ kexec -ls unsigned-kernel
Add a call to verify ima appraisal is set to "enforce" whenever lockdown
is enabled. This fixes CVE-2022-21505.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 29d3c1c8df ("kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down")
Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: John Haxby <john.haxby@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
AppArmor split out task oriented controls to their own logical file
a while ago. Ptrace mediation is better grouped with task than
ipc, so move it.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Allow labels to have debug flags that can be used to trigger debug output
only from profiles/labels that are marked. This can help reduce debug
output by allowing debug to be target to a specific confinement condition.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
When finding the profile via patterned attachments, the longest left
match is being set to the static compile time value and not using the
runtime computed value.
Fix this by setting the candidate value to the greater of the
precomputed value or runtime computed value.
Fixes: 21f6066105 ("apparmor: improve overlapping domain attachment resolution")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
When loading a profile that is set to unconfined mode, that label
flag is not set when it should be. Ensure it is set so that when
used in a label the unconfined check will be applied correctly.
Fixes: 038165070a ("apparmor: allow setting any profile into the unconfined state")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Remove warnings found by running scripts/kernel-doc, which is caused by
using 'make W=1'.
security/apparmor/policy_ns.c:65: warning: Function parameter or member 'curr' not described in 'aa_ns_name'
security/apparmor/policy_ns.c:65: warning: Function parameter or member 'view' not described in 'aa_ns_name'
security/apparmor/policy_ns.c:65: warning: Function parameter or member 'subns' not described in 'aa_ns_name'
security/apparmor/policy_ns.c:65: warning: expecting prototype for aa_na_name(). Prototype was for aa_ns_name() instead
security/apparmor/policy_ns.c:214: warning: Function parameter or member 'view' not described in '__aa_lookupn_ns'
security/apparmor/policy_ns.c:214: warning: Excess function parameter 'base' description in '__aa_lookupn_ns'
security/apparmor/policy_ns.c:297: warning: expecting prototype for aa_create_ns(). Prototype was for __aa_find_or_create_ns() instead
Reported-by: Abaci Robot <abaci@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Li <yang.lee@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Kernel test robot throws below warning ->
security/apparmor/policy_ns.c:83:20: warning: no previous prototype
for function 'alloc_unconfined' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
Mark it as static.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Souptick Joarder (HPE) <jrdr.linux@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
The SafeSetID LSM has functionality for restricting setuid()/setgid()
syscalls based on its configured security policies. This patch adds the
analogous functionality for the setgroups() syscall. Security policy
for the setgroups() syscall follows the same policies that are
installed on the system for setgid() syscalls.
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
Give the LSM framework the ability to filter setgroups() syscalls. There
are already analagous hooks for the set*uid() and set*gid() syscalls.
The SafeSetID LSM will use this new hook to ensure setgroups() calls are
allowed by the installed security policy. Tested by putting print
statement in security_task_fix_setgroups() hook and confirming that it
gets hit when userspace does a setgroups() syscall.
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
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Merge tag 'integrity-v5.19-fix' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity fixes from Mimi Zohar:
"Here are a number of fixes for recently found bugs.
Only 'ima: fix violation measurement list record' was introduced in
the current release. The rest address existing bugs"
* tag 'integrity-v5.19-fix' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
ima: Fix potential memory leak in ima_init_crypto()
ima: force signature verification when CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG is configured
ima: Fix a potential integer overflow in ima_appraise_measurement
ima: fix violation measurement list record
Revert "evm: Fix memleak in init_desc"
Displaying the mode as part of the seectx takes up unnecessary memory,
makes it so we can't use refcounted secctx so we need to alloc/free on
every conversion from secid to secctx and introduces a space that
could be potentially mishandled by tooling.
Eg. In an audit record we get
subj_type=firefix (enforce)
Having the mode reported is not necessary, and might even be confusing
eg. when writing an audit rule to match the above record field you
would use
-F subj_type=firefox
ie. the mode is not included. AppArmor provides ways to find the mode
without reporting as part of the secctx. So disable this by default
before its use is wide spread and we can't. For now we add a sysctl
to control the behavior as we can't guarantee no one is using this.
Acked-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
XArrays are a better match than IDR for how AppArmor is mapping
secids. Specifically AppArmor is trying to keep the allocation
dense. XArrays also have the advantage of avoiding the complexity IDRs
preallocation.
In addition this avoids/fixes a lockdep issue raised in the LKML thread
"Linux 5.18-rc4"
where there is a report of an interaction between apparmor and IPC,
this warning may have been spurious as the reported issue is in a
per-cpu local lock taken by the IDR. With the one side in the IPC id
allocation and the other in AppArmor's secid allocation.
Description by John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Message-Id: <226cee6a-6ca1-b603-db08-8500cd8f77b7@gnuweeb.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Separate kernel objects from unconfined. This is done so we can
distinguish between the two in debugging, auditing and in preparation
for being able to replace unconfined, which is not appropriate for the
kernel.
The kernel label will continue to behave similar to unconfined.
Acked-by: Jon Tourville <jon.tourville@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Use IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_XXX) instead of #ifdef/#endif statements to
initialize .enabled, minor simplicity improvement.
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
On failure to allocate the SHA1 tfm, IMA fails to initialize and exits
without freeing the ima_algo_array. Add the missing kfree() for
ima_algo_array to avoid the potential memory leak.
Signed-off-by: Jianglei Nie <niejianglei2021@163.com>
Fixes: 6d94809af6 ("ima: Allocate and initialize tfm for each PCR bank")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Currently, an unsigned kernel could be kexec'ed when IMA arch specific
policy is configured unless lockdown is enabled. Enforce kernel
signature verification check in the kexec_file_load syscall when IMA
arch specific policy is configured.
Fixes: 99d5cadfde ("kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE")
Reported-and-suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
With some of the stricter type checking in KUnit's EXPECT macros
removed, several casts in policy_unpack_test are no longer required.
Remove the unnecessary casts, making the conditions clearer.
Reviewed-by: Brendan Higgins <brendanhiggins@google.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: David Gow <davidgow@google.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
When copy_from_user failed, the memory is freed by kvfree. however the
management struct and data blob are allocated independently, so only
kvfree(data) cause a memleak issue here. Use aa_put_loaddata(data) to
fix this issue.
Fixes: a6a52579e5 ("apparmor: split load data into management struct and data blob")
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
The aa_pivotroot() function has a reference counting bug in a specific
path. When aa_replace_current_label() returns on success, the function
forgets to decrement the reference count of “target”, which is
increased earlier by build_pivotroot(), causing a reference leak.
Fix it by decreasing the refcount of “target” in that path.
Fixes: 2ea3ffb778 ("apparmor: add mount mediation")
Co-developed-by: Xiyu Yang <xiyuyang19@fudan.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Xiyu Yang <xiyuyang19@fudan.edu.cn>
Co-developed-by: Xin Tan <tanxin.ctf@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Tan <tanxin.ctf@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Xiong <xiongx18@fudan.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Remove some warnings found by running scripts/kernel-doc,
which is caused by using 'make W=1'.
security/apparmor/domain.c:137: warning: Function parameter or member
'state' not described in 'label_compound_match'
security/apparmor/domain.c:137: warning: Excess function parameter
'start' description in 'label_compound_match'
security/apparmor/domain.c:1294: warning: Excess function parameter
'onexec' description in 'aa_change_profile'
Reported-by: Abaci Robot <abaci@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Li <yang.lee@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
IF CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY is disabled, there remains
some unneed references to zlib, and can result in undefined symbol
references if ZLIB_INFLATE or ZLIB_DEFLATE are not defined.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Fixes: abfb9c0725f2 ("apparmor: make export of raw binary profile to userspace optional")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Clang static analysis reports this issue
label.c:1802:3: warning: 2nd function call argument
is an uninitialized value
pr_info("%s", str);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
str is set from a successful call to aa_label_asxprint(&str, ...)
On failure a negative value is returned, not a -1. So change
the check.
Fixes: f1bd904175 ("apparmor: add the base fns() for domain labels")
Signed-off-by: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Don't use /** for non-kernel-doc comments and change function name
aa_mangle_name to mangle_name in kernel-doc comment to Remove some
warnings found by running scripts/kernel-doc, which is caused by
using 'make W=1'.
security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c:1503: warning: Cannot understand *
on line 1503 - I thought it was a doc line
security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c:1530: warning: Cannot understand *
on line 1530 - I thought it was a doc line
security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c:1892: warning: Cannot understand *
on line 1892 - I thought it was a doc line
security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c:108: warning: expecting prototype for
aa_mangle_name(). Prototype was for mangle_name() instead
Reported-by: Abaci Robot <abaci@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Li <yang.lee@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Add the description of @ns_name, change function name aa_u16_chunck to
unpack_u16_chunk and verify_head to verify_header in kernel-doc comment
to remove warnings found by running scripts/kernel-doc, which is caused
by using 'make W=1'.
security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:224: warning: expecting prototype for
aa_u16_chunck(). Prototype was for unpack_u16_chunk() instead
security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:678: warning: Function parameter or
member 'ns_name' not described in 'unpack_profile'
security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:950: warning: expecting prototype for
verify_head(). Prototype was for verify_header() instead
Reported-by: Abaci Robot <abaci@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Li <yang.lee@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Fix a spelling problem and change @mntpath to @path to remove warnings
found by running scripts/kernel-doc, which is caused by using 'make W=1'.
security/apparmor/mount.c:321: warning: Function parameter or member
'devname' not described in 'match_mnt_path_str'
security/apparmor/mount.c:321: warning: Excess function parameter
'devnme' description in 'match_mnt_path_str'
security/apparmor/mount.c:377: warning: Function parameter or member
'path' not described in 'match_mnt'
security/apparmor/mount.c:377: warning: Excess function parameter
'mntpath' description in 'match_mnt'
Reported-by: Abaci Robot <abaci@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Li <yang.lee@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Make use of the struct_size() helper instead of an open-coded version,
in order to avoid any potential type mistakes or integer overflows that,
in the worst scenario, could lead to heap overflows.
Also, address the following sparse warnings:
security/apparmor/lib.c:139:23: warning: using sizeof on a flexible structure
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/174
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
When the mount check fails due to a permission check failure instead
of explicitly at one of the subcomponent checks, AppArmor is reporting
a failure in the flags match. However this is not true and AppArmor
can not attribute the error at this point to any particular component,
and should only indicate the mount failed due to missing permissions.
Fixes: 2ea3ffb778 ("apparmor: add mount mediation")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Return value from nf_register_net_hooks() directly instead
of taking this in another redundant variable.
Reported-by: Zeal Robot <zealci@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Minghao Chi <chi.minghao@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: CGEL ZTE <cgel.zte@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Global quieting of denied AppArmor generated file events is not
handled correctly. Unfortunately the is checking if quieting of all
audit events is set instead of just denied events.
Fixes: 67012e8209 ("AppArmor: basic auditing infrastructure.")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Salvatore <mike.salvatore@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Currently if sha1 hashing of policy is disabled a sha1 hash symlink
to the non-existent file is created. There is now reason to create
the symlink in this case so don't do it.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
AppArmor by default does an extensive check on loaded policy that
can take quite some time on limited resource systems. Allow
disabling this check for embedded systems where system images are
readonly and have checksumming making the need for the embedded
policy to be fully checked to be redundant.
Note: basic policy checks are still done.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Embedded systems have limited space and don't need the introspection
or checkpoint restore capability provided by exporting the raw
profile binary data so make it so make it a config option.
This will reduce run time memory use and also speed up policy loads.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Update help to note this option is not needed for small embedded systems
where regular policy introspection is not used.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Fix function name in lsm.c kernel-doc comment
to remove some warnings found by running scripts/kernel-doc,
which is caused by using 'make W=1'.
security/apparmor/lsm.c:819: warning: expecting prototype for
apparmor_clone_security(). Prototype was for
apparmor_sk_clone_security() instead
security/apparmor/lsm.c:923: warning: expecting prototype for
apparmor_socket_list(). Prototype was for apparmor_socket_listen()
instead
security/apparmor/lsm.c:1028: warning: expecting prototype for
apparmor_getsockopt(). Prototype was for apparmor_socket_getsockopt()
instead
security/apparmor/lsm.c:1038: warning: expecting prototype for
apparmor_setsockopt(). Prototype was for apparmor_socket_setsockopt()
instead
ecurity/apparmor/lsm.c:1061: warning: expecting prototype for
apparmor_socket_sock_recv_skb(). Prototype was for
apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb() instead
Reported-by: Abaci Robot <abaci@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Li <yang.lee@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Fix function name in security/apparmor/label.c, policy.c, procattr.c
kernel-doc comment to remove some warnings found by clang(make W=1 LLVM=1).
security/apparmor/label.c:499: warning: expecting prototype for
aa_label_next_not_in_set(). Prototype was for
__aa_label_next_not_in_set() instead
security/apparmor/label.c:2147: warning: expecting prototype for
__aa_labelset_udate_subtree(). Prototype was for
__aa_labelset_update_subtree() instead
security/apparmor/policy.c:434: warning: expecting prototype for
aa_lookup_profile(). Prototype was for aa_lookupn_profile() instead
security/apparmor/procattr.c:101: warning: expecting prototype for
aa_setprocattr_chagnehat(). Prototype was for aa_setprocattr_changehat()
instead
Reported-by: Abaci Robot <abaci@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Li <yang.lee@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
AppArmor is prefixing secids that are converted to secctx with the =
to indicate the secctx should only be parsed from an absolute root
POV. This allows catching errors where secctx are reparsed back into
internal labels.
Unfortunately because audit is using secid to secctx conversion this
means that subject and object labels can result in a very unfortunate
== that can break audit parsing.
eg. the subj==unconfined term in the below audit message
type=USER_LOGIN msg=audit(1639443365.233:160): pid=1633 uid=0 auid=1000
ses=3 subj==unconfined msg='op=login id=1000 exe="/usr/sbin/sshd"
hostname=192.168.122.1 addr=192.168.122.1 terminal=/dev/pts/1 res=success'
Fix this by switch the prepending of = to a _. This still works as a
special character to flag this case without breaking audit. Also move
this check behind debug as it should not be needed during normal
operqation.
Fixes: 26b7899510 ("apparmor: add support for absolute root view based labels")
Reported-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Extend LoadPin to allow loading of kernel files from trusted dm-verity [1]
devices.
This change adds the concept of trusted verity devices to LoadPin. LoadPin
maintains a list of root digests of verity devices it considers trusted.
Userspace can populate this list through an ioctl on the new LoadPin
securityfs entry 'dm-verity'. The ioctl receives a file descriptor of
a file with verity digests as parameter. Verity reads the digests from
this file after confirming that the file is located on the pinned root.
The digest file must contain one digest per line. The list of trusted
digests can only be set up once, which is typically done at boot time.
When a kernel file is read LoadPin first checks (as usual) whether the file
is located on the pinned root, if so the file can be loaded. Otherwise, if
the verity extension is enabled, LoadPin determines whether the file is
located on a verity backed device and whether the root digest of that
device is in the list of trusted digests. The file can be loaded if the
verity device has a trusted root digest.
Background:
As of now LoadPin restricts loading of kernel files to a single pinned
filesystem, typically the rootfs. This works for many systems, however it
can result in a bloated rootfs (and OTA updates) on platforms where
multiple boards with different hardware configurations use the same rootfs
image. Especially when 'optional' files are large it may be preferable to
download/install them only when they are actually needed by a given board.
Chrome OS uses Downloadable Content (DLC) [2] to deploy certain 'packages'
at runtime. As an example a DLC package could contain firmware for a
peripheral that is not present on all boards. DLCs use dm-verity to verify
the integrity of the DLC content.
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/device-mapper/verity.html
[2] https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/platform2/+/HEAD/dlcservice/docs/developer.md
Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220627083512.v7.2.I01c67af41d2f6525c6d023101671d7339a9bc8b5@changeid
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
When the ima-modsig is enabled, the rc passed to evm_verifyxattr() may be
negative, which may cause the integer overflow problem.
Fixes: 39b0709636 ("ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures")
Signed-off-by: Huaxin Lu <luhuaxin1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Although the violation digest in the IMA measurement list is always
zeroes, the size of the digest should be based on the hash algorithm.
Until recently the hash algorithm was hard coded to sha1. Fix the
violation digest size included in the IMA measurement list.
This is just a cosmetic change which should not affect attestation.
Reported-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Fixes: 09091c44cb ("ima: use IMA default hash algorithm for integrity violations")
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
With some of the stricter type checking in KUnit's EXPECT macros
removed, several casts in policy_unpack_test are no longer required.
Remove the unnecessary casts, making the conditions clearer.
Reviewed-by: Brendan Higgins <brendanhiggins@google.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: David Gow <davidgow@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
On kexec file load, the Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA)
subsystem may verify the IMA signature of the kernel and initramfs, and
measure it. The command line parameters passed to the kernel in the
kexec call may also be measured by IMA.
A remote attestation service can verify a TPM quote based on the TPM
event log, the IMA measurement list and the TPM PCR data. This can
be achieved only if the IMA measurement log is carried over from the
current kernel to the next kernel across the kexec call.
PowerPC and ARM64 both achieve this using device tree with a
"linux,ima-kexec-buffer" node. x86 platforms generally don't make use of
device tree, so use the setup_data mechanism to pass the IMA buffer to
the new kernel.
Signed-off-by: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> # IMA function definitions
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YmKyvlF3my1yWTvK@noodles-fedora-PC23Y6EG
Do fine-grained Kconfig for all the various retbleed parts.
NOTE: if your compiler doesn't support return thunks this will
silently 'upgrade' your mitigation to IBPB, you might not like this.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Now that we introduced new infrastructure to increase the type safety
for filesystems supporting idmapped mounts port the first part of the
vfs over to them.
This ports the attribute changes codepaths to rely on the new better
helpers using a dedicated type.
Before this change we used to take a shortcut and place the actual
values that would be written to inode->i_{g,u}id into struct iattr. This
had the advantage that we moved idmappings mostly out of the picture
early on but it made reasoning about changes more difficult than it
should be.
The filesystem was never explicitly told that it dealt with an idmapped
mount. The transition to the value that needed to be stored in
inode->i_{g,u}id appeared way too early and increased the probability of
bugs in various codepaths.
We know place the same value in struct iattr no matter if this is an
idmapped mount or not. The vfs will only deal with type safe
vfs{g,u}id_t. This makes it massively safer to perform permission checks
as the type will tell us what checks we need to perform and what helpers
we need to use.
Fileystems raising FS_ALLOW_IDMAP can't simply write ia_vfs{g,u}id to
inode->i_{g,u}id since they are different types. Instead they need to
use the dedicated vfs{g,u}id_to_k{g,u}id() helpers that map the
vfs{g,u}id into the filesystem.
The other nice effect is that filesystems like overlayfs don't need to
care about idmappings explicitly anymore and can simply set up struct
iattr accordingly directly.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=win6+ahs1EwLkcq8apqLi_1wXFWbrPf340zYEhObpz4jA@mail.gmail.com [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220621141454.2914719-9-brauner@kernel.org
Cc: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CC: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Before this change we used to take a shortcut and place the actual
values that would be written to inode->i_{g,u}id into struct iattr. This
had the advantage that we moved idmappings mostly out of the picture
early on but it made reasoning about changes more difficult than it
should be.
The filesystem was never explicitly told that it dealt with an idmapped
mount. The transition to the value that needed to be stored in
inode->i_{g,u}id appeared way too early and increased the probability of
bugs in various codepaths.
We know place the same value in struct iattr no matter if this is an
idmapped mount or not. The vfs will only deal with type safe
vfs{g,u}id_t. This makes it massively safer to perform permission checks
as the type will tell us what checks we need to perform and what helpers
we need to use.
Adapt the security_inode_setattr() helper to pass down the mount's
idmapping to account for that change.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220621141454.2914719-8-brauner@kernel.org
Cc: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CC: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Earlier we introduced new helpers to abstract ownership update and
remove code duplication. This converts all filesystems supporting
idmapped mounts to make use of these new helpers.
For now we always pass the initial idmapping which makes the idmapping
functions these helpers call nops.
This is done because we currently always pass the actual value to be
written to i_{g,u}id via struct iattr. While this allowed us to treat
the {g,u}id values in struct iattr as values that can be directly
written to inode->i_{g,u}id it also increases the potential for
confusion for filesystems.
Now that we are have dedicated types to prevent this confusion we will
ultimately only map the value from the idmapped mount into a filesystem
value that can be written to inode->i_{g,u}id when the filesystem
actually updates the inode. So pass down the initial idmapping until we
finished that conversion at which point we pass down the mount's
idmapping.
No functional changes intended.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220621141454.2914719-6-brauner@kernel.org
Cc: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CC: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
The selinux_add_opt() function may need to allocate memory for the
mount options if none has already been allocated, but there is no
need to free that memory on error as the callers handle that. Drop
the existing kfree() on error to help increase consistency in the
selinux_add_opt() error handling.
This patch also changes selinux_add_opt() to return -EINVAL when
the mount option value, @s, is NULL. It currently return -ENOMEM.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220611090550.135674-1-xiujianfeng@huawei.com/T/
Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
[PM: fix subject, rework commit description language]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This reverts commit ccf11dbaa0.
Commit ccf11dbaa0 ("evm: Fix memleak in init_desc") said there is
memleak in init_desc. That may be incorrect, as we can see, tmp_tfm is
saved in one of the two global variables hmac_tfm or evm_tfm[hash_algo],
then if init_desc is called next time, there is no need to alloc tfm
again, so in the error path of kmalloc desc or crypto_shash_init(desc),
It is not a problem without freeing tmp_tfm.
And also that commit did not reset the global variable to NULL after
freeing tmp_tfm and this makes *tfm a dangling pointer which may cause a
UAF issue.
Reported-by: Guozihua (Scott) <guozihua@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Just like next_entry(), boundary check is necessary to prevent memory
out-of-bound access.
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
In this function, it directly returns the result of __security_read_policy
without freeing the allocated memory in *data, cause memory leak issue,
so free the memory if __security_read_policy failed.
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
When creating (sealing) a new trusted key, migratable
trusted keys have the FIXED_TPM and FIXED_PARENT attributes
set, and non-migratable keys don't. This is backwards, and
also causes creation to fail when creating a migratable key
under a migratable parent. (The TPM thinks you are trying to
seal a non-migratable blob under a migratable parent.)
The following simple patch fixes the logic, and has been
tested for all four combinations of migratable and non-migratable
trusted keys and parent storage keys. With this logic, you will
get a proper failure if you try to create a non-migratable
trusted key under a migratable parent storage key, and all other
combinations work correctly.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.13+
Fixes: e5fb5d2c5a ("security: keys: trusted: Make sealed key properly interoperable")
Signed-off-by: David Safford <david.safford@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Commit e3489f8974 ("selinux: kill selinux_sb_get_mnt_opts()")
introduced a NULL check on the context after a successful call to
security_sid_to_context(). This is on the one hand redundant after
checking for success and on the other hand insufficient on an actual
NULL pointer, since the context is passed to seq_escape() leading to a
call of strlen() on it.
Reported by Clang analyzer:
In file included from security/selinux/hooks.c:28:
In file included from ./include/linux/tracehook.h:50:
In file included from ./include/linux/memcontrol.h:13:
In file included from ./include/linux/cgroup.h:18:
./include/linux/seq_file.h:136:25: warning: Null pointer passed as 1st argument to string length function [unix.cstring.NullArg]
seq_escape_mem(m, src, strlen(src), flags, esc);
^~~~~~~~~~~
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Randomize the layout of struct selinux_audit_data as suggested in [1],
since it contains a pointer to struct selinux_state, an already
randomized strucure.
[1]: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/188
Signed-off-by: GONG, Ruiqi <gongruiqi1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The fix is usermode_driver.c one - once you've done kern_mount(), you
must kern_unmount(); simple mntput() will end up with a leak. Several
failure exits in there messed up that way... In practice you won't
hit those particular failure exits without fault injection, though.
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Merge tag 'pull-18-rc1-work.mount' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull mount handling updates from Al Viro:
"Cleanups (and one fix) around struct mount handling.
The fix is usermode_driver.c one - once you've done kern_mount(), you
must kern_unmount(); simple mntput() will end up with a leak. Several
failure exits in there messed up that way... In practice you won't hit
those particular failure exits without fault injection, though"
* tag 'pull-18-rc1-work.mount' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
move mount-related externs from fs.h to mount.h
blob_to_mnt(): kern_unmount() is needed to undo kern_mount()
m->mnt_root->d_inode->i_sb is a weird way to spell m->mnt_sb...
linux/mount.h: trim includes
uninline may_mount() and don't opencode it in fspick(2)/fsopen(2)
This KUnit update for Linux 5.19-rc1 consists of several fixes, cleanups,
and enhancements to tests and framework:
- introduces _NULL and _NOT_NULL macros to pointer error checks
- reworks kunit_resource allocation policy to fix memory leaks when
caller doesn't specify free() function to be used when allocating
memory using kunit_add_resource() and kunit_alloc_resource() funcs.
- adds ability to specify suite-level init and exit functions
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Merge tag 'linux-kselftest-kunit-5.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/shuah/linux-kselftest
Pull KUnit updates from Shuah Khan:
"Several fixes, cleanups, and enhancements to tests and framework:
- introduce _NULL and _NOT_NULL macros to pointer error checks
- rework kunit_resource allocation policy to fix memory leaks when
caller doesn't specify free() function to be used when allocating
memory using kunit_add_resource() and kunit_alloc_resource() funcs.
- add ability to specify suite-level init and exit functions"
* tag 'linux-kselftest-kunit-5.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/shuah/linux-kselftest: (41 commits)
kunit: tool: Use qemu-system-i386 for i386 runs
kunit: fix executor OOM error handling logic on non-UML
kunit: tool: update riscv QEMU config with new serial dependency
kcsan: test: use new suite_{init,exit} support
kunit: tool: Add list of all valid test configs on UML
kunit: take `kunit_assert` as `const`
kunit: tool: misc cleanups
kunit: tool: minor cosmetic cleanups in kunit_parser.py
kunit: tool: make parser stop overwriting status of suites w/ no_tests
kunit: tool: remove dead parse_crash_in_log() logic
kunit: tool: print clearer error message when there's no TAP output
kunit: tool: stop using a shell to run kernel under QEMU
kunit: tool: update test counts summary line format
kunit: bail out of test filtering logic quicker if OOM
lib/Kconfig.debug: change KUnit tests to default to KUNIT_ALL_TESTS
kunit: Rework kunit_resource allocation policy
kunit: fix debugfs code to use enum kunit_status, not bool
kfence: test: use new suite_{init/exit} support, add .kunitconfig
kunit: add ability to specify suite-level init and exit functions
kunit: rename print_subtest_{start,end} for clarity (s/subtest/suite)
...
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Merge tag 'integrity-v5.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull IMA updates from Mimi Zohar:
"New is IMA support for including fs-verity file digests and signatures
in the IMA measurement list as well as verifying the fs-verity file
digest based signatures, both based on policy.
In addition, are two bug fixes:
- avoid reading UEFI variables, which cause a page fault, on Apple
Macs with T2 chips.
- remove the original "ima" template Kconfig option to address a boot
command line ordering issue.
The rest is a mixture of code/documentation cleanup"
* tag 'integrity-v5.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
integrity: Fix sparse warnings in keyring_handler
evm: Clean up some variables
evm: Return INTEGRITY_PASS for enum integrity_status value '0'
efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
fsverity: update the documentation
ima: support fs-verity file digest based version 3 signatures
ima: permit fsverity's file digests in the IMA measurement list
ima: define a new template field named 'd-ngv2' and templates
fs-verity: define a function to return the integrity protected file digest
ima: use IMA default hash algorithm for integrity violations
ima: fix 'd-ng' comments and documentation
ima: remove the IMA_TEMPLATE Kconfig option
ima: remove redundant initialization of pointer 'file'.
- Strictened validation of key hashes for SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST. An
invalid hash format causes a compilation error. Previously, they got
included to the kernel binary but were silently ignored at run-time.
- Allow root user to append new hashes to the blacklist keyring.
- Trusted keys backed with Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module
(CAAM), which part of some of the new NXP's SoC's. Now there is total
three hardware backends for trusted keys: TPM, ARM TEE and CAAM.
- A scattered set of fixes and small improvements for the TPM driver.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Merge tag 'tpmdd-next-v5.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd
Pull tpm updates from Jarkko Sakkinen:
- Tightened validation of key hashes for SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST. An
invalid hash format causes a compilation error. Previously, they got
included to the kernel binary but were silently ignored at run-time.
- Allow root user to append new hashes to the blacklist keyring.
- Trusted keys backed with Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance
Module (CAAM), which part of some of the new NXP's SoC's. Now there
is total three hardware backends for trusted keys: TPM, ARM TEE and
CAAM.
- A scattered set of fixes and small improvements for the TPM driver.
* tag 'tpmdd-next-v5.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd:
MAINTAINERS: add KEYS-TRUSTED-CAAM
doc: trusted-encrypted: describe new CAAM trust source
KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keys
crypto: caam - add in-kernel interface for blob generator
crypto: caam - determine whether CAAM supports blob encap/decap
KEYS: trusted: allow use of kernel RNG for key material
KEYS: trusted: allow use of TEE as backend without TCG_TPM support
tpm: Add field upgrade mode support for Infineon TPM2 modules
tpm: Fix buffer access in tpm2_get_tpm_pt()
char: tpm: cr50_i2c: Suppress duplicated error message in .remove()
tpm: cr50: Add new device/vendor ID 0x504a6666
tpm: Remove read16/read32/write32 calls from tpm_tis_phy_ops
tpm: ibmvtpm: Correct the return value in tpm_ibmvtpm_probe()
tpm/tpm_ftpm_tee: Return true/false (not 1/0) from bool functions
certs: Explain the rationale to call panic()
certs: Allow root user to append signed hashes to the blacklist keyring
certs: Check that builtin blacklist hashes are valid
certs: Make blacklist_vet_description() more strict
certs: Factor out the blacklist hash creation
tools/certs: Add print-cert-tbs-hash.sh
Important changes:
* improve the path_rename LSM hook implementations for RENAME_EXCHANGE;
* fix a too-restrictive filesystem control for a rare corner case;
* set the nested sandbox limitation to 16 layers;
* add a new LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER access right to properly handle
file reparenting (i.e. full rename and link support);
* add new tests and documentation;
* format code with clang-format to make it easier to maintain and
contribute.
Related patch series:
* [PATCH v1 0/7] Landlock: Clean up coding style with clang-format
https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506160513.523257-1-mic@digikod.net
* [PATCH v2 00/10] Minor Landlock fixes and new tests
https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506160820.524344-1-mic@digikod.net
* [PATCH v3 00/12] Landlock: file linking and renaming support
https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506161102.525323-1-mic@digikod.net
* [PATCH v2] landlock: Explain how to support Landlock
https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220513112743.156414-1-mic@digikod.net
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Merge tag 'landlock-5.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux
Pull Landlock updates from Mickaël Salaün:
- improve the path_rename LSM hook implementations for RENAME_EXCHANGE;
- fix a too-restrictive filesystem control for a rare corner case;
- set the nested sandbox limitation to 16 layers;
- add a new LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER access right to properly handle
file reparenting (i.e. full rename and link support);
- add new tests and documentation;
- format code with clang-format to make it easier to maintain and
contribute.
* tag 'landlock-5.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux: (30 commits)
landlock: Explain how to support Landlock
landlock: Add design choices documentation for filesystem access rights
landlock: Document good practices about filesystem policies
landlock: Document LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER and ABI versioning
samples/landlock: Add support for file reparenting
selftests/landlock: Add 11 new test suites dedicated to file reparenting
landlock: Add support for file reparenting with LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER
LSM: Remove double path_rename hook calls for RENAME_EXCHANGE
landlock: Move filesystem helpers and add a new one
landlock: Fix same-layer rule unions
landlock: Create find_rule() from unmask_layers()
landlock: Reduce the maximum number of layers to 16
landlock: Define access_mask_t to enforce a consistent access mask size
selftests/landlock: Test landlock_create_ruleset(2) argument check ordering
landlock: Change landlock_restrict_self(2) check ordering
landlock: Change landlock_add_rule(2) argument check ordering
selftests/landlock: Add tests for O_PATH
selftests/landlock: Fully test file rename with "remove" access
selftests/landlock: Extend access right tests to directories
selftests/landlock: Add tests for unknown access rights
...
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20220523' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
"We've got twelve patches queued for v5.19, with most being fairly
minor. The highlights are below:
- The checkreqprot and runtime disable knobs have been deprecated for
some time with no active users that we can find. In an effort to
move things along we are adding a pause when the knobs are used to
help make the deprecation more noticeable in case anyone is still
using these hacks in the shadows.
- We've added the anonymous inode class name to the AVC audit records
when anonymous inodes are involved. This should make writing policy
easier when anonymous inodes are involved.
- More constification work. This is fairly straightforward and the
source of most of the diffstat.
- The usual minor cleanups: remove unnecessary assignments, assorted
style/checkpatch fixes, kdoc fixes, macro while-loop
encapsulations, #include tweaks, etc"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20220523' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
security: declare member holding string literal const
selinux: log anon inode class name
selinux: declare data arrays const
selinux: fix indentation level of mls_ops block
selinux: include necessary headers in headers
selinux: avoid extra semicolon
selinux: update parameter documentation
selinux: resolve checkpatch errors
selinux: don't sleep when CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE is true
selinux: checkreqprot is deprecated, add some ssleep() discomfort
selinux: runtime disable is deprecated, add some ssleep() discomfort
selinux: Remove redundant assignments
KGDB and KDB allow read and write access to kernel memory, and thus
should be restricted during lockdown. An attacker with access to a
serial port (for example, via a hypervisor console, which some cloud
vendors provide over the network) could trigger the debugger so it is
important that the debugger respect the lockdown mode when/if it is
triggered.
Fix this by integrating lockdown into kdb's existing permissions
mechanism. Unfortunately kgdb does not have any permissions mechanism
(although it certainly could be added later) so, for now, kgdb is simply
and brutally disabled by immediately exiting the gdb stub without taking
any action.
For lockdowns established early in the boot (e.g. the normal case) then
this should be fine but on systems where kgdb has set breakpoints before
the lockdown is enacted than "bad things" will happen.
CVE: CVE-2022-21499
Co-developed-by: Stephen Brennan <stephen.s.brennan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Brennan <stephen.s.brennan@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Get rid of redundant assignments which end up in values not being
read either because they are overwritten or the function ends.
Reported by clang-tidy [deadcode.DeadStores]
Signed-off-by: Michal Orzel <michalorzel.eng@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
The Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module (CAAM) is an IP core
built into many newer i.MX and QorIQ SoCs by NXP.
The CAAM does crypto acceleration, hardware number generation and
has a blob mechanism for encapsulation/decapsulation of sensitive material.
This blob mechanism depends on a device specific random 256-bit One Time
Programmable Master Key that is fused in each SoC at manufacturing
time. This key is unreadable and can only be used by the CAAM for AES
encryption/decryption of user data.
This makes it a suitable backend (source) for kernel trusted keys.
Previous commits generalized trusted keys to support multiple backends
and added an API to access the CAAM blob mechanism. Based on these,
provide the necessary glue to use the CAAM for trusted keys.
Reviewed-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Tim Harvey <tharvey@gateworks.com>
Tested-by: Matthias Schiffer <matthias.schiffer@ew.tq-group.com>
Tested-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Tested-by: Michael Walle <michael@walle.cc> # on ls1028a (non-E and E)
Tested-by: John Ernberg <john.ernberg@actia.se> # iMX8QXP
Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
The two existing trusted key sources don't make use of the kernel RNG,
but instead let the hardware doing the sealing/unsealing also
generate the random key material. However, both users and future
backends may want to place less trust into the quality of the trust
source's random number generator and instead reuse the kernel entropy
pool, which can be seeded from multiple entropy sources.
Make this possible by adding a new trusted.rng parameter,
that will force use of the kernel RNG. In its absence, it's up
to the trust source to decide, which random numbers to use,
maintaining the existing behavior.
Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Tested-by: Michael Walle <michael@walle.cc> # on ls1028a (non-E and E)
Tested-by: John Ernberg <john.ernberg@actia.se> # iMX8QXP
Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
With recent rework, trusted keys are no longer limited to TPM as trust
source. The Kconfig symbol is unchanged however leading to a few issues:
- TCG_TPM is required, even if only TEE is to be used
- Enabling TCG_TPM, but excluding it from available trusted sources
is not possible
- TEE=m && TRUSTED_KEYS=y will lead to TEE support being silently
dropped, which is not the best user experience
Remedy these issues by introducing two new boolean Kconfig symbols:
TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM and TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE with the appropriate
dependencies.
Any new code depending on the TPM trusted key backend in particular
or symbols exported by it will now need to explicitly state that it
depends on TRUSTED_KEYS && TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM
The latter to ensure the dependency is built and the former to ensure
it's reachable for module builds. There are no such users yet.
Reviewed-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Tested-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Tested-by: Andreas Rammhold <andreas@rammhold.de>
Tested-by: Tim Harvey <tharvey@gateworks.com>
Tested-by: Michael Walle <michael@walle.cc> # on ls1028a (non-E and E)
Tested-by: John Ernberg <john.ernberg@actia.se> # iMX8QXP
Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Factor out the blacklist hash creation with the get_raw_hash() helper.
This also centralize the "tbs" and "bin" prefixes and make them private,
which help to manage them consistently.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210712170313.884724-5-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Add a new LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER access right to enable policy writers
to allow sandboxed processes to link and rename files from and to a
specific set of file hierarchies. This access right should be composed
with LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_* for the destination of a link or rename,
and with LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_* for a source of a rename. This
lift a Landlock limitation that always denied changing the parent of an
inode.
Renaming or linking to the same directory is still always allowed,
whatever LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER is used or not, because it is not
considered a threat to user data.
However, creating multiple links or renaming to a different parent
directory may lead to privilege escalations if not handled properly.
Indeed, we must be sure that the source doesn't gain more privileges by
being accessible from the destination. This is handled by making sure
that the source hierarchy (including the referenced file or directory
itself) restricts at least as much the destination hierarchy. If it is
not the case, an EXDEV error is returned, making it potentially possible
for user space to copy the file hierarchy instead of moving or linking
it.
Instead of creating different access rights for the source and the
destination, we choose to make it simple and consistent for users.
Indeed, considering the previous constraint, it would be weird to
require such destination access right to be also granted to the source
(to make it a superset). Moreover, RENAME_EXCHANGE would also add to
the confusion because of paths being both a source and a destination.
See the provided documentation for additional details.
New tests are provided with a following commit.
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506161102.525323-8-mic@digikod.net
In order to be able to identify a file exchange with renameat2(2) and
RENAME_EXCHANGE, which will be useful for Landlock [1], propagate the
rename flags to LSMs. This may also improve performance because of the
switch from two set of LSM hook calls to only one, and because LSMs
using this hook may optimize the double check (e.g. only one lock,
reduce the number of path walks).
AppArmor, Landlock and Tomoyo are updated to leverage this change. This
should not change the current behavior (same check order), except
(different level of) speed boosts.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220221212522.320243-1-mic@digikod.net
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506161102.525323-7-mic@digikod.net
Move the SB_NOUSER and IS_PRIVATE dentry check to a standalone
is_nouser_or_private() helper. This will be useful for a following
commit.
Move get_mode_access() and maybe_remove() to make them usable by new
code provided by a following commit.
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506161102.525323-6-mic@digikod.net
The original behavior was to check if the full set of requested accesses
was allowed by at least a rule of every relevant layer. This didn't
take into account requests for multiple accesses and same-layer rules
allowing the union of these accesses in a complementary way. As a
result, multiple accesses requested on a file hierarchy matching rules
that, together, allowed these accesses, but without a unique rule
allowing all of them, was illegitimately denied. This case should be
rare in practice and it can only be triggered by the path_rename or
file_open hook implementations.
For instance, if, for the same layer, a rule allows execution
beneath /a/b and another rule allows read beneath /a, requesting access
to read and execute at the same time for /a/b should be allowed for this
layer.
This was an inconsistency because the union of same-layer rule accesses
was already allowed if requested once at a time anyway.
This fix changes the way allowed accesses are gathered over a path walk.
To take into account all these rule accesses, we store in a matrix all
layer granting the set of requested accesses, according to the handled
accesses. To avoid heap allocation, we use an array on the stack which
is 2*13 bytes. A following commit bringing the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER
access right will increase this size to reach 112 bytes (2*14*4) in case
of link or rename actions.
Add a new layout1.layer_rule_unions test to check that accesses from
different rules pertaining to the same layer are ORed in a file
hierarchy. Also test that it is not the case for rules from different
layers.
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506161102.525323-5-mic@digikod.net
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
The maximum number of nested Landlock domains is currently 64. Because
of the following fix and to help reduce the stack size, let's reduce it
to 16. This seems large enough for a lot of use cases (e.g. sandboxed
init service, spawning a sandboxed SSH service, in nested sandboxed
containers). Reducing the number of nested domains may also help to
discover misuse of Landlock (e.g. creating a domain per rule).
Add and use a dedicated layer_mask_t typedef to fit with the number of
layers. This might be useful when changing it and to keep it consistent
with the maximum number of layers.
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506161102.525323-3-mic@digikod.net
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Create and use the access_mask_t typedef to enforce a consistent access
mask size and uniformly use a 16-bits type. This will helps transition
to a 32-bits value one day.
Add a build check to make sure all (filesystem) access rights fit in.
This will be extended with a following commit.
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506161102.525323-2-mic@digikod.net
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
According to the Landlock goal to be a security feature available to
unprivileges processes, it makes more sense to first check for
no_new_privs before checking anything else (i.e. syscall arguments).
Merge inval_fd_enforce and unpriv_enforce_without_no_new_privs tests
into the new restrict_self_checks_ordering. This is similar to the
previous commit checking other syscalls.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506160820.524344-10-mic@digikod.net
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
This makes more sense to first check the ruleset FD and then the rule
attribute. It will be useful to factor out code for other rule types.
Add inval_add_rule_arguments tests, extension of empty_path_beneath_attr
tests, to also check error ordering for landlock_add_rule(2).
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506160820.524344-9-mic@digikod.net
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
The code attempts to free the 'new' pointer using kmem_cache_free(),
which is wrong because this function isn't responsible of freeing it.
Instead, the function should free new->htable and clear the contents of
*new (to prevent double-free).
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: c7c556f1e8 ("selinux: refactor changing booleans")
Reported-by: Wander Lairson Costa <wander@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The randstruct GCC plugin gets upset when it sees struct path (which is
randomized) being assigned from a "void *" (which it cannot type-check).
There's no need for these casts, as the entire internal payload use is
following a normal struct layout. Convert the enum-based void * offset
dereferencing to the new big_key_payload struct. No meaningful machine
code changes result after this change, and source readability is improved.
Drop the randstruct exception now that there is no "confusing" cross-type
assignment.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Fix the following sparse warnings:
CHECK security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c
security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c:76:16: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer
security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c:91:16: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer
security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c:106:16: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Make hmac_tfm static since it's not used anywhere else besides the file
it is in.
Remove declaration of hash_tfm since it doesn't exist.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Return INTEGRITY_PASS for the enum integrity_status rather than 0.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
On Apple T2 Macs, when Linux attempts to read the db and dbx efi variables
at early boot to load UEFI Secure Boot certificates, a page fault occurs
in Apple firmware code and EFI runtime services are disabled with the
following logs:
[Firmware Bug]: Page fault caused by firmware at PA: 0xffffb1edc0068000
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 104 at arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c:735 efi_crash_gracefully_on_page_fault+0x50/0xf0
(Removed some logs from here)
Call Trace:
<TASK>
page_fault_oops+0x4f/0x2c0
? search_bpf_extables+0x6b/0x80
? search_module_extables+0x50/0x80
? search_exception_tables+0x5b/0x60
kernelmode_fixup_or_oops+0x9e/0x110
__bad_area_nosemaphore+0x155/0x190
bad_area_nosemaphore+0x16/0x20
do_kern_addr_fault+0x8c/0xa0
exc_page_fault+0xd8/0x180
asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30
(Removed some logs from here)
? __efi_call+0x28/0x30
? switch_mm+0x20/0x30
? efi_call_rts+0x19a/0x8e0
? process_one_work+0x222/0x3f0
? worker_thread+0x4a/0x3d0
? kthread+0x17a/0x1a0
? process_one_work+0x3f0/0x3f0
? set_kthread_struct+0x40/0x40
? ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
</TASK>
---[ end trace 1f82023595a5927f ]---
efi: Froze efi_rts_wq and disabled EFI Runtime Services
integrity: Couldn't get size: 0x8000000000000015
integrity: MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list
efi: EFI Runtime Services are disabled!
integrity: Couldn't get size: 0x8000000000000015
integrity: Couldn't get UEFI dbx list
integrity: Couldn't get size: 0x8000000000000015
integrity: Couldn't get mokx list
integrity: Couldn't get size: 0x80000000
So we avoid reading these UEFI variables and thus prevent the crash.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@live.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The struct security_hook_list member lsm is assigned in
security_add_hooks() with string literals passed from the individual
security modules. Declare the function parameter and the struct member
const to signal their immutability.
Reported by Clang [-Wwrite-strings]:
security/selinux/hooks.c:7388:63: error: passing 'const char [8]'
to parameter of type 'char *' discards qualifiers
[-Werror,-Wincompatible-pointer-types-discards-qualifiers]
security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks,
ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), selinux);
^~~~~~~~~
./include/linux/lsm_hooks.h:1629:11: note: passing argument to
parameter 'lsm' here
char *lsm);
^
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Let's follow a consistent and documented coding style. Everything may
not be to our liking but it is better than tacit knowledge. Moreover,
this will help maintain style consistency between different developers.
This contains only whitespace changes.
Automatically formatted with:
clang-format-14 -i security/landlock/*.[ch] include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506160513.523257-3-mic@digikod.net
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
In preparation to a following commit, add clang-format on and
clang-format off stanzas around constant definitions. This enables to
keep aligned values, which is much more readable than packed
definitions.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506160513.523257-2-mic@digikod.net
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
To enable Clang randstruct support, move the structure layout
randomization seed generation out of scripts/gcc-plugins/ into
scripts/basic/ so it happens early enough that it can be used by either
compiler implementation. The gcc-plugin still builds its own header file,
but now does so from the common "randstruct.seed" file.
Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220503205503.3054173-6-keescook@chromium.org
In preparation for Clang supporting randstruct, reorganize the Kconfigs,
move the attribute macros, and generalize the feature to be named
CONFIG_RANDSTRUCT for on/off, CONFIG_RANDSTRUCT_FULL for the full
randomization mode, and CONFIG_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE for the cache-line
sized mode.
Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220503205503.3054173-4-keescook@chromium.org
IMA may verify a file's integrity against a "good" value stored in the
'security.ima' xattr or as an appended signature, based on policy. When
the "good value" is stored in the xattr, the xattr may contain a file
hash or signature. In either case, the "good" value is preceded by a
header. The first byte of the xattr header indicates the type of data
- hash, signature - stored in the xattr. To support storing fs-verity
signatures in the 'security.ima' xattr requires further differentiating
the fs-verity signature from the existing IMA signature.
In addition the signatures stored in 'security.ima' xattr, need to be
disambiguated. Instead of directly signing the fs-verity digest, a new
signature format version 3 is defined as the hash of the ima_file_id
structure, which identifies the type of signature and the digest.
The IMA policy defines "which" files are to be measured, verified, and/or
audited. For those files being verified, the policy rules indicate "how"
the file should be verified. For example to require a file be signed,
the appraise policy rule must include the 'appraise_type' option.
appraise_type:= [imasig] | [imasig|modsig] | [sigv3]
where 'imasig' is the original or signature format v2 (default),
where 'modsig' is an appended signature,
where 'sigv3' is the signature format v3.
The policy rule must also indicate the type of digest, if not the IMA
default, by first specifying the digest type:
digest_type:= [verity]
The following policy rule requires fsverity signatures. The rule may be
constrained, for example based on a fsuuid or LSM label.
appraise func=BPRM_CHECK digest_type=verity appraise_type=sigv3
Acked-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Permit fsverity's file digest (a hash of struct fsverity_descriptor) to
be included in the IMA measurement list, based on the new measurement
policy rule 'digest_type=verity' option.
To differentiate between a regular IMA file hash from an fsverity's
file digest, use the new d-ngv2 format field included in the ima-ngv2
template.
The following policy rule requires fsverity file digests and specifies
the new 'ima-ngv2' template, which contains the new 'd-ngv2' field. The
policy rule may be constrained, for example based on a fsuuid or LSM
label.
measure func=FILE_CHECK digest_type=verity template=ima-ngv2
Acked-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Kees Cook