The asm version of the kernel mapping code works fine for creating a
coarse grained identity map, but for mapping the kernel down to its
exact boundaries with the right attributes, it is not suitable. This is
why we create a preliminary RWX kernel mapping first, and then rebuild
it from scratch later on.
So let's reimplement this in C, in a way that will make it unnecessary
to create the kernel page tables yet another time in paging_init().
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240214122845.2033971-63-ardb+git@google.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
In __cpu_has_rng() we use cpus_have_const_cap() to check for
ARM64_HAS_RNG, but this is not necessary and alternative_has_cap_*()
would be preferable.
For historical reasons, cpus_have_const_cap() is more complicated than
it needs to be. Before cpucaps are finalized, it will perform a bitmap
test of the system_cpucaps bitmap, and once cpucaps are finalized it
will use an alternative branch. This used to be necessary to handle some
race conditions in the window between cpucap detection and the
subsequent patching of alternatives and static branches, where different
branches could be out-of-sync with one another (or w.r.t. alternative
sequences). Now that we use alternative branches instead of static
branches, these are all patched atomically w.r.t. one another, and there
are only a handful of cases that need special care in the window between
cpucap detection and alternative patching.
Due to the above, it would be nice to remove cpus_have_const_cap(), and
migrate callers over to alternative_has_cap_*(), cpus_have_final_cap(),
or cpus_have_cap() depending on when their requirements. This will
remove redundant instructions and improve code generation, and will make
it easier to determine how each callsite will behave before, during, and
after alternative patching.
In the window between detecting the ARM64_HAS_RNG cpucap and patching
alternative branches, nothing which calls __cpu_has_rng() can run, and
hence it's not necessary to use cpus_have_const_cap().
This patch replaces the use of cpus_have_const_cap() with
alternative_has_cap_unlikely(), which will avoid generating code to test
the system_cpucaps bitmap and should be better for all subsequent calls
at runtime.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
kaslr_early_init() is called from assembler code and does not
need a declaration to work, but adding one anyway shuts up
this W=1 warning:
arch/arm64/kernel/pi/kaslr_early.c:88:16: error: no previous prototype for 'kaslr_early_init' [-Werror=missing-prototypes]
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230516160642.523862-13-arnd@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
The arch_get_random*_early() abstraction is not completely useful and
adds complexity, because it's not a given that there will be no calls to
arch_get_random*() between random_init_early(), which uses
arch_get_random*_early(), and init_cpu_features(). During that gap,
crng_reseed() might be called, which uses arch_get_random*(), since it's
mostly not init code.
Instead we can test whether we're in the early phase in
arch_get_random*() itself, and in doing so avoid all ambiguity about
where we are. Fortunately, the only architecture that currently
implements arch_get_random*_early() also has an alternatives-based cpu
feature system, one flag of which determines whether the other flags
have been initialized. This makes it possible to do the early check with
zero cost once the system is initialized.
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: Jean-Philippe Brucker <jean-philippe@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
The archrandom interface was originally designed for x86, which supplies
RDRAND/RDSEED for receiving random words into registers, resulting in
one function to generate an int and another to generate a long. However,
other architectures don't follow this.
On arm64, the SMCCC TRNG interface can return between one and three
longs. On s390, the CPACF TRNG interface can return arbitrary amounts,
with four longs having the same cost as one. On UML, the os_getrandom()
interface can return arbitrary amounts.
So change the api signature to take a "max_longs" parameter designating
the maximum number of longs requested, and then return the number of
longs generated.
Since callers need to check this return value and loop anyway, each arch
implementation does not bother implementing its own loop to try again to
fill the maximum number of longs. Additionally, all existing callers
pass in a constant max_longs parameter. Taken together, these two things
mean that the codegen doesn't really change much for one-word-at-a-time
platforms, while performance is greatly improved on platforms such as
s390.
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
When RDRAND was introduced, there was much discussion on whether it
should be trusted and how the kernel should handle that. Initially, two
mechanisms cropped up, CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM, a compile time switch, and
"nordrand", a boot-time switch.
Later the thinking evolved. With a properly designed RNG, using RDRAND
values alone won't harm anything, even if the outputs are malicious.
Rather, the issue is whether those values are being *trusted* to be good
or not. And so a new set of options were introduced as the real
ones that people use -- CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU and "random.trust_cpu".
With these options, RDRAND is used, but it's not always credited. So in
the worst case, it does nothing, and in the best case, maybe it helps.
Along the way, CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM's meaning got sort of pulled into the
center and became something certain platforms force-select.
The old options don't really help with much, and it's a bit odd to have
special handling for these instructions when the kernel can deal fine
with the existence or untrusted existence or broken existence or
non-existence of that CPU capability.
Simplify the situation by removing CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM and using the
ordinary asm-generic fallback pattern instead, keeping the two options
that are actually used. For now it leaves "nordrand" for now, as the
removal of that will take a different route.
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
The macros for accessing fields in ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1 omit the _EL1 from the
name of the register. In preparation for converting this register to be
automatically generated update the names to include an _EL1, there should
be no functional change.
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220503170233.507788-8-broonie@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
When support for RNDR/RNDRRS was introduced, we elected to only
implement arch_get_random_seed_int/_long(), and back them by RNDR
instead of RNDRRS. This was needed to prevent potential performance
and/or starvation issues resulting from the fact that the /dev/random
driver used to invoke these routines on various hot paths.
These issues have all been addressed now [0] [1], and so we can wire up
this API more straight-forwardly:
- map arch_get_random_int/_long() onto RNDR, which returns the output of
a DRBG that is reseeded at an implemented defined rate;
- map arch_get_random_seed_int/_long() onto the TRNG firmware service,
which returns true, conditioned entropy, or onto RNDRRS if the TRNG
service is unavailable, which returns the output of a DRBG that is
reseeded every time it is used.
[0] 390596c995 random: avoid arch_get_random_seed_long() when collecting IRQ randomness
[1] 2ee25b6968 random: avoid superfluous call to RDRAND in CRNG extraction
Cc: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Reviewed-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220113131239.1610455-1-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
The ARM architected TRNG firmware interface, described in ARM spec
DEN0098, defines an ARM SMCCC based interface to a true random number
generator, provided by firmware.
This can be discovered via the SMCCC >=v1.1 interface, and provides
up to 192 bits of entropy per call.
Hook this SMC call into arm64's arch_get_random_*() implementation,
coming to the rescue when the CPU does not implement the ARM v8.5 RNG
system registers.
For the detection, we piggy back on the PSCI/SMCCC discovery (which gives
us the conduit to use (hvc/smc)), then try to call the
ARM_SMCCC_TRNG_VERSION function, which returns -1 if this interface is
not implemented.
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
The ARM DEN0098 document describe an SMCCC based firmware service to
deliver hardware generated random numbers. Its existence is advertised
according to the SMCCC v1.1 specification.
Add a (dummy) call to probe functions implemented in each architecture
(ARM and arm64), to determine the existence of this interface.
For now this return false, but this will be overwritten by each
architecture's support patch.
Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Commit 9bceb80b3c ("arm64: kaslr: Use standard early random
function") removed the direct calls of the __arm64_rndr() and
__early_cpu_has_rndr() functions, but left the dummy prototypes in the
#else branch of the #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM guard.
Remove the redundant prototypes, as they have no users outside of
this header file.
Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201006194453.36519-1-andre.przywara@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
This is hopefully the final piece of the crazy puzzle with random.h
dependencies.
And by "hopefully" I obviously mean "Linus is a hopeless optimist".
Reported-and-tested-by: Daniel Díaz <daniel.diaz@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Currently arm64 doesn't initialize the primary CRNG in a (potentially)
trusted manner as we only detect the presence of the RNG once secondary
CPUs are up.
Now that the core RNG code distinguishes the early initialization of the
primary CRNG, we can implement arch_get_random_seed_long_early() to
support this.
This patch does so.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200210130015.17664-4-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
When seeding KALSR on a system where we have architecture level random
number generation make use of that entropy, mixing it in with the seed
passed by the bootloader. Since this is run very early in init before
feature detection is complete we open code rather than use archrandom.h.
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Expose the ID_AA64ISAR0.RNDR field to userspace, as the RNG system
registers are always available at EL0.
Implement arch_get_random_seed_long using RNDR. Given that the
TRNG is likely to be a shared resource between cores, and VMs,
do not explicitly force re-seeding with RNDRRS. In order to avoid
code complexity and potential issues with hetrogenous systems only
provide values after cpufeature has finalized the system capabilities.
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
[Modified to only function after cpufeature has finalized the system
capabilities and move all the code into the header -- broonie]
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
[will: Advertise HWCAP via /proc/cpuinfo]
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Ard Biesheuvel