Before we create any files to bind-mount on, make sure they are
inside the container rootfs, handling for instance absolute symbolic
links inside the container.
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Alexander Larsson <alexl@redhat.com> (github: alexlarsson)
All modern distros set up /run to be a tmpfs, see for instance:
https://wiki.debian.org/ReleaseGoals/RunDirectory
Its a very useful place to store pid-files, sockets and other things
that only live at runtime and that should not be stored in the image.
This is also useful when running systemd inside a container, as it
will try to mount /run if not already mounted, which will fail for
non-privileged container.
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Alexander Larsson <alexl@redhat.com> (github: alexlarsson)
If you specify a bind mount in a place that doesn't have a file yet we
create that (and parent directories). This is needed because otherwise
you can't use volumes like e.g. /dev/log, as that gets covered by the
/dev tmpfs mounts.
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Alexander Larsson <alexl@redhat.com> (github: alexlarsson)
This is a convenience for callers which are only interested in one value
per key. Similar to how HTTP headers allow multiple keys per value, but
are often used to store and retrieve only one value.
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Solomon Hykes <solomon@docker.com> (github: shykes)
This introduces a superficial change to the Beam API:
* `beam.SendPipe` is renamed to the more accurate `beam.SendRPipe`
* `beam.SendWPipe` is introduced as a mirror to `SendRPipe`
There is no other change in the beam API.
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Solomon Hykes <solomon@docker.com> (github: shykes)
Update restrict.Restrict to both show the error message when failing to mount /dev/null over /proc/kcore, and to ignore "not exists" errors while doing so (for when CONFIG_PROC_KCORE=n in the kernel)
This patch fixes the fact that the tests for pkg/networkfs/etchosts
couldn't build due to syntax errors.
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> (github: cyphar)
This updates systemd.Apply to match the fs backend by:
* Always join blockio controller (for stats)
* Support CpusetCpus
* Support MemorySwap
Also, it removes the generic UnitProperties in favour of a single
option to set the slice.
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Alexander Larsson <alexl@redhat.com> (github: alexlarsson)
We don't have the flexibility to do extra things with lxc because it is
a black box and most fo the magic happens before we get a chance to
interact with it in dockerinit.
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Michael Crosby <michael@crosbymichael.com> (github: crosbymichael)
There is not need for the remount hack, we use aa_change_onexec so the
apparmor profile is not applied until we exec the users app.
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Michael Crosby <michael@crosbymichael.com> (github: crosbymichael)
This also cleans up some of the left over restriction paths code from
before.
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Michael Crosby <michael@crosbymichael.com> (github: crosbymichael)
It has been pointed out that some files in /proc and /sys can be used
to break out of containers. However, if those filesystems are mounted
read-only, most of the known exploits are mitigated, since they rely
on writing some file in those filesystems.
This does not replace security modules (like SELinux or AppArmor), it
is just another layer of security. Likewise, it doesn't mean that the
other mitigations (shadowing parts of /proc or /sys with bind mounts)
are useless. Those measures are still useful. As such, the shadowing
of /proc/kcore is still enabled with both LXC and native drivers.
Special care has to be taken with /proc/1/attr, which still needs to
be mounted read-write in order to enable the AppArmor profile. It is
bind-mounted from a private read-write mount of procfs.
All that enforcement is done in dockerinit. The code doing the real
work is in libcontainer. The init function for the LXC driver calls
the function from libcontainer to avoid code duplication.
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Jérôme Petazzoni <jerome@docker.com> (github: jpetazzo)
Kernel capabilities for privileged syslog operations are currently splitted into
CAP_SYS_ADMIN and CAP_SYSLOG since the following commit:
http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=ce6ada35bdf710d16582cc4869c26722547e6f11
This patch drops CAP_SYSLOG to prevent containers from messing with
host's syslog (e.g. `dmesg -c` clears up host's printk ring buffer).
Closes#5491
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Eiichi Tsukata <devel@etsukata.com> (github: Etsukata)
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Michael Crosby <michael@crosbymichael.com> (github: crosbymichael)
This is needed for Send/Recieve to correctly handle borders between
the messages.
The framing uses a single 32bit uint32 length for each frame, of which
the high bit is used to indicate whether the message contains a file
descriptor or not. This is enough to separate out each message sent
and to decide to which message each file descriptors belongs, even
though multiple Sends may be coalesced into a single read, and/or one
Send can be split into multiple writes.
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Alexander Larsson <alexl@redhat.com> (github: alexlarsson)
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Solomon Hykes <solomon@docker.com> (github: shykes)
No need to duplicate this information when we already have a
container.json file in the root of libcontainer
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Michael Crosby <michael@crosbymichael.com> (github: crosbymichael)
