Measure keys loaded onto any keyring.
This patch defines a new IMA policy func namely KEY_CHECK to
measure keys. Updated ima_match_rules() to check for KEY_CHECK
and ima_parse_rule() to handle KEY_CHECK.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
process_buffer_measurement() may be called prior to IMA being
initialized (for instance, when the IMA hook is called when
a key is added to the .builtin_trusted_keys keyring), which
would result in a kernel panic.
This patch adds the check in process_buffer_measurement()
to return immediately if IMA is not initialized yet.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The integrity_kernel_read() call in ima_calc_file_hash_tfm() can return
a value of 0 before all bytes of the file are read. A value of 0 would
normally indicate an EOF. This has been observed if a user process is
causing a file appraisal and is terminated with a SIGTERM signal. The
most common occurrence of seeing the problem is if a shutdown or systemd
reload is initiated while files are being appraised.
The problem is similar to commit <f5e1040196db> (ima: always return
negative code for error) that fixed the problem in
ima_calc_file_hash_atfm().
Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick Callaghan <patrickc@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
task_security_struct was obtained at the beginning of may_create
and selinux_inode_init_security, no need to obtain again.
may_create will be called very frequently when create dir and file.
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Signed-off-by: Yang Guo <guoyang2@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Shaokun Zhang <zhangshaokun@hisilicon.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
syzbot is reporting that use of SOCKET_I()->sk from open() can result in
use after free problem [1], for socket's inode is still reachable via
/proc/pid/fd/n despite destruction of SOCKET_I()->sk already completed.
At first I thought that this race condition applies to only open/getattr
permission checks. But James Morris has pointed out that there are more
permission checks where this race condition applies to. Thus, get rid of
tomoyo_get_socket_name() instead of conditionally bypassing permission
checks on sockets. As a side effect of this patch,
"socket:[family=\$:type=\$:protocol=\$]" in the policy files has to be
rewritten to "socket:[\$]".
[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=73d590010454403d55164cca23bd0565b1eb3b74
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+0341f6a4d729d4e0acf1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Reported-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Fix avc_insert() to call avc_node_kill() if we've already allocated
an AVC node and the code fails to insert the node in the cache.
Fixes: fa1aa143ac ("selinux: extended permissions for ioctls")
Reported-by: rsiddoji@codeaurora.org
Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The lsm_audit code is only required when CONFIG_SECURITY is enabled.
It does not have a build dependency on CONFIG_AUDIT since audit.h
provides trivial static inlines for audit_log*() when CONFIG_AUDIT
is disabled. Hence, the Makefile should only add lsm_audit to the
obj lists based on CONFIG_SECURITY, not CONFIG_AUDIT.
Fixes: 59438b4647 ("security,lockdown,selinux: implement SELinux lockdown")
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Through a somewhat convoluted series of changes, we have ended up
with multiple unnecessary occurrences of (flags & MAY_NOT_BLOCK)
tests in selinux_inode_permission(). Clean it up and simplify.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
commit bda0be7ad9 ("security: make inode_follow_link RCU-walk aware")
passed down the rcu flag to the SELinux AVC, but failed to adjust the
test in slow_avc_audit() to also return -ECHILD on LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY.
Previously, we only returned -ECHILD if generating an audit record with
LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE since this was only relevant from inode_permission.
Move the handling of MAY_NOT_BLOCK to avc_audit() and its inlined
equivalent in selinux_inode_permission() immediately after we determine
that audit is required, and always fall back to ref-walk in this case.
Fixes: bda0be7ad9 ("security: make inode_follow_link RCU-walk aware")
Reported-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This reverts commit e46e01eebb ("selinux: stop passing MAY_NOT_BLOCK
to the AVC upon follow_link"). The correct fix is to instead fall
back to ref-walk if audit is required irrespective of the specific
audit data type. This is done in the next commit.
Fixes: e46e01eebb ("selinux: stop passing MAY_NOT_BLOCK to the AVC upon follow_link")
Reported-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Implement a SELinux hook for lockdown. If the lockdown module is also
enabled, then a denial by the lockdown module will take precedence over
SELinux, so SELinux can only further restrict lockdown decisions.
The SELinux hook only distinguishes at the granularity of integrity
versus confidentiality similar to the lockdown module, but includes the
full lockdown reason as part of the audit record as a hint in diagnosing
what triggered the denial. To support this auditing, move the
lockdown_reasons[] string array from being private to the lockdown
module to the security framework so that it can be used by the lsm audit
code and so that it is always available even when the lockdown module
is disabled.
Note that the SELinux implementation allows the integrity and
confidentiality reasons to be controlled independently from one another.
Thus, in an SELinux policy, one could allow operations that specify
an integrity reason while blocking operations that specify a
confidentiality reason. The SELinux hook implementation is
stricter than the lockdown module in validating the provided reason value.
Sample AVC audit output from denials:
avc: denied { integrity } for pid=3402 comm="fwupd"
lockdown_reason="/dev/mem,kmem,port" scontext=system_u:system_r:fwupd_t:s0
tcontext=system_u:system_r:fwupd_t:s0 tclass=lockdown permissive=0
avc: denied { confidentiality } for pid=4628 comm="cp"
lockdown_reason="/proc/kcore access"
scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:test_lockdown_integrity_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:test_lockdown_integrity_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
tclass=lockdown permissive=0
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: some merge fuzz do the the perf hooks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Translating a context struct to string can be quite slow, especially if
the context has a lot of category bits set. This can cause quite
noticeable performance impact in situations where the translation needs
to be done repeatedly. A common example is a UNIX datagram socket with
the SO_PASSSEC option enabled, which is used e.g. by systemd-journald
when receiving log messages via datagram socket. This scenario can be
reproduced with:
cat /dev/urandom | base64 | logger &
timeout 30s perf record -p $(pidof systemd-journald) -a -g
kill %1
perf report -g none --pretty raw | grep security_secid_to_secctx
Before the caching introduced by this patch, computing the context
string (security_secid_to_secctx() function) takes up ~65% of
systemd-journald's CPU time (assuming a context with 1024 categories
set and Fedora x86_64 release kernel configs). After this patch
(assuming near-perfect cache hit ratio) this overhead is reduced to just
~2%.
This patch addresses the issue by caching a certain number (compile-time
configurable) of recently used context strings to speed up repeated
translations of the same context, while using only a small amount of
memory.
The cache is integrated into the existing sidtab table by adding a field
to each entry, which when not NULL contains an RCU-protected pointer to
a cache entry containing the cached string. The cache entries are kept
in a linked list sorted according to how recently they were used. On a
cache miss when the cache is full, the least recently used entry is
removed to make space for the new entry.
The patch migrates security_sid_to_context_core() to use the cache (also
a few other functions where it was possible without too much fuss, but
these mostly use the translation for logging in case of error, which is
rare).
Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1733259
Cc: Michal Sekletar <msekleta@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Tested-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
[PM: lots of merge fixups due to collisions with other sidtab patches]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This replaces the reverse table lookup and reverse cache with a
hashtable which improves cache-miss reverse-lookup times from
O(n) to O(1)* and maintains the same performance as a reverse
cache hit.
This reduces the time needed to add a new sidtab entry from ~500us
to 5us on a Pixel 3 when there are ~10,000 sidtab entries.
The implementation uses the kernel's generic hashtable API,
It uses the context's string represtation as the hash source,
and the kernels generic string hashing algorithm full_name_hash()
to reduce the string to a 32 bit value.
This change also maintains the improvement introduced in
commit ee1a84fdfe ("selinux: overhaul sidtab to fix bug and improve
performance") which removed the need to keep the current sidtab
locked during policy reload. It does however introduce periodic
locking of the target sidtab while converting the hashtable. Sidtab
entries are never modified or removed, so the context struct stored
in the sid_to_context tree can also be used for the context_to_sid
hashtable to reduce memory usage.
This bug was reported by:
- On the selinux bug tracker.
BUG: kernel softlockup due to too many SIDs/contexts #37https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/37
- Jovana Knezevic on Android's bugtracker.
Bug: 140252993
"During multi-user performance testing, we create and remove users
many times. selinux_android_restorecon_pkgdir goes from 1ms to over
20ms after about 200 user creations and removals. Accumulated over
~280 packages, that adds a significant time to user creation,
making perf benchmarks unreliable."
* Hashtable lookup is only O(1) when n < the number of buckets.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Reported-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reported-by: Jovana Knezevic <jovanak@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Tested-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: subj tweak, removed changelog from patch description]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Replace all the occurrences of FIELD_SIZEOF() with sizeof_field() except
at places where these are defined. Later patches will remove the unused
definition of FIELD_SIZEOF().
This patch is generated using following script:
EXCLUDE_FILES="include/linux/stddef.h|include/linux/kernel.h"
git grep -l -e "\bFIELD_SIZEOF\b" | while read file;
do
if [[ "$file" =~ $EXCLUDE_FILES ]]; then
continue
fi
sed -i -e 's/\bFIELD_SIZEOF\b/sizeof_field/g' $file;
done
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Bharadiya <pankaj.laxminarayan.bharadiya@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190924105839.110713-3-pankaj.laxminarayan.bharadiya@intel.com
Co-developed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> # for net
In preparation for LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS, it's necessary to add the
ability for nd_jump_link() to return an error which the corresponding
get_link() caller must propogate back up to the VFS.
Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
- increase left match history buffer size to provide inproved conflict
resolution in overlapping execution rules.
- switch buffer allocation to use a memory pool and GFP_KERNEL
where possible.
- add compression of policy blobs to reduce memory usage.
+ Cleanups
- fix spelling mistake "immutible" -> "immutable"
+ Bug fixes
- fix unsigned len comparison in update_for_len macro
- fix sparse warning for type-casting of current->real_cred
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Merge tag 'apparmor-pr-2019-12-03' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor
Pull apparmor updates from John Johansen:
"Features:
- increase left match history buffer size to provide improved
conflict resolution in overlapping execution rules.
- switch buffer allocation to use a memory pool and GFP_KERNEL where
possible.
- add compression of policy blobs to reduce memory usage.
Cleanups:
- fix spelling mistake "immutible" -> "immutable"
Bug fixes:
- fix unsigned len comparison in update_for_len macro
- fix sparse warning for type-casting of current->real_cred"
* tag 'apparmor-pr-2019-12-03' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor:
apparmor: make it so work buffers can be allocated from atomic context
apparmor: reduce rcu_read_lock scope for aa_file_perm mediation
apparmor: fix wrong buffer allocation in aa_new_mount
apparmor: fix unsigned len comparison with less than zero
apparmor: increase left match history buffer size
apparmor: Switch to GFP_KERNEL where possible
apparmor: Use a memory pool instead per-CPU caches
apparmor: Force type-casting of current->real_cred
apparmor: fix spelling mistake "immutible" -> "immutable"
apparmor: fix blob compression when ns is forced on a policy load
apparmor: fix missing ZLIB defines
apparmor: fix blob compression build failure on ppc
apparmor: Initial implementation of raw policy blob compression
This is a series of cleanups for the y2038 work, mostly intended
for namespace cleaning: the kernel defines the traditional
time_t, timeval and timespec types that often lead to y2038-unsafe
code. Even though the unsafe usage is mostly gone from the kernel,
having the types and associated functions around means that we
can still grow new users, and that we may be missing conversions
to safe types that actually matter.
There are still a number of driver specific patches needed to
get the last users of these types removed, those have been
submitted to the respective maintainers.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20191108210236.1296047-1-arnd@arndb.de/
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
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Merge tag 'y2038-cleanups-5.5' of git://git.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/playground
Pull y2038 cleanups from Arnd Bergmann:
"y2038 syscall implementation cleanups
This is a series of cleanups for the y2038 work, mostly intended for
namespace cleaning: the kernel defines the traditional time_t, timeval
and timespec types that often lead to y2038-unsafe code. Even though
the unsafe usage is mostly gone from the kernel, having the types and
associated functions around means that we can still grow new users,
and that we may be missing conversions to safe types that actually
matter.
There are still a number of driver specific patches needed to get the
last users of these types removed, those have been submitted to the
respective maintainers"
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20191108210236.1296047-1-arnd@arndb.de/
* tag 'y2038-cleanups-5.5' of git://git.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/playground: (26 commits)
y2038: alarm: fix half-second cut-off
y2038: ipc: fix x32 ABI breakage
y2038: fix typo in powerpc vdso "LOPART"
y2038: allow disabling time32 system calls
y2038: itimer: change implementation to timespec64
y2038: move itimer reset into itimer.c
y2038: use compat_{get,set}_itimer on alpha
y2038: itimer: compat handling to itimer.c
y2038: time: avoid timespec usage in settimeofday()
y2038: timerfd: Use timespec64 internally
y2038: elfcore: Use __kernel_old_timeval for process times
y2038: make ns_to_compat_timeval use __kernel_old_timeval
y2038: socket: use __kernel_old_timespec instead of timespec
y2038: socket: remove timespec reference in timestamping
y2038: syscalls: change remaining timeval to __kernel_old_timeval
y2038: rusage: use __kernel_old_timeval
y2038: uapi: change __kernel_time_t to __kernel_old_time_t
y2038: stat: avoid 'time_t' in 'struct stat'
y2038: ipc: remove __kernel_time_t reference from headers
y2038: vdso: powerpc: avoid timespec references
...
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20191126' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
"Only three SELinux patches for v5.5:
- Remove the size limit on SELinux policies, the limitation was a
lingering vestige and no longer necessary.
- Allow file labeling before the policy is loaded. This should ease
some of the burden when the policy is initially loaded (no need to
relabel files), but it should also help enable some new system
concepts which dynamically create the root filesystem in the
initrd.
- Add support for the "greatest lower bound" policy construct which
is defined as the intersection of the MLS range of two SELinux
labels"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20191126' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: default_range glblub implementation
selinux: allow labeling before policy is loaded
selinux: remove load size limit
Highlights:
- Infrastructure for secure boot on some bare metal Power9 machines. The
firmware support is still in development, so the code here won't actually
activate secure boot on any existing systems.
- A change to xmon (our crash handler / pseudo-debugger) to restrict it to
read-only mode when the kernel is lockdown'ed, otherwise it's trivial to drop
into xmon and modify kernel data, such as the lockdown state.
- Support for KASLR on 32-bit BookE machines (Freescale / NXP).
- Fixes for our flush_icache_range() and __kernel_sync_dicache() (VDSO) to work
with memory ranges >4GB.
- Some reworks of the pseries CMM (Cooperative Memory Management) driver to
make it behave more like other balloon drivers and enable some cleanups of
generic mm code.
- A series of fixes to our hardware breakpoint support to properly handle
unaligned watchpoint addresses.
Plus a bunch of other smaller improvements, fixes and cleanups.
Thanks to:
Alastair D'Silva, Andrew Donnellan, Aneesh Kumar K.V, Anthony Steinhauser,
Cédric Le Goater, Chris Packham, Chris Smart, Christophe Leroy, Christopher M.
Riedl, Christoph Hellwig, Claudio Carvalho, Daniel Axtens, David Hildenbrand,
Deb McLemore, Diana Craciun, Eric Richter, Geert Uytterhoeven, Greg
Kroah-Hartman, Greg Kurz, Gustavo L. F. Walbon, Hari Bathini, Harish, Jason
Yan, Krzysztof Kozlowski, Leonardo Bras, Mathieu Malaterre, Mauro S. M.
Rodrigues, Michal Suchanek, Mimi Zohar, Nathan Chancellor, Nathan Lynch, Nayna
Jain, Nick Desaulniers, Oliver O'Halloran, Qian Cai, Rasmus Villemoes, Ravi
Bangoria, Sam Bobroff, Santosh Sivaraj, Scott Wood, Thomas Huth, Tyrel
Datwyler, Vaibhav Jain, Valentin Longchamp, YueHaibing.
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Merge tag 'powerpc-5.5-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux
Pull powerpc updates from Michael Ellerman:
"Highlights:
- Infrastructure for secure boot on some bare metal Power9 machines.
The firmware support is still in development, so the code here
won't actually activate secure boot on any existing systems.
- A change to xmon (our crash handler / pseudo-debugger) to restrict
it to read-only mode when the kernel is lockdown'ed, otherwise it's
trivial to drop into xmon and modify kernel data, such as the
lockdown state.
- Support for KASLR on 32-bit BookE machines (Freescale / NXP).
- Fixes for our flush_icache_range() and __kernel_sync_dicache()
(VDSO) to work with memory ranges >4GB.
- Some reworks of the pseries CMM (Cooperative Memory Management)
driver to make it behave more like other balloon drivers and enable
some cleanups of generic mm code.
- A series of fixes to our hardware breakpoint support to properly
handle unaligned watchpoint addresses.
Plus a bunch of other smaller improvements, fixes and cleanups.
Thanks to: Alastair D'Silva, Andrew Donnellan, Aneesh Kumar K.V,
Anthony Steinhauser, Cédric Le Goater, Chris Packham, Chris Smart,
Christophe Leroy, Christopher M. Riedl, Christoph Hellwig, Claudio
Carvalho, Daniel Axtens, David Hildenbrand, Deb McLemore, Diana
Craciun, Eric Richter, Geert Uytterhoeven, Greg Kroah-Hartman, Greg
Kurz, Gustavo L. F. Walbon, Hari Bathini, Harish, Jason Yan, Krzysztof
Kozlowski, Leonardo Bras, Mathieu Malaterre, Mauro S. M. Rodrigues,
Michal Suchanek, Mimi Zohar, Nathan Chancellor, Nathan Lynch, Nayna
Jain, Nick Desaulniers, Oliver O'Halloran, Qian Cai, Rasmus Villemoes,
Ravi Bangoria, Sam Bobroff, Santosh Sivaraj, Scott Wood, Thomas Huth,
Tyrel Datwyler, Vaibhav Jain, Valentin Longchamp, YueHaibing"
* tag 'powerpc-5.5-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux: (144 commits)
powerpc/fixmap: fix crash with HIGHMEM
x86/efi: remove unused variables
powerpc: Define arch_is_kernel_initmem_freed() for lockdep
powerpc/prom_init: Use -ffreestanding to avoid a reference to bcmp
powerpc: Avoid clang warnings around setjmp and longjmp
powerpc: Don't add -mabi= flags when building with Clang
powerpc: Fix Kconfig indentation
powerpc/fixmap: don't clear fixmap area in paging_init()
selftests/powerpc: spectre_v2 test must be built 64-bit
powerpc/powernv: Disable native PCIe port management
powerpc/kexec: Move kexec files into a dedicated subdir.
powerpc/32: Split kexec low level code out of misc_32.S
powerpc/sysdev: drop simple gpio
powerpc/83xx: map IMMR with a BAT.
powerpc/32s: automatically allocate BAT in setbat()
powerpc/ioremap: warn on early use of ioremap()
powerpc: Add support for GENERIC_EARLY_IOREMAP
powerpc/fixmap: Use __fix_to_virt() instead of fix_to_virt()
powerpc/8xx: use the fixmapped IMMR in cpm_reset()
powerpc/8xx: add __init to cpm1 init functions
...
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Merge tag 'notifications-pipe-prep-20191115' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs
Pull pipe rework from David Howells:
"This is my set of preparatory patches for building a general
notification queue on top of pipes. It makes a number of significant
changes:
- It removes the nr_exclusive argument from __wake_up_sync_key() as
this is always 1. This prepares for the next step:
- Adds wake_up_interruptible_sync_poll_locked() so that poll can be
woken up from a function that's holding the poll waitqueue
spinlock.
- Change the pipe buffer ring to be managed in terms of unbounded
head and tail indices rather than bounded index and length. This
means that reading the pipe only needs to modify one index, not
two.
- A selection of helper functions are provided to query the state of
the pipe buffer, plus a couple to apply updates to the pipe
indices.
- The pipe ring is allowed to have kernel-reserved slots. This allows
many notification messages to be spliced in by the kernel without
allowing userspace to pin too many pages if it writes to the same
pipe.
- Advance the head and tail indices inside the pipe waitqueue lock
and use wake_up_interruptible_sync_poll_locked() to poke poll
without having to take the lock twice.
- Rearrange pipe_write() to preallocate the buffer it is going to
write into and then drop the spinlock. This allows kernel
notifications to then be added the ring whilst it is filling the
buffer it allocated. The read side is stalled because the pipe
mutex is still held.
- Don't wake up readers on a pipe if there was already data in it
when we added more.
- Don't wake up writers on a pipe if the ring wasn't full before we
removed a buffer"
* tag 'notifications-pipe-prep-20191115' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
pipe: Remove sync on wake_ups
pipe: Increase the writer-wakeup threshold to reduce context-switch count
pipe: Check for ring full inside of the spinlock in pipe_write()
pipe: Remove redundant wakeup from pipe_write()
pipe: Rearrange sequence in pipe_write() to preallocate slot
pipe: Conditionalise wakeup in pipe_read()
pipe: Advance tail pointer inside of wait spinlock in pipe_read()
pipe: Allow pipes to have kernel-reserved slots
pipe: Use head and tail pointers for the ring, not cursor and length
Add wake_up_interruptible_sync_poll_locked()
Remove the nr_exclusive argument from __wake_up_sync_key()
pipe: Reduce #inclusion of pipe_fs_i.h
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Merge tag 'drm-next-2019-11-27' of git://anongit.freedesktop.org/drm/drm
Pull drm updates from Dave Airlie:
"Lots of stuff in here, though it hasn't been too insane this merge
apart from dealing with the security fun.
uapi:
- export different colorspace properties on DP vs HDMI
- new fourcc for ARM 16x16 block format
- syncobj: allow querying last submitted timeline value
- DRM_FORMAT_BIG_ENDIAN defined as unsigned
core:
- allow using gem vma manager in ttm
- connector/encoder/bridge doc fixes
- allow more than 3 encoders for a connector
- displayport mst suspend/resume reprobing support
- vram lazy unmapping, uniform vram mm and gem vram
- edid cleanups + AVI informframe bar info
- displayport helpers - dpcd parser added
dp_cec:
- Allow a connector to be associated with a cec device
ttm:
- pipelining with no_gpu_wait fix
- always keep BOs on the LRU
sched:
- allow free_job routine to sleep
i915:
- Block userptr from mappable GTT
- i915 perf uapi versioning
- OA stream dynamic reconfiguration
- make context persistence optional
- introduce DRM_I915_UNSTABLE Kconfig
- add fake lmem testing under unstable
- BT.2020 support for DP MSA
- struct mutex elimination
- Tigerlake display/PLL/power management improvements
- Jasper Lake PCH support
- refactor PMU for multiple GPUs
- Icelake firmware update
- Split out vga + switcheroo code
amdgpu:
- implement dma-buf import/export without helpers
- vega20 RAS enablement
- DC i2c over aux fixes
- renoir GPU reset
- DC HDCP support
- BACO support for CI/VI asics
- MSI-X support
- Arcturus EEPROM support
- Arcturus VCN encode support
- VCN dynamic powergating on RV/RV2
amdkfd:
- add navi12/14/renoir support to kfd
radeon:
- SI dpm fix ported from amdgpu
- fix bad DMA on ppc platforms
gma500:
- memory leak fixes
qxl:
- convert to new gem mmap
exynos:
- build warning fix
komeda:
- add aclk sysfs attribute
v3d:
- userspace cleanup uapi change
i810:
- fix for underflow in dispatch ioctls
ast:
- refactor show_cursor
mgag200:
- refactor show_cursor
arcgpu:
- encoder finding improvements
mediatek:
- mipi_tx, dsi and partial crtc support for MT8183 SoC
- rotation support
meson:
- add suspend/resume support
omap:
- misc refactors
tegra:
- DisplayPort support for Tegra 210, 186 and 194.
- IOMMU-backed DMA API fixes
panfrost:
- fix lockdep issue
- simplify devfreq integration
rcar-du:
- R8A774B1 SoC support
- fixes for H2 ES2.0
sun4i:
- vcc-dsi regulator support
virtio-gpu:
- vmexit vs spinlock fix
- move to gem shmem helpers
- handle large command buffers with cma"
* tag 'drm-next-2019-11-27' of git://anongit.freedesktop.org/drm/drm: (1855 commits)
drm/amdgpu: invalidate mmhub semaphore workaround in gmc9/gmc10
drm/amdgpu: initialize vm_inv_eng0_sem for gfxhub and mmhub
drm/amd/amdgpu/sriov skip RLCG s/r list for arcturus VF.
drm/amd/amdgpu/sriov temporarily skip ras,dtm,hdcp for arcturus VF
drm/amdgpu/gfx10: re-init clear state buffer after gpu reset
merge fix for "ftrace: Rework event_create_dir()"
drm/amdgpu: Update Arcturus golden registers
drm/amdgpu/gfx10: fix out-of-bound mqd_backup array access
drm/amdgpu/gfx10: explicitly wait for cp idle after halt/unhalt
Revert "drm/amd/display: enable S/G for RAVEN chip"
drm/amdgpu: disable gfxoff on original raven
drm/amdgpu: remove experimental flag for Navi14
drm/amdgpu: disable gfxoff when using register read interface
drm/amdgpu/powerplay: properly set PP_GFXOFF_MASK (v2)
drm/amdgpu: fix bad DMA from INTERRUPT_CNTL2
drm/radeon: fix bad DMA from INTERRUPT_CNTL2
drm/amd/display: Fix debugfs on MST connectors
drm/amdgpu/nv: add asic func for fetching vbios from rom directly
drm/amdgpu: put flush_delayed_work at first
drm/amdgpu/vcn2.5: fix the enc loop with hw fini
...
Pull networking fixes from David Miller:
"This is mostly to fix the iwlwifi regression:
1) Flush GRO state properly in iwlwifi driver, from Alexander Lobakin.
2) Validate TIPC link name with properly length macro, from John
Rutherford.
3) Fix completion init and device query timeouts in ibmvnic, from
Thomas Falcon.
4) Fix SKB size calculation for netlink messages in psample, from
Nikolay Aleksandrov.
5) Similar kind of fix for OVS flow dumps, from Paolo Abeni.
6) Handle queue allocation failure unwind properly in gve driver, we
could try to release pages we didn't allocate. From Jeroen de
Borst.
7) Serialize TX queue SKB list accesses properly in mscc ocelot
driver. From Yangbo Lu"
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net:
net: usb: aqc111: Use the correct style for SPDX License Identifier
net: phy: Use the correct style for SPDX License Identifier
net: wireless: intel: iwlwifi: fix GRO_NORMAL packet stalling
net: mscc: ocelot: use skb queue instead of skbs list
net: mscc: ocelot: avoid incorrect consuming in skbs list
gve: Fix the queue page list allocated pages count
net: inet_is_local_reserved_port() port arg should be unsigned short
openvswitch: fix flow command message size
net: phy: dp83869: Fix return paths to return proper values
net: psample: fix skb_over_panic
net: usbnet: Fix -Wcast-function-type
net: hso: Fix -Wcast-function-type
net: port < inet_prot_sock(net) --> inet_port_requires_bind_service(net, port)
ibmvnic: Serialize device queries
ibmvnic: Bound waits for device queries
ibmvnic: Terminate waiting device threads after loss of service
ibmvnic: Fix completion structure initialization
net-sctp: replace some sock_net(sk) with just 'net'
net: Fix a documentation bug wrt. ip_unprivileged_port_start
tipc: fix link name length check
Pull RCU updates from Ingo Molnar:
"The main changes in this cycle were:
- Dynamic tick (nohz) updates, perhaps most notably changes to force
the tick on when needed due to lengthy in-kernel execution on CPUs
on which RCU is waiting.
- Linux-kernel memory consistency model updates.
- Replace rcu_swap_protected() with rcu_prepace_pointer().
- Torture-test updates.
- Documentation updates.
- Miscellaneous fixes"
* 'core-rcu-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (51 commits)
security/safesetid: Replace rcu_swap_protected() with rcu_replace_pointer()
net/sched: Replace rcu_swap_protected() with rcu_replace_pointer()
net/netfilter: Replace rcu_swap_protected() with rcu_replace_pointer()
net/core: Replace rcu_swap_protected() with rcu_replace_pointer()
bpf/cgroup: Replace rcu_swap_protected() with rcu_replace_pointer()
fs/afs: Replace rcu_swap_protected() with rcu_replace_pointer()
drivers/scsi: Replace rcu_swap_protected() with rcu_replace_pointer()
drm/i915: Replace rcu_swap_protected() with rcu_replace_pointer()
x86/kvm/pmu: Replace rcu_swap_protected() with rcu_replace_pointer()
rcu: Upgrade rcu_swap_protected() to rcu_replace_pointer()
rcu: Suppress levelspread uninitialized messages
rcu: Fix uninitialized variable in nocb_gp_wait()
rcu: Update descriptions for rcu_future_grace_period tracepoint
rcu: Update descriptions for rcu_nocb_wake tracepoint
rcu: Remove obsolete descriptions for rcu_barrier tracepoint
rcu: Ensure that ->rcu_urgent_qs is set before resched IPI
workqueue: Convert for_each_wq to use built-in list check
rcu: Several rcu_segcblist functions can be static
rcu: Remove unused function hlist_bl_del_init_rcu()
Documentation: Rename rcu_node_context_switch() to rcu_note_context_switch()
...
Pull perf updates from Ingo Molnar:
"The main kernel side changes in this cycle were:
- Various Intel-PT updates and optimizations (Alexander Shishkin)
- Prohibit kprobes on Xen/KVM emulate prefixes (Masami Hiramatsu)
- Add support for LSM and SELinux checks to control access to the
perf syscall (Joel Fernandes)
- Misc other changes, optimizations, fixes and cleanups - see the
shortlog for details.
There were numerous tooling changes as well - 254 non-merge commits.
Here are the main changes - too many to list in detail:
- Enhancements to core tooling infrastructure, perf.data, libperf,
libtraceevent, event parsing, vendor events, Intel PT, callchains,
BPF support and instruction decoding.
- There were updates to the following tools:
perf annotate
perf diff
perf inject
perf kvm
perf list
perf maps
perf parse
perf probe
perf record
perf report
perf script
perf stat
perf test
perf trace
- And a lot of other changes: please see the shortlog and Git log for
more details"
* 'perf-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (279 commits)
perf parse: Fix potential memory leak when handling tracepoint errors
perf probe: Fix spelling mistake "addrees" -> "address"
libtraceevent: Fix memory leakage in copy_filter_type
libtraceevent: Fix header installation
perf intel-bts: Does not support AUX area sampling
perf intel-pt: Add support for decoding AUX area samples
perf intel-pt: Add support for recording AUX area samples
perf pmu: When using default config, record which bits of config were changed by the user
perf auxtrace: Add support for queuing AUX area samples
perf session: Add facility to peek at all events
perf auxtrace: Add support for dumping AUX area samples
perf inject: Cut AUX area samples
perf record: Add aux-sample-size config term
perf record: Add support for AUX area sampling
perf auxtrace: Add support for AUX area sample recording
perf auxtrace: Move perf_evsel__find_pmu()
perf record: Add a function to test for kernel support for AUX area sampling
perf tools: Add kernel AUX area sampling definitions
perf/core: Make the mlock accounting simple again
perf report: Jump to symbol source view from total cycles view
...
Note that the sysctl write accessor functions guarantee that:
net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_prot_sock <= net->ipv4.ip_local_ports.range[0]
invariant is maintained, and as such the max() in selinux hooks is actually spurious.
ie. even though
if (snum < max(inet_prot_sock(sock_net(sk)), low) || snum > high) {
per logic is the same as
if ((snum < inet_prot_sock(sock_net(sk)) && snum < low) || snum > high) {
it is actually functionally equivalent to:
if (snum < low || snum > high) {
which is equivalent to:
if (snum < inet_prot_sock(sock_net(sk)) || snum < low || snum > high) {
even though the first clause is spurious.
But we want to hold on to it in case we ever want to change what what
inet_port_requires_bind_service() means (for example by changing
it from a, by default, [0..1024) range to some sort of set).
Test: builds, git 'grep inet_prot_sock' finds no other references
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
"Another merge window, another pull full of stuff:
1) Support alternative names for network devices, from Jiri Pirko.
2) Introduce per-netns netdev notifiers, also from Jiri Pirko.
3) Support MSG_PEEK in vsock/virtio, from Matias Ezequiel Vara
Larsen.
4) Allow compiling out the TLS TOE code, from Jakub Kicinski.
5) Add several new tracepoints to the kTLS code, also from Jakub.
6) Support set channels ethtool callback in ena driver, from Sameeh
Jubran.
7) New SCTP events SCTP_ADDR_ADDED, SCTP_ADDR_REMOVED,
SCTP_ADDR_MADE_PRIM, and SCTP_SEND_FAILED_EVENT. From Xin Long.
8) Add XDP support to mvneta driver, from Lorenzo Bianconi.
9) Lots of netfilter hw offload fixes, cleanups and enhancements,
from Pablo Neira Ayuso.
10) PTP support for aquantia chips, from Egor Pomozov.
11) Add UDP segmentation offload support to igb, ixgbe, and i40e. From
Josh Hunt.
12) Add smart nagle to tipc, from Jon Maloy.
13) Support L2 field rewrite by TC offloads in bnxt_en, from Venkat
Duvvuru.
14) Add a flow mask cache to OVS, from Tonghao Zhang.
15) Add XDP support to ice driver, from Maciej Fijalkowski.
16) Add AF_XDP support to ice driver, from Krzysztof Kazimierczak.
17) Support UDP GSO offload in atlantic driver, from Igor Russkikh.
18) Support it in stmmac driver too, from Jose Abreu.
19) Support TIPC encryption and auth, from Tuong Lien.
20) Introduce BPF trampolines, from Alexei Starovoitov.
21) Make page_pool API more numa friendly, from Saeed Mahameed.
22) Introduce route hints to ipv4 and ipv6, from Paolo Abeni.
23) Add UDP segmentation offload to cxgb4, Rahul Lakkireddy"
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next: (1857 commits)
libbpf: Fix usage of u32 in userspace code
mm: Implement no-MMU variant of vmalloc_user_node_flags
slip: Fix use-after-free Read in slip_open
net: dsa: sja1105: fix sja1105_parse_rgmii_delays()
macvlan: schedule bc_work even if error
enetc: add support Credit Based Shaper(CBS) for hardware offload
net: phy: add helpers phy_(un)lock_mdio_bus
mdio_bus: don't use managed reset-controller
ax88179_178a: add ethtool_op_get_ts_info()
mlxsw: spectrum_router: Fix use of uninitialized adjacency index
mlxsw: spectrum_router: After underlay moves, demote conflicting tunnels
bpf: Simplify __bpf_arch_text_poke poke type handling
bpf: Introduce BPF_TRACE_x helper for the tracing tests
bpf: Add bpf_jit_blinding_enabled for !CONFIG_BPF_JIT
bpf, testing: Add various tail call test cases
bpf, x86: Emit patchable direct jump as tail call
bpf: Constant map key tracking for prog array pokes
bpf: Add poke dependency tracking for prog array maps
bpf: Add initial poke descriptor table for jit images
bpf: Move owner type, jited info into array auxiliary data
...
In some situations AppArmor needs to be able to use its work buffers
from atomic context. Add the ability to specify when in atomic context
and hold a set of work buffers in reserve for atomic context to
reduce the chance that a large work buffer allocation will need to
be done.
Fixes: df323337e5 ("apparmor: Use a memory pool instead per-CPU caches")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Now that the buffers allocation has changed and no longer needs
the full mediation under an rcu_read_lock, reduce the rcu_read_lock
scope to only where it is necessary.
Fixes: df323337e5 ("apparmor: Use a memory pool instead per-CPU caches")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
The sanity check in macro update_for_len checks to see if len
is less than zero, however, len is a size_t so it can never be
less than zero, so this sanity check is a no-op. Fix this by
making len a ssize_t so the comparison will work and add ulen
that is a size_t copy of len so that the min() macro won't
throw warnings about comparing different types.
Addresses-Coverity: ("Macro compares unsigned to 0")
Fixes: f1bd904175 ("apparmor: add the base fns() for domain labels")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Preparing for a change to the itimer internals, stop using the
do_setitimer() symbol and instead use a new higher-level interface.
The do_getitimer()/do_setitimer functions can now be made static,
allowing the compiler to potentially produce better object code.
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
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Merge v5.4-rc7 into drm-next
We have the i915 security fixes to backmerge, but first
let's clear the decks for other drivers to avoid a bigger
mess.
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
Merge the secureboot support, as well as the IMA changes needed to
support it.
From Nayna's cover letter:
In order to verify the OS kernel on PowerNV systems, secure boot
requires X.509 certificates trusted by the platform. These are
stored in secure variables controlled by OPAL, called OPAL secure
variables. In order to enable users to manage the keys, the secure
variables need to be exposed to userspace.
OPAL provides the runtime services for the kernel to be able to
access the secure variables. This patchset defines the kernel
interface for the OPAL APIs. These APIs are used by the hooks, which
load these variables to the keyring and expose them to the userspace
for reading/writing.
Overall, this patchset adds the following support:
* expose secure variables to the kernel via OPAL Runtime API interface
* expose secure variables to the userspace via kernel sysfs interface
* load kernel verification and revocation keys to .platform and
.blacklist keyring respectively.
The secure variables can be read/written using simple linux
utilities cat/hexdump.
For example:
Path to the secure variables is: /sys/firmware/secvar/vars
Each secure variable is listed as directory.
$ ls -l
total 0
drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 0 Aug 20 21:20 db
drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 0 Aug 20 21:20 KEK
drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 0 Aug 20 21:20 PK
The attributes of each of the secure variables are (for example: PK):
$ ls -l
total 0
-r--r--r--. 1 root root 4096 Oct 1 15:10 data
-r--r--r--. 1 root root 65536 Oct 1 15:10 size
--w-------. 1 root root 4096 Oct 1 15:12 update
The "data" is used to read the existing variable value using
hexdump. The data is stored in ESL format. The "update" is used to
write a new value using cat. The update is to be submitted as AUTH
file.
Fixes gcc '-Wunused-but-set-variable' warning:
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c: In function tpm_unseal:
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c:588:11: warning: variable keyhndl set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
Fixes: 00aa975bd031 ("KEYS: trusted: Create trusted keys subsystem")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: zhengbin <zhengbin13@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Move TPM2 trusted keys code to trusted keys subsystem. The reason
being it's better to consolidate all the trusted keys code to a single
location so that it can be maintained sanely.
Also, utilize existing tpm_send() exported API which wraps the internal
tpm_transmit_cmd() API.
Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Move existing code to trusted keys subsystem. Also, rename files with
"tpm" as suffix which provides the underlying implementation.
Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Switch to utilize common heap based tpm_buf code for TPM based trusted
and asymmetric keys rather than using stack based tpm1_buf code. Also,
remove tpm1_buf code.
Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Move tpm_buf code to common include/linux/tpm.h header so that it can
be reused via other subsystems like trusted keys etc.
Also rename trusted keys and asymmetric keys usage of TPM 1.x buffer
implementation to tpm1_buf to avoid any compilation errors.
Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
The keys used to verify the Host OS kernel are managed by firmware as
secure variables. This patch loads the verification keys into the
.platform keyring and revocation hashes into .blacklist keyring. This
enables verification and loading of the kernels signed by the boot
time keys which are trusted by firmware.
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com>
[mpe: Search by compatible in load_powerpc_certs(), not using format]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1573441836-3632-5-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com
The handlers to add the keys to the .platform keyring and blacklisted
hashes to the .blacklist keyring is common for both the uefi and powerpc
mechanisms of loading the keys/hashes from the firmware.
This patch moves the common code from load_uefi.c to keyring_handler.c
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1573441836-3632-4-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com
Asymmetric private keys are used to sign multiple files. The kernel
currently supports checking against blacklisted keys. However, if the
public key is blacklisted, any file signed by the blacklisted key will
automatically fail signature verification. Blacklisting the public key
is not fine enough granularity, as we might want to only blacklist a
particular file.
This patch adds support for checking against the blacklisted hash of
the file, without the appended signature, based on the IMA policy. It
defines a new policy option "appraise_flag=check_blacklist".
In addition to the blacklisted binary hashes stored in the firmware
"dbx" variable, the Linux kernel may be configured to load blacklisted
binary hashes onto the .blacklist keyring as well. The following
example shows how to blacklist a specific kernel module hash.
$ sha256sum kernel/kheaders.ko
77fa889b35a05338ec52e51591c1b89d4c8d1c99a21251d7c22b1a8642a6bad3
kernel/kheaders.ko
$ grep BLACKLIST .config
CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING=y
CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST="blacklist-hash-list"
$ cat certs/blacklist-hash-list
"bin:77fa889b35a05338ec52e51591c1b89d4c8d1c99a21251d7c22b1a8642a6bad3"
Update the IMA custom measurement and appraisal policy
rules (/etc/ima-policy):
measure func=MODULE_CHECK template=ima-modsig
appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_flag=check_blacklist
appraise_type=imasig|modsig
After building, installing, and rebooting the kernel:
545660333 ---lswrv 0 0 \_ blacklist:
bin:77fa889b35a05338ec52e51591c1b89d4c8d1c99a21251d7c22b1a8642a6bad3
measure func=MODULE_CHECK template=ima-modsig
appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_flag=check_blacklist
appraise_type=imasig|modsig
modprobe: ERROR: could not insert 'kheaders': Permission denied
10 0c9834db5a0182c1fb0cdc5d3adcf11a11fd83dd ima-sig
sha256:3bc6ed4f0b4d6e31bc1dbc9ef844605abc7afdc6d81a57d77a1ec9407997c40
2 /usr/lib/modules/5.4.0-rc3+/kernel/kernel/kheaders.ko
10 82aad2bcc3fa8ed94762356b5c14838f3bcfa6a0 ima-modsig
sha256:3bc6ed4f0b4d6e31bc1dbc9ef844605abc7afdc6d81a57d77a1ec9407997c40
2 /usr/lib/modules/5.4.0rc3+/kernel/kernel/kheaders.ko sha256:77fa889b3
5a05338ec52e51591c1b89d4c8d1c99a21251d7c22b1a8642a6bad3
3082029a06092a864886f70d010702a082028b30820287020101310d300b0609608648
016503040201300b06092a864886f70d01070131820264....
10 25b72217cc1152b44b134ce2cd68f12dfb71acb3 ima-buf
sha256:8b58427fedcf8f4b20bc8dc007f2e232bf7285d7b93a66476321f9c2a3aa132
b blacklisted-hash
77fa889b35a05338ec52e51591c1b89d4c8d1c99a21251d7c22b1a8642a6bad3
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: updated patch description]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1572492694-6520-8-git-send-email-zohar@linux.ibm.com
process_buffer_measurement() is limited to measuring the kexec boot
command line. This patch makes process_buffer_measurement() more
generic, allowing it to measure other types of buffer data (e.g.
blacklisted binary hashes or key hashes).
process_buffer_measurement() may be called directly from an IMA hook
or as an auxiliary measurement record. In both cases the buffer
measurement is based on policy. This patch modifies the function to
conditionally retrieve the policy defined PCR and template for the IMA
hook case.
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: added comment in process_buffer_measurement()]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1572492694-6520-6-git-send-email-zohar@linux.ibm.com
The only slightly tricky merge conflict was the netdevsim because the
mutex locking fix overlapped a lot of driver reload reorganization.
The rest were (relatively) trivial in nature.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The driver exposes EFI runtime services to user-space through an IOCTL
interface, calling the EFI services function pointers directly without
using the efivar API.
Disallow access to the /dev/efi_test character device when the kernel is
locked down to prevent arbitrary user-space to call EFI runtime services.
Also require CAP_SYS_ADMIN to open the chardev to prevent unprivileged
users to call the EFI runtime services, instead of just relying on the
chardev file mode bits for this.
The main user of this driver is the fwts [0] tool that already checks if
the effective user ID is 0 and fails otherwise. So this change shouldn't
cause any regression to this tool.
[0]: https://wiki.ubuntu.com/FirmwareTestSuite/Reference/uefivarinfo
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191029173755.27149-7-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Pull RCU and LKMM changes from Paul E. McKenney:
- Documentation updates.
- Miscellaneous fixes.
- Dynamic tick (nohz) updates, perhaps most notably changes to
force the tick on when needed due to lengthy in-kernel execution
on CPUs on which RCU is waiting.
- Replace rcu_swap_protected() with rcu_prepace_pointer().
- Torture-test updates.
- Linux-kernel memory consistency model updates.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
This commit replaces the use of rcu_swap_protected() with the more
intuitively appealing rcu_replace_pointer() as a step towards removing
rcu_swap_protected().
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wiAsJLw1egFEE=Z7-GGtM6wcvtyytXZA1+BHqta4gg6Hw@mail.gmail.com/
Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Reported-by: Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
[ paulmck: From rcu_replace() to rcu_replace_pointer() per Ingo Molnar. ]
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Xmon should be either fully or partially disabled depending on the
kernel lockdown state.
Put xmon into read-only mode for lockdown=integrity and prevent user
entry into xmon when lockdown=confidentiality. Xmon checks the lockdown
state on every attempted entry:
(1) during early xmon'ing
(2) when triggered via sysrq
(3) when toggled via debugfs
(4) when triggered via a previously enabled breakpoint
The following lockdown state transitions are handled:
(1) lockdown=none -> lockdown=integrity
set xmon read-only mode
(2) lockdown=none -> lockdown=confidentiality
clear all breakpoints, set xmon read-only mode,
prevent user re-entry into xmon
(3) lockdown=integrity -> lockdown=confidentiality
clear all breakpoints, set xmon read-only mode,
prevent user re-entry into xmon
Suggested-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christopher M. Riedl <cmr@informatik.wtf>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190907061124.1947-3-cmr@informatik.wtf
drm-next-5.5-2019-10-09:
amdgpu:
- Additional RAS enablement for vega20
- RAS page retirement and bad page storage in EEPROM
- No GPU reset with unrecoverable RAS errors
- Reserve vram for page tables rather than trying to evict
- Fix issues with GPU reset and xgmi hives
- DC i2c over aux fixes
- Direct submission for clears, PTE/PDE updates
- Improvements to help support recoverable GPU page faults
- Silence harmless SAD block messages
- Clean up code for creating a bo at a fixed location
- Initial DC HDCP support
- Lots of documentation fixes
- GPU reset for renoir
- Add IH clockgating support for soc15 asics
- Powerplay improvements
- DC MST cleanups
- Add support for MSI-X
- Misc cleanups and bug fixes
amdkfd:
- Query KFD device info by asic type rather than pci ids
- Add navi14 support
- Add renoir support
- Add navi12 support
- gfx10 trap handler improvements
- pasid cleanups
- Check against device cgroup
ttm:
- Return -EBUSY with pipelining with no_gpu_wait
radeon:
- Silence harmless SAD block messages
device_cgroup:
- Export devcgroup_check_permission
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
From: Alex Deucher <alexdeucher@gmail.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20191010041713.3412-1-alexander.deucher@amd.com
In current mainline, the degree of access to perf_event_open(2) system
call depends on the perf_event_paranoid sysctl. This has a number of
limitations:
1. The sysctl is only a single value. Many types of accesses are controlled
based on the single value thus making the control very limited and
coarse grained.
2. The sysctl is global, so if the sysctl is changed, then that means
all processes get access to perf_event_open(2) opening the door to
security issues.
This patch adds LSM and SELinux access checking which will be used in
Android to access perf_event_open(2) for the purposes of attaching BPF
programs to tracepoints, perf profiling and other operations from
userspace. These operations are intended for production systems.
5 new LSM hooks are added:
1. perf_event_open: This controls access during the perf_event_open(2)
syscall itself. The hook is called from all the places that the
perf_event_paranoid sysctl is checked to keep it consistent with the
systctl. The hook gets passed a 'type' argument which controls CPU,
kernel and tracepoint accesses (in this context, CPU, kernel and
tracepoint have the same semantics as the perf_event_paranoid sysctl).
Additionally, I added an 'open' type which is similar to
perf_event_paranoid sysctl == 3 patch carried in Android and several other
distros but was rejected in mainline [1] in 2016.
2. perf_event_alloc: This allocates a new security object for the event
which stores the current SID within the event. It will be useful when
the perf event's FD is passed through IPC to another process which may
try to read the FD. Appropriate security checks will limit access.
3. perf_event_free: Called when the event is closed.
4. perf_event_read: Called from the read(2) and mmap(2) syscalls for the event.
5. perf_event_write: Called from the ioctl(2) syscalls for the event.
[1] https://lwn.net/Articles/696240/
Since Peter had suggest LSM hooks in 2016 [1], I am adding his
Suggested-by tag below.
To use this patch, we set the perf_event_paranoid sysctl to -1 and then
apply selinux checking as appropriate (default deny everything, and then
add policy rules to give access to domains that need it). In the future
we can remove the perf_event_paranoid sysctl altogether.
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Co-developed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org
Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: jeffv@google.com
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: primiano@google.com
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: rsavitski@google.com
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191014170308.70668-1-joel@joelfernandes.org
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20191007' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinuxfix from Paul Moore:
"One patch to ensure we don't copy bad memory up into userspace"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20191007' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: fix context string corruption in convert_context()
A policy developer can now specify glblub as a default_range default and
the computed transition will be the intersection of the mls range of
the two contexts.
The glb (greatest lower bound) lub (lowest upper bound) of a range is calculated
as the greater of the low sensitivities and the lower of the high sensitivities
and the and of each category bitmap.
This can be used by MLS solution developers to compute a context that satisfies,
for example, the range of a network interface and the range of a user logging in.
Some examples are:
User Permitted Range | Network Device Label | Computed Label
---------------------|----------------------|----------------
s0-s1:c0.c12 | s0 | s0
s0-s1:c0.c12 | s0-s1:c0.c1023 | s0-s1:c0.c12
s0-s4:c0.c512 | s1-s1:c0.c1023 | s1-s1:c0.c512
s0-s15:c0,c2 | s4-s6:c0.c128 | s4-s6:c0,c2
s0-s4 | s2-s6 | s2-s4
s0-s4 | s5-s8 | INVALID
s5-s8 | s0-s4 | INVALID
Signed-off-by: Joshua Brindle <joshua.brindle@crunchydata.com>
[PM: subject lines and checkpatch.pl fixes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
For AMD compute (amdkfd) driver.
All AMD compute devices are exported via single device node /dev/kfd. As
a result devices cannot be controlled individually using device cgroup.
AMD compute devices will rely on its graphics counterpart that exposes
/dev/dri/renderN node for each device. For each task (based on its
cgroup), KFD driver will check if /dev/dri/renderN node is accessible
before exposing it.
Signed-off-by: Harish Kasiviswanathan <Harish.Kasiviswanathan@amd.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Felix Kuehling <Felix.Kuehling@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
The ima/ and evm/ sub-directories contain built-in objects, so
obj-$(CONFIG_...) is the correct way to descend into them.
subdir-$(CONFIG_...) is redundant.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
I guess commit 15ea0e1e3e ("efi: Import certificates from UEFI Secure
Boot") attempted to add -fshort-wchar for building load_uefi.o, but it
has never worked as intended.
load_uefi.o is created in the platform_certs/ sub-directory. If you
really want to add -fshort-wchar, the correct code is:
$(obj)/platform_certs/load_uefi.o: KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fshort-wchar
But, you do not need to fix it.
Commit 8c97023cf0 ("Kbuild: use -fshort-wchar globally") had already
added -fshort-wchar globally. This code was unneeded in the first place.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
string_to_context_struct() may garble the context string, so we need to
copy back the contents again from the old context struct to avoid
storing the corrupted context.
Since string_to_context_struct() tokenizes (and therefore truncates) the
context string and we are later potentially copying it with kstrdup(),
this may eventually cause pieces of uninitialized kernel memory to be
disclosed to userspace (when copying to userspace based on the stored
length and not the null character).
How to reproduce on Fedora and similar:
# dnf install -y memcached
# systemctl start memcached
# semodule -d memcached
# load_policy
# load_policy
# systemctl stop memcached
# ausearch -m AVC
type=AVC msg=audit(1570090572.648:313): avc: denied { signal } for pid=1 comm="systemd" scontext=system_u:system_r:init_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 tclass=process permissive=0 trawcon=73797374656D5F75007400000000000070BE6E847296FFFF726F6D000096FFFF76
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Milos Malik <mmalik@redhat.com>
Fixes: ee1a84fdfe ("selinux: overhaul sidtab to fix bug and improve performance")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Add two commands to add and delete list of link properties. Implement
the first property type along - alternative ifnames.
Each net device can have multiple alternative names.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Currently, the SELinux LSM prevents one from setting the
`security.selinux` xattr on an inode without a policy first being
loaded. However, this restriction is problematic: it makes it impossible
to have newly created files with the correct label before actually
loading the policy.
This is relevant in distributions like Fedora, where the policy is
loaded by systemd shortly after pivoting out of the initrd. In such
instances, all files created prior to pivoting will be unlabeled. One
then has to relabel them after pivoting, an operation which inherently
races with other processes trying to access those same files.
Going further, there are use cases for creating the entire root
filesystem on first boot from the initrd (e.g. Container Linux supports
this today[1], and we'd like to support it in Fedora CoreOS as well[2]).
One can imagine doing this in two ways: at the block device level (e.g.
laying down a disk image), or at the filesystem level. In the former,
labeling can simply be part of the image. But even in the latter
scenario, one still really wants to be able to set the right labels when
populating the new filesystem.
This patch enables this by changing behaviour in the following two ways:
1. allow `setxattr` if we're not initialized
2. don't try to set the in-core inode SID if we're not initialized;
instead leave it as `LABEL_INVALID` so that revalidation may be
attempted at a later time
Note the first hunk of this patch is mostly the same as a previously
discussed one[3], though it was part of a larger series which wasn't
accepted.
[1] https://coreos.com/os/docs/latest/root-filesystem-placement.html
[2] https://github.com/coreos/fedora-coreos-tracker/issues/94
[3] https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-initramfs/msg04593.html
Co-developed-by: Victor Kamensky <kamensky@cisco.com>
Signed-off-by: Victor Kamensky <kamensky@cisco.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Lebon <jlebon@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Load size was limited to 64MB, this was legacy limitation due to vmalloc()
which was removed a while ago.
Signed-off-by: zhanglin <zhang.lin16@zte.com.cn>
[PM: removed comments in the description about 'real world use cases']
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Pull kernel lockdown mode from James Morris:
"This is the latest iteration of the kernel lockdown patchset, from
Matthew Garrett, David Howells and others.
From the original description:
This patchset introduces an optional kernel lockdown feature,
intended to strengthen the boundary between UID 0 and the kernel.
When enabled, various pieces of kernel functionality are restricted.
Applications that rely on low-level access to either hardware or the
kernel may cease working as a result - therefore this should not be
enabled without appropriate evaluation beforehand.
The majority of mainstream distributions have been carrying variants
of this patchset for many years now, so there's value in providing a
doesn't meet every distribution requirement, but gets us much closer
to not requiring external patches.
There are two major changes since this was last proposed for mainline:
- Separating lockdown from EFI secure boot. Background discussion is
covered here: https://lwn.net/Articles/751061/
- Implementation as an LSM, with a default stackable lockdown LSM
module. This allows the lockdown feature to be policy-driven,
rather than encoding an implicit policy within the mechanism.
The new locked_down LSM hook is provided to allow LSMs to make a
policy decision around whether kernel functionality that would allow
tampering with or examining the runtime state of the kernel should be
permitted.
The included lockdown LSM provides an implementation with a simple
policy intended for general purpose use. This policy provides a coarse
level of granularity, controllable via the kernel command line:
lockdown={integrity|confidentiality}
Enable the kernel lockdown feature. If set to integrity, kernel features
that allow userland to modify the running kernel are disabled. If set to
confidentiality, kernel features that allow userland to extract
confidential information from the kernel are also disabled.
This may also be controlled via /sys/kernel/security/lockdown and
overriden by kernel configuration.
New or existing LSMs may implement finer-grained controls of the
lockdown features. Refer to the lockdown_reason documentation in
include/linux/security.h for details.
The lockdown feature has had signficant design feedback and review
across many subsystems. This code has been in linux-next for some
weeks, with a few fixes applied along the way.
Stephen Rothwell noted that commit 9d1f8be5cf ("bpf: Restrict bpf
when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode") is missing a
Signed-off-by from its author. Matthew responded that he is providing
this under category (c) of the DCO"
* 'next-lockdown' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (31 commits)
kexec: Fix file verification on S390
security: constify some arrays in lockdown LSM
lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages
efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load when the kernel is locked down
tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down
debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down
kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down
lockdown: Lock down perf when in confidentiality mode
bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode
lockdown: Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode
lockdown: Lock down /proc/kcore
x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module
lockdown: Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)
lockdown: Lock down TIOCSSERIAL
lockdown: Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down
acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down
acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down
ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down
x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down
x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down
...
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
"The major feature in this time is IMA support for measuring and
appraising appended file signatures. In addition are a couple of bug
fixes and code cleanup to use struct_size().
In addition to the PE/COFF and IMA xattr signatures, the kexec kernel
image may be signed with an appended signature, using the same
scripts/sign-file tool that is used to sign kernel modules.
Similarly, the initramfs may contain an appended signature.
This contained a lot of refactoring of the existing appended signature
verification code, so that IMA could retain the existing framework of
calculating the file hash once, storing it in the IMA measurement list
and extending the TPM, verifying the file's integrity based on a file
hash or signature (eg. xattrs), and adding an audit record containing
the file hash, all based on policy. (The IMA support for appended
signatures patch set was posted and reviewed 11 times.)
The support for appended signature paves the way for adding other
signature verification methods, such as fs-verity, based on a single
system-wide policy. The file hash used for verifying the signature and
the signature, itself, can be included in the IMA measurement list"
* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
ima: ima_api: Use struct_size() in kzalloc()
ima: use struct_size() in kzalloc()
sefltest/ima: support appended signatures (modsig)
ima: Fix use after free in ima_read_modsig()
MODSIGN: make new include file self contained
ima: fix freeing ongoing ahash_request
ima: always return negative code for error
ima: Store the measurement again when appraising a modsig
ima: Define ima-modsig template
ima: Collect modsig
ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures
ima: Factor xattr_verify() out of ima_appraise_measurement()
ima: Add modsig appraise_type option for module-style appended signatures
integrity: Select CONFIG_KEYS instead of depending on it
PKCS#7: Introduce pkcs7_get_digest()
PKCS#7: Refactor verify_pkcs7_signature()
MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions
ima: initialize the "template" field with the default template
Commit 0b6cf6b97b ("tpm: pass an array of tpm_extend_digest structures to
tpm_pcr_extend()") modifies tpm_pcr_extend() to accept a digest for each
PCR bank. After modification, tpm_pcr_extend() expects that digests are
passed in the same order as the algorithms set in chip->allocated_banks.
This patch fixes two issues introduced in the last iterations of the patch
set: missing initialization of the TPM algorithm ID in the tpm_digest
structures passed to tpm_pcr_extend() by the trusted key module, and
unreleased locks in the TPM driver due to returning from tpm_pcr_extend()
without calling tpm_put_ops().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 0b6cf6b97b ("tpm: pass an array of tpm_extend_digest structures to tpm_pcr_extend()")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
response to mechanically detected potential issues. The remaining
patch cleans up kernel-doc notations.
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Merge tag 'smack-for-5.4-rc1' of git://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next
Pull smack updates from Casey Schaufler:
"Four patches for v5.4. Nothing is major.
All but one are in response to mechanically detected potential issues.
The remaining patch cleans up kernel-doc notations"
* tag 'smack-for-5.4-rc1' of git://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next:
smack: use GFP_NOFS while holding inode_smack::smk_lock
security: smack: Fix possible null-pointer dereferences in smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb()
smack: fix some kernel-doc notations
Smack: Don't ignore other bprm->unsafe flags if LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE is set
Pull SafeSetID fix from Micah Morton:
"Jann Horn sent some patches to fix some bugs in SafeSetID for 5.3.
After he had done his testing there were a couple small code tweaks
that went in and caused this bug.
From what I can see SafeSetID is broken in 5.3 and crashes the kernel
every time during initialization if you try to use it. I came across
this bug when backporting Jann's changes for 5.3 to older kernels
(4.14 and 4.19). I've tested on a Chrome OS device with those kernels
and verified that this change fixes things.
It doesn't seem super useful to have this bake in linux-next, since it
is completely broken in 5.3 and nobody noticed"
* tag 'safesetid-bugfix-5.4' of git://github.com/micah-morton/linux:
LSM: SafeSetID: Stop releasing uninitialized ruleset
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20190917' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
- Add LSM hooks, and SELinux access control hooks, for dnotify,
fanotify, and inotify watches. This has been discussed with both the
LSM and fs/notify folks and everybody is good with these new hooks.
- The LSM stacking changes missed a few calls to current_security() in
the SELinux code; we fix those and remove current_security() for
good.
- Improve our network object labeling cache so that we always return
the object's label, even when under memory pressure. Previously we
would return an error if we couldn't allocate a new cache entry, now
we always return the label even if we can't create a new cache entry
for it.
- Convert the sidtab atomic_t counter to a normal u32 with
READ/WRITE_ONCE() and memory barrier protection.
- A few patches to policydb.c to clean things up (remove forward
declarations, long lines, bad variable names, etc)
* tag 'selinux-pr-20190917' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
lsm: remove current_security()
selinux: fix residual uses of current_security() for the SELinux blob
selinux: avoid atomic_t usage in sidtab
fanotify, inotify, dnotify, security: add security hook for fs notifications
selinux: always return a secid from the network caches if we find one
selinux: policydb - rename type_val_to_struct_array
selinux: policydb - fix some checkpatch.pl warnings
selinux: shuffle around policydb.c to get rid of forward declarations
The first time a rule set is configured for SafeSetID, we shouldn't be
trying to release the previously configured ruleset, since there isn't
one. Currently, the pointer that would point to a previously configured
ruleset is uninitialized on first rule set configuration, leading to a
crash when we try to call release_ruleset with that pointer.
Acked-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
No reason for these not to be const.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Suggested-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
If a request_key authentication token key gets revoked, there's a window in
which request_key_auth_describe() can see it with a NULL payload - but it
makes no check for this and something like the following oops may occur:
BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0x00000038
Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000004ddf30
Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
...
NIP [...] request_key_auth_describe+0x90/0xd0
LR [...] request_key_auth_describe+0x54/0xd0
Call Trace:
[...] request_key_auth_describe+0x54/0xd0 (unreliable)
[...] proc_keys_show+0x308/0x4c0
[...] seq_read+0x3d0/0x540
[...] proc_reg_read+0x90/0x110
[...] __vfs_read+0x3c/0x70
[...] vfs_read+0xb4/0x1b0
[...] ksys_read+0x7c/0x130
[...] system_call+0x5c/0x70
Fix this by checking for a NULL pointer when describing such a key.
Also make the read routine check for a NULL pointer to be on the safe side.
[DH: Modified to not take already-held rcu lock and modified to also check
in the read routine]
Fixes: 04c567d931 ("[PATCH] Keys: Fix race between two instantiators of a key")
Reported-by: Sachin Sant <sachinp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Sachin Sant <sachinp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
We need to use selinux_cred() to fetch the SELinux cred blob instead
of directly using current->security or current_security(). There
were a couple of lingering uses of current_security() in the SELinux code
that were apparently missed during the earlier conversions. IIUC, this
would only manifest as a bug if multiple security modules including
SELinux are enabled and SELinux is not first in the lsm order. After
this change, there appear to be no other users of current_security()
in-tree; perhaps we should remove it altogether.
Fixes: bbd3662a83 ("Infrastructure management of the cred security blob")
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
inode_smack::smk_lock is taken during smack_d_instantiate(), which is
called during a filesystem transaction when creating a file on ext4.
Therefore to avoid a deadlock, all code that takes this lock must use
GFP_NOFS, to prevent memory reclaim from waiting for the filesystem
transaction to complete.
Reported-by: syzbot+0eefc1e06a77d327a056@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
In smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(), there is an if statement
on line 3920 to check whether skb is NULL:
if (skb && skb->secmark != 0)
This check indicates skb can be NULL in some cases.
But on lines 3931 and 3932, skb is used:
ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
ipv6_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
Thus, possible null-pointer dereferences may occur when skb is NULL.
To fix these possible bugs, an if statement is added to check skb.
These bugs are found by a static analysis tool STCheck written by us.
Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
There is a logic bug in the current smack_bprm_set_creds():
If LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE is set, but the ptrace state is deemed to be
acceptable (e.g. because the ptracer detached in the meantime), the other
->unsafe flags aren't checked. As far as I can tell, this means that
something like the following could work (but I haven't tested it):
- task A: create task B with fork()
- task B: set NO_NEW_PRIVS
- task B: install a seccomp filter that makes open() return 0 under some
conditions
- task B: replace fd 0 with a malicious library
- task A: attach to task B with PTRACE_ATTACH
- task B: execve() a file with an SMACK64EXEC extended attribute
- task A: while task B is still in the middle of execve(), exit (which
destroys the ptrace relationship)
Make sure that if any flags other than LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE are set in
bprm->unsafe, we reject the execve().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5663884caa ("Smack: unify all ptrace accesses in the smack")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
If check_cached_key() returns a non-NULL value, we still need to call
key_type::match_free() to undo key_type::match_preparse().
Fixes: 7743c48e54 ("keys: Cache result of request_key*() temporarily in task_struct")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
One of the more common cases of allocation size calculations is finding
the size of a structure that has a zero-sized array at the end, along
with memory for some number of elements for that array. For example:
struct ima_template_entry {
...
struct ima_field_data template_data[0]; /* template related data */
};
instance = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ima_template_entry) + count * sizeof(struct ima_field_data), GFP_NOFS);
Instead of leaving these open-coded and prone to type mistakes, we can
now use the new struct_size() helper:
instance = kzalloc(struct_size(instance, entry, count), GFP_NOFS);
This code was detected with the help of Coccinelle.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
One of the more common cases of allocation size calculations is finding
the size of a structure that has a zero-sized array at the end, along
with memory for some number of elements for that array. For example:
struct foo {
int stuff;
struct boo entry[];
};
instance = kzalloc(sizeof(struct foo) + count * sizeof(struct boo), GFP_KERNEL);
Instead of leaving these open-coded and prone to type mistakes, we can
now use the new struct_size() helper:
instance = kzalloc(struct_size(instance, entry, count), GFP_KERNEL);
This code was detected with the help of Coccinelle.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
If we can't parse the PKCS7 in the appended modsig, we will free the modsig
structure and then access one of its members to determine the error value.
Fixes: 39b0709636 ("ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures")
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Reported-by: Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@lip6.fr>
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
As noted in Documentation/atomic_t.txt, if we don't need the RMW atomic
operations, we should only use READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() +
smp_rmb()/smp_wmb() where necessary (or the combined variants
smp_load_acquire()/smp_store_release()).
This patch converts the sidtab code to use regular u32 for the counter
and reverse lookup cache and use the appropriate operations instead of
atomic_get()/atomic_set(). Note that when reading/updating the reverse
lookup cache we don't need memory barriers as it doesn't need to be
consistent or accurate. We can now also replace some atomic ops with
regular loads (when under spinlock) and stores (for conversion target
fields that are always accessed under the master table's spinlock).
We can now also bump SIDTAB_MAX to U32_MAX as we can use the full u32
range again.
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Print the content of current->comm in messages generated by lockdown to
indicate a restriction that was hit. This makes it a bit easier to find
out what caused the message.
The message now patterned something like:
Lockdown: <comm>: <what> is restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Tracefs may release more information about the kernel than desirable, so
restrict it when the kernel is locked down in confidentiality mode by
preventing open().
(Fixed by Ben Hutchings to avoid a null dereference in
default_file_open())
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Disallow opening of debugfs files that might be used to muck around when
the kernel is locked down as various drivers give raw access to hardware
through debugfs. Given the effort of auditing all 2000 or so files and
manually fixing each one as necessary, I've chosen to apply a heuristic
instead. The following changes are made:
(1) chmod and chown are disallowed on debugfs objects (though the root dir
can be modified by mount and remount, but I'm not worried about that).
(2) When the kernel is locked down, only files with the following criteria
are permitted to be opened:
- The file must have mode 00444
- The file must not have ioctl methods
- The file must not have mmap
(3) When the kernel is locked down, files may only be opened for reading.
Normal device interaction should be done through configfs, sysfs or a
miscdev, not debugfs.
Note that this makes it unnecessary to specifically lock down show_dsts(),
show_devs() and show_call() in the asus-wmi driver.
I would actually prefer to lock down all files by default and have the
the files unlocked by the creator. This is tricky to manage correctly,
though, as there are 19 creation functions and ~1600 call sites (some of
them in loops scanning tables).
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com>
cc: acpi4asus-user@lists.sourceforge.net
cc: platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org
cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Systems in lockdown mode should block the kexec of untrusted kernels.
For x86 and ARM we can ensure that a kernel is trustworthy by validating
a PE signature, but this isn't possible on other architectures. On those
platforms we can use IMA digital signatures instead. Add a function to
determine whether IMA has or will verify signatures for a given event type,
and if so permit kexec_file() even if the kernel is otherwise locked down.
This is restricted to cases where CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING is set
in order to prevent an attacker from loading additional keys at runtime.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Disallow the use of certain perf facilities that might allow userspace to
access kernel data.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
bpf_read() and bpf_read_str() could potentially be abused to (eg) allow
private keys in kernel memory to be leaked. Disable them if the kernel
has been locked down in confidentiality mode.
Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
cc: Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@suse.com>
cc: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Disallow the creation of perf and ftrace kprobes when the kernel is
locked down in confidentiality mode by preventing their registration.
This prevents kprobes from being used to access kernel memory to steal
crypto data, but continues to allow the use of kprobes from signed
modules.
Reported-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com>
Cc: davem@davemloft.net
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Disallow access to /proc/kcore when the kernel is locked down to prevent
access to cryptographic data. This is limited to lockdown
confidentiality mode and is still permitted in integrity mode.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The testmmiotrace module shouldn't be permitted when the kernel is locked
down as it can be used to arbitrarily read and write MMIO space. This is
a runtime check rather than buildtime in order to allow configurations
where the same kernel may be run in both locked down or permissive modes
depending on local policy.
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
cc: x86@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Provided an annotation for module parameters that specify hardware
parameters (such as io ports, iomem addresses, irqs, dma channels, fixed
dma buffers and other types).
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Lock down TIOCSSERIAL as that can be used to change the ioport and irq
settings on a serial port. This only appears to be an issue for the serial
drivers that use the core serial code. All other drivers seem to either
ignore attempts to change port/irq or give an error.
Reported-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.com>
Cc: linux-serial@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Prohibit replacement of the PCMCIA Card Information Structure when the
kernel is locked down.
Suggested-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
custom_method effectively allows arbitrary access to system memory, making
it possible for an attacker to circumvent restrictions on module loading.
Disable it if the kernel is locked down.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Writing to MSRs should not be allowed if the kernel is locked down, since
it could lead to execution of arbitrary code in kernel mode. Based on a
patch by Kees Cook.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
cc: x86@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
IO port access would permit users to gain access to PCI configuration
registers, which in turn (on a lot of hardware) give access to MMIO
register space. This would potentially permit root to trigger arbitrary
DMA, so lock it down by default.
This also implicitly locks down the KDADDIO, KDDELIO, KDENABIO and
KDDISABIO console ioctls.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
cc: x86@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down in
order to avoid it being possible for an attacker to modify kernel code,
allowing them to circumvent disabled module loading or module signing.
Default to paranoid - in future we can potentially relax this for
sufficiently IOMMU-isolated devices.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
cc: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
There is currently no way to verify the resume image when returning
from hibernate. This might compromise the signed modules trust model,
so until we can work with signed hibernate images we disable it when the
kernel is locked down.
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: rjw@rjwysocki.net
Cc: pavel@ucw.cz
cc: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This is a preparatory patch for kexec_file_load() lockdown. A locked down
kernel needs to prevent unsigned kernel images from being loaded with
kexec_file_load(). Currently, the only way to force the signature
verification is compiling with KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG. This prevents loading
usigned images even when the kernel is not locked down at runtime.
This patch splits KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE.
Analogous to the MODULE_SIG and MODULE_SIG_FORCE for modules, KEXEC_SIG
turns on the signature verification but allows unsigned images to be
loaded. KEXEC_SIG_FORCE disallows images without a valid signature.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The kexec_load() syscall permits the loading and execution of arbitrary
code in ring 0, which is something that lock-down is meant to prevent. It
makes sense to disable kexec_load() in this situation.
This does not affect kexec_file_load() syscall which can check for a
signature on the image to be booted.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Acked-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Allowing users to read and write to core kernel memory makes it possible
for the kernel to be subverted, avoiding module loading restrictions, and
also to steal cryptographic information.
Disallow /dev/mem and /dev/kmem from being opened this when the kernel has
been locked down to prevent this.
Also disallow /dev/port from being opened to prevent raw ioport access and
thus DMA from being used to accomplish the same thing.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
If the kernel is locked down, require that all modules have valid
signatures that we can verify.
I have adjusted the errors generated:
(1) If there's no signature (ENODATA) or we can't check it (ENOPKG,
ENOKEY), then:
(a) If signatures are enforced then EKEYREJECTED is returned.
(b) If there's no signature or we can't check it, but the kernel is
locked down then EPERM is returned (this is then consistent with
other lockdown cases).
(2) If the signature is unparseable (EBADMSG, EINVAL), the signature fails
the check (EKEYREJECTED) or a system error occurs (eg. ENOMEM), we
return the error we got.
Note that the X.509 code doesn't check for key expiry as the RTC might not
be valid or might not have been transferred to the kernel's clock yet.
[Modified by Matthew Garrett to remove the IMA integration. This will
be replaced with integration with the IMA architecture policy
patchset.]
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
While existing LSMs can be extended to handle lockdown policy,
distributions generally want to be able to apply a straightforward
static policy. This patch adds a simple LSM that can be configured to
reject either integrity or all lockdown queries, and can be configured
at runtime (through securityfs), boot time (via a kernel parameter) or
build time (via a kconfig option). Based on initial code by David
Howells.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Add a mechanism to allow LSMs to make a policy decision around whether
kernel functionality that would allow tampering with or examining the
runtime state of the kernel should be permitted.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The lockdown module is intended to allow for kernels to be locked down
early in boot - sufficiently early that we don't have the ability to
kmalloc() yet. Add support for early initialisation of some LSMs, and
then add them to the list of names when we do full initialisation later.
Early LSMs are initialised in link order and cannot be overridden via
boot parameters, and cannot make use of kmalloc() (since the allocator
isn't initialised yet).
(Fixed by Stephen Rothwell to include a stub to fix builds when
!CONFIG_SECURITY)
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Commit c78719203f ("KEYS: trusted: allow trusted.ko to initialize w/o a
TPM") allows the trusted module to be loaded even if a TPM is not found, to
avoid module dependency problems.
However, trusted module initialization can still fail if the TPM is
inactive or deactivated. tpm_get_random() returns an error.
This patch removes the call to tpm_get_random() and instead extends the PCR
specified by the user with zeros. The security of this alternative is
equivalent to the previous one, as either option prevents with a PCR update
unsealing and misuse of sealed data by a user space process.
Even if a PCR is extended with zeros, instead of random data, it is still
computationally infeasible to find a value as input for a new PCR extend
operation, to obtain again the PCR value that would allow unsealing.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 240730437d ("KEYS: trusted: explicitly use tpm_chip structure...")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
As of now, setting watches on filesystem objects has, at most, applied a
check for read access to the inode, and in the case of fanotify, requires
CAP_SYS_ADMIN. No specific security hook or permission check has been
provided to control the setting of watches. Using any of inotify, dnotify,
or fanotify, it is possible to observe, not only write-like operations, but
even read access to a file. Modeling the watch as being merely a read from
the file is insufficient for the needs of SELinux. This is due to the fact
that read access should not necessarily imply access to information about
when another process reads from a file. Furthermore, fanotify watches grant
more power to an application in the form of permission events. While
notification events are solely, unidirectional (i.e. they only pass
information to the receiving application), permission events are blocking.
Permission events make a request to the receiving application which will
then reply with a decision as to whether or not that action may be
completed. This causes the issue of the watching application having the
ability to exercise control over the triggering process. Without drawing a
distinction within the permission check, the ability to read would imply
the greater ability to control an application. Additionally, mount and
superblock watches apply to all files within the same mount or superblock.
Read access to one file should not necessarily imply the ability to watch
all files accessed within a given mount or superblock.
In order to solve these issues, a new LSM hook is implemented and has been
placed within the system calls for marking filesystem objects with inotify,
fanotify, and dnotify watches. These calls to the hook are placed at the
point at which the target path has been resolved and are provided with the
path struct, the mask of requested notification events, and the type of
object on which the mark is being set (inode, superblock, or mount). The
mask and obj_type have already been translated into common FS_* values
shared by the entirety of the fs notification infrastructure. The path
struct is passed rather than just the inode so that the mount is available,
particularly for mount watches. This also allows for use of the hook by
pathname-based security modules. However, since the hook is intended for
use even by inode based security modules, it is not placed under the
CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH conditional. Otherwise, the inode-based security
modules would need to enable all of the path hooks, even though they do not
use any of them.
This only provides a hook at the point of setting a watch, and presumes
that permission to set a particular watch implies the ability to receive
all notification about that object which match the mask. This is all that
is required for SELinux. If other security modules require additional hooks
or infrastructure to control delivery of notification, these can be added
by them. It does not make sense for us to propose hooks for which we have
no implementation. The understanding that all notifications received by the
requesting application are all strictly of a type for which the application
has been granted permission shows that this implementation is sufficient in
its coverage.
Security modules wishing to provide complete control over fanotify must
also implement a security_file_open hook that validates that the access
requested by the watching application is authorized. Fanotify has the issue
that it returns a file descriptor with the file mode specified during
fanotify_init() to the watching process on event. This is already covered
by the LSM security_file_open hook if the security module implements
checking of the requested file mode there. Otherwise, a watching process
can obtain escalated access to a file for which it has not been authorized.
The selinux_path_notify hook implementation works by adding five new file
permissions: watch, watch_mount, watch_sb, watch_reads, and watch_with_perm
(descriptions about which will follow), and one new filesystem permission:
watch (which is applied to superblock checks). The hook then decides which
subset of these permissions must be held by the requesting application
based on the contents of the provided mask and the obj_type. The
selinux_file_open hook already checks the requested file mode and therefore
ensures that a watching process cannot escalate its access through
fanotify.
The watch, watch_mount, and watch_sb permissions are the baseline
permissions for setting a watch on an object and each are a requirement for
any watch to be set on a file, mount, or superblock respectively. It should
be noted that having either of the other two permissions (watch_reads and
watch_with_perm) does not imply the watch, watch_mount, or watch_sb
permission. Superblock watches further require the filesystem watch
permission to the superblock. As there is no labeled object in view for
mounts, there is no specific check for mount watches beyond watch_mount to
the inode. Such a check could be added in the future, if a suitable labeled
object existed representing the mount.
The watch_reads permission is required to receive notifications from
read-exclusive events on filesystem objects. These events include accessing
a file for the purpose of reading and closing a file which has been opened
read-only. This distinction has been drawn in order to provide a direct
indication in the policy for this otherwise not obvious capability. Read
access to a file should not necessarily imply the ability to observe read
events on a file.
Finally, watch_with_perm only applies to fanotify masks since it is the
only way to set a mask which allows for the blocking, permission event.
This permission is needed for any watch which is of this type. Though
fanotify requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN, this is insufficient as it gives implicit
trust to root, which we do not do, and does not support least privilege.
Signed-off-by: Aaron Goidel <acgoide@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
integrity_kernel_read() can fail in which case we forward to call
ahash_request_free() on a currently running request. We have to wait
for its completion before we can free the request.
This was observed by interrupting a "find / -type f -xdev -print0 | xargs -0
cat 1>/dev/null" with ctrl-c on an IMA enabled filesystem.
Signed-off-by: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
integrity_kernel_read() returns the number of bytes read. If this is
a short read then this positive value is returned from
ima_calc_file_hash_atfm(). Currently this is only indirectly called from
ima_calc_file_hash() and this function only tests for the return value
being zero or nonzero and also doesn't forward the return value.
Nevertheless there's no point in returning a positive value as an error,
so translate a short read into -EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
If the IMA template contains the "modsig" or "d-modsig" field, then the
modsig should be added to the measurement list when the file is appraised.
And that is what normally happens, but if a measurement rule caused a file
containing a modsig to be measured before a different rule causes it to be
appraised, the resulting measurement entry will not contain the modsig
because it is only fetched during appraisal. When the appraisal rule
triggers, it won't store a new measurement containing the modsig because
the file was already measured.
We need to detect that situation and store an additional measurement with
the modsig. This is done by adding an IMA_MEASURE action flag if we read a
modsig and the IMA template contains a modsig field.
Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Define new "d-modsig" template field which holds the digest that is
expected to match the one contained in the modsig, and also new "modsig"
template field which holds the appended file signature.
Add a new "ima-modsig" defined template descriptor with the new fields as
well as the ones from the "ima-sig" descriptor.
Change ima_store_measurement() to accept a struct modsig * argument so that
it can be passed along to the templates via struct ima_event_data.
Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Obtain the modsig and calculate its corresponding hash in
ima_collect_measurement().
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Implement the appraise_type=imasig|modsig option, allowing IMA to read and
verify modsig signatures.
In case a file has both an xattr signature and an appended modsig, IMA will
only use the appended signature if the key used by the xattr signature
isn't present in the IMA or platform keyring.
Because modsig verification needs to convert from an integrity keyring id
to the keyring itself, add an integrity_keyring_from_id() function in
digsig.c so that integrity_modsig_verify() can use it.
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Verify xattr signature in a separate function so that the logic in
ima_appraise_measurement() remains clear when it gains the ability to also
verify an appended module signature.
The code in the switch statement is unchanged except for having to
dereference the status and cause variables (since they're now pointers),
and fixing the style of a block comment to appease checkpatch.
Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Introduce the modsig keyword to the IMA policy syntax to specify that
a given hook should expect the file to have the IMA signature appended
to it. Here is how it can be used in a rule:
appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig
With this rule, IMA will accept either a signature stored in the extended
attribute or an appended signature.
For now, the rule above will behave exactly the same as if
appraise_type=imasig was specified. The actual modsig implementation
will be introduced separately.
Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
This avoids a dependency cycle in soon-to-be-introduced
CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG: it will select CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
which in turn selects CONFIG_KEYS. Kconfig then complains that
CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE depends on CONFIG_KEYS.
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Previously if we couldn't find an entry in the cache and we failed to
allocate memory for a new cache entry we would fail the network object
label lookup; this is obviously not ideal. This patch fixes this so
that we return the object label even if we can't cache the object at
this point in time due to memory pressure.
The GitHub issue tracker is below:
* https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/3
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The name is overly long and inconsistent with the other *_val_to_struct
members. Dropping the "_array" prefix makes the code easier to read and
gets rid of one line over 80 characters warning.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Fix most of the code style warnings discovered when moving code around.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
No code changes, but move a lot of the policydb destructors higher up
so we can get rid of a forward declaration.
This patch does expose a few old checkpatch.pl errors, but those will
be dealt with in a separate (set of) patches.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20190801' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux fix from Paul Moore:
"One more small fix for a potential memory leak in an error path"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20190801' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: fix memory leak in policydb_init()
IMA policy rules are walked sequentially. Depending on the ordering of
the policy rules, the "template" field might be defined in one rule, but
will be replaced by subsequent, applicable rules, even if the rule does
not explicitly define the "template" field.
This patch initializes the "template" once and only replaces the
"template", when explicitly defined.
Fixes: 19453ce0bc ("IMA: support for per policy rule template formats")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Since roles_init() adds some entries to the role hash table, we need to
destroy also its keys/values on error, otherwise we get a memory leak in
the error path.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: syzbot+fee3a14d4cdf92646287@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
- Disable gcc-based stack variable auto-init under KASAN (Arnd Bergmann)
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Merge tag 'meminit-v5.3-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull structleak fix from Kees Cook:
"Disable gcc-based stack variable auto-init under KASAN (Arnd
Bergmann).
This fixes a bunch of build warnings under KASAN and the
gcc-plugin-based stack auto-initialization features (which are
arguably redundant, so better to let KASAN control this)"
* tag 'meminit-v5.3-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
structleak: disable STRUCTLEAK_BYREF in combination with KASAN_STACK
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20190726' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux fix from Paul Moore:
"One small SELinux patch to add some proper bounds/overflow checking
when adding a new sid/secid"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20190726' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: check sidtab limit before adding a new entry
The combination of KASAN_STACK and GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF
leads to much larger kernel stack usage, as seen from the warnings
about functions that now exceed the 2048 byte limit:
drivers/media/i2c/tvp5150.c:253:1: error: the frame size of 3936 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes
drivers/media/tuners/r820t.c:1327:1: error: the frame size of 2816 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes
drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmsmac/phy/phy_n.c:16552:1: error: the frame size of 3144 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes [-Werror=frame-larger-than=]
fs/ocfs2/aops.c:1892:1: error: the frame size of 2088 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes
fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmrecovery.c:737:1: error: the frame size of 2088 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes
fs/ocfs2/namei.c:1677:1: error: the frame size of 2584 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes
fs/ocfs2/super.c:1186:1: error: the frame size of 2640 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes
fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:3678:1: error: the frame size of 2176 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7056:1: error: the frame size of 2144 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes [-Werror=frame-larger-than=]
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c: In function 'l2cap_recv_frame':
net/bridge/br_netlink.c:1505:1: error: the frame size of 2448 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes
net/ieee802154/nl802154.c:548:1: error: the frame size of 2232 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes
net/wireless/nl80211.c:1726:1: error: the frame size of 2224 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes
net/wireless/nl80211.c:2357:1: error: the frame size of 4584 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes
net/wireless/nl80211.c:5108:1: error: the frame size of 2760 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes
net/wireless/nl80211.c:6472:1: error: the frame size of 2112 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes
The structleak plugin was previously disabled for CONFIG_COMPILE_TEST,
but meant we missed some bugs, so this time we should address them.
The frame size warnings are distracting, and risking a kernel stack
overflow is generally not beneficial to performance, so it may be best
to disallow that particular combination. This can be done by turning
off either one. I picked the dependency in GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF
and GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL, as this option is designed to
make uninitialized stack usage less harmful when enabled on its own,
but it also prevents KASAN from detecting those cases in which it was
in fact needed.
KASAN_STACK is currently implied by KASAN on gcc, but could be made a
user selectable option if we want to allow combining (non-stack) KASAN
with GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF.
Note that it would be possible to specifically address the files that
print the warning, but presumably the overall stack usage is still
significantly higher than in other configurations, so this would not
address the full problem.
I could not test this with CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL, which may or may not
suffer from a similar problem.
Fixes: 81a56f6dcd ("gcc-plugins: structleak: Generalize to all variable types")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190722114134.3123901-1-arnd@arndb.de
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
We need to error out when trying to add an entry above SIDTAB_MAX in
sidtab_reverse_lookup() to avoid overflow on the odd chance that this
happens.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ee1a84fdfe ("selinux: overhaul sidtab to fix bug and improve performance")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Pull vfs mount updates from Al Viro:
"The first part of mount updates.
Convert filesystems to use the new mount API"
* 'work.mount0' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (63 commits)
mnt_init(): call shmem_init() unconditionally
constify ksys_mount() string arguments
don't bother with registering rootfs
init_rootfs(): don't bother with init_ramfs_fs()
vfs: Convert smackfs to use the new mount API
vfs: Convert selinuxfs to use the new mount API
vfs: Convert securityfs to use the new mount API
vfs: Convert apparmorfs to use the new mount API
vfs: Convert openpromfs to use the new mount API
vfs: Convert xenfs to use the new mount API
vfs: Convert gadgetfs to use the new mount API
vfs: Convert oprofilefs to use the new mount API
vfs: Convert ibmasmfs to use the new mount API
vfs: Convert qib_fs/ipathfs to use the new mount API
vfs: Convert efivarfs to use the new mount API
vfs: Convert configfs to use the new mount API
vfs: Convert binfmt_misc to use the new mount API
convenience helper: get_tree_single()
convenience helper get_tree_nodev()
vfs: Kill sget_userns()
...
In the sysctl code the proc_dointvec_minmax() function is often used to
validate the user supplied value between an allowed range. This
function uses the extra1 and extra2 members from struct ctl_table as
minimum and maximum allowed value.
On sysctl handler declaration, in every source file there are some
readonly variables containing just an integer which address is assigned
to the extra1 and extra2 members, so the sysctl range is enforced.
The special values 0, 1 and INT_MAX are very often used as range
boundary, leading duplication of variables like zero=0, one=1,
int_max=INT_MAX in different source files:
$ git grep -E '\.extra[12].*&(zero|one|int_max)' |wc -l
248
Add a const int array containing the most commonly used values, some
macros to refer more easily to the correct array member, and use them
instead of creating a local one for every object file.
This is the bloat-o-meter output comparing the old and new binary
compiled with the default Fedora config:
# scripts/bloat-o-meter -d vmlinux.o.old vmlinux.o
add/remove: 2/2 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 24/-188 (-164)
Data old new delta
sysctl_vals - 12 +12
__kstrtab_sysctl_vals - 12 +12
max 14 10 -4
int_max 16 - -16
one 68 - -68
zero 128 28 -100
Total: Before=20583249, After=20583085, chg -0.00%
[mcroce@redhat.com: tipc: remove two unused variables]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530091952.4108-1-mcroce@redhat.com
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c]
[arnd@arndb.de: proc/sysctl: make firmware loader table conditional]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617130014.1713870-1-arnd@arndb.de
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/eventpoll.c]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190430180111.10688-1-mcroce@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Merge tag 'docs/v5.3-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mchehab/linux-media
Pull rst conversion of docs from Mauro Carvalho Chehab:
"As agreed with Jon, I'm sending this big series directly to you, c/c
him, as this series required a special care, in order to avoid
conflicts with other trees"
* tag 'docs/v5.3-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mchehab/linux-media: (77 commits)
docs: kbuild: fix build with pdf and fix some minor issues
docs: block: fix pdf output
docs: arm: fix a breakage with pdf output
docs: don't use nested tables
docs: gpio: add sysfs interface to the admin-guide
docs: locking: add it to the main index
docs: add some directories to the main documentation index
docs: add SPDX tags to new index files
docs: add a memory-devices subdir to driver-api
docs: phy: place documentation under driver-api
docs: serial: move it to the driver-api
docs: driver-api: add remaining converted dirs to it
docs: driver-api: add xilinx driver API documentation
docs: driver-api: add a series of orphaned documents
docs: admin-guide: add a series of orphaned documents
docs: cgroup-v1: add it to the admin-guide book
docs: aoe: add it to the driver-api book
docs: add some documentation dirs to the driver-api book
docs: driver-model: move it to the driver-api book
docs: lp855x-driver.rst: add it to the driver-api book
...
The capable() hook returns an error number. -EPERM is actually the same as
-1, so this doesn't make a difference in behavior.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
Someone might write a ruleset like the following, expecting that it
securely constrains UID 1 to UIDs 1, 2 and 3:
1:2
1:3
However, because no constraints are applied to UIDs 2 and 3, an attacker
with UID 1 can simply first switch to UID 2, then switch to any UID from
there. The secure way to write this ruleset would be:
1:2
1:3
2:2
3:3
, which uses "transition to self" as a way to inhibit the default-allow
policy without allowing anything specific.
This is somewhat unintuitive. To make sure that policy authors don't
accidentally write insecure policies because of this, let the kernel verify
that a new ruleset does not contain any entries that are constrained, but
transitively unconstrained.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
For debugging a running system, it is very helpful to be able to see what
policy the system is using. Add a read handler that can dump out a copy of
the loaded policy.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
The current API of the SafeSetID LSM uses one write() per rule, and applies
each written rule instantly. This has several downsides:
- While a policy is being loaded, once a single parent-child pair has been
loaded, the parent is restricted to that specific child, even if
subsequent rules would allow transitions to other child UIDs. This means
that during policy loading, set*uid() can randomly fail.
- To replace the policy without rebooting, it is necessary to first flush
all old rules. This creates a time window in which no constraints are
placed on the use of CAP_SETUID.
- If we want to perform sanity checks on the final policy, this requires
that the policy isn't constructed in a piecemeal fashion without telling
the kernel when it's done.
Other kernel APIs - including things like the userns code and netfilter -
avoid this problem by performing updates atomically. Luckily, SafeSetID
hasn't landed in a stable (upstream) release yet, so maybe it's not too
late to completely change the API.
The new API for SafeSetID is: If you want to change the policy, open
"safesetid/whitelist_policy" and write the entire policy,
newline-delimited, in there.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
Looking at current_cred() in write handlers is bad form, stop doing that.
Also, let's just require that the write is coming from the initial user
namespace. Especially SAFESETID_WHITELIST_FLUSH requires privilege over all
namespaces, and SAFESETID_WHITELIST_ADD should probably require it as well.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
In preparation for changing the policy parsing logic, refactor the line
parsing logic to be less verbose and move it into a separate function.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
At the moment, safesetid_security_capable() has two nested conditional
blocks, and one big comment for all the logic. Chop it up and reduce the
amount of indentation.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
parent_kuid and child_kuid are kuids, there is no reason to make them
uint64_t. (And anyway, in the kernel, the normal name for that would be
u64, not uint64_t.)
check_setuid_policy_hashtable_key() and
check_setuid_policy_hashtable_key_value() are basically the same thing,
merge them.
Also fix the comment that claimed that (1<<8)==128.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
With the old code, when a process with the (real,effective,saved) UID set
(1,1,1) calls setresuid(2,3,4), safesetid_task_fix_setuid() only checks
whether the transition 1->2 is permitted; the transitions 1->3 and 1->4 are
not checked. Fix this.
This is also a good opportunity to refactor safesetid_task_fix_setuid() to
be less verbose - having one branch per set*uid() syscall is unnecessary.
Note that this slightly changes semantics: The UID transition check for
UIDs that were not in the old cred struct is now always performed against
the policy of the RUID. I think that's more consistent anyway, since the
RUID is also the one that decides whether any policy is enforced at all.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
Fix the pr_warn() calls in the SafeSetID LSM to have newlines at the end.
Without this, denial messages will be buffered as incomplete lines in
log_output(), and will then only show up once something else prints into
dmesg.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
Those two docs belong to the x86 architecture:
Documentation/Intel-IOMMU.txt -> Documentation/x86/intel-iommu.rst
Documentation/intel_txt.txt -> Documentation/x86/intel_txt.rst
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Merge updates from Andrew Morton:
"Am experimenting with splitting MM up into identifiable subsystems
perhaps with a view to gitifying it in complex ways. Also with more
verbose "incoming" emails.
Most of MM is here and a few other trees.
Subsystems affected by this patch series:
- hotfixes
- iommu
- scripts
- arch/sh
- ocfs2
- mm:slab-generic
- mm:slub
- mm:kmemleak
- mm:kasan
- mm:cleanups
- mm:debug
- mm:pagecache
- mm:swap
- mm:memcg
- mm:gup
- mm:pagemap
- mm:infrastructure
- mm:vmalloc
- mm:initialization
- mm:pagealloc
- mm:vmscan
- mm:tools
- mm:proc
- mm:ras
- mm:oom-kill
hotfixes:
mm: vmscan: scan anonymous pages on file refaults
mm/nvdimm: add is_ioremap_addr and use that to check ioremap address
mm/memcontrol: fix wrong statistics in memory.stat
mm/z3fold.c: lock z3fold page before __SetPageMovable()
nilfs2: do not use unexported cpu_to_le32()/le32_to_cpu() in uapi header
MAINTAINERS: nilfs2: update email address
iommu:
include/linux/dmar.h: replace single-char identifiers in macros
scripts:
scripts/decode_stacktrace: match basepath using shell prefix operator, not regex
scripts/decode_stacktrace: look for modules with .ko.debug extension
scripts/spelling.txt: drop "sepc" from the misspelling list
scripts/spelling.txt: add spelling fix for prohibited
scripts/decode_stacktrace: Accept dash/underscore in modules
scripts/spelling.txt: add more spellings to spelling.txt
arch/sh:
arch/sh/configs/sdk7786_defconfig: remove CONFIG_LOGFS
sh: config: remove left-over BACKLIGHT_LCD_SUPPORT
sh: prevent warnings when using iounmap
ocfs2:
fs: ocfs: fix spelling mistake "hearbeating" -> "heartbeat"
ocfs2/dlm: use struct_size() helper
ocfs2: add last unlock times in locking_state
ocfs2: add locking filter debugfs file
ocfs2: add first lock wait time in locking_state
ocfs: no need to check return value of debugfs_create functions
fs/ocfs2/dlmglue.c: unneeded variable: "status"
ocfs2: use kmemdup rather than duplicating its implementation
mm:slab-generic:
Patch series "mm/slab: Improved sanity checking":
mm/slab: validate cache membership under freelist hardening
mm/slab: sanity-check page type when looking up cache
lkdtm/heap: add tests for freelist hardening
mm:slub:
mm/slub.c: avoid double string traverse in kmem_cache_flags()
slub: don't panic for memcg kmem cache creation failure
mm:kmemleak:
mm/kmemleak.c: fix check for softirq context
mm/kmemleak.c: change error at _write when kmemleak is disabled
docs: kmemleak: add more documentation details
mm:kasan:
mm/kasan: print frame description for stack bugs
Patch series "Bitops instrumentation for KASAN", v5:
lib/test_kasan: add bitops tests
x86: use static_cpu_has in uaccess region to avoid instrumentation
asm-generic, x86: add bitops instrumentation for KASAN
Patch series "mm/kasan: Add object validation in ksize()", v3:
mm/kasan: introduce __kasan_check_{read,write}
mm/kasan: change kasan_check_{read,write} to return boolean
lib/test_kasan: Add test for double-kzfree detection
mm/slab: refactor common ksize KASAN logic into slab_common.c
mm/kasan: add object validation in ksize()
mm:cleanups:
include/linux/pfn_t.h: remove pfn_t_to_virt()
Patch series "remove ARCH_SELECT_MEMORY_MODEL where it has no effect":
arm: remove ARCH_SELECT_MEMORY_MODEL
s390: remove ARCH_SELECT_MEMORY_MODEL
sparc: remove ARCH_SELECT_MEMORY_MODEL
mm/gup.c: make follow_page_mask() static
mm/memory.c: trivial clean up in insert_page()
mm: make !CONFIG_HUGE_PAGE wrappers into static inlines
include/linux/mm_types.h: ifdef struct vm_area_struct::swap_readahead_info
mm: remove the account_page_dirtied export
mm/page_isolation.c: change the prototype of undo_isolate_page_range()
include/linux/vmpressure.h: use spinlock_t instead of struct spinlock
mm: remove the exporting of totalram_pages
include/linux/pagemap.h: document trylock_page() return value
mm:debug:
mm/failslab.c: by default, do not fail allocations with direct reclaim only
Patch series "debug_pagealloc improvements":
mm, debug_pagelloc: use static keys to enable debugging
mm, page_alloc: more extensive free page checking with debug_pagealloc
mm, debug_pagealloc: use a page type instead of page_ext flag
mm:pagecache:
Patch series "fix filler_t callback type mismatches", v2:
mm/filemap.c: fix an overly long line in read_cache_page
mm/filemap: don't cast ->readpage to filler_t for do_read_cache_page
jffs2: pass the correct prototype to read_cache_page
9p: pass the correct prototype to read_cache_page
mm/filemap.c: correct the comment about VM_FAULT_RETRY
mm:swap:
mm, swap: fix race between swapoff and some swap operations
mm/swap_state.c: simplify total_swapcache_pages() with get_swap_device()
mm, swap: use rbtree for swap_extent
mm/mincore.c: fix race between swapoff and mincore
mm:memcg:
memcg, oom: no oom-kill for __GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL
memcg, fsnotify: no oom-kill for remote memcg charging
mm, memcg: introduce memory.events.local
mm: memcontrol: dump memory.stat during cgroup OOM
Patch series "mm: reparent slab memory on cgroup removal", v7:
mm: memcg/slab: postpone kmem_cache memcg pointer initialization to memcg_link_cache()
mm: memcg/slab: rename slab delayed deactivation functions and fields
mm: memcg/slab: generalize postponed non-root kmem_cache deactivation
mm: memcg/slab: introduce __memcg_kmem_uncharge_memcg()
mm: memcg/slab: unify SLAB and SLUB page accounting
mm: memcg/slab: don't check the dying flag on kmem_cache creation
mm: memcg/slab: synchronize access to kmem_cache dying flag using a spinlock
mm: memcg/slab: rework non-root kmem_cache lifecycle management
mm: memcg/slab: stop setting page->mem_cgroup pointer for slab pages
mm: memcg/slab: reparent memcg kmem_caches on cgroup removal
mm, memcg: add a memcg_slabinfo debugfs file
mm:gup:
Patch series "switch the remaining architectures to use generic GUP", v4:
mm: use untagged_addr() for get_user_pages_fast addresses
mm: simplify gup_fast_permitted
mm: lift the x86_32 PAE version of gup_get_pte to common code
MIPS: use the generic get_user_pages_fast code
sh: add the missing pud_page definition
sh: use the generic get_user_pages_fast code
sparc64: add the missing pgd_page definition
sparc64: define untagged_addr()
sparc64: use the generic get_user_pages_fast code
mm: rename CONFIG_HAVE_GENERIC_GUP to CONFIG_HAVE_FAST_GUP
mm: reorder code blocks in gup.c
mm: consolidate the get_user_pages* implementations
mm: validate get_user_pages_fast flags
mm: move the powerpc hugepd code to mm/gup.c
mm: switch gup_hugepte to use try_get_compound_head
mm: mark the page referenced in gup_hugepte
mm/gup: speed up check_and_migrate_cma_pages() on huge page
mm/gup.c: remove some BUG_ONs from get_gate_page()
mm/gup.c: mark undo_dev_pagemap as __maybe_unused
mm:pagemap:
asm-generic, x86: introduce generic pte_{alloc,free}_one[_kernel]
alpha: switch to generic version of pte allocation
arm: switch to generic version of pte allocation
arm64: switch to generic version of pte allocation
csky: switch to generic version of pte allocation
m68k: sun3: switch to generic version of pte allocation
mips: switch to generic version of pte allocation
nds32: switch to generic version of pte allocation
nios2: switch to generic version of pte allocation
parisc: switch to generic version of pte allocation
riscv: switch to generic version of pte allocation
um: switch to generic version of pte allocation
unicore32: switch to generic version of pte allocation
mm/pgtable: drop pgtable_t variable from pte_fn_t functions
mm/memory.c: fail when offset == num in first check of __vm_map_pages()
mm:infrastructure:
mm/mmu_notifier: use hlist_add_head_rcu()
mm:vmalloc:
Patch series "Some cleanups for the KVA/vmalloc", v5:
mm/vmalloc.c: remove "node" argument
mm/vmalloc.c: preload a CPU with one object for split purpose
mm/vmalloc.c: get rid of one single unlink_va() when merge
mm/vmalloc.c: switch to WARN_ON() and move it under unlink_va()
mm/vmalloc.c: spelling> s/informaion/information/
mm:initialization:
mm/large system hash: use vmalloc for size > MAX_ORDER when !hashdist
mm/large system hash: clear hashdist when only one node with memory is booted
mm:pagealloc:
arm64: move jump_label_init() before parse_early_param()
Patch series "add init_on_alloc/init_on_free boot options", v10:
mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options
mm: init: report memory auto-initialization features at boot time
mm:vmscan:
mm: vmscan: remove double slab pressure by inc'ing sc->nr_scanned
mm: vmscan: correct some vmscan counters for THP swapout
mm:tools:
tools/vm/slabinfo: order command line options
tools/vm/slabinfo: add partial slab listing to -X
tools/vm/slabinfo: add option to sort by partial slabs
tools/vm/slabinfo: add sorting info to help menu
mm:proc:
proc: use down_read_killable mmap_sem for /proc/pid/maps
proc: use down_read_killable mmap_sem for /proc/pid/smaps_rollup
proc: use down_read_killable mmap_sem for /proc/pid/pagemap
proc: use down_read_killable mmap_sem for /proc/pid/clear_refs
proc: use down_read_killable mmap_sem for /proc/pid/map_files
mm: use down_read_killable for locking mmap_sem in access_remote_vm
mm: smaps: split PSS into components
mm: vmalloc: show number of vmalloc pages in /proc/meminfo
mm:ras:
mm/memory-failure.c: clarify error message
mm:oom-kill:
mm: memcontrol: use CSS_TASK_ITER_PROCS at mem_cgroup_scan_tasks()
mm, oom: refactor dump_tasks for memcg OOMs
mm, oom: remove redundant task_in_mem_cgroup() check
oom: decouple mems_allowed from oom_unkillable_task
mm/oom_kill.c: remove redundant OOM score normalization in select_bad_process()"
* akpm: (147 commits)
mm/oom_kill.c: remove redundant OOM score normalization in select_bad_process()
oom: decouple mems_allowed from oom_unkillable_task
mm, oom: remove redundant task_in_mem_cgroup() check
mm, oom: refactor dump_tasks for memcg OOMs
mm: memcontrol: use CSS_TASK_ITER_PROCS at mem_cgroup_scan_tasks()
mm/memory-failure.c: clarify error message
mm: vmalloc: show number of vmalloc pages in /proc/meminfo
mm: smaps: split PSS into components
mm: use down_read_killable for locking mmap_sem in access_remote_vm
proc: use down_read_killable mmap_sem for /proc/pid/map_files
proc: use down_read_killable mmap_sem for /proc/pid/clear_refs
proc: use down_read_killable mmap_sem for /proc/pid/pagemap
proc: use down_read_killable mmap_sem for /proc/pid/smaps_rollup
proc: use down_read_killable mmap_sem for /proc/pid/maps
tools/vm/slabinfo: add sorting info to help menu
tools/vm/slabinfo: add option to sort by partial slabs
tools/vm/slabinfo: add partial slab listing to -X
tools/vm/slabinfo: order command line options
mm: vmscan: correct some vmscan counters for THP swapout
mm: vmscan: remove double slab pressure by inc'ing sc->nr_scanned
...
Patch series "add init_on_alloc/init_on_free boot options", v10.
Provide init_on_alloc and init_on_free boot options.
These are aimed at preventing possible information leaks and making the
control-flow bugs that depend on uninitialized values more deterministic.
Enabling either of the options guarantees that the memory returned by the
page allocator and SL[AU]B is initialized with zeroes. SLOB allocator
isn't supported at the moment, as its emulation of kmem caches complicates
handling of SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU caches correctly.
Enabling init_on_free also guarantees that pages and heap objects are
initialized right after they're freed, so it won't be possible to access
stale data by using a dangling pointer.
As suggested by Michal Hocko, right now we don't let the heap users to
disable initialization for certain allocations. There's not enough
evidence that doing so can speed up real-life cases, and introducing ways
to opt-out may result in things going out of control.
This patch (of 2):
The new options are needed to prevent possible information leaks and make
control-flow bugs that depend on uninitialized values more deterministic.
This is expected to be on-by-default on Android and Chrome OS. And it
gives the opportunity for anyone else to use it under distros too via the
boot args. (The init_on_free feature is regularly requested by folks
where memory forensics is included in their threat models.)
init_on_alloc=1 makes the kernel initialize newly allocated pages and heap
objects with zeroes. Initialization is done at allocation time at the
places where checks for __GFP_ZERO are performed.
init_on_free=1 makes the kernel initialize freed pages and heap objects
with zeroes upon their deletion. This helps to ensure sensitive data
doesn't leak via use-after-free accesses.
Both init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 guarantee that the allocator
returns zeroed memory. The two exceptions are slab caches with
constructors and SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU flag. Those are never
zero-initialized to preserve their semantics.
Both init_on_alloc and init_on_free default to zero, but those defaults
can be overridden with CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON and
CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON.
If either SLUB poisoning or page poisoning is enabled, those options take
precedence over init_on_alloc and init_on_free: initialization is only
applied to unpoisoned allocations.
Slowdown for the new features compared to init_on_free=0, init_on_alloc=0:
hackbench, init_on_free=1: +7.62% sys time (st.err 0.74%)
hackbench, init_on_alloc=1: +7.75% sys time (st.err 2.14%)
Linux build with -j12, init_on_free=1: +8.38% wall time (st.err 0.39%)
Linux build with -j12, init_on_free=1: +24.42% sys time (st.err 0.52%)
Linux build with -j12, init_on_alloc=1: -0.13% wall time (st.err 0.42%)
Linux build with -j12, init_on_alloc=1: +0.57% sys time (st.err 0.40%)
The slowdown for init_on_free=0, init_on_alloc=0 compared to the baseline
is within the standard error.
The new features are also going to pave the way for hardware memory
tagging (e.g. arm64's MTE), which will require both on_alloc and on_free
hooks to set the tags for heap objects. With MTE, tagging will have the
same cost as memory initialization.
Although init_on_free is rather costly, there are paranoid use-cases where
in-memory data lifetime is desired to be minimized. There are various
arguments for/against the realism of the associated threat models, but
given that we'll need the infrastructure for MTE anyway, and there are
people who want wipe-on-free behavior no matter what the performance cost,
it seems reasonable to include it in this series.
[glider@google.com: v8]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190626121943.131390-2-glider@google.com
[glider@google.com: v9]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190627130316.254309-2-glider@google.com
[glider@google.com: v10]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190628093131.199499-2-glider@google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617151050.92663-2-glider@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> [page and dmapool parts
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>]
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@android.com>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
"Some highlights from this development cycle:
1) Big refactoring of ipv6 route and neigh handling to support
nexthop objects configurable as units from userspace. From David
Ahern.
2) Convert explored_states in BPF verifier into a hash table,
significantly decreased state held for programs with bpf2bpf
calls, from Alexei Starovoitov.
3) Implement bpf_send_signal() helper, from Yonghong Song.
4) Various classifier enhancements to mvpp2 driver, from Maxime
Chevallier.
5) Add aRFS support to hns3 driver, from Jian Shen.
6) Fix use after free in inet frags by allocating fqdirs dynamically
and reworking how rhashtable dismantle occurs, from Eric Dumazet.
7) Add act_ctinfo packet classifier action, from Kevin
Darbyshire-Bryant.
8) Add TFO key backup infrastructure, from Jason Baron.
9) Remove several old and unused ISDN drivers, from Arnd Bergmann.
10) Add devlink notifications for flash update status to mlxsw driver,
from Jiri Pirko.
11) Lots of kTLS offload infrastructure fixes, from Jakub Kicinski.
12) Add support for mv88e6250 DSA chips, from Rasmus Villemoes.
13) Various enhancements to ipv6 flow label handling, from Eric
Dumazet and Willem de Bruijn.
14) Support TLS offload in nfp driver, from Jakub Kicinski, Dirk van
der Merwe, and others.
15) Various improvements to axienet driver including converting it to
phylink, from Robert Hancock.
16) Add PTP support to sja1105 DSA driver, from Vladimir Oltean.
17) Add mqprio qdisc offload support to dpaa2-eth, from Ioana
Radulescu.
18) Add devlink health reporting to mlx5, from Moshe Shemesh.
19) Convert stmmac over to phylink, from Jose Abreu.
20) Add PTP PHC (Physical Hardware Clock) support to mlxsw, from
Shalom Toledo.
21) Add nftables SYNPROXY support, from Fernando Fernandez Mancera.
22) Convert tcp_fastopen over to use SipHash, from Ard Biesheuvel.
23) Track spill/fill of constants in BPF verifier, from Alexei
Starovoitov.
24) Support bounded loops in BPF, from Alexei Starovoitov.
25) Various page_pool API fixes and improvements, from Jesper Dangaard
Brouer.
26) Just like ipv4, support ref-countless ipv6 route handling. From
Wei Wang.
27) Support VLAN offloading in aquantia driver, from Igor Russkikh.
28) Add AF_XDP zero-copy support to mlx5, from Maxim Mikityanskiy.
29) Add flower GRE encap/decap support to nfp driver, from Pieter
Jansen van Vuuren.
30) Protect against stack overflow when using act_mirred, from John
Hurley.
31) Allow devmap map lookups from eBPF, from Toke Høiland-Jørgensen.
32) Use page_pool API in netsec driver, Ilias Apalodimas.
33) Add Google gve network driver, from Catherine Sullivan.
34) More indirect call avoidance, from Paolo Abeni.
35) Add kTLS TX HW offload support to mlx5, from Tariq Toukan.
36) Add XDP_REDIRECT support to bnxt_en, from Andy Gospodarek.
37) Add MPLS manipulation actions to TC, from John Hurley.
38) Add sending a packet to connection tracking from TC actions, and
then allow flower classifier matching on conntrack state. From
Paul Blakey.
39) Netfilter hw offload support, from Pablo Neira Ayuso"
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (2080 commits)
net/mlx5e: Return in default case statement in tx_post_resync_params
mlx5: Return -EINVAL when WARN_ON_ONCE triggers in mlx5e_tls_resync().
net: dsa: add support for BRIDGE_MROUTER attribute
pkt_sched: Include const.h
net: netsec: remove static declaration for netsec_set_tx_de()
net: netsec: remove superfluous if statement
netfilter: nf_tables: add hardware offload support
net: flow_offload: rename tc_cls_flower_offload to flow_cls_offload
net: flow_offload: add flow_block_cb_is_busy() and use it
net: sched: remove tcf block API
drivers: net: use flow block API
net: sched: use flow block API
net: flow_offload: add flow_block_cb_{priv, incref, decref}()
net: flow_offload: add list handling functions
net: flow_offload: add flow_block_cb_alloc() and flow_block_cb_free()
net: flow_offload: rename TCF_BLOCK_BINDER_TYPE_* to FLOW_BLOCK_BINDER_TYPE_*
net: flow_offload: rename TC_BLOCK_{UN}BIND to FLOW_BLOCK_{UN}BIND
net: flow_offload: add flow_block_cb_setup_simple()
net: hisilicon: Add an tx_desc to adapt HI13X1_GMAC
net: hisilicon: Add an rx_desc to adapt HI13X1_GMAC
...
- A fair pile of RST conversions, many from Mauro. These create more
than the usual number of simple but annoying merge conflicts with other
trees, unfortunately. He has a lot more of these waiting on the wings
that, I think, will go to you directly later on.
- A new document on how to use merges and rebases in kernel repos, and one
on Spectre vulnerabilities.
- Various improvements to the build system, including automatic markup of
function() references because some people, for reasons I will never
understand, were of the opinion that :c:func:``function()`` is
unattractive and not fun to type.
- We now recommend using sphinx 1.7, but still support back to 1.4.
- Lots of smaller improvements, warning fixes, typo fixes, etc.
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Merge tag 'docs-5.3' of git://git.lwn.net/linux
Pull Documentation updates from Jonathan Corbet:
"It's been a relatively busy cycle for docs:
- A fair pile of RST conversions, many from Mauro. These create more
than the usual number of simple but annoying merge conflicts with
other trees, unfortunately. He has a lot more of these waiting on
the wings that, I think, will go to you directly later on.
- A new document on how to use merges and rebases in kernel repos,
and one on Spectre vulnerabilities.
- Various improvements to the build system, including automatic
markup of function() references because some people, for reasons I
will never understand, were of the opinion that
:c:func:``function()`` is unattractive and not fun to type.
- We now recommend using sphinx 1.7, but still support back to 1.4.
- Lots of smaller improvements, warning fixes, typo fixes, etc"
* tag 'docs-5.3' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (129 commits)
docs: automarkup.py: ignore exceptions when seeking for xrefs
docs: Move binderfs to admin-guide
Disable Sphinx SmartyPants in HTML output
doc: RCU callback locks need only _bh, not necessarily _irq
docs: format kernel-parameters -- as code
Doc : doc-guide : Fix a typo
platform: x86: get rid of a non-existent document
Add the RCU docs to the core-api manual
Documentation: RCU: Add TOC tree hooks
Documentation: RCU: Rename txt files to rst
Documentation: RCU: Convert RCU UP systems to reST
Documentation: RCU: Convert RCU linked list to reST
Documentation: RCU: Convert RCU basic concepts to reST
docs: filesystems: Remove uneeded .rst extension on toctables
scripts/sphinx-pre-install: fix out-of-tree build
docs: zh_CN: submitting-drivers.rst: Remove a duplicated Documentation/
Documentation: PGP: update for newer HW devices
Documentation: Add section about CPU vulnerabilities for Spectre
Documentation: platform: Delete x86-laptop-drivers.txt
docs: Note that :c:func: should no longer be used
...
Pull capabilities update from James Morris:
"Minor fixes for capabilities:
- Update the commoncap.c code to utilize XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN,
from Carmeli tamir.
- Make the capability hooks static, from Yue Haibing"
* 'next-lsm' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
security/commoncap: Use xattr security prefix len
security: Make capability_hooks static
Lakshmi Ramasubramanian