commit 2bb69f5fc7 upstream.
Part of a merge commit from Linus that adjusted the default setting of
SPECTRE_BHI_ON.
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ed2e8d49b5 upstream.
Intel processors that aren't vulnerable to BHI will set
MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES[BHI_NO] = 1;. Guests may use this BHI_NO bit to
determine if they need to implement BHI mitigations or not. Allow this bit
to be passed to the guests.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 95a6ccbdc7 upstream.
BHI mitigation mode spectre_bhi=auto does not deploy the software
mitigation by default. In a cloud environment, it is a likely scenario
where userspace is trusted but the guests are not trusted. Deploying
system wide mitigation in such cases is not desirable.
Update the auto mode to unconditionally mitigate against malicious
guests. Deploy the software sequence at VMexit in auto mode also, when
hardware mitigation is not available. Unlike the force =on mode,
software sequence is not deployed at syscalls in auto mode.
Suggested-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ec9404e40e upstream.
Branch history clearing software sequences and hardware control
BHI_DIS_S were defined to mitigate Branch History Injection (BHI).
Add cmdline spectre_bhi={on|off|auto} to control BHI mitigation:
auto - Deploy the hardware mitigation BHI_DIS_S, if available.
on - Deploy the hardware mitigation BHI_DIS_S, if available,
otherwise deploy the software sequence at syscall entry and
VMexit.
off - Turn off BHI mitigation.
The default is auto mode which does not deploy the software sequence
mitigation. This is because of the hardening done in the syscall
dispatch path, which is the likely target of BHI.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0f4a837615 upstream.
Newer processors supports a hardware control BHI_DIS_S to mitigate
Branch History Injection (BHI). Setting BHI_DIS_S protects the kernel
from userspace BHI attacks without having to manually overwrite the
branch history.
Define MSR_SPEC_CTRL bit BHI_DIS_S and its enumeration CPUID.BHI_CTRL.
Mitigation is enabled later.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7390db8aea upstream.
Branch History Injection (BHI) attacks may allow a malicious application to
influence indirect branch prediction in kernel by poisoning the branch
history. eIBRS isolates indirect branch targets in ring0. The BHB can
still influence the choice of indirect branch predictor entry, and although
branch predictor entries are isolated between modes when eIBRS is enabled,
the BHB itself is not isolated between modes.
Alder Lake and new processors supports a hardware control BHI_DIS_S to
mitigate BHI. For older processors Intel has released a software sequence
to clear the branch history on parts that don't support BHI_DIS_S. Add
support to execute the software sequence at syscall entry and VMexit to
overwrite the branch history.
For now, branch history is not cleared at interrupt entry, as malicious
applications are not believed to have sufficient control over the
registers, since previous register state is cleared at interrupt
entry. Researchers continue to poke at this area and it may become
necessary to clear at interrupt entry as well in the future.
This mitigation is only defined here. It is enabled later.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 1e3ad78334 upstream.
Make <asm/syscall.h> build a switch statement instead, and the compiler can
either decide to generate an indirect jump, or - more likely these days due
to mitigations - just a series of conditional branches.
Yes, the conditional branches also have branch prediction, but the branch
prediction is much more controlled, in that it just causes speculatively
running the wrong system call (harmless), rather than speculatively running
possibly wrong random less controlled code gadgets.
This doesn't mitigate other indirect calls, but the system call indirection
is the first and most easily triggered case.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0cd01ac5dc upstream.
Change the format of the 'spectre_v2' vulnerabilities sysfs file
slightly by converting the commas to semicolons, so that mitigations for
future variants can be grouped together and separated by commas.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9c55461040 upstream.
Currently, the EFI stub invokes the EFI memory attributes protocol to
strip any NX restrictions from the entire loaded kernel, resulting in
all code and data being mapped read-write-execute.
The point of the EFI memory attributes protocol is to remove the need
for all memory allocations to be mapped with both write and execute
permissions by default, and make it the OS loader's responsibility to
transition data mappings to code mappings where appropriate.
Even though the UEFI specification does not appear to leave room for
denying memory attribute changes based on security policy, let's be
cautious and avoid relying on the ability to create read-write-execute
mappings. This is trivially achievable, given that the amount of kernel
code executing via the firmware's 1:1 mapping is rather small and
limited to the .head.text region. So let's drop the NX restrictions only
on that subregion, but not before remapping it as read-only first.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 428080c9b1 upstream.
In preparation for implementing rigorous build time checks to enforce
that only code that can support it will be called from the early 1:1
mapping of memory, move SEV init code that is called in this manner to
the .head.text section.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240227151907.387873-19-ardb+git@google.com
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 48204aba80 upstream.
The .head.text section is the initial primary entrypoint of the core
kernel, and is entered with the CPU executing from a 1:1 mapping of
memory. Such code must never access global variables using absolute
references, as these are based on the kernel virtual mapping which is
not active yet at this point.
Given that the SME startup code is also called from this early execution
context, move it into .head.text as well. This will allow more thorough
build time checks in the future to ensure that early startup code only
uses RIP-relative references to global variables.
Also replace some occurrences of __pa_symbol() [which relies on the
compiler generating an absolute reference, which is not guaranteed] and
an open coded RIP-relative access with RIP_REL_REF().
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240227151907.387873-18-ardb+git@google.com
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit cd0d9d92c8 upstream.
The early SME/SEV code parses the command line very early, in order to
decide whether or not memory encryption should be enabled, which needs
to occur even before the initial page tables are created.
This is problematic for a number of reasons:
- this early code runs from the 1:1 mapping provided by the decompressor
or firmware, which uses a different translation than the one assumed by
the linker, and so the code needs to be built in a special way;
- parsing external input while the entire kernel image is still mapped
writable is a bad idea in general, and really does not belong in
security minded code;
- the current code ignores the built-in command line entirely (although
this appears to be the case for the entire decompressor)
Given that the decompressor/EFI stub is an intrinsic part of the x86
bootable kernel image, move the command line parsing there and out of
the core kernel. This removes the need to build lib/cmdline.o in a
special way, or to use RIP-relative LEA instructions in inline asm
blocks.
This involves a new xloadflag in the setup header to indicate
that mem_encrypt=on appeared on the kernel command line.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240227151907.387873-17-ardb+git@google.com
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7205f06e84 upstream.
Parse the mem_encrypt= command line parameter from the EFI stub if
CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_MEM_ENCRYPT=y, so that it can be passed to the early
boot code by the arch code in the stub.
This avoids the need for the core kernel to do any string parsing very
early in the boot.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240227151907.387873-16-ardb+git@google.com
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 1a80dbcb2d upstream.
BPF link for some program types is passed as a "context" which can be
used by those BPF programs to look up additional information. E.g., for
multi-kprobes and multi-uprobes, link is used to fetch BPF cookie values.
Because of this runtime dependency, when bpf_link refcnt drops to zero
there could still be active BPF programs running accessing link data.
This patch adds generic support to defer bpf_link dealloc callback to
after RCU GP, if requested. This is done by exposing two different
deallocation callbacks, one synchronous and one deferred. If deferred
one is provided, bpf_link_free() will schedule dealloc_deferred()
callback to happen after RCU GP.
BPF is using two flavors of RCU: "classic" non-sleepable one and RCU
tasks trace one. The latter is used when sleepable BPF programs are
used. bpf_link_free() accommodates that by checking underlying BPF
program's sleepable flag, and goes either through normal RCU GP only for
non-sleepable, or through RCU tasks trace GP *and* then normal RCU GP
(taking into account rcu_trace_implies_rcu_gp() optimization), if BPF
program is sleepable.
We use this for multi-kprobe and multi-uprobe links, which dereference
link during program run. We also preventively switch raw_tp link to use
deferred dealloc callback, as upcoming changes in bpf-next tree expose
raw_tp link data (specifically, cookie value) to BPF program at runtime
as well.
Fixes: 0dcac27254 ("bpf: Add multi kprobe link")
Fixes: 89ae89f53d ("bpf: Add multi uprobe link")
Reported-by: syzbot+981935d9485a560bfbcb@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+2cb5a6c573e98db598cc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+62d8b26793e8a2bd0516@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240328052426.3042617-2-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e9c856cabe upstream.
There is no need to delay putting either path or task to deallocation
step. It can be done right after bpf_uprobe_unregister. Between release
and dealloc, there could be still some running BPF programs, but they
don't access either task or path, only data in link->uprobes, so it is
safe to do.
On the other hand, doing path_put() in dealloc callback makes this
dealloc sleepable because path_put() itself might sleep. Which is
problematic due to the need to call uprobe's dealloc through call_rcu(),
which is what is done in the next bug fix patch. So solve the problem by
releasing these resources early.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240328052426.3042617-1-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This reverts commit 3428faa0d6 which is
commit f2208aa12c upstream.
It is reported to cause problems in the stable branches, so revert it.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/899b7c1419a064a2b721b78eade06659@stwm.de
Reported-by: Wolfgang Walter <linux@stwm.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a00e7e3fb4 upstream.
Instead of handling the vm's rebind fence separately,
which is error prone if they are not strictly ordered,
attach rebind fences as kernel fences to the vm's resv.
Fixes: dd08ebf6c3 ("drm/xe: Introduce a new DRM driver for Intel GPUs")
Cc: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Cc: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v6.8+
Signed-off-by: Thomas Hellström <thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20240327091136.3271-3-thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com
(cherry picked from commit 5a091aff50)
Signed-off-by: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3c88b8f471 upstream.
For each rebind we insert a GuC TLB invalidation and add a
corresponding unordered TLB invalidation fence. This might
add a huge number of TLB invalidation fences to wait for so
rather than doing that, defer the TLB invalidation to the
next ring ops for each affected exec queue. Since the TLB
is invalidated on exec_queue switch, we need to invalidate
once for each affected exec_queue.
v2:
- Simplify if-statements around the tlb_flush_seqno.
(Matthew Brost)
- Add some comments and asserts.
Fixes: 5387e865d9 ("drm/xe: Add TLB invalidation fence after rebinds issued from execs")
Cc: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v6.8+
Signed-off-by: Thomas Hellström <thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20240327091136.3271-2-thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com
(cherry picked from commit 4fc4899e86)
Signed-off-by: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6db31251bb upstream.
Enable only one CCS engine by default with all the compute sices
allocated to it.
While generating the list of UABI engines to be exposed to the
user, exclude any additional CCS engines beyond the first
instance.
This change can be tested with igt i915_query.
Fixes: d2eae8e98d ("drm/i915/dg2: Drop force_probe requirement")
Signed-off-by: Andi Shyti <andi.shyti@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Chris Wilson <chris.p.wilson@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Matt Roper <matthew.d.roper@intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v6.2+
Reviewed-by: Matt Roper <matthew.d.roper@intel.com>
Acked-by: Michal Mrozek <michal.mrozek@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20240328073409.674098-4-andi.shyti@linux.intel.com
(cherry picked from commit 2bebae0112)
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ea315f98e5 upstream.
We want a fixed load CCS balancing consisting in all slices
sharing one single user engine. For this reason do not create the
intel_engine_cs structure with its dedicated command streamer for
CCS slices beyond the first.
Fixes: d2eae8e98d ("drm/i915/dg2: Drop force_probe requirement")
Signed-off-by: Andi Shyti <andi.shyti@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Chris Wilson <chris.p.wilson@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Matt Roper <matthew.d.roper@intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v6.2+
Acked-by: Michal Mrozek <michal.mrozek@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Roper <matthew.d.roper@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20240328073409.674098-3-andi.shyti@linux.intel.com
(cherry picked from commit c7a5aa4e57)
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit bc9a1ec012 upstream.
The hardware should not dynamically balance the load between CCS
engines. Wa_14019159160 recommends disabling it across all
platforms.
Fixes: d2eae8e98d ("drm/i915/dg2: Drop force_probe requirement")
Signed-off-by: Andi Shyti <andi.shyti@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Chris Wilson <chris.p.wilson@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Matt Roper <matthew.d.roper@intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v6.2+
Reviewed-by: Matt Roper <matthew.d.roper@intel.com>
Acked-by: Michal Mrozek <michal.mrozek@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20240328073409.674098-2-andi.shyti@linux.intel.com
(cherry picked from commit f5d2904cf8)
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f7caddfd55 upstream.
For DISPLAY < 13, compressed bpp is chosen from a list of
supported compressed bpps. Fix the condition to choose the
appropriate compressed bpp from the list.
Fixes: 1c56e9a398 ("drm/i915/dp: Get optimal link config to have best compressed bpp")
Cc: Ankit Nautiyal <ankit.k.nautiyal@intel.com>
Cc: Stanislav Lisovskiy <stanislav.lisovskiy@intel.com>
Cc: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v6.7+
Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/-/issues/10162
Signed-off-by: Ankit Nautiyal <ankit.k.nautiyal@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Suraj Kandpal <suraj.kandpal@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20240305054443.2489895-1-ankit.k.nautiyal@intel.com
(cherry picked from commit 5a1da42b50)
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 51bc63392e upstream.
The MST code currently assumes that glk+ already supports MST+DSC,
which is incorrect. We need to check for TGL+ actually. ICL does
support SST+DSC, but supposedly it can't do MST+FEC which will
also rule out MST+DSC.
Note that a straight TGL+ check doesn't work here because DSC
support can get fused out, so we do need to also check 'has_dsc'.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d51f25eb47 ("drm/i915: Add DSC support to MST path")
Reviewed-by: Uma Shankar <uma.shankar@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20240402135148.23011-6-ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com
(cherry picked from commit c9c92f286d)
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e0e50401cc upstream.
Skip sessions that are being teared down (status == SES_EXITING) to
avoid UAF.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <pc@manguebit.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 63981561ff upstream.
Skip sessions that are being teared down (status == SES_EXITING) to
avoid UAF.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <pc@manguebit.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 69ccf040ac upstream.
Skip sessions that are being teared down (status == SES_EXITING) to
avoid UAF.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <pc@manguebit.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 705c76fbf7 upstream.
Skip sessions that are being teared down (status == SES_EXITING) to
avoid UAF.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <pc@manguebit.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 22863485a4 upstream.
Skip sessions that are being teared down (status == SES_EXITING) to
avoid UAF.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <pc@manguebit.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 58acd1f497 upstream.
Skip sessions that are being teared down (status == SES_EXITING) to
avoid UAF.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <pc@manguebit.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0865ffefea upstream.
Skip sessions that are being teared down (status == SES_EXITING) to
avoid UAF.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <pc@manguebit.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d3da25c5ac upstream.
Skip sessions that are being teared down (status == SES_EXITING) to
avoid UAF.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <pc@manguebit.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ca545b7f08 upstream.
Skip sessions that are being teared down (status == SES_EXITING) to
avoid UAF.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <pc@manguebit.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 173217bd73 upstream.
In the current implementation, CIFS close sends a close to the
server and does not check for the success of the server close.
This patch adds functionality to check for server close return
status and retries in case of an EBUSY or EAGAIN error.
This can help avoid handle leaks
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ritvik Budhiraja <rbudhiraja@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 93cee45ccf upstream.
Serialise cifs_construct_tcon() with cifs_mount_mutex to handle
parallel mounts that may end up reusing the session and tcon created
by it.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.4+
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <pc@manguebit.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4a5ba0e0bf upstream.
The tcons created by cifs_construct_tcon() on multiuser mounts must
also be able to failover and refresh DFS referrals, so set the
appropriate fields in order to get a full DFS tcon. They could be
shared among different superblocks later, too.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.4+
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202404021518.3Xu2VU4s-lkp@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <pc@manguebit.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0a05ad21d7 upstream.
Avoid refreshing DFS referral with refpath_lock acquired as the I/O
could block for a while due to a potentially disconnected or slow DFS
root server and then making other threads - that use same @server and
don't require a DFS root server - unable to make any progress.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.4+
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <pc@manguebit.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 062a7f0ff4 upstream.
Avoid potential use-after-free bugs when walking DFS referrals,
mounting and performing DFS failover by ensuring that all children
from parent @tcon->ses are also refcounted. They're all needed across
the entire DFS mount. Get rid of @tcon->dfs_ses_list while we're at
it, too.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.4+
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202404021527.ZlRkIxgv-lkp@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <pc@manguebit.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 24a9799aa8 upstream.
The UAF bug is due to smb2_reconnect_server() accessing a session that
is already being teared down by another thread that is executing
__cifs_put_smb_ses(). This can happen when (a) the client has
connection to the server but no session or (b) another thread ends up
setting @ses->ses_status again to something different than
SES_EXITING.
To fix this, we need to make sure to unconditionally set
@ses->ses_status to SES_EXITING and prevent any other threads from
setting a new status while we're still tearing it down.
The following can be reproduced by adding some delay to right after
the ipc is freed in __cifs_put_smb_ses() - which will give
smb2_reconnect_server() worker a chance to run and then accessing
@ses->ipc:
kinit ...
mount.cifs //srv/share /mnt/1 -o sec=krb5,nohandlecache,echo_interval=10
[disconnect srv]
ls /mnt/1 &>/dev/null
sleep 30
kdestroy
[reconnect srv]
sleep 10
umount /mnt/1
...
CIFS: VFS: Verify user has a krb5 ticket and keyutils is installed
CIFS: VFS: \\srv Send error in SessSetup = -126
CIFS: VFS: Verify user has a krb5 ticket and keyutils is installed
CIFS: VFS: \\srv Send error in SessSetup = -126
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
0x6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 3 PID: 50 Comm: kworker/3:1 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc2 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-1.fc39
04/01/2014
Workqueue: cifsiod smb2_reconnect_server [cifs]
RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x33/0xf0
Code: 4f 08 48 85 d2 74 42 48 85 c9 74 59 48 b8 00 01 00 00 00 00 ad
de 48 39 c2 74 61 48 b8 22 01 00 00 00 00 74 69 <48> 8b 01 48 39 f8 75
7b 48 8b 72 08 48 39 c6 0f 85 88 00 00 00 b8
RSP: 0018:ffffc900001bfd70 EFLAGS: 00010a83
RAX: dead000000000122 RBX: ffff88810da53838 RCX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b
RDX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b RSI: ffffffffc02f6878 RDI: ffff88810da53800
RBP: ffff88810da53800 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88810c064000
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff88810c064000 R15: ffff8881039cc000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888157c00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fe3728b1000 CR3: 000000010caa4000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? die_addr+0x36/0x90
? exc_general_protection+0x1c1/0x3f0
? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30
? __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x33/0xf0
__cifs_put_smb_ses+0x1ae/0x500 [cifs]
smb2_reconnect_server+0x4ed/0x710 [cifs]
process_one_work+0x205/0x6b0
worker_thread+0x191/0x360
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0xe2/0x110
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <pc@manguebit.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d14fa1fcf6 upstream.
childregs represents the registers which are active for the new thread
in user context. For a kernel thread, childregs->gp is never used since
the kernel gp is not touched by switch_to. For a user mode helper, the
gp value can be observed in user space after execve or possibly by other
means.
[From the email thread]
The /* Kernel thread */ comment is somewhat inaccurate in that it is also used
for user_mode_helper threads, which exec a user process, e.g. /sbin/init or
when /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern is a pipe. Such threads do not have
PF_KTHREAD set and are valid targets for ptrace etc. even before they exec.
childregs is the *user* context during syscall execution and it is observable
from userspace in at least five ways:
1. kernel_execve does not currently clear integer registers, so the starting
register state for PID 1 and other user processes started by the kernel has
sp = user stack, gp = kernel __global_pointer$, all other integer registers
zeroed by the memset in the patch comment.
This is a bug in its own right, but I'm unwilling to bet that it is the only
way to exploit the issue addressed by this patch.
2. ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET): you can PTRACE_ATTACH to a user_mode_helper thread
before it execs, but ptrace requires SIGSTOP to be delivered which can only
happen at user/kernel boundaries.
3. /proc/*/task/*/syscall: this is perfectly happy to read pt_regs for
user_mode_helpers before the exec completes, but gp is not one of the
registers it returns.
4. PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_USER: LOCKDOWN_PERF normally prevents access to kernel
addresses via PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR, but due to this bug kernel addresses
are also exposed via PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_USER which is permitted under
LOCKDOWN_PERF. I have not attempted to write exploit code.
5. Much of the tracing infrastructure allows access to user registers. I have
not attempted to determine which forms of tracing allow access to user
registers without already allowing access to kernel registers.
Fixes: 7db91e57a0 ("RISC-V: Task implementation")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stefan O'Rear <sorear@fastmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240327061258.2370291-1-sorear@fastmail.com
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d080a08b06 upstream.
These macros did not initialize __kr_err, so they could fail even if
the access did not fault.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d464118cdc ("riscv: implement __get_kernel_nofault and __put_user_nofault")
Signed-off-by: Samuel Holland <samuel.holland@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Jenkins <charlie@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240312022030.320789-1-samuel.holland@sifive.com
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 378ca2d2ad upstream.
Align system call table on 8 bytes. With sys_call_table entry size
of 8 bytes that eliminates the possibility of a system call pointer
crossing cache line boundary.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Suggested-by: Ulrich Weigand <ulrich.weigand@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sumanth Korikkar <sumanthk@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 65291dcfcf upstream.
folio_is_secretmem() currently relies on secretmem folios being LRU
folios, to save some cycles.
However, folios might reside in a folio batch without the LRU flag set, or
temporarily have their LRU flag cleared. Consequently, the LRU flag is
unreliable for this purpose.
In particular, this is the case when secretmem_fault() allocates a fresh
page and calls filemap_add_folio()->folio_add_lru(). The folio might be
added to the per-cpu folio batch and won't get the LRU flag set until the
batch was drained using e.g., lru_add_drain().
Consequently, folio_is_secretmem() might not detect secretmem folios and
GUP-fast can succeed in grabbing a secretmem folio, crashing the kernel
when we would later try reading/writing to the folio, because the folio
has been unmapped from the directmap.
Fix it by removing that unreliable check.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240326143210.291116-2-david@redhat.com
Fixes: 1507f51255 ("mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas")
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reported-by: xingwei lee <xrivendell7@gmail.com>
Reported-by: yue sun <samsun1006219@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CABOYnLyevJeravW=QrH0JUPYEcDN160aZFb7kwndm-J2rmz0HQ@mail.gmail.com/
Debugged-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Tested-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b017a0cea6 upstream.
The SVE register sets have two different formats, one of which is a wrapped
version of the standard FPSIMD register set and another with actual SVE
register data. At present we check TIF_SVE to see if full SVE register
state should be provided when reading the SVE regset but if we were in a
syscall we may have saved only floating point registers even though that is
set.
Fix this and simplify the logic by checking and using the format which we
recorded when deciding if we should use FPSIMD or SVE format.
Fixes: 8c845e2731 ("arm64/sve: Leave SVE enabled on syscall if we don't context switch")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 6.2.x
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240325-arm64-ptrace-fp-type-v1-1-8dc846caf11f@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c27fa53b85 upstream.
The RISC-V Vector specification states in "Appendix D: Calling
Convention for Vector State" [1] that "Executing a system call causes
all caller-saved vector registers (v0-v31, vl, vtype) and vstart to
become unspecified.". In the RISC-V kernel this is called "discarding
the vstate".
Returning from a signal handler via the rt_sigreturn() syscall, vector
discard is also performed. However, this is not an issue since the
vector state should be restored from the sigcontext, and therefore not
care about the vector discard.
The "live state" is the actual vector register in the running context,
and the "vstate" is the vector state of the task. A dirty live state,
means that the vstate and live state are not in synch.
When vectorized user_from_copy() was introduced, an bug sneaked in at
the restoration code, related to the discard of the live state.
An example when this go wrong:
1. A userland application is executing vector code
2. The application receives a signal, and the signal handler is
entered.
3. The application returns from the signal handler, using the
rt_sigreturn() syscall.
4. The live vector state is discarded upon entering the
rt_sigreturn(), and the live state is marked as "dirty", indicating
that the live state need to be synchronized with the current
vstate.
5. rt_sigreturn() restores the vstate, except the Vector registers,
from the sigcontext
6. rt_sigreturn() restores the Vector registers, from the sigcontext,
and now the vectorized user_from_copy() is used. The dirty live
state from the discard is saved to the vstate, making the vstate
corrupt.
7. rt_sigreturn() returns to the application, which crashes due to
corrupted vstate.
Note that the vectorized user_from_copy() is invoked depending on the
value of CONFIG_RISCV_ISA_V_UCOPY_THRESHOLD. Default is 768, which
means that vlen has to be larger than 128b for this bug to trigger.
The fix is simply to mark the live state as non-dirty/clean prior
performing the vstate restore.
Link: https://github.com/riscv/riscv-isa-manual/releases/download/riscv-isa-release-8abdb41-2024-03-26/unpriv-isa-asciidoc.pdf # [1]
Reported-by: Charlie Jenkins <charlie@rivosinc.com>
Reported-by: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@kernel.org>
Fixes: c2a658d419 ("riscv: lib: vectorize copy_to_user/copy_from_user")
Signed-off-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Chiu <andy.chiu@sifive.com>
Tested-by: Vineet Gupta <vineetg@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240403072638.567446-1-bjorn@kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 312be9fc22 upstream.
The MSR_PEBS_DATA_CFG MSR register is used to configure which data groups
should be generated into a PEBS record, and it's shared among all counters.
If there are different configurations among counters, perf combines all the
configurations.
The first perf command as below requires a complete PEBS record
(including memory info, GPRs, XMMs, and LBRs). The second perf command
only requires a basic group. However, after the second perf command is
running, the MSR_PEBS_DATA_CFG register is cleared. Only a basic group is
generated in a PEBS record, which is wrong. The required information
for the first perf command is missed.
$ perf record --intr-regs=AX,SP,XMM0 -a -C 8 -b -W -d -c 100000003 -o /dev/null -e cpu/event=0xd0,umask=0x81/upp &
$ sleep 5
$ perf record --per-thread -c 1 -e cycles:pp --no-timestamp --no-tid taskset -c 8 ./noploop 1000
The first PEBS event is a system-wide PEBS event. The second PEBS event
is a per-thread event. When the thread is scheduled out, the
intel_pmu_pebs_del() function is invoked to update the PEBS state.
Since the system-wide event is still available, the cpuc->n_pebs is 1.
The cpuc->pebs_data_cfg is cleared. The data configuration for the
system-wide PEBS event is lost.
The (cpuc->n_pebs == 1) check was introduced in commit:
b6a32f023f ("perf/x86: Fix PEBS threshold initialization")
At that time, it indeed didn't hurt whether the state was updated
during the removal, because only the threshold is updated.
The calculation of the threshold takes the last PEBS event into
account.
However, since commit:
b752ea0c28 ("perf/x86/intel/ds: Flush PEBS DS when changing PEBS_DATA_CFG")
we delay the threshold update, and clear the PEBS data config, which triggers
the bug.
The PEBS data config update scope should not be shrunk during removal.
[ mingo: Improved the changelog & comments. ]
Fixes: b752ea0c28 ("perf/x86/intel/ds: Flush PEBS DS when changing PEBS_DATA_CFG")
Reported-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240401133320.703971-1-kan.liang@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>