In ondemand mode, when the daemon is processing an open request, if the
kernel flags the cache as CACHEFILES_DEAD, the cachefiles_daemon_write()
will always return -EIO, so the daemon can't pass the copen to the kernel.
Then the kernel process that is waiting for the copen triggers a hung_task.
Since the DEAD state is irreversible, it can only be exited by closing
/dev/cachefiles. Therefore, after calling cachefiles_io_error() to mark
the cache as CACHEFILES_DEAD, if in ondemand mode, flush all requests to
avoid the above hungtask. We may still be able to read some of the cached
data before closing the fd of /dev/cachefiles.
Note that this relies on the patch that adds reference counting to the req,
otherwise it may UAF.
Fixes: c838305450 ("cachefiles: notify the user daemon when looking up cookie")
Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240522114308.2402121-12-libaokun@huaweicloud.com
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
If copen is maliciously called in the user mode, it may delete the request
corresponding to the random id. And the request may have not been read yet.
Note that when the object is set to reopen, the open request will be done
with the still reopen state in above case. As a result, the request
corresponding to this object is always skipped in select_req function, so
the read request is never completed and blocks other process.
Fix this issue by simply set object to close if its id < 0 in copen.
Signed-off-by: Zizhi Wo <wozizhi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240522114308.2402121-11-libaokun@huaweicloud.com
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jia Zhu <zhujia.zj@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
After installing the anonymous fd, we can now see it in userland and close
it. However, at this point we may not have gotten the reference count of
the cache, but we will put it during colse fd, so this may cause a cache
UAF.
So grab the cache reference count before fd_install(). In addition, by
kernel convention, fd is taken over by the user land after fd_install(),
and the kernel should not call close_fd() after that, i.e., it should call
fd_install() after everything is ready, thus fd_install() is called after
copy_to_user() succeeds.
Fixes: c838305450 ("cachefiles: notify the user daemon when looking up cookie")
Suggested-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240522114308.2402121-10-libaokun@huaweicloud.com
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Now every time the daemon reads an open request, it gets a new anonymous fd
and ondemand_id. With the introduction of "restore", it is possible to read
the same open request more than once, and therefore an object can have more
than one anonymous fd.
If the anonymous fd is not unique, the following concurrencies will result
in an fd leak:
t1 | t2 | t3
------------------------------------------------------------
cachefiles_ondemand_init_object
cachefiles_ondemand_send_req
REQ_A = kzalloc(sizeof(*req) + data_len)
wait_for_completion(&REQ_A->done)
cachefiles_daemon_read
cachefiles_ondemand_daemon_read
REQ_A = cachefiles_ondemand_select_req
cachefiles_ondemand_get_fd
load->fd = fd0
ondemand_id = object_id0
------ restore ------
cachefiles_ondemand_restore
// restore REQ_A
cachefiles_daemon_read
cachefiles_ondemand_daemon_read
REQ_A = cachefiles_ondemand_select_req
cachefiles_ondemand_get_fd
load->fd = fd1
ondemand_id = object_id1
process_open_req(REQ_A)
write(devfd, ("copen %u,%llu", msg->msg_id, size))
cachefiles_ondemand_copen
xa_erase(&cache->reqs, id)
complete(&REQ_A->done)
kfree(REQ_A)
process_open_req(REQ_A)
// copen fails due to no req
// daemon close(fd1)
cachefiles_ondemand_fd_release
// set object closed
-- umount --
cachefiles_withdraw_cookie
cachefiles_ondemand_clean_object
cachefiles_ondemand_init_close_req
if (!cachefiles_ondemand_object_is_open(object))
return -ENOENT;
// The fd0 is not closed until the daemon exits.
However, the anonymous fd holds the reference count of the object and the
object holds the reference count of the cookie. So even though the cookie
has been relinquished, it will not be unhashed and freed until the daemon
exits.
In fscache_hash_cookie(), when the same cookie is found in the hash list,
if the cookie is set with the FSCACHE_COOKIE_RELINQUISHED bit, then the new
cookie waits for the old cookie to be unhashed, while the old cookie is
waiting for the leaked fd to be closed, if the daemon does not exit in time
it will trigger a hung task.
To avoid this, allocate a new anonymous fd only if no anonymous fd has
been allocated (ondemand_id == 0) or if the previously allocated anonymous
fd has been closed (ondemand_id == -1). Moreover, returns an error if
ondemand_id is valid, letting the daemon know that the current userland
restore logic is abnormal and needs to be checked.
Fixes: c838305450 ("cachefiles: notify the user daemon when looking up cookie")
Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240522114308.2402121-9-libaokun@huaweicloud.com
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
The following concurrency may cause a read request to fail to be completed
and result in a hung:
t1 | t2
---------------------------------------------------------
cachefiles_ondemand_copen
req = xa_erase(&cache->reqs, id)
// Anon fd is maliciously closed.
cachefiles_ondemand_fd_release
xa_lock(&cache->reqs)
cachefiles_ondemand_set_object_close(object)
xa_unlock(&cache->reqs)
cachefiles_ondemand_set_object_open
// No one will ever close it again.
cachefiles_ondemand_daemon_read
cachefiles_ondemand_select_req
// Get a read req but its fd is already closed.
// The daemon can't issue a cread ioctl with an closed fd, then hung.
So add spin_lock for cachefiles_ondemand_info to protect ondemand_id and
state, thus we can avoid the above problem in cachefiles_ondemand_copen()
by using ondemand_id to determine if fd has been closed.
Fixes: c838305450 ("cachefiles: notify the user daemon when looking up cookie")
Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240522114308.2402121-8-libaokun@huaweicloud.com
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
This prevents malicious processes from completing random copen/cread
requests and crashing the system. Added checks are listed below:
* Generic, copen can only complete open requests, and cread can only
complete read requests.
* For copen, ondemand_id must not be 0, because this indicates that the
request has not been read by the daemon.
* For cread, the object corresponding to fd and req should be the same.
Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240522114308.2402121-7-libaokun@huaweicloud.com
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jingbo Xu <jefflexu@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
The err_put_fd label is only used once, so remove it to make the code
more readable. In addition, the logic for deleting error request and
CLOSE request is merged to simplify the code.
Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240522114308.2402121-6-libaokun@huaweicloud.com
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jia Zhu <zhujia.zj@bytedance.com>
Reviewed-by: Gao Xiang <hsiangkao@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Jingbo Xu <jefflexu@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
We got the following issue in a fuzz test of randomly issuing the restore
command:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in cachefiles_ondemand_daemon_read+0xb41/0xb60
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888122e84088 by task ondemand-04-dae/963
CPU: 13 PID: 963 Comm: ondemand-04-dae Not tainted 6.8.0-dirty #564
Call Trace:
kasan_report+0x93/0xc0
cachefiles_ondemand_daemon_read+0xb41/0xb60
vfs_read+0x169/0xb50
ksys_read+0xf5/0x1e0
Allocated by task 116:
kmem_cache_alloc+0x140/0x3a0
cachefiles_lookup_cookie+0x140/0xcd0
fscache_cookie_state_machine+0x43c/0x1230
[...]
Freed by task 792:
kmem_cache_free+0xfe/0x390
cachefiles_put_object+0x241/0x480
fscache_cookie_state_machine+0x5c8/0x1230
[...]
==================================================================
Following is the process that triggers the issue:
mount | daemon_thread1 | daemon_thread2
------------------------------------------------------------
cachefiles_withdraw_cookie
cachefiles_ondemand_clean_object(object)
cachefiles_ondemand_send_req
REQ_A = kzalloc(sizeof(*req) + data_len)
wait_for_completion(&REQ_A->done)
cachefiles_daemon_read
cachefiles_ondemand_daemon_read
REQ_A = cachefiles_ondemand_select_req
msg->object_id = req->object->ondemand->ondemand_id
------ restore ------
cachefiles_ondemand_restore
xas_for_each(&xas, req, ULONG_MAX)
xas_set_mark(&xas, CACHEFILES_REQ_NEW)
cachefiles_daemon_read
cachefiles_ondemand_daemon_read
REQ_A = cachefiles_ondemand_select_req
copy_to_user(_buffer, msg, n)
xa_erase(&cache->reqs, id)
complete(&REQ_A->done)
------ close(fd) ------
cachefiles_ondemand_fd_release
cachefiles_put_object
cachefiles_put_object
kmem_cache_free(cachefiles_object_jar, object)
REQ_A->object->ondemand->ondemand_id
// object UAF !!!
When we see the request within xa_lock, req->object must not have been
freed yet, so grab the reference count of object before xa_unlock to
avoid the above issue.
Fixes: 0a7e54c195 ("cachefiles: resend an open request if the read request's object is closed")
Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240522114308.2402121-5-libaokun@huaweicloud.com
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jia Zhu <zhujia.zj@bytedance.com>
Reviewed-by: Jingbo Xu <jefflexu@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
We got the following issue in a fuzz test of randomly issuing the restore
command:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in cachefiles_ondemand_daemon_read+0x609/0xab0
Write of size 4 at addr ffff888109164a80 by task ondemand-04-dae/4962
CPU: 11 PID: 4962 Comm: ondemand-04-dae Not tainted 6.8.0-rc7-dirty #542
Call Trace:
kasan_report+0x94/0xc0
cachefiles_ondemand_daemon_read+0x609/0xab0
vfs_read+0x169/0xb50
ksys_read+0xf5/0x1e0
Allocated by task 626:
__kmalloc+0x1df/0x4b0
cachefiles_ondemand_send_req+0x24d/0x690
cachefiles_create_tmpfile+0x249/0xb30
cachefiles_create_file+0x6f/0x140
cachefiles_look_up_object+0x29c/0xa60
cachefiles_lookup_cookie+0x37d/0xca0
fscache_cookie_state_machine+0x43c/0x1230
[...]
Freed by task 626:
kfree+0xf1/0x2c0
cachefiles_ondemand_send_req+0x568/0x690
cachefiles_create_tmpfile+0x249/0xb30
cachefiles_create_file+0x6f/0x140
cachefiles_look_up_object+0x29c/0xa60
cachefiles_lookup_cookie+0x37d/0xca0
fscache_cookie_state_machine+0x43c/0x1230
[...]
==================================================================
Following is the process that triggers the issue:
mount | daemon_thread1 | daemon_thread2
------------------------------------------------------------
cachefiles_ondemand_init_object
cachefiles_ondemand_send_req
REQ_A = kzalloc(sizeof(*req) + data_len)
wait_for_completion(&REQ_A->done)
cachefiles_daemon_read
cachefiles_ondemand_daemon_read
REQ_A = cachefiles_ondemand_select_req
cachefiles_ondemand_get_fd
copy_to_user(_buffer, msg, n)
process_open_req(REQ_A)
------ restore ------
cachefiles_ondemand_restore
xas_for_each(&xas, req, ULONG_MAX)
xas_set_mark(&xas, CACHEFILES_REQ_NEW);
cachefiles_daemon_read
cachefiles_ondemand_daemon_read
REQ_A = cachefiles_ondemand_select_req
write(devfd, ("copen %u,%llu", msg->msg_id, size));
cachefiles_ondemand_copen
xa_erase(&cache->reqs, id)
complete(&REQ_A->done)
kfree(REQ_A)
cachefiles_ondemand_get_fd(REQ_A)
fd = get_unused_fd_flags
file = anon_inode_getfile
fd_install(fd, file)
load = (void *)REQ_A->msg.data;
load->fd = fd;
// load UAF !!!
This issue is caused by issuing a restore command when the daemon is still
alive, which results in a request being processed multiple times thus
triggering a UAF. So to avoid this problem, add an additional reference
count to cachefiles_req, which is held while waiting and reading, and then
released when the waiting and reading is over.
Note that since there is only one reference count for waiting, we need to
avoid the same request being completed multiple times, so we can only
complete the request if it is successfully removed from the xarray.
Fixes: e73fa11a35 ("cachefiles: add restore command to recover inflight ondemand read requests")
Suggested-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240522114308.2402121-4-libaokun@huaweicloud.com
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jia Zhu <zhujia.zj@bytedance.com>
Reviewed-by: Jingbo Xu <jefflexu@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Even with CACHEFILES_DEAD set, we can still read the requests, so in the
following concurrency the request may be used after it has been freed:
mount | daemon_thread1 | daemon_thread2
------------------------------------------------------------
cachefiles_ondemand_init_object
cachefiles_ondemand_send_req
REQ_A = kzalloc(sizeof(*req) + data_len)
wait_for_completion(&REQ_A->done)
cachefiles_daemon_read
cachefiles_ondemand_daemon_read
// close dev fd
cachefiles_flush_reqs
complete(&REQ_A->done)
kfree(REQ_A)
xa_lock(&cache->reqs);
cachefiles_ondemand_select_req
req->msg.opcode != CACHEFILES_OP_READ
// req use-after-free !!!
xa_unlock(&cache->reqs);
xa_destroy(&cache->reqs)
Hence remove requests from cache->reqs when flushing them to avoid
accessing freed requests.
Fixes: c838305450 ("cachefiles: notify the user daemon when looking up cookie")
Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240522114308.2402121-3-libaokun@huaweicloud.com
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jia Zhu <zhujia.zj@bytedance.com>
Reviewed-by: Gao Xiang <hsiangkao@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Jingbo Xu <jefflexu@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
This lets us see the correct trace output.
Fixes: c838305450 ("cachefiles: notify the user daemon when looking up cookie")
Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240522114308.2402121-2-libaokun@huaweicloud.com
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jingbo Xu <jefflexu@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
This reverts commit b8995a1841.
Ard managed to reproduce the dm-crypt corruption problem and got to the
bottom of it, so re-apply the problematic patch in preparation for
fixing things properly.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
When CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE=n, we fail to add necessary padding bytes
to bug_table entries, and as a result the last entry in a bug table will
be ignored, potentially leading to an unexpected panic(). All prior
entries in the table will be handled correctly.
The arm64 ABI requires that struct fields of up to 8 bytes are
naturally-aligned, with padding added within a struct such that struct
are suitably aligned within arrays.
When CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERPOSE=y, the layout of a bug_entry is:
struct bug_entry {
signed int bug_addr_disp; // 4 bytes
signed int file_disp; // 4 bytes
unsigned short line; // 2 bytes
unsigned short flags; // 2 bytes
}
... with 12 bytes total, requiring 4-byte alignment.
When CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE=n, the layout of a bug_entry is:
struct bug_entry {
signed int bug_addr_disp; // 4 bytes
unsigned short flags; // 2 bytes
< implicit padding > // 2 bytes
}
... with 8 bytes total, with 6 bytes of data and 2 bytes of trailing
padding, requiring 4-byte alginment.
When we create a bug_entry in assembly, we align the start of the entry
to 4 bytes, which implicitly handles padding for any prior entries.
However, we do not align the end of the entry, and so when
CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE=n, the final entry lacks the trailing padding
bytes.
For the main kernel image this is not a problem as find_bug() doesn't
depend on the trailing padding bytes when searching for entries:
for (bug = __start___bug_table; bug < __stop___bug_table; ++bug)
if (bugaddr == bug_addr(bug))
return bug;
However for modules, module_bug_finalize() depends on the trailing
bytes when calculating the number of entries:
mod->num_bugs = sechdrs[i].sh_size / sizeof(struct bug_entry);
... and as the last bug_entry lacks the necessary padding bytes, this entry
will not be counted, e.g. in the case of a single entry:
sechdrs[i].sh_size == 6
sizeof(struct bug_entry) == 8;
sechdrs[i].sh_size / sizeof(struct bug_entry) == 0;
Consequently module_find_bug() will miss the last bug_entry when it does:
for (i = 0; i < mod->num_bugs; ++i, ++bug)
if (bugaddr == bug_addr(bug))
goto out;
... which can lead to a kenrel panic due to an unhandled bug.
This can be demonstrated with the following module:
static int __init buginit(void)
{
WARN(1, "hello\n");
return 0;
}
static void __exit bugexit(void)
{
}
module_init(buginit);
module_exit(bugexit);
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
... which will trigger a kernel panic when loaded:
------------[ cut here ]------------
hello
Unexpected kernel BRK exception at EL1
Internal error: BRK handler: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in: hello(O+)
CPU: 0 PID: 50 Comm: insmod Tainted: G O 6.9.1 #8
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : buginit+0x18/0x1000 [hello]
lr : buginit+0x18/0x1000 [hello]
sp : ffff800080533ae0
x29: ffff800080533ae0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000
x26: ffffaba8c4e70510 x25: ffff800080533c30 x24: ffffaba8c4a28a58
x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffff3947c0eab3c0
x20: ffffaba8c4e3f000 x19: ffffaba846464000 x18: 0000000000000006
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffaba8c2492834 x15: 0720072007200720
x14: 0720072007200720 x13: ffffaba8c49b27c8 x12: 0000000000000312
x11: 0000000000000106 x10: ffffaba8c4a0a7c8 x9 : ffffaba8c49b27c8
x8 : 00000000ffffefff x7 : ffffaba8c4a0a7c8 x6 : 80000000fffff000
x5 : 0000000000000107 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000
x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff3947c0eab3c0
Call trace:
buginit+0x18/0x1000 [hello]
do_one_initcall+0x80/0x1c8
do_init_module+0x60/0x218
load_module+0x1ba4/0x1d70
__do_sys_init_module+0x198/0x1d0
__arm64_sys_init_module+0x1c/0x28
invoke_syscall+0x48/0x114
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0
do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28
el0_svc+0x34/0xd8
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x12c
el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194
Code: d0ffffe0 910003fd 91000000 9400000b (d4210000)
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Kernel panic - not syncing: BRK handler: Fatal exception
Fix this by always aligning the end of a bug_entry to 4 bytes, which is
correct regardless of CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE.
Fixes: 9fb7410f95 ("arm64/BUG: Use BRK instruction for generic BUG traps")
Signed-off-by: Yuanbin Xie <xieyuanbin1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiangfeng Xiao <xiaojiangfeng@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1716212077-43826-1-git-send-email-xiaojiangfeng@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
for_each_sibling_event() checks leader's ctx but it doesn't have the ctx
yet if it's the leader. Like in perf_event_validate_size(), we should
skip checking siblings in that case.
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Fixes: f3c0eba287 ("perf: Add a few assertions")
Reported-by: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Cc: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Cc: Tuan Phan <tuanphan@os.amperecomputing.com>
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240514180050.182454-1-namhyung@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
This reverts commit 2632e25217.
Johannes (and others) report data corruption with dm-crypt on Apple M1
which has been bisected to this change. Revert the offending commit
while we figure out what's going on.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Johannes Nixdorf <mixi@shadowice.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/D1B7GPIR9K1E.5JFV37G0YTIF@shadowice.org/
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cortex-X4 and Neoverse-V3 suffer from errata whereby an MSR to the SSBS
special-purpose register does not affect subsequent speculative
instructions, permitting speculative store bypassing for a window of
time. This is described in their Software Developer Errata Notice (SDEN)
documents:
* Cortex-X4 SDEN v8.0, erratum 3194386:
https://developer.arm.com/documentation/SDEN-2432808/0800/
* Neoverse-V3 SDEN v6.0, erratum 3312417:
https://developer.arm.com/documentation/SDEN-2891958/0600/
To workaround these errata, it is necessary to place a speculation
barrier (SB) after MSR to the SSBS special-purpose register. This patch
adds the requisite SB after writes to SSBS within the kernel, and hides
the presence of SSBS from EL0 such that userspace software which cares
about SSBS will manipulate this via prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL, ...).
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240508081400.235362-5-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Add cputype definitions for Neoverse-V3. These will be used for errata
detection in subsequent patches.
These values can be found in Table B-249 ("MIDR_EL1 bit descriptions")
in issue 0001-04 of the Neoverse-V3 TRM, which can be found at:
https://developer.arm.com/documentation/107734/0001/?lang=en
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240508081400.235362-4-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Add cputype definitions for Cortex-X4. These will be used for errata
detection in subsequent patches.
These values can be found in Table B-249 ("MIDR_EL1 bit descriptions")
in issue 0002-05 of the Cortex-X4 TRM, which can be found at:
https://developer.arm.com/documentation/102484/0002/?lang=en
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240508081400.235362-3-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Upcoming errata workarounds will need to use SB from C code. Restore the
spec_bar() macro so that we can use SB.
This is effectively a revert of commit:
4f30ba1cce ("arm64: barrier: Remove spec_bar() macro")
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240508081400.235362-2-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
* for-next/misc:
arm64: simplify arch_static_branch/_jump function
arm64: Add the arm64.no32bit_el0 command line option
arm64: defer clearing DAIF.D
arm64: assembler: update stale comment for disable_step_tsk
arm64/sysreg: Update PIE permission encodings
arm64: Add Neoverse-V2 part
arm64: Remove unnecessary irqflags alternative.h include
The recent change to use pud_valid() as part of the implementation of
pud_user_accessible_page() fails to build when PGTABLE_LEVELS <= 2
because pud_valid() is not defined in that case.
Fix this by defining pud_valid() to false for this case. This means that
pud_user_accessible_page() will correctly always return false for this
config.
Fixes: f0f5863a0f ("arm64/mm: Remove PTE_PROT_NONE bit")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202405082221.43rfWxz5-lkp@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240509122844.563320-1-ryan.roberts@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Let's use the newly-free PTE SW bit (58) to add support for uffd-wp.
The standard handlers are implemented for set/test/clear for both pte
and pmd. Additionally we must also track the uffd-wp state as a pte swp
bit, so use a free swap pte bit (3).
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240503144604.151095-5-ryan.roberts@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
PTE_PRESENT_INVALID was previously occupying bit 59, which when a PTE is
valid can either be IGNORED, PBHA[0] or AttrIndex[3], depending on the
HW configuration. In practice this is currently not a problem because
PTE_PRESENT_INVALID can only be 1 when PTE_VALID=0 and upstream Linux
always requires the bit set to 0 for a valid pte.
However, if in future Linux wants to use the field (e.g. AttrIndex[3])
then we could end up with confusion when PTE_PRESENT_INVALID comes along
and corrupts the field - we would ideally want to preserve it even for
an invalid (but present) pte.
The other problem with bit 59 is that it prevents the offset field of a
swap entry within a swap pte from growing beyond 51 bits. By moving
PTE_PRESENT_INVALID to a low bit we can lay the swap pte out so that the
offset field could grow to 52 bits in future.
So let's move PTE_PRESENT_INVALID to overlay PTE_NG (bit 11).
There is no need to persist NG for a present-invalid entry; it is always
set for user mappings and is not used by SW to derive any state from the
pte. PTE_NS was considered instead of PTE_NG, but it is RES0 for
non-secure SW, so there is a chance that future architecture may
allocate the bit and we may therefore need to persist that bit for
present-invalid ptes.
These are both marginal benefits, but make things a bit tidier in my
opinion.
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240503144604.151095-4-ryan.roberts@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Currently the PTE_PRESENT_INVALID and PTE_PROT_NONE functionality
explicitly occupy 2 bits in the PTE when PTE_VALID/PMD_SECT_VALID is
clear. This has 2 significant consequences:
- PTE_PROT_NONE consumes a precious SW PTE bit that could be used for
other things.
- The swap pte layout must reserve those same 2 bits and ensure they
are both always zero for a swap pte. It would be nice to reclaim at
least one of those bits.
But PTE_PRESENT_INVALID, which since the previous patch, applies
uniformly to page/block descriptors at any level when PTE_VALID is
clear, can already give us most of what PTE_PROT_NONE requires: If it is
set, then the pte is still considered present; pte_present() returns
true and all the fields in the pte follow the HW interpretation (e.g. SW
can safely call pte_pfn(), etc). But crucially, the HW treats the pte as
invalid and will fault if it hits.
So let's remove PTE_PROT_NONE entirely and instead represent PROT_NONE
as a present but invalid pte (PTE_VALID=0, PTE_PRESENT_INVALID=1) with
PTE_USER=0 and PTE_UXN=1. This is a unique combination that is not used
anywhere else.
The net result is a clearer, simpler, more generic encoding scheme that
applies uniformly to all levels. Additionally we free up a PTE SW bit
and a swap pte bit (bit 58 in both cases).
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240503144604.151095-3-ryan.roberts@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
As preparation for the next patch, which frees up the PTE_PROT_NONE
present pte and swap pte bit, generalize PMD_PRESENT_INVALID to
PTE_PRESENT_INVALID. This will then be used to mark PROT_NONE ptes (and
entries at any other level) in the next patch.
While we're at it, fix up the swap pte format comment to include
PTE_PRESENT_INVALID. This is not new, it just wasn't previously
documented.
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240503144604.151095-2-ryan.roberts@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Extracted the jump table definition code from the arch_static_branch and
arch_static_branch_jump functions into a macro JUMP_TABLE_ENTRY to reduce
code duplication.
Signed-off-by: George Guo <guodongtai@kylinos.cn>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240430085655.2798551-2-dongtai.guo@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Currently, userstacktrace is unsupported for ftrace and uprobe
tracers on arm64. This patch uses the perf_callchain_user() code
as blueprint to implement the arch_stack_walk_user() which add
userstacktrace support on arm64.
Meanwhile, we can use arch_stack_walk_user() to simplify the
implementation of perf_callchain_user().
This patch is tested pass with ftrace, uprobe and perf tracers
profiling userstacktrace cases.
Tested-by: chenqiwu <qiwu.chen@transsion.com>
Signed-off-by: chenqiwu <qiwu.chen@transsion.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231219022229.10230-1-qiwu.chen@transsion.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Introducing the field 'el0' to the idreg-override for register
ID_AA64PFR0_EL1. This field is also aliased to the new kernel
command line option 'arm64.no32bit_el0' as a more recognizable
and mnemonic name to disable the execution of 32 bit userspace
applications (i.e. avoid Aarch32 execution state in EL0) from
kernel command line.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240207105847.7739-1-andrea.porta@suse.com/
Signed-off-by: Andrea della Porta <andrea.porta@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240429102833.6426-1-andrea.porta@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
pci_alloc_irq_vectors() allocates an irq vector. When devm_add_action()
fails, the irq vector is not freed, which leads to a memory leak.
Replace the devm_add_action with devm_add_action_or_reset to ensure
the irq vector can be destroyed when it fails.
Fixes: 66637ab137 ("drivers/perf: hisi: add driver for HNS3 PMU")
Signed-off-by: Hao Chen <chenhao418@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Junhao He <hejunhao3@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jijie Shao <shaojijie@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240425124627.13764-4-hejunhao3@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
The perf tool allows users to create event groups through following
cmd [1], but the driver does not check whether the array index is out
of bounds when writing data to the event_group array. If the number of
events in an event_group is greater than HNS3_PMU_MAX_HW_EVENTS, the
memory write overflow of event_group array occurs.
Add array index check to fix the possible array out of bounds violation,
and return directly when write new events are written to array bounds.
There are 9 different events in an event_group.
[1] perf stat -e '{pmu/event1/, ... ,pmu/event9/}
Fixes: 66637ab137 ("drivers/perf: hisi: add driver for HNS3 PMU")
Signed-off-by: Junhao He <hejunhao3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Hao Chen <chenhao418@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jijie Shao <shaojijie@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240425124627.13764-3-hejunhao3@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
The perf tool allows users to create event groups through following
cmd [1], but the driver does not check whether the array index is out of
bounds when writing data to the event_group array. If the number of events
in an event_group is greater than HISI_PCIE_MAX_COUNTERS, the memory write
overflow of event_group array occurs.
Add array index check to fix the possible array out of bounds violation,
and return directly when write new events are written to array bounds.
There are 9 different events in an event_group.
[1] perf stat -e '{pmu/event1/, ... ,pmu/event9/}'
Fixes: 8404b0fbc7 ("drivers/perf: hisi: Add driver for HiSilicon PCIe PMU")
Signed-off-by: Junhao He <hejunhao3@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jijie Shao <shaojijie@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240425124627.13764-2-hejunhao3@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
There is a 'malloc' call, which can be unsuccessful.
This patch will add the malloc failure checking
to avoid possible null dereference and give more information
about test fail reasons.
Signed-off-by: Kunwu Chan <chentao@kylinos.cn>
Reviewed-by: Muhammad Usama Anjum <usama.anjum@collabora.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240423082102.2018886-1-chentao@kylinos.cn
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
For historical reasons we unmask debug exceptions in __cpu_setup(), but
it's not necessary to unmask debug exceptions this early in the
boot/idle entry paths. It would be better to unmask debug exceptions
later in C code as this simplifies the current code and will make it
easier to rework exception masking logic to handle non-DAIF bits in
future (e.g. PSTATE.{ALLINT,PM}).
We started clearing DAIF.D in __cpu_setup() in commit:
2ce39ad151 ("arm64: debug: unmask PSTATE.D earlier")
At the time, we needed to ensure that DAIF.D was clear on the primary
CPU before scheduling and preemption were possible, and chose to do this
in __cpu_setup() so that this occurred in the same place for primary and
secondary CPUs. As we cannot handle debug exceptions this early, we
placed an ISB between initializing MDSCR_EL1 and clearing DAIF.D so that
no exceptions should be triggered.
Subsequently we rewrote the return-from-{idle,suspend} paths to use
__cpu_setup() in commit:
cabe1c81ea ("arm64: Change cpu_resume() to enable mmu early then access sleep_sp by va")
... which allowed for earlier use of the MMU and had the desirable
property of using the same code to reset the CPU in the cold and warm
boot paths. This introduced a bug: DAIF.D was clear while
cpu_do_resume() restored MDSCR_EL1 and other control registers (e.g.
breakpoint/watchpoint control/value registers), and so we could
unexpectedly take debug exceptions.
We fixed that in commit:
744c6c37cc ("arm64: kernel: Fix unmasked debug exceptions when restoring mdscr_el1")
... by having cpu_do_resume() use the `disable_dbg` macro to set DAIF.D
before restoring MDSCR_EL1 and other control registers. This relies on
DAIF.D being subsequently cleared again in cpu_resume().
Subsequently we reworked DAIF masking in commit:
0fbeb31875 ("arm64: explicitly mask all exceptions")
... where we began enforcing a policy that DAIF.D being set implies all
other DAIF bits are set, and so e.g. we cannot take an IRQ while DAIF.D
is set. As part of this the use of `disable_dbg` in cpu_resume() was
replaced with `disable_daif` for consistency with the rest of the
kernel.
These days, there's no need to clear DAIF.D early within __cpu_setup():
* setup_arch() clears DAIF.DA before scheduling and preemption are
possible on the primary CPU, avoiding the problem we we originally
trying to work around.
Note: DAIF.IF get cleared later when interrupts are enabled for the
first time.
* secondary_start_kernel() clears all DAIF bits before scheduling and
preemption are possible on secondary CPUs.
Note: with pseudo-NMI, the PMR is initialized here before any DAIF
bits are cleared. Similar will be necessary for the architectural NMI.
* cpu_suspend() restores all DAIF bits when returning from idle,
ensuring that we don't unexpectedly leave DAIF.D clear or set.
Note: with pseudo-NMI, the PMR is initialized here before DAIF is
cleared. Similar will be necessary for the architectural NMI.
This patch removes the unmasking of debug exceptions from __cpu_setup(),
relying on the above locations to initialize DAIF. This allows some
other cleanups:
* It is no longer necessary for cpu_resume() to explicitly mask debug
(or other) exceptions, as it is always called with all DAIF bits set.
Thus we drop the use of `disable_daif`.
* The `enable_dbg` macro is no longer used, and so is dropped.
* It is no longer necessary to have an ISB immediately after
initializing MDSCR_EL1 in __cpu_setup(), and we can revert to relying
on the context synchronization that occurs when the MMU is enabled
between __cpu_setup() and code which clears DAIF.D
Comments are added to setup_arch() and secondary_start_kernel() to
explain the initial unmasking of the DAIF bits.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240422113523.4070414-3-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
A comment in the disable_step_tsk macro refers to synchronising with
enable_dbg, as historically the entry used enable_dbg to unmask debug
exceptions after disabling single-stepping.
These days the unmasking happens in entry-common.c via
local_daif_restore() or local_daif_inherit(), so the comment is stale.
This logic is likely to chang in future, so it would be best to avoid
referring to those macros specifically.
Update the comment to take this into account, and describe it in terms
of clearing DAIF.D so that it doesn't macro where this logic lives nor
what it is called.
There should be no functional change as a result of this patch.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240422113523.4070414-2-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Fix left shift overflow issue when the parameter idx is greater than or
equal to 8 in the calculation of perm in PIRx_ELx_PERM macro.
Fix this by modifying the encoding to use a long integer type.
Signed-off-by: Shiqi Liu <shiqiliu@hust.edu.cn>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240421063328.29710-1-shiqiliu@hust.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
